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This dissertation examines the role of discourse and domestic structure in the 
diffusion of norms and the conditions under which the policy recommendations of 
transnational advocates transplant to the domestic law of a target state. In particular, it 
examines contemporary episodes of transnational pressure that either succeeded or 
failed to bring a country’s legal commitments more closely in line with the 
constitutive and regulative norms of international society.  
This research challenges mainstream international relations literature on the 
subject, which relies on either a rationalist logic of norm diffusion or the constructivist 
logic of norm localization. In addition, this work expands beyond sociological 
institutionalist literature that leaves largely unexamined the agency of domestic actors 
in the promotion and resistance of normative change. Instead, I explore the 
communicative interactions among transnational actors, domestic reformers, and 
domestic reactionaries (so-called “legal nationalist rebels”) to show that normative 
change is determined not only by coercion or emulation, but also by the discursive 
practices of these actors.  
Through a study of legal development in a civil law state—China—and 
common law state—South Africa—this dissertation demonstrates that transnational 
discourse can both create and block channels for the diffusion of ideas about best 
practices, legitimacy, and perceptions of policy problems. More specifically, it 
 addresses the problematic conflation between discourse and norms by incorporating 
insights from communication theory and social psychology research. By speaking 
interchangeably of  “grafting onto a norm” and “appealing to resonant discourses,” 
norm localization theorists often ignore the observation that the more strongly held a 
belief or deeply engrained a practice, the less an actor can articulate his or her reasons 
for holding that belief or engaging in that practice. It follows that entrenched beliefs 
and practices are especially vulnerable to discursive challenge, whereas contested 
practices are more likely to have already generated an active discourse that can be 
readily employed in their defense. The vulnerability of deeply entrenched norms thus 
suggests that transnational advocates and their domestic counterparts may not be as 
bound by “local values,” as some scholars have suggested, and are instead capable of 
affecting legal rules previously thought too entrenched for reform.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION: DISCOURSE, DOMESTIC POLITICS  
AND THE DIFFUSION OF FOREIGN LAW 
 
 
I. Introduction 
Transnational legal advocates have played a significant part in redefining the 
role of the state in international relations (IR) theory.1 These legal entrepreneurs have 
influenced not only how states trade with one another,2 but also how they fight.3 The 
rise of these actors—and their ability to affect domestic political reform—presents an 
important analytical domain not encompassed by the ontological foundations of 
standard IR theory or even the ontological foundation of the modern state system 
itself.4 States in the contemporary international system are no longer challenged only 
on the battlefield or in the international marketplace, but also in the conferences and 
                                                
1 “Transnational” is understood here as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye described: 
“regular interactions across national boundaries when at leas one actor is a non-state 
agent….” See Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Transnational Relations and 
World Politics,” in Keohane and Nye, eds., Transnational Relations and World 
Politics (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA: 1971), at xii-xvi. A legal 
advocate is understood to mean any policy entrepreneur that employs litigation or 
lobbying of legal actors for the purposes of policy reform. 
2 See, e.g., Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against 
Apartheid (Cornell University Press: 1995); Robert O’Brien, et al., Contesting Global 
Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements 
(Cambridge University Press: 2000).  
3 See, e.g., Peter Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and 
Identity in World Politics (Columbia University Press: 1996); Matthew Evangelista, 
Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War (Cornell 
University Press: 1999); Richard M. Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational 
Civil Society Targets Land Mines,” 52 International Organization 613 (2003); Martha 
Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Cornell University Press: 
1996). 
4 See Smith, 2004. This is not to suggest a decline in the role of the state itself. Some 
scholars suggest that transnational actors have been able to operate successfully only 
with state permission (Huntington, 1973, at 343) and only in relation to the domestic 
political structure of the states (Evangelista, 1999; Risse-Kappen, 1995).  
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courtrooms wherein members of a transnational legal epistemic community teach 
states new norms and best practices.5  
The international exchange of law and the perceived convergence of national 
legal norms brought about by these new actors is a subject of intense controversy in 
many countries. Serving as a powerful political force intertwined with a state’s social 
structure, a national legal system is often considered part of what constitutes a state’s 
national identity.6 Domestic actors thus frequently mobilize to combat foreign 
interpretations of law or proposals for legal reform that appear of foreign origin.7 In 
contemporary international politics, domestic discomfort with the importation of 
foreign law can persist even as domestic actors, in the course of dramatically 
expanded international trade and mobility, are increasingly familiar with the merits of 
certain foreign law.8 Indeed, contemporary efforts to exclude foreign legal norms 
parallel similar episodes of domestic resistance to foreign legal encroachment seen in 
previous historical periods,9 including Irish concern about the import of English law 
                                                
5 See, e.g., E. Haas, 1991; M. Barnett & P. Haas, 1992; Adler, 1998. 
6 See Laura Nader, The Anthropological Study of Law, 67 AMERICAN 
ANTHROPOLOGIST 3, 10 (1965). 
7 See ANTHONY D. SMITH, NATIONAL IDENTITY: ETHNONATIONALISM IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 13–14 (1993). 
8 See, e.g., Andrea Hamann & Hélène Ruiz Fabri, Transnational Networks and 
Constitutionalism, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 481, 498 (2008) (describing the process of 
“constitutional cross-fertilization,” where foreign approaches are imported and 
resisted).  
9 The controversy surrounding the citation of foreign law in U.S. constitutional 
interpretation provides one contemporary example, appearing most recently in the 
confirmation hearings of Justices John Roberts and Samuel Alito, during which both 
maintained that the practice should be proscribed. See Confirmation Hearing on the 
Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005); Confirmation Hearing on 
the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court 
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 
(2006). The opposition of Justices Alito and Roberts is supported by Congressional 
efforts to pass legislation explicitly forbidding the use of foreign law in constitutional 
decisions of the Supreme Court. See, e.g., American Justice for American Citizens 
Act, H.R. 1658, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005); Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 
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and continental opposition to the spread of Teutonic law.10  
Given the sensitive relationship political communities have with their legal 
system, it is argued by some that the only way for advocates to affect change in those 
systems is through grafting a candidate norm onto a preexisting discourse from the 
body politic. In this approach, advocates are limited to what Chinese legal scholar Zhu 
Suli has described as the “native resources” of the political community.11 Reflected in 
the local discourse, these resources are said to be the resonant norms through which 
domestic and transnational advocates can successfully import foreign law.12 The 
theory outlined below explores this dynamic between domestic discourse and 
domestic resistance to the adoption of foreign legal rules. More specifically, it 
addresses the problematic conflation between discourse and norms by incorporating 
insights from communication theory and social psychology research. By speaking 
interchangeably of  “grafting onto a local norm” and “appealing to a resonant 
discourse,”13 the literature on diffusion ignores the observation that the more strongly 
held a belief or deeply engrained a practice, the less an actor can articulate his or her 
reasons for holding that belief or engaging in that practice. It follows that such 
                                                                                                                                       
1070, 109th Cong. §201 (2005); S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. Res. 97, 109th 
Cong. (2005); American Justice for American Citizens Act, H.R. 4118, 108th Cong. 
(2004); Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 3799, 108th Cong. (2004); H. Res. 
568, 108th Cong. (2004); H. Res. 468, 108th Cong. (2003). 
10 See Adam M. Smith, Making Itself at Home: Understanding Foreign Law in 
Domestic Jurisprudence, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 218, 220 (2006). 
11 朱苏力 [Zhu Suli], 送法下乡:中国基层司法制度研究 [Sending Law to the 
Countryside: Research on China’s Basic-Level Judicial System] (China University of 
Political Science and Law: 2000). 
12 Jeffrey Checkel, “Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary 
Europe,” 43 International Studies Quarterly 83 (1999), at 99. 
13 See, e.g., Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear 
and Chemical Weapons Taboos, in Peter J. Katzenstein ed., THE CULTURE OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY (1996), at 114-52; Richard Price, Reversing the Gun Sights: 
Transnational Civil Society Targets Landmines, 52 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 
613 (1998).  
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entrenched beliefs and practices are especially vulnerable to discursive challenge, 
whereas contested practices are more likely to have already generated an active 
discourse that can be readily employed in their defense. The vulnerability of deeply 
entrenched norms thus suggests that transnational advocates and their domestic 
counterparts may not be as bound by “local values” as some scholars have suggested 
and are instead capable of affecting legal rules otherwise thought too entrenched for 
successful reform.  
Through a study of contemporary legal reform and the incorporation of 
insights from comparative legal studies, which too often go underutilized by both 
comparative political scientists and international relations theorists, the research below 
attempts to contribute to the growing body of IR literature by examining the 
circumstances under which foreign advocacy succeeds or fails to bring a target state’s 
legal practices in line with the constitutive and regulative norms of the dominant 
international society.14 To better understand the dynamics of norm diffusion, this study 
attempts to answer two main questions: 1.) To what extent does domestic discourse 
concerning a norm determine the pace and content of reform?; and 2.) To what extent 
does the structure of a state’s legal system affect the vulnerability of that state to 
international and transnational legal advocacy campaigns?  
This consideration of domestic discursive and structural conditions, though 
underexamined in IR scholarship, is central to understanding successful norm 
                                                
14 See, e.g., Amitav Acharya, How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm 
Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism, 28 INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION 239 (2004); Pitman B. Potter, Globalization and Economic Regulation 
in China: Selective Adaptation of Globalized Norms and Practices, 2 WASH. U. 
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 119 (2003); Jeffrey W. Legro, Which Norms Matter? 
Revisiting the "Failure" of Internationalism, 51 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 31 
(1997).  
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diffusion and persuasion.15 The basic insight of the model described below is that 
while local advocacy networks are activated by increased international and 
transnational pressure from the outside, so too are extant domestic opposition groups 
eager to deploy discursive challenges to such reforms. This insight helps explain why, 
after the application of foreign pressure for reform, a norm with a history as a 
contested practice or “point of concern”16 in a society—e.g. capital punishment—
proves resistant to foreign pressure, but a novel or deeply entrenched practice about 
which little domestic discourse exists—e.g. plea bargaining—may undergo rapid and 
significant change. 
 In addition, the model addresses (in Chapter 2) the intervening variable of 
domestic structure. More specifically, the model examines how domestic structure, in 
the form of a state’s legal system, further affects the openness of a state to foreign 
pressure, the persuasive strategy foreign advocates must employ and, in the case of a 
successful advocacy campaign, the ultimate pace of legal reform. With distinctive 
configurations of power and prestige, legal systems (i.e. common law or civil law) can 
be distinguished by the location of key legal decision makers (i.e. in courtrooms, law 
schools, or national legislatures). These differences directly affect the means by which 
foreign legal advocates are able to achieve desired legal reforms. In centralized, 
statute-based civil law states, transnational diffusion can occur quickly, and generally 
requires the successful persuasion of a small number of influential academics and 
                                                
15 For the terms “norm diffusion” and “persuasion,” this paper understands both as 
being an activity or process through which an actor is induced to make a change in 
belief, attitude, or behavior. 
16 Rather than perceive of culture as a society’s received and/or shared values 
legitimating social practices, this work instead proceeds, as David Laitin and Aaron 
Wildavsky suggest, with culture conceived of as delineating the “points of concern” of 
a society. They argue that a general focus on “points of concern” rather than an 
attempt to identify shared values provides a richer appreciation of why political action 
may differ across cultures. See David Laitin & Aaron Wildavsky, Political Culture 
and Political Preferences, 82 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 589, 590 (1988). 
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legislative drafters. In decentralized, precedent-based common law systems, which 
lack the unifying institutional structures of civil law, transnational diffusion often 
occurs more slowly, requiring the successful persuasion not of a handful of scholars or 
legislators, but rather judges dispersed throughout the legal system. Through an 
examination of the these two variables—discursive context and legal system—this 
study thus aims to improve our understanding of the domestic factors involved in 
determining whether international and transnational actors will succeed in their 
attempts to affect legal reform in the international system. In so doing, it offers 
insights into how those actors can, through the appropriate discursive framing of their 
advocacy, as well as the targeting of the right domestic actors, avoid undermining the 
positive efforts of local reformers.  
While there exist many competing explanations of diffusion, this research does 
not seek to advance another unified theory purporting to explain all episodes of legal 
diffusion. It proceeds with the more modest goal of identifying various scope 
conditions that indicate which of the many theoretical approaches to diffusion should 
be applied. I readily concede that under certain conditions of force, self-interest, 
shame, and scarcity, foreign legal practices have successfully diffused.17 However, as 
is shown below, foreign advocates for reform do not necessarily succeed when those 
conditions are present. Instead, successful diffusion can even occur—counter-
intuitively—in the absence of such conditions. Moreover, the variability with which 
foreign norms diffuse reveals a discursive element that political scientists and 
comparative legal scholars should consider. 
 
                                                
17 See Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal 
History and Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process, 51 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 839, 843-67 (2003) (usefully specifying a typology of legal transplant theories: 
cost-saving, externally dictated, entrepreneurial, and legitimacy-generating).   
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II. Legal Rules and Local Resistance 
To successfully diffuse into a new legal domain, a legal norm or practice must 
overcome significant discursive and structural obstacles.18 Certain laws serve as a 
mutually constitutive component of the legal culture of a society, and so the relative 
success of any transplant operation often depends on the characteristics of the 
transplanted law itself and whether the foreign law can coexist with extant legal norms 
in the recipient body politic.19 As Montesquieu suggested in his De L‘esprit des Lois, 
laws often serve as an expression of national spirit.20 The divergent cognitive 
orientations of different legal systems, and not just the laws themselves, thus 
distinguish jurisdictions and reinforce in jurists what Hans-Georg Gadamer has 
described as a distinct “pre-understanding” of law.21  
In addition to varied constitutive understandings of law, any successful 
transplantation between different legal systems must also consider the translation of 
                                                
18 Usefully illustrating the controversial nature of citations to foreign law, activists in 
both the United States and the People’s Republic of China have proposed formal 
prohibitions on references to foreign law. Compare Setting a Precedent, BEIJING 
REVIEW (Jan. 4, 2007) (citing suggestions from China’s then top legislator, Wu 
Bangguo) with American Justice for American Citizens Act, H.R. 1658, 109th Cong. § 
3 (2005); Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 1070, 109th Cong. §201 (2005); 
S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005); American Justice 
for American Citizens Act, H.R. 4118, 108th Cong. (2004); Constitution Restoration 
Act of 2004, H.R. 3799, 108th Cong. (2004); H. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004); H. 
Res. 468, 108th Cong. (2003). 
19 See MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING 
INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE, at 134 (noting that a successful graft 
requires a series of people who take one set of ideas and reframe them in different 
terms for another group and translate grievances and alternative understandings); 
Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change, 52 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 887 (2005) (identifying the ability of 
transnational advocacy networks to mobilize on behalf of foreign norms and 
enforcement measures); MARTIN CHANOCK, THE MAKING OF SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL 
CULTURE 23 (2007). 
20 C.S. MONTESQUIEU, L‘ESPRIT DES LOIS (1748). 
21 See Pierre Legrand, “Against a European Civil Code,” 60 MOD. L. REV. 44, 45 
(1997).  
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concepts into different legal languages.22 In this way, successful legal transplants 
require a legal actor serving as equal parts linguist, legal scholar, and hermeneut. Any 
direct reference to a law that neither resembles the known legal practices of a foreign 
legal system or does not effectively translate into the domestic legal discourse is thus 
controversial because, as Pierre Bourdieu explains, to genuinely experience the “force 
of law,” individuals must first accept the reasoning and judicial precedent upon which 
the law is based, as well as the institutions within which those laws are embedded.23 It 
follows that foreign laws are difficult to import because of the unique habitus of every 
political community, which he defines as the “habitual, patterned ways of 
understanding, judging, and acting.”24  
For these reasons, some comparative law scholars distinguish between 
“mechanical transplants,” which transplant relatively easily into a variety of body 
politics, and “organic transplants”25 or “legal irritants,”26 which require greater 
attention to local conditions and the nature of the proposed legal reform. Indeed, some 
legal anthropologists question whether a foreign law has any useful application outside 
its theoretical birthplace.27 For Clifford Geertz, domestic laws are tight “webs of 
                                                
22 Maximo Langer, “From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization 
of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure,” 45 
Harvard Int. Law Journal 1, 10 (2004). See also Damaska 1997, 839-40. 
23 Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Judicial Field, 28 
HASTINGS L.J. 805, 807 (1986).  
24 Id. at 811.  
25 See Otto Kahn-Freund, On the Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. 
REV. 1, 12-13 (1974); William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of 
Legal Transplants, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 489, 495 n.7 (1995); John Gillespie, Towards 
a Discursive Analysis of Legal Transfers into Developing East Asia, 40 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 657, 664 (2008).  
26 See Gunther Teubner, “Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying 
Law Ends Up in New Divergences,” 61 MOD. L. REV. 11, 17 (1998) (noting that even 
though the production of law is increasingly detached from national culture, many 
laws are still difficult to transplant because they are tightly coupled with the specific 
political power structure of the society in which they develop). 
27 See generally CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN 
  9 
signification” in which individuals enclose themselves.28 Domestic law, he describes, 
is not merely an instrumental means of social mechanics, but a form of cultural 
hermeneutics, a semantics of social action, whereby individuals in a community 
determine who they are and distinguish whom they are among.29 Other legal 
anthropologists similarly maintain that law is local custom lifted from daily life to be 
“reinstitutionalized within the legal institution,”30 a product of its unique historical 
experience.31 Law, it follows, is a purely local knowledge and remains so, despite the 
competing pressures of increasing international transactions or transnational 
advocacy.32  
                                                                                                                                       
INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY (1983). Many colonial powers, for instance, were 
aware of the difficulty of imposing law and so did so incrementally.  See, e.g., 
Campbell v. Hall, 98 Eng. Rep. 1045, 1047 (K.B. 1774) (“[T]he laws of a conquered 
country continue in force, until they are altered….”).  
28 GEERTZ at 182. 
29 Id. Successful transplants, Geertz argued, are extraordinarily rare. Islamic law, he 
noted, proved a rare successful homogenizing force in the fourteenth century, whereas 
most legal systems, like Indic law, failed to retain their meaning once transplanted into 
foreign jurisdictions. See id. at 229. 
30 Paul Bohannan, The Differing Realms of the Law, 67 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST 
33, 36 (1965).  
31 Pierre Legrand, “Comparative Legal Studies Commitment to Theory,” 58 MOD. L. 
REV. 262 (1995). 
32 The fundamental weakness of the challenge posed by Geertz and others, however, is 
that defining local law is just as difficult as the project of identifying the causes of 
transnational legal influences. For example, the valuable scholarship of Laura Nader, 
Edward Said, Francis Snyder, and others, describes the perverting role many 
missionaries, both colonial and neocolonial, played in the fabrication of “indigenous” 
and “customary” local law. Much of what was treated by colonial jurists as extant 
local legal norms was in fact the synthetic product of a two-level game involving the 
converging interests of colonial officials and local elites. See generally LAURA NADER, 
HARMONY IDEOLOGY: JUSTICE AND CONTROL IN A ZAPOTEC VILLAGE (1991); see also 
CHANOCK (2007); Sally Falk Moore, Certainties Undone: Fifty Turbulent Years of 
Legal Anthropology, 1949–1999, 7 JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL 
INSTITUTE 95 (2001); Langer (2004) (arguing that legal systems are structures of 
interpretation and meaning internalized by legal actors through legal education, 
training, and repeated interactions rendering them predisposed to understand 
procedure and the various roles the actors play within it in a particular way). See also 
GEERTZ, at 182. 
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Despite the skepticism of Geertz and other legal anthropologists, this project 
proceeds with the understanding that the mere adoption of a foreign law is a political 
event worthy of study, regardless of whether a transplant ultimately survives, mutates, 
or fails.33 As such, this dissertation does not address the gulf between law on the books 
and law in practice. The project outlined here examines an antecedent event in the 
transnational policy cycle—i.e. the initial process by which a foreign law or norm is 
codified in the statutory law of a target state. While much great work on the 
interaction between codified law and society exists,34 such political phenomena lie 
outside the scope of this work, which focuses instead on the event that has been 
subject to considerable scrutiny in international relations literature—the agenda-
setting or “norm emergence” phase of normative diffusion.35 In so doing, this study 
examines whether certain legal reforms advocated for by international and 
transnational actors are transplanted strategically by policymakers in target states, or 
whether variation in such transplants suggests that nonmaterial factors such as 
                                                
33 Of course, there is much valuable work on the question of whether efforts to 
transform national laws and legal systems can ever succeed. See, e.g., John Henry 
Merryman, The French Deviation, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 109, 119 (1996) (noting that 
“In each case the attempt to detach a national legal system from the European jus 
commune and move it in an independent direction by following persuasive theoretical 
principles appears to have ended with a return to the mainstream).  
34 See, e.g., Andrew Mertha, The Politics of Piracy: Intellectual Property in 
Contemporary China (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY: 2005); Robert O. 
Keohane, Peter M. Haas, & Marc A. Levy, “The Effectiveness of International 
Environmental Institutions,” in Peter M. Haas, Robert O. Keohane, and Marc A. Levy, 
eds., Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental 
Protection (MIT Press: 1993); David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala, & Eugene Skolnikoff, 
eds., The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental 
Commitments (MIT Press: 1998); Wolfgang Streeck & Kathleen Thelen, “Advanced 
Political Economies,” in Wolfgang Streeck & Kathleen Thelen, eds., Beyond 
Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies, (Cambridge 
University Press, New York: 2005); Teubner (1998); Damaska (1997); The 
Institutions of Private Law (Karl Renner and O. Kahn-Freund, eds.) (London: 1949). 
35 See Risse (2002) (noting that “agenda-setting does not equal norm creation”), at 
268; Keck & Sikkink (2005). 
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constitutive discourse might also play a role in the selection of foreign law. The 
plausibility of the latter stems from the fact that that states have accepted a selection of 
the proposed legal reforms—e.g. adversarial procedures—but rejected less costly and 
easily circumvented rules—e.g. the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained. Put 
simply, this study attempts to answer the question of why a state adopts certain 
procedural reforms but reject others, even when that state at the implementation stage 
could circumvent both. The question of how those transplants ultimately operate in the 
receiving polity, while essential to understanding the comparative legal development 
of that state, stands apart from the simpler—and arguably less interesting—task of 
identifying patterns in interstate and transnational relationships.36  
Studies of the observed convergence or harmonization of legal systems, from 
the fields of both law and political science, generally provide a limited sense of what 
causal factors determine the degree to which those systems come to resemble one 
another.37 Legal scholars such as Rudolf Schlesinger and political scientists such as 
Hedley Bull usefully performed a form of “legal cartography” to map the so-called 
“common core” of legal systems, but this static picture of commonalities provided 
little insight into how those systems became more or less alike over time.38 Frequent 
claims by constructivist political scientists such as Martha Finnemore that “states are 
                                                
36 See K.J. Holsti, “Retreat from Utopia: International Relations Theory: 1945-1970,” 
4 CAN. J. POLI. SCI. 165, 167 (1971). 
37 See, e.g., YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF 
PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN 
AMERICAN STATES 5 (2002) (expressing frustration with the limited explanatory 
power of extant theories); Yves Dezelay & Bryant G. Garth, Legitimating the New 
Legal Orthodoxy, in GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS: THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION, AND 
IMPORTATION OF A NEW LEGAL ORTHODOXY 306, 312-13 (Yves Dezelay & Bryant G, 
Garth eds., 2002). 
38 See, e.g., FORMATION OF CONTRACTS: A STUDY OF THE COMMON CORE OF LEGAL 
SYSTEMS (Rudolf B. Schlesinger ed., 1968); HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL 
SOCIETY 4 (1977). See also Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei, The Common Core 
Approach to European Private Law, 3 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 339, 339 (1996). 
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embedded in dense networks of transnational and international social relations that 
shape their perceptions of the world and their role in that world” similarly leave 
unexplained the process by which a state’s interests are shaped and why variation 
occurs.39 The observation of Edith Brown Weiss, an international law scholar, that 
there is a growing tendency in the international system to recognize the rights of 
“future generations” in national constitutions, treaties, and other instruments of formal 
law,40 while instructive, similarly cannot explain the growth nor why it is that while 
the past constitutions of only twenty-one countries referenced the rights of “future 
generations,” forty-eight now do.41 The following section presents a theory explaining 
the variation. 
 
III. A Two-Tailed Theory of Norm Diffusion 
There currently exist at least three distinct logics to explain the legal and 
regulatory reforms states implement in order to bring their policies in line with the 
constitutive and regulative norms of other states—realism, liberalism, and 
constructivism. The theoretical framework that guides the theory outlined below 
integrates the communicative action theory of constructivism with the transnational 
and domestic politics research programs of international relations theory. In the 
general-equilibrium model proposed here, an exogenous rise in pressure for legal 
                                                
39 FINNEMORE (1996), at 2 (arguing that “states are socialized to want certain things by 
the international society in which they and the people in them live.” (emphasis in 
original)).  
40 Edith Brown Weiss, Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the 
Environment, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 198 (1990); EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO 
FUTURE GENERATIONS (1988) (identifying an emerging consensus in the common and 
civil law traditions, in Islamic law, in African customary law, and in Asian nontheistic 
traditions). 
41 Compiled by author from Ocean Law: Constitutions of the Countries of the World 
Database, available at www.oceanlaw.net. It is worth noting also that while only 61 
past constitutions refer to the environment, 140 now do. 
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reform led by international and transnational advocates can result in increased 
lobbying by both domestic reform advocates and opponents—a group Gao Hongjun, a 
professor and vice dean of Qinghua University School of Law, has called in the 
context of legal reform in the People’s Republic of China “legal nationalist rebels” 
(“法律民族主义的反叛”).42 Much as in two-level games, in which domestic and 
international actors are incorporated into a single strategic framework, the degree to 
which a state is able to adopt certain foreign legal reforms is affected by the presence 
or absence of motivated domestic constituencies, as well as by the content of those 
foreign legal reforms.43 In addition to considering these actors, the model below also 
adopts a discourse- and structure-centered approach, asking how a state’s discursive 
and institutional environment affects the importability of foreign law. In so doing, the 
model attempts to identify which reforms and which discursive contexts are most 
viable for diffusion. Put in Robert Putnam’s terms, it aims to identify the discursive 
“win-set” shared by state and non-state actors.  
International and transnational advocates consist of members of both formal 
organizations (from international organizations to development agencies) and informal 
networks, defined as “forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, 
and horizontal patterns of communication.”44 The domestic opponents of these 
advocates, as John Merryman observed in his discussion of notable differences 
emerging between legal systems, serve as a powerful “particularizing force,” 
“opposing uniformity, standardization, and the loss of those characteristics by which 
                                                
42 Hongjun Gao, “法律移植与法律文化: 译者前言,” in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 
(H. Gao trans.; Johannes Feest & David Nelken eds., 2006). 
43 See Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level 
Games,” 42 Int’l Org. 427 (1988). 
44 Margaret Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Transnational 
Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY: 
1998), at 8.  
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people define themselves and establish their unique identities.”45 It follows that 
international and transnational legal advocates must overcome not only the preexisting 
normative landscape and institutional barriers to entry such as the relative strength of 
the political system,46 but also the domestic legal parochialism of these so-called legal 
nationalist rebels.47 The contest between this local resistance and domestic advocates 
for reform can determine which reforms are invited in and which are blocked. As 
Jason Frank similarly observes, amidst early American legal advocates one of the most 
consequential struggles of the revolutionary era was the persistent contest over what 
and who constituted the will of the people. Some, such as Thomas Paine, saw 
themselves as “citizens of the world” advocating transnational revolutionary thought. 
In tension with these visionaries, however, were ardent nationalists who proclaimed 
the reforms advocated by Paine and others were in fact the products of foreign 
conspirators “who had no part of the people, as nationally defined.”48 
The mobilization of non-state domestic actors resistant to proposed legal 
reforms is not surprising, but its role is overlooked in the relevant literature on 
contemporary norm diffusion.49 In Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s so-called 
“boomerang” model of norm diffusion, reform is best achieved when domestic 
supporters of reform circumvent their domestic government and associate with foreign 
                                                
45 John Henry Merryman, “On the Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law 
and the Common Law,” 17 STAN. J. INT’L L. 357, 372(1981).  
46 MATTHEW EVANGELISTA, UNARMED FORCES: THE TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENT TO 
END THE COLD WAR (1999). 
47 Extant theories of diffusion suffer from a tendency to collapse the normative 
orientations of states targeted for reform, thus missing a dynamic essential 
understanding successful norm diffusion. 
48 Jason Frank, Constituent Moments: Enacting the People in Postrevolutionary 
America (Duke University Press: 2010), at 133, 177. 
49 These scholars argue that domestic actors such as nongovernmental organizations 
and trade unions, in cooperation with transnational organizations and networks, 
exploit international movements to generate pressures for compliance or reform on 
state decision makers. See, e.g., KLOTZ (1995). 
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allies to bring pressure against their host government from the outside.50 In this 
network model of diffusion, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in state A 
cooperate with an NGO in state B (or an international NGO) to advocate for reform in 
state B.51  
 
Figure 1.1. Risse and Sikkink’s “Spiral Model” of Diffusion 
As sketched in Figure 1.1, Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp, and Kathryn 
Sikkink’s similar five-phase “spiral” model of the diffusion of issue-specific norms 
considers several such “boomerang” throws between domestic supporters of reform 
and foreign allies. Like Keck and Sikkink’s model, however, it too focuses on the 
relationship among the transnational human rights community, the domestic 
                                                
50 See Keck & Sikkink (1998). 
51 See Keck & Sikkink, at 12-13. 
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supporters of the norm, and the target state government, thereby excluding potentially 
decisive players in non-state domestic opposition.52  
The “boomerang” and “spiral” explanations, which depict a constrained target 
state ensnared between activists from domestic society and the international 
community, exclude from the analysis a crucial player in the two-level game—
domestic non-state opponents to legal reform.53 All that is required for success, these 
models suggest, is domestic non-state support for reform and sustained international 
and transnational pressure. Matthew Evangelista offers an analogous model of 
transnational diffusion in which transnational allies of domestic political actors 
provide the necessary ideas and information to aid key domestic supporters in their 
efforts to influence the state.54 Other prominent studies of diffusion similarly leave 
under-examined the internal domestic dynamics of reform, often giving only cursory 
attention to or neglecting outright the local nonstate agents that can effectively 
translate or impede structural effects of international norms.55 As Peter Spiro observes, 
these models, while innovative and insightful, are all marked by the traditional 
emphasis of political science research—state action—and thus overlook important 
non-state actors.56 These nonstate actors and their tools of resistance are worthy of 
                                                
52 See Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, Introduction, in POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 1, 20 (Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp, 
& Kathryn Sikkink eds., 1999).  
53 For a similar critique of the failure of diffusion literature in international relations to 
examine domestic conditions, see Jeffrey T. Checkel, Why Comply?: Social Learning 
and European Identity Change, 55 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 553, 557 (2001).  
54 See Evangelista (1999), at 19.  
55 See, e.g., TIMOTHY J. SINCLAIR, THE NEW MASTERS OF CAPITAL: AMERICAN BOND 
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES AND THE POLITICS OF CREDITWORTHINESS (2005); Nina 
Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of 
Nuclear Non-Use, 53 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 433 (1999); ALEXANDER 
WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999); Finnemore & Sikkink, 
International Norms and Political Change, at 887 (1998); FINNEMORE (1996). 
56 See Peter Spiro, “Nonstate Actors in Global Politics,” 92 American Journal of 
International Law 808, 810 (1998). 
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study, scholars such as Putnam and Leonard Shoppa note, because they can impair a 
state’s ability to adopt certain reforms, as well as affect the abilities of foreign actors 
to effectively market those same reforms in the target state.57 
The two-tailed theory of diffusion presented here begins with the more 
empirically sound expectation that foreign and international advocacy activates not 
only the supportive domestic reformers identified by Risse and Sikkink, but also less-
supportive—if not outright resistant—non-state legal nationalists. The ability of these 
opponents to block the adoption of foreign law depends in part on their ability to tap 
into an extant oppositional discourse. Thus, I hypothesize that the greatest degree of 
normative change may be achieved not when foreign advocates promote a norm, as 
Schoppa suggests, by synergistically appending the norm onto an agenda already 
being considered by a domestic interest group or via a campaign of norm localization 
(in the Chinese context: “本土化”) in which those advocates attempt graft the foreign 
norm onto a comparable domestic discourse, but rather when such discourse is most 
minimal.58 Put another way, if a legal practice or norm has not become a “point of 
concern” or discursive issue within a society, members of that group may be more 
open to reform even where the proposed reform implicates an entrenched social 
practice.59 If, by contrast, a normative discourse already exists, it is more likely that 
there is also an opposing vocabulary, ready to be exploited by domestic opponents or 
manipulated to fit their framing. A normative landscape already populated with 
supporters and opponents equipped with such an established domestic discourse 
concerning an issue poses a greater challenge to foreign advocates. It follows that 
                                                
57 See Putnam (1988); LEONARD SCHOPPA, BARGAINING WITH JAPAN: WHAT 
AMERICAN PRESSURE CAN AND CANNOT DO (1997). 
58 See P.G. ZIMBARDO & M. R LEIPPE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDE CHANGE AND 
SOCIAL INFLUENCE 192 (1991). 
59 See Paul T. Wangerin, A Multidisciplinary Analysis of the Structure of Persuasive 
Arguments, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 195, 200 (1993).  
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foreign advocates can successfully introduce viable legal reforms into target states by 
introducing novel legal reforms or novel legal challenges to entrenched legal practices 
that lie outside the contemporary discourse.  
Paul Wangerin, surveying the field of cognitive psychology observed a similar 
phenomenon with respect to the role of discourse: “Researchers now largely agree that 
audiences that have ‘high involvement’ with the issue being argued tend to be 
persuaded to different degrees, and in different ways than people who have ‘low 
involvement’ with the issue.”60 This relationship fits with the empirical findings of 
various psychological experiments that similarly find that the susceptibility of an actor 
to persuasion relates to the actor’s degree of cognitive involvement with the issue and 
that actors have the least cognitive involvement with novel and ingrained practices.61 
In this way, “cultural cognition,” as Paul DiMaggio dubbed it, is central to whether 
actors will be motivated to resist a proposed reform.62 It follows that the less an actor 
is challenged about or made aware of a justification for a particular legal practice, the 
less equipped that actor is to raise an effective defense of that practice. Salient 
practices, by contrast, are already affixed with a vocabulary from which that actor can 
draw in support or opposition. To provide one example from the American legal 
context, Dan Kahan et al. noted in the realm of commitment laws that individuals 
often resist legal reforms that are too novel to have a clear liberal-conservative valence 
so long as they nonetheless trigger extant discursive cues that are readily accessible.63 
It should be noted that this explanation does not assume that legal reform 
                                                
60 See Wangerin, (1993), at 200. 
61 Blair T. Johnson & Alice H. Eagly, Effects of Involvement on Persuasion: A Meta-
Analysis, 106 PSYCHOL. BULL. 290, 290 (1989). 
62 See Paul DiMaggio, “Culture and Cognition,” 23 Annual Review of Sociology 263-
87 (1997). 
63 See Dan M. Kahan, et al., “Cultural Cognition and Public Policy: The Case of 
Outpatient Commitment Laws,” 34 Law & Human Behavior 118-40 (2010). 
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advocates necessarily accept the candidate foreign norm in its entirety. Nor does it 
assume that those advocates do not intend to manipulate the adopted norm to their 
advantage, once codified. Rather, the model simply suggests that those foreign legal 
advocates will experience greater success in promoting foreign legal norms when a 
candidate norm does not evoke extant vocabularies that can be employed by state and 
non-state opponents resistant to that reform. That is, if a reform can be successfully 
framed outside of an existing domestic discourse or debate, it will likely prove more 
successful in diffusing into a new legal market.  
Bourdieu, who, as described above, is skeptical of the ability of foreign actors 
to influence the legal development of a state, instructively analogizes the field of legal 
development to a game involving various state and non-state actors, each vying to 
appropriate the “right to determine the law.”64 In this game, state and non-state legal 
actors interact according the constitutive “rules of the game”65 because both are 
members of a shared legal “habitus.”66 As in a tennis game, Bourdieu explains, the net 
and the lines of the court establish the parameters within which this discursive struggle 
occurs.67 What Bourdieu’s analysis overlooks, however, is that such a game is often 
disrupted by the introduction of new technology by outside actors.68 It follows that the 
constitutive “rules of the game” are not always equipped to settle disputes concerning 
                                                
64 See Bourdieu (1987); P. Bourdieu & L. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive 
Sociology (University of Chicago Press: 1992). 
65 See Bourdieu & Wacquant (1992), at 98. 
66 See R. Terdiman, “Translator’s Introduction: The Force of Law—Toward a 
Sociology of the Juridical Field,” 38 Hastings Law Journal 805-13 (1987). 
67 See Bourdieu & Wacquant, at 98. 
68 Tennis itself is a “game” in which technological innovations by exogenous 
commercial actors often generate controversy and uncertainty, resulting in both 
commercial successes and failures. See Hann Earl Kimm & Johannes M. Pennings, 
Innovation and Strategic Renewal in Mature Markets: A Study of the Tennis Racket 
Industry, 20 Organization Science 368-83 (2009) (observing that whether new norms 
and practices are adopted by the target community depends in large part on how 
marketers introduce technologies that implicate a celebrated tradition of the game). 
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a novel or innovative challenge advocated by an outside actor. As Jeffrey Checkel 
similarly explained, “Argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective when the 
persuadee is in a novel and uncertain environment…and thus cognitively motivated to 
analyze new information.”69 Foreign legal advocates, it follows, need not in all cases 
reconstruct—“localize”—candidate legal norms to ensure they fit with the normative 
priors of the target state. Rather, a state targeted for legal reform is more likely to 
make significant issue-specific changes when the preexisting discourse about the norm 
is most minimal and thus offers little for foreign legal advocates to help graft or 
localize the proposed reform. Put simply, the more limited the domestic discourse 
related to a particular law, the more success legal reformers will have in overcoming 
any cleavages with state opposition or reluctant non-state legal nationalists, even if the 
proposed reform runs counter to an entrenched local practice or shared understanding.  
The hypothesis that foreign campaigns to change state behavior can succeed 
without a process of norm localization or organic transplantation stems from the 
observation that when actors are uncertain of their interests or have no extant cognitive 
scripts to follow, the more open they may be to persuasion and discursive challenges.70 
Such periods resemble what Mark Blyth referred to as Knightian uncertainty—
situations in which actors are unsure of their interests.71 Figure 1.2, supplies a useful 
heuristic to illustrate this relationship between discourse and diffusion in which less 
domestic discourse is associated with a greater likelihood of diffusion. 
                                                
69 Checkel (2003), at 562-3, 573 (citing as an example the openness of Ukrainian 
actors during early dealings with the Council of Europe). The theory proposed here 
differs from Checkel in that he hypothesizes that persuasion is more likely where there 
are fewer ingrained beliefs. The theory here, by contrast, suggests such deeply 
ingrained beliefs, which required less “involvement” from the belief-holder, are more 
open to persuasion. See Checkel, at 563. 
70 See ZIMBARDO & LEIPPE (1991), at 192; Johnson & Eagly, (1989).  
71 See MARK BLYTH, GREAT TRANSFORMATIONS: ECONOMIC IDEAS AND 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2002).  
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Figure 1.2. Two-Tailed Relationship between Diffusion and Domestic Discourse 
Philip Zimbardo and Michael Leippe, in a review of psychological studies 
regarding persuasion, observed a process similar to this two-tailed pattern of diffusion 
in challenges of so-called “cultural truisms.” They note: 
In some situations, lack of knowledge base makes the individual 
especially susceptible to a persuasive attack on beliefs that are subscribed 
to universally, so much so that they are never attacked. They are called 
cultural truisms…. Persuasive messages aimed at debunking these cultural 
truisms are likely to be quite effective because people simply have a weak 
defense. Their cognitive structure, the fortress in which the belief exists, 
has such low walls and inept weapons that the attacking message cannot 
be effectively argued against.72 
                                                
72 ZIMBARDO & LIEPPE (1991), at 230 (citing W.J. McGuire & D. Papageorgis, The 
Relative Efficacy of Various Types of Prior Belief-Defense in Producing Immunity 
Against Persuasion, 62 JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 327 
(1961)).  
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Cultural truisms, as originally dubbed by social psychologist William McGuire, leave 
their holders with inadequate knowledge or reasoning to defend the practices when 
attacked.73 It follows that cultural truisms such as a “presumption of guilt,” when 
challenged by legal advocates, are more easily challenged because domestic opponents 
had not yet raised an effective discursive defense of such an allocation of the burden 
of proof. When a pre-existing cognitive script or discourse of an actor is activated, by 
contrast, the ability of advocates to persuade that actor is far more limited.74 Indeed, 
the greatest resistance to influence and persuasion occurs among people who have 
“well-articulated” attitudes about the candidate norm.75 The operative difference, 
Zimbardo and Leippe observe, is that “if you know how you feel and why, forces 
outside you have less impact in changing beliefs and emotions.”76 Actors with ready 
access to language that can be deployed to defend their normative commitments, it 
follows, are less open to persuasion, even if their understanding for ‘why’ they feel as 
they do is insincere or incompatible with the original justification of the practice. In 
this way, unquestioned orthodoxy that lies outside an actor’s “cognitive boundaries” 
can readily change not only, as John Odell observes, when faced with a dramatic 
contradictory experience, but similarly in the face of a forceful ideational challenge of 
an unarticulated belief.77 
 Communication theorists offer a useful biological metaphor to illustrate the 
process of diffusion captured by the two-tailed theory of diffusion—Inoculation 
Theory. This approach posits that a resistance to persuasion is similar to the 
                                                
73 McGuire & D. Papageorgis (1961), at 327. 
74 See Peter A. Hall & Rosemary C.R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms, 44 POLITICAL STUDIES 936 (1996). 
75 See Zimbardo & Lieppe (1991), at 151.  
76 Id. at 151 (emphasis added). 
77 John S. Odell, From London to Bretton Woods: Sources of Change in Bargaining 
Strategies and Outcomes, 8 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC POLICY 287 (1988), at 308. 
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inoculation of a body to a virus through weak doses of the virus itself. If healthy, the 
body produces antibodies to fight the virus, leaving it better prepared to ward off 
future attacks.78 Applied to discursive scenarios, actors presented with or challenged 
by novel ideas, cultural truisms and entrenched beliefs all “have had little motivation 
or practice in developing supporting arguments to bolster [them] or in preparing 
refutations for the unsuspected counterarguments.”79 It follows that actors with beliefs 
that are rarely challenged domestically are more open to the persuasive efforts of 
international and transnational legal advocates than are actors that have had to defend 
those beliefs domestically. An extension of this biological metaphor to political 
communities yields instructive insights. An inoculated body politic is one that has 
already developed a discourse in support or opposition to a particular belief or practice 
through a prior domestic challenge to the practice. It follows that the introduction of 
foreign advocates, acting like an infection trying to overwhelm a body, can thus be 
combated by the inoculant—i.e. the preexisting discourse. If, however, the practice or 
belief was left unchallenged prior to the arrival of infectious foreign agents, the body 
politic is less prepared to resist the ideas germinated by the outsiders. 
 
IV. Legal Diffusion in Contemporary Politics (and Political Science) 
The study of legal convergence is, like the practice of legal convergence, a 
point of controversy. Analyses of the spread of legal norms, while a decades-old 
industry, have not yet reached a consensus. From Karl Deutch’s early observation that 
increasing cross-border transactions were leading to shared identities, to more 
contemporary studies of trends toward a convergence of national civil procedures by 
scholars such as Joachim Zekoll, K.D. Kerameus, Christopher Hodges, and Jürgen 
                                                
78 See JAMES BRIAN STIFF & PAUL A. MONGEAU, PERSUASIVE COMMUNICATION 
(2003); ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL (9th ed. 2004). 
79 See McGuire & Papageorgis (1961), at 327. 
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Schwarze, many legal observers report a growing community of similarly governed 
states.80 This convergence is said to be especially acute in the domain of commercial 
law. Susan Strange, for example, notes that, “the authority of the governments of all 
states, large and small, strong and weak, has been weakened as a result of 
technological and financial change and of the accelerated integration of national 
economies into one single global market economy.”81 Outside of commercial 
convergence, sociological institutionalists such as John Meyer similarly see the 
emergence of a more encompassing “world culture,” in which certain institutions and 
the norms they embody can be found in widely dispersed parts of the world, 
irrespective of local need or suitability.82 J.A. Jolowicz, by contrast, notes that while 
many countries have joined the trend of important procedural reforms, they have done 
so “without benefit of serious comparative study, which has led to further divergence 
between them.”83  
                                                
80 See Joachim Zekoll, Comparative Civil Procedure, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006); K.D. 
Kerameus, Political Integration and Procedural Unification in the European Union, 
45 AM. J. COMP. L. 919 (1997); Christopher Hodges, Europeanization of Civil Justice: 
Trends and Issues, 26 CIVIL JUSTICE QUARTERLY 96 (2007); and Jürgen Schwarze, 
The Convergence of the Administrative Laws of the E.U. Member States, in Francis 
Snyder ed., THE EUROPEANIZATION OF LAW (2000), at 163. 
81 See SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN THE 
WORLD ECONOMY (Cambridge University Press: 1996).  
82 See J.W. Meyer, J. Boli, et al., “World Society and the Nation-State,” 103 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 144 (1997); J.W. Meyer, “Review Essay: Kings 
and People,” AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY; Martha Finnemore, “Norms, 
Culture, and World Politics,” 50 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 325 (1996). See also 
ALICE H. AMSDEN, THE RISE OF THE “REST”: CHALLENGES TO THE WEST FROM LATE-
INDUSTRIALIZING ECONOMIES, (Oxford University Press, 2003); CHARLES SABEL AND 
MICHAEL J. PIORE, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE, (Basic Books, 1984), at 14. 
83 See J.A. Jolowicz, Civil Procedure and the Common and Civil Law, in LAW AND 
LEGAL CULTURE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Guenther Doeker-Mach and Klaus 
A. Ziegart eds., 2004). See also MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND 
STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS (1991) 
(observing a widening gap between American and other jurisdictions’ procedural 
practices). 
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Despite disagreements about the extent and direction of reform, there has been 
an observable trafficking in various areas of law.84 Indeed, “most changes in most 
[legal] systems are the result of borrowing,”85 leaving domestic criminal, civil, and 
administrative legal systems all a mixture of disparate foreign and local elements.86 
Laws within a single system now derive from various sources and are thoroughly 
intertwined. For this reason, many comparative scholars have shifted away from an 
emphasis on the categories essential to legal pluralism and adopted instead, as the 
communication theorists discussed above have done, a biological metaphor—the 
“legal transplant.”87 This term usefully evokes the complex requirements in the 
recipient body politic and donor country for a viable diffusion of law and better 
reflects the dialectic, mutually constitutive relations between the extant local law and 
the transplanted law.  
Although challenging to study, international legal transplants of substantive 
and procedural law, and the discourses that surround them, are essential to any 
understanding of contemporary legal development. Domestic legal advocates of 
human rights, endeavoring to transplant foreign laws in whole or in part, increasingly 
negotiate from within a web of global and local legal norms and construct legal 
arguments rooted in an emerging transnational discourse of human rights.88 Moreover, 
                                                
84 See e.g. Nathan Cortez, International Health Care Convergence: The Benefits and 
Borders of Market-Oriented Standardization, 26 WIS. INT’L L.J. 646 (2008); Robert 
Chesney, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 1079 (2008); Joseph Farrell, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and 
Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the 
Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH 85 (2003). 
85 See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMMON LAW (1974), 
at 94.  
86 See Daniel Visser, “Cultural Forces in the Making of Mixed Legal Systems,” 78 
TUL. L. REV. 41, 47 (2003). 
87 Watson (1974).  
88 See MERRY (2006), at 134 (identifying a process of legal translation, whereby a 
local movement—e.g. labor, women, or environmental rights—draws upon legal 
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expanding global commerce and the civil claims that arise from it render already 
permeable domestic legal systems even more sensitive to and affected by foreign law 
and legal theory in areas of law far removed from matters of human rights.89 As the 
judicial decisions of even the U.S. Supreme Court demonstrate, all national legal 
institutions, even those of the most materially powerful state, are porous and, to 
varying degrees, shaped by transnational and international legal norms.90 The 
following subsection discusses several popular alternative explanations of 
transnational diffusion of law and legal scholarship derived from international 
relations and comparative law literatures. 
 
V. Power & Proximity: Alternative Explanations of Legal Diffusion 
To strengthen confidence in the theory of diffusion proposed above, this study 
will also explore common alternative explanations of legal and norm diffusion. 
Scholars have proposed several explanations for why a state welcomes or resists the 
introduction of foreign law.91 These explanations range from external coercion, 
internal power and efficiency concerns, international legitimacy, and norm 
localization. The theoretical efforts of these observers, however, have lacked 
                                                                                                                                       
knowledge and reasoning from extant transnational organizations and translates it to 
fit the local context). 
89 See Saul Levmore, Transfusing Tort Law, in ISSUES IN COMPENSATORY JUSTICE: 
THE BHOPAL ACCIDENT 48 (R.S. Khare ed. 1987) (noting how the extensive 
transnational litigation that followed the massive industrial disaster in Bhopal, India, 
led to the diffusion of several aspects of American tort law). 
90 See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (citing European jurisprudence in 
support of holding that the execution of mentally retarded defendants constitutes cruel 
and unusual punishment); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (citing Dudgeon v. 
United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981) (applying the European Court of Human 
Rights’ invalidation of laws barring homosexual sodomy in E.U. member states in 
support of holding that the Bowers court mistakenly claimed there was a long tradition 
of condemning homosexual relations)). 
91 See, e.g., Miller (2003). 
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systematic empirical analysis. In order to fill this gap, the following section specifies a 
set of testable hypotheses derived from the most common scholarly arguments 
purported to explain the transnational diffusion of law and legal scholarship. 
a. Power  
A common explanation of diffusion proposed by many scholars of IR applies 
the logic of consequence to explain patterns of legal diffusion. These scholars 
maintain that the legal rules and obligations to which states commit themselves are a 
manifestation of the distribution of power in either the international system or the 
domestic structure of a state.92 For the power-focused IR scholars, transnational 
relations reflect merely the interests of the most powerful states.93 Accordingly, 
economic and military aid serves as a means through which the hegemonic power in 
the international system induces cooperation and coerces particular political reforms 
from subordinate states.94 As Robert Gilpin explains, “In order to maintain its 
dominant position, a state must expend resources on military forces, the financing of 
allies, foreign aid, and the costs associated with maintaining the international 
economy.”95 To appease the dominant power and secure this stream of aid, it follows, 
subordinate states in the international system make legal reforms consonant with those 
of the hegemonic power.96  
                                                
92 See, e.g., John J. Mearsheimer, False Promise of International Institutions, 19 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 5 (1995); Jeffry A. Frieden and Ronald Rogowski, “The 
Impact of the International Economy on National Policies: An Analytical Overview,” 
in Helen V. Milner and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Internationalization and Domestic 
Politics, (Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
93 See Robert Gilpin, “The Politics of Transnational Economic Relations,” in Robert 
O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., Transnational Relations and World Politics 
(Harvard University Press: 1971); Stephen D. Krasner, “Minority Rights and the 
Westphalian Model,” Stanford: Department of Political Science (1995). 
94 Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation 104 (1975).  
95 See Robert Gilpin, War and Change 156-57 (1983).  
96 As the subsequent chapters demonstrate, it is important not to overstate the ability of 
great powers to impose laws abroad. The largest prior effort to export the principles 
and practices of U.S. law occurred in the well-funded Law and Development 
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According to such power-based models of diffusion, significant legal reform is 
often imposed or coerced from above, with or without the support of the receiving 
national government or judiciary.97 Extreme examples include the extension of Roman 
law during the expansion of the Roman Empire and the legal reconstruction efforts of 
various colonial or military occupations.98 Similar instances of imposed foreign law 
occur more subtly, such as through mechanisms of soft power.99 Edward Said, for 
example, noted that actors often implicitly valorize one legal form over another, 
reflecting important material imbalances of power.100 Once the “primitive” society 
developed a court system to resemble that of the valorized Western power, the West 
                                                                                                                                       
movement of the 1960s and 1970s. This effort met considerable resistance in the target 
states. Indeed, its key protagonists conceded its failure as early as 1974. However, 
many realist explanations of legal convergence nonetheless mischaracterize the degree 
to which powerful states have the power to determine the outcome of legal reform. 
See, e.g., JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND 
FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA 8 (1980) (observing the failures of the “legal 
missionaries” of the United States Law and Development movement who lobbied for 
legal reform abroad in the 1960s); David Trubeck & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-
Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development, 1974 WIS. L. 
REV. 1062 (1974) (noting the failure of the first campaigns of the Law and 
Development movement). 
97 This has in recent years been especially true in the area of trade and finance, as 
powerful states and institutions condition loans on the achievement of certain legal 
reforms. See deLisle, Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance, American 
Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, at 277; 
Beth Simmons, “The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital 
Market Regulation,” 55 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (2003). 
98 On “imposed law,” see THE IMPOSITION OF LAW xiii (Burman and Harrell-Bond 
eds., 1979). They note that imposed law, a concept they admit is difficult to 
operationalize, is that law which “does not reflect the values and norms of the majority 
of the population or of that segment which will be subject to it.” 
99 See generally JOSEPH NYE, BOUND TO LEAD: THE CHANGING NATURE OF AMERICAN 
POWER (1990); Donald J. Kochan, The Soft Power and Persuasion of Translations in 
the War on Terror: Words and Wisdom in the Transformation of Legal Systems, 110 
W. VA. L. REV. 545 (2008) 
100 See EDWARD SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM 286 (1994). See also Watson, 
Aspects of Reception of Law, at 346, 350-51. 
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simply moved on to another form of law—e.g. alternative dispute resolutions.101  
If not directly imposed by force, these scholars maintain, domestic legal reform 
that seeks to mimic the dominant form in international society is nonetheless 
concluded to be the product of a coerced appeasement strategy or an attempt to 
increase the bargaining power of a state. In such instances, domestic leaders facing a 
risk of imperial acquisition engage in counter-hegemonic legal activism in order to 
fend off foreign encroachment.102 As demonstrated by the self-strengthening reforms 
employed by both China and Japan when faced by encroaching Western powers, states 
are said to use domestic legal innovations in order to represent themselves as meeting 
the requirements of sovereign states in the international community.103 More recently, 
realist scholars have observed that national courts have invoked international and 
foreign law “not because they defer to other communities’ values and interests but 
because they wish to protect or even reclaim the domestic political space that is 
increasingly restricted by the economic forces of globalization and the delegation of 
authority to international institutions.”104 In this two-level game, the resistance of the 
national court to the national government policy results in greater bargaining power in 
the international system for the state as a whole.105 Finally, power-focused scholars 
maintain that states use judicial language that other courts understand—even to the 
point of quoting directly from the judicial opinions and laws of other states—in order 
                                                
101 Laura Nader, “Hegemonic Processes in Law: Colonial to Contemporary,” in L. 
Nader (ed.), The Life of the Law: Anthropological Projects (University of California 
Press: 2002). 
102 See Miller (2003), at 845-56. 
103 See Merry (2006), at 585 (examining the appeasement strategy of Hawaiian leaders 
attempting to stave off a colonial takeover); BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS & 
CESAR A. RODRIGUEZ-GARAVITO, LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: TOWARDS 
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104 Benvenisti (2008), at 244.  
105 See Putnam, (1988), at 427. 
  30 
to signal a willingness to cooperate in certain aspects of their international relations.106 
It is necessary to examine power-based explanations of transnational legal 
diffusion in this study because many transnational legal advocates are quite dependent 
on the power of states. For example, contemporary episodes of power-based diffusion 
are best exemplified by the well-financed Law and Development campaigns supported 
by the U.S. Government.107 These efforts, as Ugo Mattei describes, serve as a powerful 
coercive vehicle for the spread of American law.108 The current boom in well-funded 
Rule of Law campaigns, dubbed by some the “Third Moment” of the Law and 
Development movement, follows two previous eras of transnational legal 
campaigns.109 The first being the Law and Developmental State period of the 1950s 
and 1960s, centered around the U.S.-supported export of U.S. legal theory and whole 
legal structures.110 The second, which followed in the 1980s and 1990s, described as 
the Law and the Neoliberal Market period, advocated that states should forgo efforts 
to create a “first-class judiciary or an extensive system of civil liberties” in favor of 
rigid rules devoted to protecting contract and property rights.111 Finally, in the Third 
Moment, the emerging paradigm maintains that the judiciary is linked to poverty 
reduction, therefore placing legal reform at the center of the global development 
                                                
106 See, e.g., Benvenisti, at p. 251 (noting that such signals can be seen in recent 
national jurisprudence related to judicial review of counterterrorism measures, 
environmental policies, and the status of asylum seekers in destination countries in 
various countries, including Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Israel, and 
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agenda.112  
The on-going Third Moment in Law and Development is supported materially 
by powerful state mechanisms, even when such efforts occur in the shadow of the 
state.113 Firstly, support for Rule of Law programs comes in the form of aid or 
assistance to countries engaged in legal reform. In 2008, G7 countries committed more 
than eight billion dollars (US) to government and civil society programs in recipient 
states.114 Much of the U.S. portion of this aid is drawn primarily from the United 
States Agency for International Development, but also the United States Department 
of State.115 Formal Rule of Law programs include: U.S.-supported exchange of legal 
opinion leaders; public grants and tax credits for the work of private corporations, 
foundations, and nongovernmental organizations that campaign for or are dedicated to 
legal reform abroad; and financial support through international financial institutions 
(e.g. World Bank and International Monetary Fund), funding of which is conditional 
on certain structural legal reforms.116  
                                                
112 See Trubeck & Santos (2006). This movement intends to capture the post-
Washington Consensus shift articulated by Amartya Sen’s work in which he argued 
that multiple aspects of development, including law, should be pursued in tandem. On 
the failure of the Law and Development movement to serve its stated purpose, see 
Trubeck & Galanter (1974) (concluding that any such broad commitment to a 
particular legal system fatally ignored empirical realities of local contexts and 
domestic power structures that affect the success or failure of legal reforms). 
113 See deLisle (1999), at 185.  
114 See OECD International Aid Statistics, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/document/16/0,3343,en_2649_34447_42396496_1_1_1_1,00.ht
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115 See Hiram E. Chodosh, Reforming Judicial Reform Inspired by U.S. Models, 52 
DEPAUL L. REV. 351, 368 (2002). 
116 See id. Despite the observation that the Third Moment, at its core, reflects an effort 
to move away from U.S.-centric legal development, the lawyers on the staffs of these 
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World Bank’s legal associate program, for example, 98% have an advanced degree 
related to law from a U.S. institution, even though only one of the associates is an 
American citizen (a dual citizen from Peru). Moreover, only one of the forty-nine 
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In the shadow of these overtly state-led efforts, the United States also stands as 
a powerful source of foreign legal practices in the contemporary commercial legal 
marketplace.117 Armed with wealthy law schools that train approximately two 
thousand foreign students each year,118 hundreds of law offices in foreign capitals 
performing complex and lengthy litigation,119 American-trained of lawyers at 
multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, as well as the long arm of American-
style discovery procedures and certain U.S. laws,120 the United States presents a 
                                                                                                                                       
studied outside of the Anglo-American tradition (four of the five that were educated 
outside the U.S. were educated in either the UK or Canada).  
117 The so-called Americanization of law has occurred even in the most derided aspects 
of U.S. practice—e.g. the excesses of “U.S.-style discovery and distended briefs.” 
Elana Helmer, for instance, observes the corrosion in arbitral practices. Although 
modern international commercial arbitration was born in continental Europe, the 
practice experienced strong American influence in the 1970s when the first teams of 
U.S. lawyers arrived to represent their clients in extensive petroleum arbitrations. 
They brought with them, she notes, “the familiar [American] procedural techniques, 
court standards of minimum contacts between the arbitrators and the parties…and 
other practices foreign to international commercial arbitration.” See Elana V. Helmer, 
International Commercial Arbitration: ‘Americanized,’ ‘Civilized,’ or ‘Harmonized,’ 
19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RES. 35, 46 (2003). See also THE RECEPTION AND 
TRANSMISSION OF CIVIL PROCEDURAL LAW IN THE GLOBAL SOCIETY 227 (Masahisa 
Deguchi & Marcel Storme eds., 2008) (noting the influence in Brazil of Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 23, which provides for class actions); Chodosh (2002); Rosa 
Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the ‘Rule of Law,’ 
101 MICH. L. REV. 2275, 2276; deLisle (1999); Hendrix (2003) (chronicling USAID 
efforts in Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, in 
addition to broader regional programs). 
118 See American Bar Association, Legal Education Statistics, 
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/stats.html.  
119 Each of the top fifty U.S. law firms has established an average of approximately 
eight foreign law offices. Data compiled by author according to Vault rankings. See 
VAULT GUIDE TO THE TOP 100 LAW FIRMS (2008). 
120 Antitrust law, for example, is one area in which foreign jurisdictions are regularly 
confronted with U.S. law. Current U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence allows the 
Department of Justice, in many circumstances, to exercise authority under the 
Sherman Act and for U.S. courts to recognize jurisdiction over U.S. unfair competition 
claims related to activities outside the borders of the United States so long as the 
anticompetitive activity has direct and reasonably foreseeable effects on U.S. 
commerce or consumers. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Nat’l Trust 
  33 
“complex, varied, and fragmented”121 array of powerful actors in the international 
system and a formidable alternative legal civilization.  
According to scholars applying the logic of consequence at the international 
level, an increase in financial assistance from a state should therefore be associated 
with an increase in the frequency of positive references to the law and legal 
scholarship of that state.122 Such influence, moreover, is assumed to occur irrespective 
of whether the assistance is supplied with or without conditions.123 Under the logic of 
consequence, each of the various types of foreign economic assistance, which includes 
both conditional and unconditional aid, as well as aid that flows either directly to the 
state or to citizens,124 achieve similar outcomes in the international system by 
increasing the economic dominance of one power over a state at the expense of 
                                                                                                                                       
& Savings Ass’n, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976); Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. 
California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). Other laws that affect directly or indirectly the 
conduct of foreign actors include securities fraud enforcement actions pursued by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and claims brought under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, which can require of foreign government actors certain conduct when 
dealing with U.S. businesses. See deLisle, (1999), at 209.  
121 deLisle (1999), at 200. 
122 Data for the annual economic assistance to China for the countries selected for 
analysis was compiled from the following sources: U.S—United States Agency for 
International Development, U.S. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS, OBLIGATIONS AND 
LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS (2008) [commonly known as the “Greenbook”], available at: 
http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/; U.K.—OECD.StatExtracts, available at: 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=ODA_DONOR; France— 
OECD.StatExtracts, available at: id.; Germany— OECD.StatExtracts, available at: 
id. Data for the annual economic assistance to China from United Nations programs 
was compiled from expenditure data of the United Nations Development Programme 
reported in the United Nations Yearbook, 1978-1997. The Yearbook did not include 
data for several years (1985, 1986, 1987, & 1995), and so approximations for those 
years were calculated using linear interpolation. 
123 See, e.g., Raymond Vernon, “Foreign Aid: “A Proposal” Reexamined,” 9 WORLD 
POLITICS 579, 581 (1957). 
124 See, e.g., Kevin M. Morrison, Natural Resources, Aid, and Democratization: A 
Best-Case Scenario, 131 PUBLIC CHOICE 365 (2007); Jakob Svensson, When is 
Foreign Aid Policy Credible? Aid Dependence and Conditionality, 61 J. OF DEV. 
ECON. 61 (2000). 
  34 
another. From this perspective, China’s unconditional aid to and considerable foreign-
direct investment in African states by state-owned enterprises administered by central 
government ministries and agencies has met with deep skepticism among realists.125 In 
short, such aid furthers national interests and increases the influence of one state over 
another, whether or not such assistance is conditional or unconditional.126 As shown in 
the analyses below, however, state power is neither a necessary nor sufficient 
condition for the success of inter- or transnational advocacy campaigns.  
A related explanation of policy reform derived from the logic of consequence 
posits that the laws adopted by a state reflect the preferences and interests of the more 
powerful interest groups within a state.127 By this logic, legal systems are said to 
import favorable rules that favor certain domestic interests, and are often designed to 
grant privileges to such powerful groups.128 As such, the structure and rules of a legal 
system reflect the domestic power structures within which these are formed rather than 
some domestic jurisprudential philosophy.129 The interests of these domestic actors 
reflect the characteristics of their institutional setting.130 It follows that the normative 
discourse of legal entrepreneurs does not affect political or economic outcomes 
beyond serving as a mobilizing tool by which bureaucratic agencies and interest 
                                                
125 Peter Brooks & Hyeshin Ji, “China’s Influence in Africa: Implications for the 
United States,” Background, No. 1916, Heritage Foundation (Feb. 22, 2006); 
“China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment,” 6 OECD Investment News (March 
2008), at 2. 
126 See Hans J. Morgenthau, “A Political Theory of Foreign Aid,” 56 AMERICAN 
POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 301 (1962); GUY ARNOLD, AID AND THE THIRD WORLD: 
THE NORTH SOUTH DIVIDE (1985). 
127 Frieden & Rogowski (1996), at 42. 
128 See J. STARR AND J. COLLIER, HISTORY AND POWER IN THE STUDY OF LAW (1989). 
See also Said Amir Arjomand, Civil Society and the Rule of Law in the Constitutional 
Politics of Iran under Khatami, 67 SOCIAL RESEARCH 283 (2000) (examining the 
creation of an Islamic theocracy in Iran).  
129 See Merry (2003). 
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groups position themselves against one another.131 In this way, the ideas advocated by 
foreign actors matter not by dint of their persuasive force, but rather in their ability to 
serve as focal points that crystallize areas of common interest shared by different 
interest groups.132 Reforms of a state’s legal system or regulatory framework, even 
when conducted under the intense scrutiny of the international community, thus reflect 
the demands made by powerful domestic groups or agencies that expect to be aided or 
disadvantaged by the proposed reforms.133 Any selection of a foreign law is thus the 
rational response to a particular domestic interest.134 In the context contemporary 
globalization,135 such domestic-interest explanations vary depending on the domestic 
interest at stake. Some scholars posit that the growing demand for international 
transactions motivates states to adopt uniform legal systems to reduce the cost of 
interstate transactions for its most powerful constituents.136 Others, by contrast, 
observe that if the preferences of the most powerful interest groups are hostile to such 
transactions, legal differences qua barriers to transnational legal diffusion will arise.137 
                                                
131 See Gary S. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, (University of 
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Put another way, a state is said to be more likely to adopt a proposed legal reform if 
the law serves the interests of its most powerful domestic constituents. 
 A related domestic politics approach to understanding legal reform in the 
international system posits that legal reforms ratified by state-level actors must be 
considered separately from any consideration of implementation because agents have 
different interests from their principals.138 In this way, a central government ratifies 
legal reforms and negotiates with a keen eye to the future implementation (or lack 
thereof) of those laws. The adoption of certain reforms thus does not reflect the 
success of transnational advocates. Rather, such concessions are often made when a 
negotiating state believes neither that the less desirable provisions will be 
implemented locally nor that certain retaliatory threats will ever materialize.139 As 
Daniel Berkowitz and others note, many countries borrow law with no intention of 
implementing the new rules, but instead in an “attempt to signal to foreign investors 
from different countries that they comply with their domestic legal standards.”140 It 
follows that procedural rules or legal reforms that comply with emerging international 
norms are often adopted by target states that possess no intent to implement the laws 
fully or in good faith.  
b. Proximity 
As discussed above, the dominant theory of diffusion—norm localization—
maintains that a foreign legal practice will transfer only in the presence of a proximate 
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Rights, 59 INT’L ORG. 695 (2005). 
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local norm upon which foreign advocates can indigenize the candidate reform.141 This 
hypothesis, also dubbed “resonance,” maintains that the more a candidate reform 
promoted by transnational coalitions resonates with local actors or is compatible with 
a pre-existing local norm, the more policy influence those transnational coalitions are 
likely to have.142 As Richard Price describes it, the most powerful finding in the study 
of norms is that efforts to diffuse norms “are more likely to be successful to the extent 
they can be grafted on to previously accepted norms.”143 Jeffrey Checkel notes 
similarly that norms diffuse most readily when there is a “cultural match,” which he 
describes as situations in which “the prescriptions embodied in an international norm 
are convergent with domestic norms, as reflected in the discourse.”144 The underlying 
assumption in this literature is that historical institutions and traditional routines render 
actors in the state targeted for legal reform less likely to submit to exogenous pressure 
for reform or update their beliefs. Thus, contrary to inoculation theory, which finds 
entrenched practices more open to discursive challenge, norm localization theory 
maintains the more widely shared a belief and the more active the discourse, the less 
malleable the political attitudes of those who hold it. Accordingly, foreign legal 
advocates must first search for and then graft the candidate legal reform onto what 
Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan describe as a proximate “indigenous consciousness” 
already present in the target state.145 By such logic, a state is expected to be more 
likely to adopt a proposed law in the presence of an active domestic discourse related 
                                                
141 KLOTZ (1995); Legro (1997); Potter (2003); Acharya (2004). 
142 See Risse (2002); see also Andrew Cortell & James W. Davis, Jr., Understanding 
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145 See Amitav Acharya & Barry Buzan, Conclusion: On the Possibility of a non-
Western IR Theory in Asia, 7 INT’L RELATIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC 427, 435 (2007); 
see also Acharya (2004); Merry (2006) Finnemore & Sikkink (1998). 
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to the proposed law. 
A related explanation of legal transplants emphasizes the role of legal family in 
the occurrence of importing field-tested laws and procedures from foreign 
jurisdictions.146 Under this approach, the normative proximity and perceived efficiency 
of a rule, not state power, are believed to drive patterns of legal diffusion. The closer 
states’ legal systems are in terms of structure and constitutive rules, the more likely 
those states are to look to each other for legal innovations. Countries with legal 
systems born from civil law origins, for example, are believed more likely and able to 
accept and adopt the laws and legal theories of another civil law system than are states 
with a common law or mixed legal system.147 As Peter Gourevitch and James Shinn 
observe, such explanations leave legal systems “trapped in their founding moment.”148 
The likelihood of importing like from like is said to occur in part because the legal 
culture of the sending state better approximates the extant normative landscape of the 
receiving state.149 In addition, the laws selected for import satisfy efficiency concerns 
because they have been field tested amidst institutional conditions similar to the 
receiving country. Accordingly, laws are said to transfer more readily and frequently 
when a receiving legal system is derived from the same legal family as that of the 
sending country. As such, the legal family from which a country imports its legal 
system is said to explain much of the variation among states.  
While the formulation of the legal family logic forces us to specify a measure 
of “legal family,” it should be noted that any typology of legal families has proved 
                                                
146 See Miller (2003), at 845-56. 
147 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic 
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epistemologically unsatisfactory. René David, for example, identified five legal 
families—Western, Socialist, Islamic, Hindu, and Chinese. He subsequently recast 
these molds into three: Romanistic-German, Common Law, and Socialist (plus a 
residual category of “Other systems”).150 The problem of categorization—and thus 
much empirical work using such categories as a variable—stems from the fact that no 
unadulterated legal system exists, as all are alloys composed of various legal 
traditions. As Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz instructed, “we need more help with the 
difficult question whether a system is affiliated to one parent or to another, especially 
as legal systems have been known to adopt new parents.”151  
Despite the problems associated with legal family categorization, this study 
will test whether a relationship does indeed exist between the type of legal system and 
the manner in which legal entrepreneurs—scholars, legislators, vocal private 
citizens—within that system cite foreign law and legal scholarship. A variable for 
legal family is included in the analysis not only because the legal family explanation is 
widely supported in the empirical legal transplant literature,152 but also because such a 
variable will serve to expand upon the limited empirical literature on the subject.153 
Hypothesis 2A restates the prediction that legal family determines the source of legal 
influence. 
A final claim in the literature concerning legal diffusion asserts that courts 
interpreting relatively young constitutions are more likely to look abroad for 
                                                
150 See KONRAD ZWEIGERT AND HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE 
LAW 44 (1977). 
151 Id., at 28.  
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Shleifer, The Divergence of Legal Procedures, (NBER Working Paper No. 13809, 
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interpretive assistance than are countries with mature constitutions and well-developed 
constitutional jurisprudence.154 The creation of judicial precedent is a time-consuming 
process, and so newer courts interpreting younger constitutions often rely on foreign 
case law dealing with similar constitutional provisions. Accordingly, these scholars 
hypothesize that the justices of a court facing a particular constitutional question in a 
country with a relatively old constitution are far less likely to look abroad for legal 
reasoning than are justices interpreting a younger constitutional document.  
Supporters of the constitutional-maturity hypothesis cite supporting evidence 
in the experiences of such countries as Canada, South Africa, and New Zealand, each 
of which underwent significant constitutional reform in the recent past and in turn 
looked abroad for legal solutions to new problems. South African Justice Arthur 
Chaskalson, for example, noted that “[c]omparative ‘bill of rights’ jurisprudence will 
no doubt be of importance, particularly in the early stages of the transition when there 
is no developed indigenous jurisprudence in this branch of the law on which we 
draw.”155 Canadian Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dube similarly observed that the 
unresolved questions created by the then-new Canadian Charter of 1982 presented an 
“ideal opportunity to look south and learn from the experience of the United States.”156 
It follows from this understanding of legal development that as a country’s 
constitution ages, the likelihood of a court of that country to cite foreign law or legal 
scholarship declines.  
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VI. Conclusion 
This dissertation introduces a new, two-tailed theory of norm diffusion and 
tests the alternative power- and identity-based explanations drawn from the literatures 
of international relations and comparative legal studies. It will be shown that power-
based explanations cannot explain those cases in which certain concessions and legal 
reforms made by the outlier state exceed the demands of the dominant state or vary 
depending on policy context.157 In many instances, states will acquire new interests or 
abandon long-held beliefs in the absence of or in opposition to clear material 
incentives to behave otherwise. In addition, the model will help explain why states 
adopt certain procedural rules that ostensibly reduce their coercive power but resist 
others. The model described above also helps identify and anticipate those instances in 
order to improve our understanding of the circumstances under which foreign 
advocacy for legal reform succeeds. In so doing, this study aspires to explain what role 
the international community can play in affecting domestic reform in target states. 
More importantly, it aims to better our understanding of how policy entrepreneurs can 
avoid undermining the positive efforts of local advocates.  
The process by which legal advocates successfully revise the constitutive or 
cognitive commitments of high court justices, legal scholars, and legislators raises 
difficult methodological challenges.158 More specifically, the study of global 
trafficking in legal norms presented in the Chapters that follow requires a strategy of 
                                                
157 Rationalist realist theory would predict, for example, that when foreign powers 
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methodological eclecticism that includes a content analysis of political texts. Legal 
norms by which groups organize political behavior, consist of two dimensions—
content and contestation. Content includes the more entrenched elements of national 
identity, including constitutive norms, shared social purposes, relational comparisons, 
and extant worldviews. Contestation, by contrast, consists of salient points of 
disagreement within a group, or what is described in this Chapter as “points of 
concern.”159 To understand the diffusion of new constitutive legal norms, it follows 
that one must study political language because, as Abdelal et al. note, “much of 
identity discourse is the working out of the meaning of a particular collective identity 
through the contestation of its members.”160 Content analysis of legal scholarship and 
judicial opinions thus provides the analytical tools necessary to understand this 
contestation.161  
To perform such a study, several factors must be considered. Firstly, one must 
consider what political language merits analysis. In Chapter 2, I introduce the salient 
structural and constitutive differences between the two major legal systems—civil law 
and common law. As I explain, the structure of a country’s legal system acts as an 
important intervening variable affecting the process by which legal advocates facilitate 
the transnational diffusion of law. Put simply, it claims that a key difference in the 
process of diffusion in civil and common law systems lies in the location and character 
of legal decision makers. In civil law systems, for example, the key actors are 
legislators and scholars. As such, any content analysis of legal discourse and diffusion 
to such systems is best directed at the scholarly writings of legal observers and 
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legislative drafters. In common law systems, by contrast, the key actors are primarily 
judges. It follows that the legal opinions authored by such actors (or their clerks) 
provide the best window into the discursive context and processes of legal diffusion. 
In the subsequent chapters, I employ both manual discourse analysis as well as 
computer-aided content analysis of legal texts from two countries (a civil law country 
and a common law country) that have in recent years undergone considerable legal 
reform—China and South Africa.  Such an analysis reveals important insights into the 
discursive context within which legal reform occurs—i.e. the content and contestation. 
In Chapters 3 and 4, an analysis of legal articles written by Chinese legal scholars and 
practitioners published during China’s legal development in the reform era reveals that 
the attitudes of legal observers to proposed legal reforms varied in large part due to the 
preexisting discursive environments. As illustrated in Chapter 4, a selective content 
analysis of these articles—which in total number as many as 3,231 articles published 
in 320 journals from 29 of China’s 31 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous 
regions—indicates that pro-reform attitudes bore no relationship to efforts to ‘localize’ 
the proposed reforms or to the influences of aid flows. In Chapters 5 and 6, a similar 
content analysis of hundreds of judicial opinions authored by South African judges 
reveals a comparable finding. In addition, an analysis of opinions scribed by justices 
from South Africa’s highest court reveals that successful reforms did not diffuse via 
processes of localization but rather via a process of transnational socialization. Put 
simply, the greatest degree of reform came not from those justices most able to embed 
proposed reforms within extant national discourse but rather via those justices who 
made the most explicit overtures to international norms and foreign law. Finally, 
Chapter 7 concludes with a summary of the two-tailed model of diffusion and a 
discussion of possible future research that can further the understanding of the role of 
discourse in the process of legal diffusion presented here. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
WEAK STATES, STRONG COURTS: STATE STRENGTH AND MECHANISMS OF 
DIFFUSION IN COMMON AND CIVIL LAW COUNTRIES 
 
 
I. Introduction 
Sources of legal innovation can come from within a jurisdiction, such as when 
the voting public demands the regulation of a new industry, or from without, such as 
when a legislature or court imports the law or legal reasoning of another 
jurisdiction.162 Due to the federal structure of the United States, political scientists 
from the American politics subfield have enjoyed an embarrassment of riches when it 
comes to examining these two directions of policy diffusion across a wide range of 
legal issues, including such disparate legal topics as same-sex marriage, smoking bans, 
the death penalty, and fluoridation.163 The phenomenon of diffusion in the 
international system, however, is far less understood by scholars of international 
relations.  
To address this shortcoming, this Chapter considers how the structure of a 
country’s legal system acts as an important intervening variable affecting the process 
by which legal advocates facilitate the transnational diffusion of law. More 
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specifically, it claims that a key difference in the process of diffusion in civil and 
common law systems lies in the location of legal decision makers. In centralized, 
statute-based civil law states, transnational diffusion can occur quickly, and often 
requires the successful persuasion of a small number of influential academics and 
legislative drafters. In France, for example, the legal system is led by an elite corps of 
legal scholars and a small handful of magistrat.164 To transplant a particular legal 
practice to such a system, one must first persuade this elite corps of the practice’s 
merits. In decentralized, precedent-based common law systems, which lack the 
unifying institutional structures of civil law, transnational diffusion often occurs more 
slowly, requiring the successful persuasion not of a handful of scholars or legislators, 
but rather judges dispersed throughout the legal system. In the South African system, 
for example, there is no automatic right of appeal, and so in addition to any lengthy 
litigation there is also the process of filing for “leave to appeal” and possibly a need to 
petition that decision—often an eighteen-month procedure—before elevating to a 
higher court for review.165 This lengthy process is then repeated in order to reach the 
Constitutional Court. Table 2.1 illustrates the varied outcomes that can result from 
variation on the independent and intervening variables of interest. 
Table 2.1. Variation in Variables and Anticipated Legal Reform 
DOMESTIC 
DISCOURSE 
 
Active discourse 
 
Inactive discourse 
 
LEGAL SYSTEM  
 
Common Law 
 
Civil Law 
 
Common Law 
 
Civil Law 
 
PACE OF REFORM 
  
 Slowest                                                                      Fastest 
 
                                                
164 See Lasser, at 18. 
165 8/26/2010. 
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As described in Chapter 1, an independent variable affecting the influence of 
international and transnational legal advocates on domestic legal reform is the 
domestic discursive environment surrounding a certain policy. But this does not tell 
the whole story. While discourse can affect the relative success of an advocacy 
campaign, domestic structure can affect the relative pace and process by which that 
success is achieved. Put another way, the process by which any attempt to transplant a 
legal norm ultimately succeeds depends also “on the domestic structures of the polity 
to be affected,” as well as the ability of advocates to gain access to the domestic actors 
necessary for the creation of a winning coalition.166 Indeed, few transnational actors 
are, as some have described them, “sovereignty-free actors”167 because variation in 
either national-level variable—discourse or domestic structure—will determine the 
relative success and strategy of any transnational movement.168 As illustrated in table 
2.1, different legal structures can affect how quickly the influence of a successful 
transnational legal advocacy campaign penetrates the target legal system. Candidate 
legal norms, which may be adopted by target states due to either strategic or ideational 
concerns, can often travel more quickly into civil law states than into their common 
law counterparts. Given their different concentrations of power and prestige, advocacy 
campaigns directed at civil law jurisdictions can target a centralized legal elite that 
                                                
166 See Thomas Risse, “Transnational Actors and World Politics,” in Walter Carlsnaes, 
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includes a handful of legislators, legal drafters, and scholars. In common law systems, 
by contrast, diffusion often entails the longue durée, whereby judges and litigants 
introduce new rights through the slow, accretive process that includes finding the right 
plaintiff, protracted trials, overruling precedent, and ultimately appellate litigation. 
Any reform of a right or obligation in common law develops gradually as a case works 
its way up the appellate system and subsequent judges scrutinize its judicial reasoning. 
This temporal difference to legal reform is nicely captured in Albert Dicey’s famous 
remark that while civil law statutes reflect the public opinion of yesterday, common 
law “reflects the opinion of the day before yesterday.”169 Outside of constitutional 
rights, moreover, common-law courts are generally less able to affect matters of 
statutory law.  
 In this way, domestic structure does not interact with the role played by 
discourse in the process of legal reform. It does, however, by standing between 
transnational advocates and the domestic actors with sufficient power and prestige to 
reform law, affect “target vulnerability.”170 The structure of a state’s legal system, (i.e. 
common law or civil law) and the location of key legal decision makers in that system 
(i.e. in courtrooms, universities, or national legislatures), directly affects the means by 
which foreign legal advocates achieve desired legal reforms and the likely pace with 
which such reforms are implemented. The pace of legal reform is not necessarily of 
consequence for those interested in the diffusion of substantive legal rights protections 
because in some instances, as mentioned above, legal reforms diffuse through the 
international system due merely to the strategic rather than ideational considerations of 
the targeted states, and so may experience poor implementation after ratification. In 
this way, legalization and legal reform can, as Miles Kahler noted in the context of 
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Asia-Pacific communities, be “primarily a means to other ends.”171 This strategic 
adoption of law, Stephen Krasner likewise observes, is best described as “organized 
hypocrisy,” wherein actors “say[] one thing but do another, endorsing a logic of 
appropriateness while acting in ways consistent with a logic of consequence.”172 As 
such, in some instances states “make greater concessions knowing that they will not be 
implemented.”173  
While this project does not examine the implementation of laws subsequent to 
their adoption, it is important to note that the strategic adoption of laws can 
nonetheless serve to ensnare reluctant states in a transnational discursive spiral that 
can transform imported ideas into constitutive rights through socialization processes of 
argumentation, dialogue, and persuasion.174 As Beth Simmons recently observed in the 
case of international treaties, such legal commitments provide domestic advocates 
with the political, legal, and social resources that assist them in holding a government 
to its promise. That is, “[t]hey involve changes that give relatively weak political 
actors important tangible and intangible resources that raise the political costs 
governments pay for foot-dragging or noncompliance.”175 It follows that even when 
policymakers strategically import a candidate legal reform with no intention or 
expectation that the law will be enforced domestically, the discursive context can 
matter in at least two points in time: firstly, the absence of a salient extant domestic 
discourse can leave targeted policymakers ill-equipped to raise a compelling defense 
against a candidate transnational norm; and secondly, domestic advocates can then in 
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turn employ the imported discourses that underlie that candidate norm as a weapon 
against a reluctant state, leaving strategically minded policymakers ensnared by the 
very transnational discourses they tacitly endorsed by importing the foreign law. In 
this way, the mechanism for the expansion of norms such as decolonization was, as 
Neta Crawford describes, “a combination of the effective work of moral entrepreneurs 
and of the logical extension of arguments” used in their advocacy.176  
In a similar way, the adoption in the PRC of certain labor mediation and 
arbitration procedures long advocated by domestic and transnational labor rights 
proponents, and the reshaped expectations of citizens they bring about, has resulted in 
an explosion in the number of labor disputes.177 After the adoption of the first Labor 
Law in 1995, labor disputes increased annually by 29.6% as growing numbers of 
Chinese workers learned of their legal rights and sought to realize them through legal 
channels.178 As transnational labor advocate Aaron Halegua noted more recently, 
“[p]ublicity regarding the [2007] Labor Contract Law had a tremendous impact on 
raising worker consciousness…. Even if migrant workers still do not know the specific 
details of each of their legal rights, far more came to realize that they have rights and 
there are laws protecting them.”179 This growing awareness among workers, while a 
positive outcome for a regime interested in improving labor conditions throughout the 
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country, may nonetheless serve to undermine the interests of a regime more concerned 
by Solidarność-like labor mobilization. 
Considered together, as they are in the following chapters, the interaction 
between domestic discourse and domestic structure improves our understanding of 
norm diffusion and answers the call for further research on how domestic structure 
affects transnational relations in the presence of nonstructural influences.180 The 
following section outlines this structural distinction as an important intervening 
variable and identifies the ways in which variation in the type of legal system 
determines the processes through which transnational legal advocacy succeeds.  
 
II. Common Law v. Civil Law: Differences in Kind, Not Degree 
Most modern legal systems can be categorized as either common law or civil 
law.181 A century ago, civil and common law systems were deemed to be two 
incompatible systems fated to forever divide the world between them.182 In broad 
terms, this division of the world’s jurisdictions has persisted over time despite 
repeated forecasts of a complete harmonization of laws. In the modern area of 
globalization, for example, many comparative legal scholars and observers of 
comparative political economy anticipated a gradual convergence of national laws.183 
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Drawing on the logic of Ronald Coase and his articulation of the hierarchical firm as 
an entity endogenous to the free market organized to reduce transaction costs, these 
scholars hypothesized that the increased sensitivity and openness of markets 
worldwide would motivate states to reorganize according to a new, uniform logic of 
transaction-cost reduction.184 Any persistent variations among state laws would be a 
function of either a catching-up process or a failure in those states’ economic policy 
management.185  
The anticipated flattening of national law by the forces of globalization, 
however, has not occurred, despite global pressures. As Peter Hall and David Soskice 
observed in their study of the varieties of capitalism, there still exist at least two 
families of market structures: liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated 
market economies (CMEs). Firms in either type of economy operate strategically 
within the state’s legal regimes.186 In any jurisdiction, therefore, firms gravitate not 
toward some global logic of industrial organization but instead operate according to a 
local mode of coordination for which there is domestic institutional support. As with 
LMEs and CMEs, civil and common law systems have likewise largely survived 
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globalizing pressures to converge and their institutional differences remain 
considerable. These differences, in turn, mean that different mechanisms of diffusion 
may apply in each system. Moreover, transnational legal advocates, like firms 
operating in an LME or CME, must expend their resources in a manner tailored to 
maximize domestic institutional support in each legal family. The following 
subsections outline the need for different advocacy strategies raised by differences in 
civil and common legal systems.187 
a. Historical Institutionalism and the Origins of Common and Civil Law 
Systems 
Scholars of transnational and comparative politics have long observed in 
various policy contexts that “a country’s domestic structure influences its degree of 
openness to ideas promoted by transnational actors as well as the degree to which 
those ideas are implemented as policy.”188 For example, a decentralized, fragmented 
state offers multiple points of access for policy entrepreneurs to advocate their 
innovative ideas. Such states experience difficulty implementing the new policies as 
the new ideas percolate slowly to the top, but should they reach the summit of power 
the policies generally achieve broad and lasting support. By contrast, policymakers in 
a centralized, hierarchical, and bureaucratized state may be resistant to new ideas at 
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first, but they are able to implement relevant policies effectively and quickly, once 
they choose to adopt them.189 This distinction proves especially salient in the case of 
centralized, hierarchical single-party countries like China.190 Centralized states that are 
otherwise impervious to foreign legal influences are nonetheless—once the legal 
norms advocated by inter- and transnational entrepreneurs persuade top decision 
makers—quick to adopt new reforms.191 Decentralized states, by contrast, may be 
exposed to many foreign influences at various levels of authority, but consolidated 
national reform may prove more difficult to achieve than in more centralized regimes.  
This distinction made in the transnational politics subfield between strong, 
hierarchically arranged political systems and weaker, more horizontally arranged 
systems parallels a similar distinction that can be made between common and civil law 
legal families. These two families of legal systems differ in important ways, including 
the distribution of power within them and the constitutive rules apportioning 
responsibilities among legal actors.192 While it must be recognized that there are also 
important differences among the members of each legal family,193 each family is 
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nonetheless distinguished by certain shared, long-standing characteristics—derived 
and reinforced by historical practice—that make the typology useful for understanding 
differences in the mechanisms and in the effects of transnational legal diffusion.194  
b. Legislative Primacy and the Origins of the Civil Law 
Civil law systems trace their origins the Roman jus civile. This set of rules, 
which was ultimately compiled in the Corpus Juris Civilis by leading jurists and legal 
scholars under Emperor Justinian, stood as a single, codified body of law promulgated 
by the state with the intent of regulating all relationships among individuals.195 The 
force of these comprehensive codified statutes thus came at the expense of an 
independent judicial power, as expressed in Justinian’s instruction to judges: non 
exemplis sed legibus iudicandum est (Do not judge by examples but by the law).196 As 
such, in civil law systems the ultimate—and sometimes the only—source of law is 
legislation.  
The elevation of statutory law over judge-made law traces in part to a fear of 
encroachment by the judicial branch on the tasks of the legislature.197 The true 
expression of the vox populi, civil law defenders maintain, is announced not by 
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unaccountable judges but by the elected representatives of citizens—the legislature.198 
The Roman Law tradition has been most faithfully preserved in France’s Jacobian 
constitutional tradition, which emphasizes the dominance of legislative authority. This 
emphasis is likely due to the long-standing influence of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who 
maintained that the supreme law should not come from courts but rather from the 
manifestation of the social compact—the legislative organ—and expressed through 
legal abstractions.199 Indeed, until as recently as 2008, France’s Constitutional Council 
only reviewed legislation prior to its passage, and was unable to invalidate laws 
already in force.  
Civil law judges thus function primarily as bureaucratic agents of the 
legislative and the executive branches. In addition, civil law judges are not bound to 
follow prior judicial decisions. Instead, they are tasked with justifying their decision 
under the authority of statutory law.200 Judges in lower courts are thus free, at least in 
principle, to ignore interpretations of law announced by a higher court or even by the 
same court.201 Nor are judges required to publish detailed accounts of their reasoning. 
As Rudolf Schlesinger observed prior to the most recent constitutional reforms in 
France, “French judicial decisions, and especially the decisions of the Cour de 
Cassation, are reported in such a way that the reader of the reports is not reliably 
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informed either of the facts of the case or of the reasoning of the Court.”202 Instead, all 
that need be reported is the statutory source that underlies the court’s decision. 
c. Judicial Independence and the Origins of the Common Law 
In sharp contrast to the courts of civil law systems, common law courts 
evolved outside the jus civile of Roman law and amidst far greater independence from 
sovereign and legislative authority.203 Indeed, a policy or foreign legal doctrine, if 
invoked by a common law court of a state, could become the law of that state, even 
over the protests of the legislature.204 This diffuse system of power-sharing emerged 
from the historical development of the law in both England and the United States.205 
During the formative period of law in England, relatively independent fiefdoms 
operated in the absence of a strong, centralized legislature. To fill this power vacuum 
and institute order, common law courts emerged in feudal localities across England, 
operating locally and without knowledge of the laws applied elsewhere. When the 
king ultimately sought to consolidate central authority, these local judicial organs 
chafed against the encroachment on their power. The sovereign succeeded in creating 
a uniform system of rules and norms common throughout the kingdom, but each 
subsequent statute passed by parliament was viewed by judges as an intrusion upon 
the authority of the courts. Any ambiguous legislation, therefore, was construed 
especially narrowly so as to minimize the parliamentary encroachment on judicial 
power. For this reason, Anglo-Saxons have been described as “instinctively hostile to 
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codification”206 and distrust of the government is said to be their “mother’s milk.”207 
Europe’s Justinian Code, which announced that the will of the Prince holds the force 
of law [quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem], was thus especially unattractive to 
English jurists.208  
Extending the power of common law courts still further, the king also oversaw 
the development of a system known as “equity,” which was intended to mete out 
remedies in egregious cases and deal with novel legal scenarios. In Britain, this system 
evolved into the Court of Chancery, a powerful supplement to codified law that, 
through judicial decisions and judge-made rules, developed a large body of case law 
independent from parliamentary dictates.209 Once transplanted to the U.S. colonies, the 
decentralized structure of the common law and the power of its courts were 
strengthened still further by the introduction of federalism, which created many more 
competing and overlapping bodies of judicial law—what Louis Brandeis dubbed the 
“laboratories of democracy”210—to compete with and balance against legislative and 
executive authority. 
 
III. Different Systems, Different Actors  
 The different histories of civil and common law systems, and the distinct roles 
and rules institutionalized in each, suggest inter- and transnational legal advocates 
hoping to successfully transplant a proposed reform to a target state must tailor their 
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campaign according to whether the target state is a civil law or common law 
jurisdiction. In addition to the different historical origins of each system discussed 
above, the roles played by key domestic actors in each system illustrate further the 
important distinction between the centralized, hierarchical structure of civil law 
systems and the diffuse, decentralized character of common law states. In short, the 
difference lies in the shared power of judges to make law in common law states and 
the exclusive power of legislators to do the same in civil law states. 
Given the elevation of statutory law over judicial interpretation in civil law 
jurisdictions, the most valued expositors of the legal code are not judges but rather 
legal scholars in the form of published treatises and commentaries.211 Legal scholars 
can be so influential in the formation of doctrine in civil law countries that such 
systems have been varyingly dubbed “professors’ law”212 and “university law”213 by 
some observers. Often based in capital cities near the legislature or serving as 
consulting experts with the legal drafting offices of the legislative body, these 
esteemed scholars educate legislators and jurists on how a certain body of law operates 
and advocate for how it may be improved by future amendments.  
In the French civil law system, for example, the primary source consulted by 
attorneys to understand developments in the law are not the judicial opinions 
themselves but case notes written by legal scholars to accompany those opinions in 
commercially published volumes. These notes stand as quasi-official documents, 
printed in the most prominent legal collections on the same page as the judicial 
opinions themselves and offering a thorough explanation and critique of each case.214 
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Indeed, civil law scholars and legal drafters are generally uninterested in the routine 
work of courts and judges. Civil law judges operate through a practiced deductive 
methodology, organizing their judicial decisions according to syllogisms derived from 
abstract rules stipulated in the state’s legal code.215 While these judges are undoubtedly 
influenced by extrastatutory ideas and norms, the official judicial record produced in a 
civil law court is in most cases closely linked to the statutory text.216 
In common law countries, by contrast, the most influential legal entrepreneurs 
are more likely to be the judges themselves than scholars. The most authoritative texts 
are likewise less likely to be scholarly treatises than they are the judicial precedents 
given the force of mandatory law under the common law principle of stare decisis,217 
which is itself a judge-made rule.218 Richard Cappalli, explaining the common law 
method, notes that legal norms in common law countries develop by means of 
precedents through an “inter-temporal and inter-jurisdictional collaboration among the 
judges who decide cases and write justifying opinions.”219 These justifying opinions, 
Lon Fuller describes, differ from their civil law counterparts in that they offer 
articulate elaborations of the law, often discussing its origins, purpose, and 
reasoning.220 In this way, “the judge functions not as one who seeks to conform his 
will to an external [codified] order, but as one whose will itself creates the order to 
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which men must conform.”221 [sic] In lieu of legal scholarship, these judicial opinions 
of esteemed judges from courtrooms throughout the country are considered the most 
authoritative and valued source of legal commentary. Even in those cases in which a 
judicial opinion is not binding on their sister courts, they nonetheless stand as 
persuasive authority.  
Instead of lengthy treatises, which in civil law systems serve as authoritative 
explanations of how articles of a particular code operate and interact with one another, 
an influential unofficial source of legal scholarship in common law countries is 
modeled on the so-called Restatements of the Law published by the American Law 
Institute.222 These volumes are not lengthy expository texts, but rather are primarily a 
distillation of legal rules divined from judicial opinions. In them, an editorial staff of 
legal scholars and judges survey judicial opinions of fifty states to divine and restate 
the most “common” laws of the country and then compile those laws into a code-like 
body of rules. While in form they resemble “what a French lawyer sees as the 
permanent basis of a Code,”223 they mainly serve the aesthetic purpose of clarity, 
distilling the universe of judicial opinions down to more a manageable text. 
Restatements also differ from the treatises common to civil law systems in so far as 
the credibility of treatises depends greatly on the authority of the scholarly author and 
the arguments he or she advances. Restatements, by contrast, speak of rules already 
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established by courts in the form of judicial decisions. In this way, judges, not 
scholars, remain the final authority on the law.224 
To say scholars in common-law systems may not be as central to patterns of 
diffusion as their counterparts in civil-law systems is not to say their influence in the 
international system is not immense. One particularly influential role of common-law 
scholars in the global legal community, and one that has triggered considerable 
controversy, has been as advocates in a transnational effort to introduce common-law 
reforms to civil law states. This effort advocates bolstering the role of the judiciary in 
civil law systems.225 In the post-Washington Consensus era of international 
developmental assistance, there has been a notable shift in discourse away from a 
focus on market growth toward a focus on market failures and regulation. As such, 
lawyers have assumed an important place in development agencies and multilateral 
development banks in both high-level decision-making and consulting positions.226 
These lawyers, though situated in a wide variety of institutions and hailing from a 
large number of countries, are still overwhelmingly influenced by the Anglo-American 
Law and Economics movement, which largely favors common law. As expressed in 
the guidance documents of USAID, the UN’s own Basic Principles on the 
Independence of the Judiciary reflect a similar commitment to this common-law 
theoretical approach.227 
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The different institutional environments within which legal drafters operate 
further illustrate the importance of different actors in civil and common law systems. 
The U.S. Congressional and Senate support agencies tasked with assisting their 
respective legislative body in the drafting of new laws, for example, do so primarily in 
the shadow of the courts.228 Every element of every proposed law is scrutinized by a 
staff attorney for its constitutionality in anticipation of how a judge will interpret the 
text. These nonpartisan staffers rarely have any expertise in the policy area covered by 
the law and so are unlikely to suggest to legislators new policies or legal solutions to a 
address a particular social ill.229 Instead, their role is to prepare laws for judicial 
interpretation in the courts. 
In civil law systems, by contrast, the policy portfolios of legislative and 
executive support agencies are divided among policy experts according to policy 
domain—e.g. criminal law, commercial law, and family law—and initial drafts are 
then compiled by ad hoc committees of experts. The eventual scrutiny of the law by a 
judge is less central a concern to its drafters.230 When a law ultimately does endure 
judicial scrutiny, a civil law judge gives primary importance to the legislative history 
of the law and the intent of legislators.231 As Merryman and Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo 
describe, in a pure civil law system, the “authoritative interpretation by the lawmaker 
[is] the only permissible kind of interpretation.”232  
For a common law judge, the legislative record and intent are just two of many 
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possible interpretive, extrastatutory sources to which he or she may turn. Much to the 
consternation of originalists such as U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia,233 the 
common law judge possesses additional tools that are unfamiliar to many civilian 
jurist, including various schools of interpretation ranging from literalism, pragmatism, 
developmentalism, to structuralism, as well as history and tradition theory, 
consensualism, natural law, John Hart Ely’s theory of representation-reinforcement, 
and Richard Dworkin’s moral theory of constitutional interpretation.234  Scalia, though 
not prone to look abroad for legal solutions, would prefer judicial authority be 
constrained in a manner resembling civil law systems, in which the power of judges is 
circumscribed by a judicial formalism in which precedent is less essential than the text 
of the law, as written by the legislature.235  
Reflecting the distinct apportionments of power among civil and common law 
actors, Joseph Dainow notes, “the great names of the civil law are the names of 
professors who wrote the treatises and created the doctrine, e.g. Bartolus, Domat, 
Pothier, Savigny, Ihering, Planiol, Capitant, Laurent and Depage. By contrast, the 
heroes of the common law are the outstanding judges who contributed most to its 
development, like Coke, Hardwicke, Mansfield, Marshall, Story, Holmes and 
Brandeis.”236 With judges the most important legal authority in common law systems, 
it is no surprise that the author most frequently cited in American law journals in 2009 
was Richard Posner, a U.S. Court of Appeals judge on the Seventh Circuit situated in 
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Illinois, far from the national capital.237 Nor is it surprising that the co-authors of the 
most frequently cited law review article—“The Right to Privacy”—were not legal 
scholars, but a judge and a lawyer—Justice Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren.238 
The free exchange of rationales and ideas among common law judges is 
particularly pronounced when a common law court is faced with a novel, 
unprecedented case or controversy. In such circumstances, lawyers trained in the 
common law are generally given the task of analogizing the material facts of the case 
at hand with related cases faced by past courts, including courts lying outside their 
jurisdiction. In civil law states, by contrast, the express purpose of the statutory code is 
to specify the universe of legal rights and obligations at a high level of generality in 
order to anticipate every factual scenario. These codes, which generally consist of 
thousands of articles, require considerable effort to develop and so are intended to 
survive decades without much alteration, especially from judges.  
 
IV. Different Systems, Different Identities 
To fully understand the implications of whether a state possesses a civil or 
common law legal system, on must examine more than just the structural 
characteristics of those systems. Indeed, as scholars such as Peter Katzenstein and 
others observed in their studies of the varieties of capitalism, there is also an important 
domestic ideational setting in which actors are embedded.239 Domestic structures, 
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these scholars argue, are not limited to the economic and legal institutions of a state, 
but extend further to include the state’s dominant national ideologies, defined as “the 
collective understandings that channel the way individuals in particular societies relate 
to one another.”240 Key to the development of the U.S. corporation, for example, was a 
norm that valued decentralization and “the avoidance of concentrations of power, 
financial or otherwise.”241 Germany’s norm of “patient capital,” by contrast, 
emphasized stability and a deep sense of mutual trust engendered by valuing the 
“reciprocal and enduring relationships” between firms.242 The two systems do not 
represent different stages of development, but rather different solutions constituted by 
distinct sociological histories.243 
Similarly, a nation’s legal system entails more than the statutes, cases, or legal 
institutions created by the state.244 It is also “a style of thought,”245 “a web of beliefs, 
ideals, choices, desires, interests, justifications, principles, techniques, reasons, and 
assumptions.”246 As one scholar observed: 
A civilian system differs from a common law system as much as 
rationalism differs from empiricism or deduction from induction. The 
civilian naturally reasons from principles to instances, the common 
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lawyer from instances to principles. The civilian puts his faith in 
syllogisms, the common lawyer in precedents; the first silently asking 
himself as each new problem arises, “What should we do this time?” 
and the second asking along in the same situation, “What did we do 
last time?” The civilian thinks in terms of rights and duties, the 
common lawyer in terms of remedies….The instinct of the civilian is 
to systematize. The working rule of the common lawyer is solvitur 
ambulando. [sic] 
It follows, as Rodolfo Sacco suggests, that to understand a system of law it is 
necessary to examine the “legal formants” of the system—i.e. the constitutive 
elements present in a society that inform each actor’s understanding of the “law on the 
books.”247 As such, to understand the important differences between common and civil 
law systems one must compare not only the respective rules of each system, but also 
their legal cultures.248  
Modern reminders of the salient ideational differences between civil and 
common law countries—and of the risks generated by a failure to fully consider 
them—date back at least to the Law and Development movement of the 1960's (see 
Chapter 1). This movement has been described and critiqued by both scholars and its 
own participants, including David M. Trubek, Marc Galanter, James Gardner, and 
John Henry Merryman.249 Their efforts to export law, these authors note, were 
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carelessly crafted around the export of U.S. common law legal theory to states that 
were civilian in origin. Few actors in this failed effort had any training in comparative 
or international law, and this inexperience was evident in the effort’s 
ineffectiveness.250 
William Ewald’s interpretive “legal thought” approach to differentiating legal 
systems provides useful insights into how common and civil law identities differ.251 
From this approach, he maintains that in a common law system the meaning of a law 
can only be arrived at through the close examination of the judicial opinions cited in 
support of a court’s holding and the study of those opinions’ justifications, reasoning, 
and aspirations. In a civil law system, by comparison, lawyers are schooled in 
deductive methods, with law supplied by abstract rules stated in statutory codes. The 
legal education and cognitive formation of common and civil law attorneys thus differ. 
In common law systems, students study judicial opinions and practice inductive 
reasoning, while in civil law systems students apply deductive reasoning to codes and 
scholarly treatises. Legal studies in civil law countries, then, are classified as a social 
science, whereas the approach in common law systems more closely resembles social 
engineering through which the law is seen as a flexible tool for lawyers and judges to 
address social ills.252  
Indeed, as observed by Pierre Legrand, who stands out among even the most 
vocal scholars claiming a distinct mentalité distinguishes civil and common law 
systems,  “there is both a civil-law and a common-law way of thinking about the 
                                                
250 Leah Larson-Rabin, “Happenstance and Memory: A Legacy of Law and 
Development Scholarship and Policy in Legal Education,” 25 Wisc. Int. Law J. (2007). 
251 Ewald (1995), at 1987. 
252 See John Henry Merryman, “Legal Education There and Here: A Comparison,” 27 
STAN. L. REV. 859, 870 (1974). See also Philip M. Genty, “Overcoming Cultural 
Blindness in International Clinical Collaboration: The Divide Between Civil and 
Common Law Cultures and Its Implications for Clinical Education,” 15 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 131 (2008). 
  68 
law…. Moreover, such difference is irreducible so that it is not possible for a civilian 
to think like a common-law lawyer (or for a common-law lawyer to think like a 
civilian).”253 Divergent cognitive orientations and a distinct “pre-understanding,”254 
and not just the laws themselves, thus distinguish civil and common law systems. In 
this hermeneutic tradition, Mary Ann Glendon similarly notes that the main 
differences between and among civil and common law traditions lie not in the positive 
legal structures but “more in the area of mental processes, in styles of argumentation, 
and in the organization and methodology of law.”255 Maximo Langer likewise 
maintains that the differences between the civil and common legal systems lie in their 
normative “structures of interpretation and meaning,” which are largely socialized 
through legal education and, subsequently, repeated interactions with the legal 
community and the court.256  
These normative differences between civil and common law manifest 
themselves in practical terms and can affect the likelihood that a proposed legal 
transplant will occur. The public interest practice of “cause lawyering,” for example, is 
achieved through the common-law (if not “uniquely American”257) device of class 
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actions.258 In a class action, class representatives, serving as “private attorneys-
general,” sue on behalf of all those individuals similarly situated—i.e. all those 
similarly harmed by the defendant—and the court’s final judgment binds all members 
of the class irrespective of their participation in the suit or their awareness that the suit 
was brought, so long as they had fair notice and did not request exclusion from the 
class. U.S. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which governs this type of suit in U.S. 
federal courts, allows for claims to be brought by class members no matter how large 
the class and no matter how small the value of each individual class member’s claim, 
so long as it satisfies the federal jurisdiction amount required.259 
Some civil law scholars attest that the class action suit, which until recently 
was unique to U.S. civil procedure, is normatively incompatible with civil law 
systems.260 This incompatibility, it is argued, stems from the ideational premise in civil 
law systems that law is to be applied through logical, abstract legal principles and 
concepts rather than common-law ends-based devices. As Richard B. Cappalli 
explains, “[t]he study of law in continental Europe is quite unlike [the common law’s] 
pragmatic, ‘problem solving’ focus; it is dominated by dogmatics, i.e., a focus on legal 
abstractions and the inter-relationship of juridical concepts.”261 A fundamental legal 
abstraction of civil law systems, and one of the greatest obstacles to the adoption of 
class action litigation, is the principle of the “subjective right” (droit subjectif, 
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subjektives Recht, diritto soggettivo, derecho subjetivo) held by individuals.262 The 
common law practice of class action, it is argued, thus runs fundamentally counter to 
deeply rooted ideational precepts of the Kantian liberal-individualist tradition, in 
which the representation and pursuit of group rights cannot coexist with the traditional 
individual right model.  
Despite Gadamer’s caution that there may be incommensurability between the 
worldviews of two different systems, this does not lead necessarily to the impossibility 
of nonparochial understandings or exchange.263 As the next section shows, 
socialization and persuasion can occur in both common and civil law jurisdictions, 
thus enabling legal norms to travel both within and between these two ontologically 
opposed legal families. What has been lacking, however, is a systematic way of 
conceptualizing legal diffusion that takes into account the normative foundations of 
legal families and the different actors that populate each. 
 
V. Legal Families and Mechanisms of Legal Diffusion 
As Roscoe Pound observed, the history of any system of law “is largely a 
history of borrowings of legal materials from other legal systems and of assimilation 
of materials from outside of the law.”264 This legal syncretism evident in all legal 
systems reveals a need to look beyond diffusion within a single legal family to 
understand the dynamics of legal diffusion. A common error among attempts by 
comparative and international legal scholars to understand the borrowing of law across 
national boundaries, however, has been a failure to consider the institutional and 
sociological differences between civil and common law countries. As will be shown 
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below, many of the most accepted studies of legal diffusion suffer from a bias toward 
evidence gathered exclusively from either common law or civil law jurisdictions to 
support their theory of diffusion. The obvious implication of this failure to consider 
the role of legal family in any theory of legal diffusion is that the mechanisms by 
which laws are said to spread may be limited by certain structural conditions specific 
to each type of legal system. This oversight renders the proposed explanations of 
diffusion and legal syncretism underspecified and in need of further study. The 
following section outlines these explanations and proposes a way forward that aims to 
incorporate and improve upon the merits of each. 
a. “Judicial Globalization” and the Common Law 
Anne-Marie Slaughter stands out among the few contemporary IR scholars 
attempting to understand the observable diffusion of constitutional and human rights 
law across national boundaries. The sharing of public constitutional jurisprudence that 
she observes is a relatively modern phenomenon in the history of legal diffusion, 
which until recently tended to include only private law.265 She identifies as many as 
three typologies and five categories of what she calls “judicial globalization.”266 In her 
important work, she also identifies several causes of legal diffusion.267 These include: 
the internationalization of domestic transactions (and the resultant litigation); 
accessible electronic databases of foreign law; structural factors such as international 
instruments that mandate transjudicial communication (e.g. Article 177 of the Treaty 
of Rome, which provides for the referral of national cases to the supranational body); 
and the judicial comity that exists among the growing number of liberal democracies 
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after the “third wave” of democratization.268 
What Slaughter’s analysis ignores, however, is that her evidence in the global 
trafficking of law among civil law countries relies almost exclusively among members 
of the European Union, which is arguably a sui generis case of regional legal 
integration.269 Even among these civil law countries of the E.U., Slaughter moderates 
her overall constructivist socialization theory of diffusion and cites the more rationalist 
conclusion that those national courts importing the rules and reasoning of European 
Court of Justice decisions may have been doing so at the behest of their respective 
governments in order to facilitate the efficient harmonization of commercial law in the 
European Community.270  
Slaughter’s other evidence suffers from similar selection bias. Outside of the 
trafficking in law among members of the European Union, Slaughter’s claim that there 
is an emerging global judicial community identifies only one case of a civil law 
state—Argentina—looking abroad to solve a pressing legal question, and in that case 
the Supreme Court of Argentina did not look far for inspiration, reversing a lower 
court ruling by relying on an advisory opinion of the Inter-American Human Rights 
Court, of which it is a member state.271 Similarly, Slaughter offers no examples from 
civil law states to support her claim that a global community of human rights law is 
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emerging outside the European Union through the trafficking of decisions 
promulgated by the European Court of Human Rights.272  
In Slaughter’s own explanation of the so-called “judicial comity” among states, 
she does not cite a single civil law state as a practitioner of this pattern of mutual 
judicial respect. While the reason for the omission may stem from the relative ease of 
examining case law—which is unique to common law systems and almost always 
written in English—to trace the international passage of laws, the global judicial 
community that is depicted nonetheless appears populated with judges from only 
common law courts such as South Africa, Zimbabwe, the United Kingdom, Jamaica, 
Israel, the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. 
This common-law-centric evidence of legal diffusion is not unique to 
Slaughter’s work. Outside the field of IR, comparative legal scholars raising evidence 
to support the similar claim that there is an emerging “global dialogue among courts” 
offer case studies equally biased toward the common law, even where they claim 
explicitly that the trend has “spread rapidly to other parts of the world, including civil 
law countries.”273 The repeated observation that states in the international system are 
developing a “common law of human rights” overlooks the fact that the evidence 
marshaled in support of the claim relies overwhelmingly on common law 
jurisdictions.274 Comparative and international legal scholars such as Glendon, Louis 
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Henkin, and Anthony Lester have all contributed equally biased evidence in support of 
similar claims.275 
The theme that emerges upon closer inspection of this evidence suggests that 
common law judges are the only type of actor looking abroad for innovative solutions 
to legal questions. It follows that the global community of law that these scholars 
identify either does not exist or that its constitutive elements deserve closer scrutiny. 
Upon such scrutiny, it is apparent that the explanation of the phenomenon of legal 
diffusion touted by Slaughter and others biases their conclusions about the 
mechanisms by which legal diffusion can occur in the international system. Slaughter, 
for example, highlights the learning and persuasion that occurs in judicial exchanges 
such as the Organization of Supreme Courts of the Americas.276 While such meetings 
are undoubtedly effective ways of facilitating cross-border exchanges, the effect of 
these seminars is limited by the make-up and abilities of the participants. As discussed 
above, civil law judges, no matter how persuaded they may be by the transnational 
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epistemic community of scholars attending such an event,277 are structurally 
constrained agents of the legislature and executive and are limited in the degree to 
which they can import new norms into their courtroom. Common law judges, by 
contrast, are better positioned to import what is learned of foreign jurisprudence at 
such events, even that law which is learned from their civil law counterparts. One 
South African Constitutional Court justice, for example, noted his ongoing research 
regarding novel Colombian approaches to socio-economic rights. Colombia’s unique 
approach become known to him during preparations for just such a global judicial 
conference and is likely to appear in a South African judgment soon.278 To better 
understand how the inter- and transnational judicial community affects the legal norms 
of target states, one must look for evidence beyond case law and international 
gatherings of judges, both of which rely too heavily on the experiences of common 
law states. Instead, the study of the global judicial community must extend to other 
state and non-state actors such as legislators and legal scholars. 
b. Socialization of Lawyers and the Civil Law 
Outside the world of international relations theory, comparative legal scholars 
have given considerable thought to the phenomenon of legal and norm diffusion for 
decades. Nonetheless, and in direct contrast to Slaughter’s work, much of the 
scholarship in this field has tended to focus on transplants between and among civil 
law countries. This emphasis on civil law systems among comparative legal scholars 
likely stems from the field being “dominated by [continental] European legal 
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theory,”279 in part because of the relative lack of interest in comparative legal studies 
in the United States (and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom).280 Moreover, what 
little interest has developed in the United States and the United Kingdom did so in part 
because of the intellectual traditions of America’s leading comparative law scholars, 
most of whom came from civil law countries after fleeing persecution in Europe 
before and during World War II. The contribution of these refugee scholars to the 
development of an Anglo-American school of comparative law, although tremendous, 
was diluted by the relegation of these scholars to less prestigious universities.281  
Given the evidentiary bias toward civil law systems in much of the work of 
comparative law, these scholars identify mechanisms of diffusion that differ from 
those looking mainly at diffusion among common law systems. In this civil-law 
focused work, the mechanism of diffusion is not the socialization of judges, but rather 
the socialization of legal scholars and the relative autonomy of the legal profession.282 
For example, civil law scholars qua “legal brokers” played a central role in the 
diffusion of the German and French Codes, both of which, with a few exceptions, 
transplanted to other states through a voluntary process of adoption.283 This stands in 
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stark contrast to the historical spread of the common law, which was transplanted 
primarily through colonial imposition.284  
According to the seminal work of legal comparativist Alan Watson, the 
diffusion of law is relatively simple task, even when the transplanted rules derive from 
a very different jurisdiction. This ease is said to be due to the nature of the legal 
profession. Scholars in the legal profession, he explains, operate largely autonomously 
from society due to their highly specialized vocation. This professional autonomy, 
along with their preference developed during their professional training for appealing 
to established legal authority, leads legal scholars to look abroad for innovative 
solutions rather than appeal to domestic norms or other societal authorities.285  
This legal borrowing, it follows, occurs without necessarily conforming to the 
national social, political, or economic factors of the receiving state.286 Instead, Watson 
explains, the main facilitator of foreign legal rules is the access and exposure of legal 
elites to the laws and doctrines of other jurisdictions. For this reason alone Emperor 
Justinian’s civil code spread so readily throughout the world, whereas the common 
law, the rules of which diffuse slowly through countless judicial opinions, spread 
initially through force.  
Watson’s evidence in support of his theory in which the socialization of legal 
scholars enables them to play the role of legal brokers, however, suggests this 
mechanism may be largely confined to the civil law world.287 One of his theory-
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generating cases, for example, focuses on the radical legal transformation that 
occurred in Turkey in the early twentieth century. Turkish legal intellectuals, he 
describes, served as necessary “culture carriers” importing a new civilian legal system 
from the land of their legal training, Switzerland.288 Swiss law, he maintains, was 
chosen not because it fit Turkey’s sociopolitical or economic circumstances or because 
Turkish judges went looking for legal innovations in the judicial opinions of foreign 
justices, but rather because it is what legal scholars were socialized to know.289 Figure 
2.1 sketches the distinct authority structures of the two major legal families and 
depicts the key targets of a successful transnational advocacy campaign. As depicted, 
the key domestic facilitators of diffusion are located in the courtrooms of a common 
law state, whereas those same actors are concentrated at the apex of a civil law system. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Targets of Legal Diffusion in Civil and Common Law 
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To say there has been a parochial focus on evidence from either—but not 
both—civil or common law in studies of legal diffusion is not to say there has been no 
work on inter-family legal transplants by comparative legal scholars. Several classic 
works of comparative law from Herman Oliphant, Roscoe Pound, and others note the 
influence of civil law on early American and English legal development. William 
Blackstone, for example, England’s most influential judge and legal scholar, absorbed 
insights from civilian codes through his study of the Swiss jurist Dionysius 
Gothofredus.290 U.S. rules governing conflicts of laws, which determine what 
jurisdiction’s law will apply to adjudicate a conflict and which directly implicate 
issues of national sovereignty as well as other fundamental rights (the infamous Dred 
Scott decision, Watson notes, was a conflicts case),291 were likewise influenced by 
civil law scholars.292 More recently, Peter Gourevitch and James Shinn note that rules 
of shareholder protection have transplanted between the two legal families.293 As Ugo 
Mattei notes, however, “it is one thing to detect some particular influence at a peculiar 
historical moment and quite another to reflect on transplants as a phenomenon linking 
two families of law.”294 The following subsection attempts to conduct such a 
reflection. 
c. A Hybridized Approach  
The discussion above presents competing theories of which actors stand as the 
most critical actors in the legal diffusion process. The apparent evidentiary bias in 
previous studies of legal diffusion in the international system suggests a need to 
specify the differences between legal families and to reexamine the phenomenon of 
legal diffusion with the understanding that the legal system of the receiving state may 
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determine which mechanism of diffusion will be successful. Table 2.2 lists these 
important differences between processes of diffusion in civil law and common law 
systems. As they suggest, the legal system of a state serves as a significant intervening 
variable that leads to variation in at least three key respects. 
Table 2.2. Processes of Legal Diffusion in Civil and Common Law 
 Common Law Civil Law 
Judicial Structure 
 
Decentralized Centralized 
Domestic 
Entrepreneurs 
Lawyers, Judges, 
NGOs 
Legislators, NGOs, 
Executive Officials 
 
Policy Networks 
 
Decentralized Centralized 
Tools of 
Persuasion 
 
Case law Codes, Treatises 
Pace of Policy 
Implementation 
 
Gradual Rapid 
Firstly, it suggests that the important differences in the concentrations of legal 
power generally found in common and civil law states empower different groups as 
the most influential domestic entrepreneurs of legal reform. While figure 2.1 above 
does not capture the complete picture of how political institutions bind one another 
(for example, legislatures do bind courts within the realm of constitutionally valid 
law), it nonetheless captures certain theoretically important differences in the 
concentrations of legal power and the process by which actors can introduce new legal 
norms to new jurisdictions. As depicted, the structural elements of each legal family 
distribute the power to innovate differently, with legal entrepreneurs in a common law 
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state located in courtrooms around the country and their civil law counterparts located 
in universities and legislatures at the apex of the state hierarchy. The legal academy 
exerts far more influence within the civil law system. Indeed, as Mitchel Lasser 
observed in the French civil law context, “it would be quite difficult to overestimate 
the centrality of academic doctrine” in civil law systems.295  
Although civil law legislators, and their advisors in the legal academy and 
legislative drafting bodies, are, by comparison, more empowered to dictate the terms 
and limits of the law than are their common law equivalents, judges within a common 
law system are more able to introduce foreign ideas or cite to persuasive authorities 
from outside their jurisdiction than their civil law counterparts. This phenomenon 
tracks well even with the observations of some common law scholars that would 
prefer to eliminate the influence of foreign legal norms on their judicial branch. Steven 
Calabresi, conservative co-founder of the Federalist Society, derides the 
“Europhil[ic]” “elite” of U.S. federal courts who too often look to foreign law when 
deciding American cases.296 This infiltration of foreign law into judicial opinions 
relating to difficult constitutional questions, he concedes, permeates the practice of 
U.S. judges, tracing all the way back to the Marshall Court era of the early 19th 
century.297 Further confirming the notion that this diffusion of law occurs through the 
socialization of judges, and not the legislature or public as a whole, he notes that “the 
elite lawyerly culture of the Supreme Court conflicts with the mass culture of most 
Americans as expressed over four hundred years.”298  
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Secondly, as important as the structural power relationships of a legal system 
can be, it is also important not to ignore the mutually constitutive relationship between 
structure and actor identity. By endogenizing identities and interests in this way, one 
can see that the ways in which legal actors are persuaded relates to their experiences 
with the legal system. Legal institutions, via the micro-level interactions that occur 
when an actor interacts with a court, are generative of that actor’s identity or legal 
mentalité. As Maximo Langer describes, this mentalité is “acquired by the 
internalization of the procedural structures of interpretation and meaning, through a 
number of [domestic] socialization processes (i.e., law schools, judiciary school, 
prosecutor's office and law firm training, interaction with the courts, etc.).”299 As a 
result of this iterative socialization, actors are disposed to think of the constitutive 
rules of procedure and practice of law in a particular way, and this disposition remains 
relatively durable even as ideas about the regulative substance of law are more 
malleable.  
From this perspective, actors’ interests and ways of reasoning are “social 
constructs” constituted, not merely constrained, by the actors’ sociopolitical 
environment.300 Moreover, the relationship between actors and institutions within 
which they are embedded is mutually constitutive. The constitutive rules of a system 
play a role not only in shaping the types of educations lawyers within those systems 
receive, but also in shaping their reasoning and discursive styles. These styles are 
developed and reinforced among repeat players in the legal system—e.g. lawyers, 
judges, scholars, legislators. It follows that the mentalité that develops within a legal 
                                                
299 See Langer (2004), at 12. 
300 See Paul DiMaggio, “Culture and Economy,” in Neil J. Smelser and Richard 
Swedberg, eds., The Handbook of Economic Sociology, at 28; Eric Helleiner, 
“Conclusion: The Meaning and Contemporary Significance of Economic 
Nationalism,” in Eric Helleiner and Andreas Pickel, eds., Economic Nationalism in a 
Globalizing World, (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY:  2004), at 231. 
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system and its corresponding approach to understanding law determines which types 
of legal materials are the most conducive for persuasion. For civil law actors, 
suggested reforms are more attractive and digestible when they employ the syllogistic 
reasoning to which they are accustomed. For common law actors, who are trained 
through the study of precedent, analogistic reasoning proves more persuasive. These 
distinct cognitive habits suggest that proposed legal reform will be more successful in 
a civil law state if it is presented in the form of an annotated draft of a code provision 
or clear bright-line rules, whereas in common law countries the most compelling 
advocates of reform present the material in the direct argumentative form seen in legal 
briefs and judicial opinions of common law courtrooms.  
 
VI. Conclusion  
 This Chapter introduced legal family as an intervening variable essential to 
understanding processes of legal diffusion. As discussed above, the differences 
between civil and common law systems in terms of structure, the placement of key 
legal entrepreneurs, and the constitutive identities of those entrepreneurs, can affect 
the success of otherwise similar transnational advocacy campaigns. In the chapters 
that follow, the implications of legal family will be considered and controlled for in 
conjunction with the two-tailed theory of norm diffusion discussed in Chapter 1. The 
examination of the process by which legal reform occurs in China and South Africa, as 
illustrated in the chapters that follow, illustrates that the effects of a state’s discursive 
environment are mediated through that state’s legal system. This intervening variable 
can serve to either mediate or amplify the difficulties faced by a transnational legal 
advocate attempting to persuade a winning coalition.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE LONG ARM OF THE LAW REACHES CHINA:  
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL DIFFUSION INTO CIVIL LAW SYSTEMs 
 
 
“[T]he truth seems to be, that there are in every case very great obstacles 
to the transferring of the Criminal Law of any one nation to another. 
Because in any country, the frame and character of this part of its laws, 
has always a much closer dependence on the peculiar circumstances of 
the people, than the details of its customs and regulations in most of the 
affairs of civil life.” 
—David Hume301 
 
 
I. Two-Tailed Theory of Legal Diffusion 
In the above quote, David Hume touches upon a common understanding of the 
formidable domestic obstacles that hinder the adoption of foreign law. His pessimism, 
though, overlooks the considerable degree to which foreign laws have successfully 
diffused into new jurisdictions, even his native Scotland.302 Indeed, transnational legal 
advocates have influenced policy outcomes in significant ways,303 even affecting 
matters as consequential as weapons proliferation.304 This Chapter aims to contribute 
to the growing literature concerning the phenomenon of diffusion through an 
examination of how transnational actors have redefined conceptions of criminal justice 
                                                
301 DAVID HUME, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF SCOTLAND RESPECTING CRIMES 
(4th ed., 1844), at 15. 
302 See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 
(1974), at 105. 
303 See, e.g., MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS 
(1998).  
304 See, e.g., D. P. Eyre & M. C. Suchman, “Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of 
Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach,” in THE CULTURE OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY: NORMS AND IDENTITY IN WORLD POLITICS, P. J. Katzenstein, ed. 
(1996), at 79-113. 
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in the PRC. Chapter 4 then undertakes a content analysis to explore more rigorously 
the process of legal diffusion by examining the effect of discourse and legal structure 
in the export of criminal procedure norms to the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  
There are many theoretical and empirical reasons to expect, as Hume did, that 
inter- or transnational efforts to reform Chinese criminal procedure would fail. 
Reasons to doubt foreign influence over Chinese leaders parallel similar skepticism 
about the ability of transnational advocates during the Cold War. As Matthew 
Evangelista noted in the Soviet setting, “In a political system dominated by a strong 
party-state apparatus…societal forces, including transnational actors, should exert 
little influence on policy.”305 In addition, the policy of interest examined here—
criminal procedure law—and its direct implications on the ability of the central 
government to exert control over its citizens, lies in, or at least near, the category of 
“high politics,”306 and are thus relatively immune to the influence of transnational 
advocates. These rules governing the rights of accused criminals, unlike commercial 
regulations, lie close to issues related to national security, leaving many scholars to 
expect foreign actors to be ineffective advocates for change.307 For example, as Beth 
Simmons noted in the context of state compliance with international treaties, 
procedural rights afforded to criminal defendants in treaties such as the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights have broad implications for the coercive 
                                                
305 See MATTHEW EVANGELISTA, UNARMED FORCES: THE TRANSNATIONAL 
MOVEMENT TO END THE COLD WAR (1999), at 17.  
306 See ROBERT O. KEOHANE AND JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., EDS., TRANSNATIONAL 
RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS (Harvard University Press: 1972).  
307 On this dichotomy and the different expectations of transnational influence 
depending on the category of law implicated, see Peter B. Evans, “Building an 
Integrative Approach to International and Domestic Politics: Reflections and 
Projections,” in DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND 
DOMESTIC POLITICS, Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, eds. 
(University of California Press, Berkeley, CA: 1993), at 418. 
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abilities of a political regime. As such, governments are much more likely to avoid 
international commitments that might “endanger their grip on power or the ‘stability’ 
of the broader polity.”308 
Despite such strong theoretical arguments against the expectation of inter- and 
transnational influence, diffusion of foreign criminal procedure law into the PRC is, 
according to participants in the drafting process, a common occurrence. As described 
below, this diffusion has occurred in large part because China’s national project of 
legal development increasingly involves multiple exogenous advocates—foreign 
states, nongovernmental organizations, and an epistemic community of transnational 
legal advocates—each vying to persuade officials in Beijing to import certain global 
legal norms and best practices.309 In the absence among many Chinese legal actors of 
much familiarity with or training in comparative law,310 which is acquired only if a 
student selects to study it,311 these foreign advocates lend a powerful voice to the 
campaign to transform the perceived interests of state legislators. Under pressure from 
these foreign actors, as Audie Klotz conceded, “no state conforms to international 
norms in all aspects of its domestic or foreign policies.”312 Nonetheless, many global 
and foreign norms do overcome domestic obstacles and successfully change the 
interests and identities of state actors.313  
                                                
308 See SIMMONS (2009), at 15. 
309 See Sida Liu & Terence C. Halliday, “Recursivity in Legal Change: Lawyers and 
Reforms of China’s Criminal Procedure Law,” 34 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 911, 915 
(2009). 
310 Interview, 9/5/2010. 
311 Interview, 9/7/2010. 
312 AUDIE KLOTZ, NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STRUGGLE AGAINST 
APARTHEID (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press: 1995), at 14. 
313 See Klotz, at 152; see also ALICE H. AMSDEN, THE RISE OF THE “REST”: 
CHALLENGES TO THE WEST FROM LATE-INDUSTRIALIZING ECONOMIES (Oxford 
University Press, 2003). Amsden describes a pattern of policy adoption across 
different that suggests an emergence of a “world culture.” 
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The model outlined below attempts to contribute to the understanding of norm 
diffusion in political science by examining the conditions under which foreign 
advocacy succeeds or fails to bring a target state’s legal commitments in line with the 
constitutive and regulative norms of the dominant international society.314 As 
described in Chapter 1, the basic insight of the model is that while increased 
international and transnational pressure for reform activates local advocacy networks, 
so too does it activate extant domestic opposition groups resistant to such reform, the 
voices of which have been underexamined in similar studies of China’s adoption of 
global legal norms by scholars such as Rosemary Foot and Ann Kent. Foot concedes 
early on in her important study of China’s participation in the international human 
rights regime that, “the domestic arena is not covered in this study in anything like the 
level of detail that it deserves.”315 Instead, Foot focuses much of her attention on the 
role of transnational nongovernmental organizations, foreign governments, U.N. 
human rights institutions, and the important role of these actors in reshaping China’s 
concern for human rights. Significantly, though, she concedes that various domestic 
actors in China have appealed to international legal norms to advocate for reform 
domestically and that they have been “empowered not only by the Beijing 
government’s decision to participate in the international human rights regime, but also 
by its recognition of the value of building a domestic ‘rule of law.’”316 Kent similarly 
focuses her analysis of compliance and cooperation with international legal regimes 
                                                
314 See, e.g., Amitav Acharya, “How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm 
Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism,” 28 INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION 239 (2004); Pitman B. Potter, “Globalization and Economic 
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THE STRUGGLE OVER HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA (2000), at 5.  
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on, as she describes them, the “pressures from without.”317 She thus marshals evidence 
of how the multilateral system, through international organizations, has succeeded in 
socializing new or outlying members such as China. In so doing, she speaks broadly of 
a Chinese “legal culture,”318 but does not unpack that concept to discover the 
importance of the contested aspects of that culture.  
The study undertaken here, by closely examining the texts of Chinese legal 
scholars, will disaggregate the notion of a Chinese legal culture and help explain why, 
after the application of outside pressure for reform, a norm with a history as a 
contested practice or “point of concern”319 in a society can prove resistant to foreign 
pressure, but a novel or deeply engrained practice about which little domestic 
discourse exists may elicit little debate and undergo rapid, significant change. As 
several participants in Chinese legal reform described, officials are on many occasions 
most persuadable when they have no preexisting discourse from which to draw. As 
one participant described, “they want their eyes opened”320 to new legal devices, 
especially “when they have nothing to draw from domestically.”321 As such, the model 
suggests a different form of communicative action at work than that proposed by norm 
                                                
317 See ANN KENT, BEYOND COMPLIANCE: CHINA, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, 
AND GLOBAL SECURITY (2000), at 4.  
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localization theory.322 In its discursive approach, the model also helps explain why, as 
Foot notes, “the Chinese government does not appear fully to have accepted the 
prescriptive status of international rights norms.”323 Furthermore, it adds a useful 
domestic perspective on elite opinion toward global practices to help explain why, as 
Kent observed, China “has interpreted the norms and rules of the regime[s] narrowly, 
failed to commit itself to voluntary and extended controls that accord with the spirit of 
its obligations, and failed to participate in some voluntary agreements.”324 Finally, by 
examining the variation among criminal procedural reforms adopted by China in the 
1997 Criminal Procedure Law, it attempts to supplement the insights provided by Beth 
Simmons on the ability of the international community to affect criminal procedure 
reform in target states. As she explains, such influence is weakened in states with 
stable political institutions.325 The evidence provided below suggests such influence is 
limited further by the presence of a stable political discourse. 
The hypothesis that foreign campaigns to change state behavior can succeed 
without a process of norm localization stems from the observation that when actors 
have no pre-established cognitive scripts to follow, the more open they are to 
persuasion and the discursive challenges of policy entrepreneurs who, as Andrew 
Mertha described in the context of hydropower policy in the PRC, can offer “a fresh, 
alternative perspective on the issue in question.”326 This hypothesis, I propose, 
explains the relative successes and failures of transnational legal advocates in affecting 
                                                
322 On communicative action, see Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, “Introduction,” in 
POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 1, 20 
(Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp, & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 1999). 
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the final draft of China’s 1997 Criminal Procedure Law (1997 CPL). These sweeping 
procedural reforms had the ambitious goal of “chang[ing] the ingrained patterns of 
behavior by law enforcement officials.”327 Significant changes in the law included 
provisions related to arrest, defendant rights during the investigation process, means of 
prosecution, and the trial itself. Nevertheless, as hypothesized, less policy change 
occurred with respect to those provisions about which considerable domestic discourse 
already existed, namely investigatory powers and responsibilities related to detention, 
admissibility of evidence, right to an appeal, and the review of death sentences. The 
greatest changes brought about by the 1997 CPL reform were instead concentrated 
around those reforms that targeted novel or entrenched policies, as measured by the 
degree to which those policies lacked a preexisting discourse among Chinese legal 
actors. It follows that the new law put into place a criminal procedure system more 
protective of certain defendant rights about which little domestic discourse existed in 
the PRC, including the presumption of innocence, plea-bargaining, the right to 
counsel, and adversarial trials. (See table 3.1) 
Table 3.1. Variation in 1997 Criminal Procedure Reform 
SUCCESSFUL 
TRANSPLANTS 
FAILED 
TRANSPLANTS 
Presumption of Innocence   Exclusionary Rule 
Adversarial Process   Right to Appeal 
Right to Counsel   Death Penalty 
Plea Bargaining   Detention 
In this Chapter and the next, I survey the political landscape surrounding the 
proposed 1997 CPL through a content analysis of political and legal periodicals 
                                                
327 Jonathan Hecht, OPENING TO REFORM? (1996), at i. 
  91 
published between 1978 and 1997. As will be shown, this examination lends support 
to the two-tailed model of norm diffusion proposed in Chapter 1. In addition, the 
process by which transnational advocates targeted scholars to set or helped shape the 
agenda for Chinese reformers confirms the importance of legal family as an important 
intervening variable through which transnational legal advocates socialize their 
domestic counterparts. 
 
II. Alternative Explanations of Legal Diffusion: Power & Proximity 
Scholars have proposed several explanations for why countries welcome or 
resist the introduction of foreign law.328 The theoretical efforts of these observers, 
however, have lacked systematic empirical analysis. In order to fill this gap and to 
preface my two-tailed model of norm diffusion, the following section specifies a set of 
hypotheses derived from the most common scholarly arguments purported to explain 
the transnational diffusion of law and legal scholarship. 
a. Power  
As discussed in Chapter 1, a dominant explanation of diffusion in IR maintains 
that the legal rules and obligations to which states commit themselves are a 
manifestation of the distribution of power in either the international system or the 
domestic structure of a state.329 Under this view, states adopt the best practices of the 
                                                
328 See, e.g., Jonathan Miller, “A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, 
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international system when the structure of power is sufficiently coercive.330 Those 
rationalist scholars advocating the former maintain that China uses legal reform as a 
signaling mechanism to the hegemonic power in the international system. Hypothesis 
1 restates this expectation. Accordingly, an increase in military and economic aid 
should be associated with an increase in the frequency of references to foreign law and 
legal scholarship. 
Rationalist explanations that look to domestic distributions of influence, by 
contrast, attribute China’s political reforms to the distribution of power among various 
domestic interest groups. According to this view, “internal—as opposed to solely 
external—treat to government rule” determine what policies a state adopts.331 Early 
work on the diffusion of Western legal norms and practices to late-Qing and Republic 
periods offered just such an interest-group explanation of legal development in 
China.332 This rationalist, interest-group approach is less applicable to the development 
of law contemporary in contemporary China, as Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
control over the criminal justice system remains pervasive.333 Nonetheless, an interest 
group explanation is worth investigating here because with the growing range and 
complexity of legal matters regulated by law, the CCP is increasingly joined by an 
expanding pool of actors and institutions participating in the development of law in the 
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PRC.334 As a result, a degree of “institutional pluralism” has emerged, possessing a 
multitude of institutional interests and preferences spread out among various persons 
and groups.335 As Sarah Biddulph writes, “as reform progresses, there is increasing 
evidence to suggest that the Party elites no longer exercise complete domination over 
legal production and that a distinctly legal discourse is growing.”336 Moreover, given 
that the 1997 CPL reforms were intended to specify more clearly the jurisdictional 
boundaries among the police, the court, the procuratorate, and defense counsel, the 
increasing salience of these competing interests warrant an analysis of whether 
institutional preferences correlate with the tenor of legal commentary published in 
China’s various institutional journals.  The codification of such an institutional 
framework in China, despite largely serving as a gloss over CCP control, creates some 
space within the Party for competing positions to develop.337 Over the course of time, 
Randall Peerenboom observes: 
[P]olitical organs can be expected to resist reforms that strengthen the 
judiciary at their expense. The procuracy and people’s congresses are 
likely to oppose any attempt to limit their right to supervise the judiciary. 
The State Council will object to proposals that give the courts the right to 
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strike down administrative regulations. The Ministry of Public security 
will fight efforts to do away with reeducation through labor or to impose 
further restrictions on administrative penalties.338 
In this way, Graham Allison’s organizational and bureaucratic politics models offer 
possible insights into examining how the process of legal reform may be an “intra-
national political outcome.”339 
In the case presented below, the various groups potentially vying to affect 
criminal procedure law include the relevant public security and judicial ministries, 
legislative and executive organs, and unofficial publications. It follows that we should 
expect the pages of legal scholarship discussing the proposed legal reforms to contain 
a pattern of variation in authors’ policy positions toward certain proposed reforms that 
reflects the interests of the author or of the institution issuing the publication. Most 
especially, we should expect authors with an institutional interest in limiting 
defendants’ rights to oppose the codification of norms such as the presumption of 
innocence and the right to counsel.  
 A related domestic politics explanation of legal reform in China posits that 
legal reforms ratified by state-level actors must be considered separately from any 
consideration of implementation because agents have different interests from their 
principals.340 In this way, Beijing ratifies legal reforms with a keen eye to the future 
implementation (or lack thereof) of those laws. The adoption of certain reforms thus 
does not necessarily reflect the success of transnational advocates. Rather, any such 
concessions are made with the knowledge that less desirable provisions will never be 
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implemented. Officials in Beijing, for example, tasked with drafting international trade 
policy, proved adept at shaping the negotiating agenda with their U.S. counterparts via 
the indirect threat of local governments refusing to implement certain provisions or 
retaliating against the foreign interests.341 
b. Proximity 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the dominant theory of diffusion—norm 
localization—maintains that a foreign legal practice will transplant only in the 
presence of a proximate local norm upon which foreign advocates can graft the 
candidate reform.342 Such an understanding of legal diffusion to China traces back to 
the first introduction of Western procedural and substantive notions of human rights. 
As Marina Svensson notes, many scholars suggest that the export of certain concepts 
of human rights in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries often relied upon the 
presence of an extant Confucian political discourse.343 These scholars maintain that 
Western notions of “heaven-endowed rights”—i.e. natural rights—were grafted onto 
Confucian conceptions of the nature of man, and that it thus was a case of a 
“Confucianization of human rights.”344 Some observers even describe the imperialist 
treaty port system as an institution born from the attempt of encroaching Western 
powers to graft an existing norm of international law onto the existing Chinese 
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normative practice of “barbarian management.”345 In the contemporary setting, 
scholars likewise maintain that this model of diffusion explains such reforms as 
China’s adoption of American-style clinical legal education as well as other judicial 
practices.346 As Melanie Manion similarly describes in the context of internal CCP 
policy reform, a “peaceful coercion” of policy—i.e. the nonviolent altering of political 
behavior—is often most successful through a strategy of normative “association,” the 
process by which change is achieved by “appealing to old norms to build new ones.”347 
In similar contemporary accounts, China is portrayed as importing those foreign 
practices that already complement extant Chinese norms, and so is said to be 
modernizing “on its own terms”348 or, as many have dubbed it, with “Chinese style”349 
or “Chinese characteristics.”350 As such, we should also expect Chinese legal observers 
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to view those legal reforms identified as foreign in origin less favorably.  
A final explanation of legal transplants emphasizes the role of legal family in 
the occurrence of importing field-tested laws and procedures from foreign 
jurisdictions.351 Many scholars maintain that the distinction between common and civil 
legal systems serves as a useful tool to determine which laws a country is likely to 
adopt and enforce.352 By such accounts, the world consists of two major bodies of 
law.353 Accordingly, many argue that Chinese legal scholars and advocates are more 
likely to voice support for civil law systems than for common law systems. Scholars 
maintain that this intra-family diffusion explains China’s initial adoption of Japanese, 
German, and Soviet-styled continental legal rules under the Guomindang and the early 
CCP leadership.354 China’s recent adoption of certain common law criminal and civil 
procedures suggests this hypothesis requires more rigorous testing.  
 
III. Criminal Procedure Reform in the PRC 
Before selecting specific cases of legal diffusion for this study, it is necessary 
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to first address the issue of what type of law lends itself to such a study. Firstly, it is 
worth distinguishing two principle types of law—procedural and substantive. 
Procedural law refers to “the rules that prescribe the steps for having a right or duty 
judicially enforced.” Substantive law, by contrast, refers to that law which creates, 
defines, and regulates rights and duties.355  
The legal reforms examined below fall under the category of procedural law. 
Many comparative legal scholars maintain that the procedural rules by which actors 
raise substantive rights claims, and not the substantive rights themselves, are the most 
basic features that distinguish legal cultures.356 This stems in part from the fact that 
procedural systems arguably precede substantive law. As Konrad Zweigert and Hein 
Kötz explain, the Roman civil law and medieval common law traditions were each 
dominated by a distinctive “procedural thinking.”357 In both systems of law, the rules 
of substantive law emerged later.358 In addition, while there is considerable overlap in 
the substantive law of both systems, civil and common law systems are distinctly 
different in terms of procedural matters such that they constitute distinct ideational 
structures.359 It follows that procedural rather than substantive law is more appropriate 
for the purposes of comparative study because legal procedure is the purest—perhaps 
“defining”360—expression of a legal tradition. Indeed, differences between legal 
                                                
355 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2008). 
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systems are “most visible in the area of procedure.”361 While many of the substantive 
rights held by citizens in both civil and common law states may be identical, the legal 
means by which citizens seek to realize those rights vary greatly between the two 
systems. As John Henry Merryman observed, the substantive rules of different 
countries often appear alike, but they become operative under such strikingly different 
procedural rules that contrary results in otherwise similar cases frequently occur.362 It 
follows that procedural norms are likewise analytically prior to substantive law 
because substantive rules cannot be understood outside of the procedural context in 
which they are applied. For example, the right to be free from tortious injury or 
improper deprivation of property may be similar in France and the United States, but 
there is considerable difference in the manner by which an individual can remedy such 
a loss.363 Henry Hart and Albert Sacks note further that “[t]hese institutionalized 
procedures and the constitutive arrangements governing them are obviously more 
fundamental than the substantive arrangements in the structure of society…since they 
are at once the source of the substantive arrangements and the indispensable means of 
making them work effectively.”364 Finally, the greater the variation between states in 
the realm of procedural law, and the smaller size of procedural codes compared to 
substantive codes, allows for more precise observations of change over time. 
                                                
361 Helmer, “International Commercial Arbitration: ‘Americanized,’ ‘Civilized,’ or 
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a. Criminal Procedure Law in Chinese History 
For this study, I selected eight proposed reforms of China’s criminal procedure 
law for three reasons: large within-case variance in terms of independent and 
dependent variables; the divergence of predictions made by competing theories; and 
simply for the intrinsic importance of Chinese legal reform.365 As such, the areas of 
criminal procedure law selected for this study differ in the degree to which an active 
domestic discourse preceded international or transnational pressure for reform and the 
degree to which advocates for reform succeeded in expanding defendant rights. 
China is governed by three basic codes of procedural law—the Law of 
Criminal Procedure (promulgated in 1979 and amended in 1997), the Law of Civil 
Procedure (first announced in 1982 and enacted in 1991), and the Law of 
Administrative Litigation (enacted in 1989). The 1997 Criminal Procedure Law serves 
here as the principal locus of analysis for several reasons. Firstly, criminal procedure 
stands as a “hard case.”366 The successful passage of certain reforms that serve to 
protect the rights of the defendant at the expense of the government’s coercive power 
challenges many rational choice explanations of legal reform for at least three reasons: 
1.) China had during the Tiananmen Square protests experienced tumultuous political 
unrest that highlighted the regime’s preference for public order over due process; 2.) 
the instability associated with China’s ongoing economic liberalization generated 
increasing public support for so-called “Strike Hard” campaigns in which officials 
subordinated certain procedural rights to the interests of swift adjudication of criminal 
                                                
365 See GARY KING, ROBERT KEOHANE, & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL 
INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 108-9, 129-32, 137-38, 
140-49 (1994). 
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defendants; and 3.) budget constraints at all levels of government increased the 
perceived need to reduce the costs of criminal trials and, therefore, reduce the 
application of defendant rights that delay the criminal justice system.367 
Secondly, the 1997 CPL lends itself to analysis because the transnational or 
foreign provenance of any particular reform relating to criminal procedure is relatively 
easy to identify amidst China’s longstanding domestic tradition of criminal procedure. 
Scholars of China have successfully traced codified criminal law as far back as the 
Western Zhou period (1100-771 BC),368 possibly as far as the Shang Dynasty (1766-
122 BC),369 and certainly as far as the Qin Dynasty (221-206 BC).370 Moreover, prior 
to the first adoption of a codified code of criminal procedure in 1910, China’s criminal 
procedure law enjoyed relative continuity since at least the Tang Dynasty (618-906 
BC).371 This stable system of law, William Jones notes, “seems to have developed 
completely independently from the West and to have received no influence from 
Western law.”372 China’s norms related to criminal procedure are thus few in number 
and easy to identify. The following sections briefly describe this extensive history of 
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criminal procedure law in China and the post-Mao project of reform. 
 The Road to the 1997 Criminal Procedure Reform 
The criminal justice system in China has a long history of stressing the 
importance of maintaining social order over the rigid adherence to procedural 
constraints.373 The notable weakness of procedural safeguards to restrain the coercive 
powers of the state in the dynastic era continued after the founding of the PRC, at 
which point the agenda of establishing a new society subordinated any procedural 
obstacles to that goal. As Jerome Cohen once described the earliest years of the PRC, 
1949-1953, “[T]he criminal process served as a blunt instrument of terror, as the 
[CCP] proceeded relentlessly to crush all sources of political opposition and to rid 
society of apolitical but antisocial elements who plagued public order.”374  
The subordination of an individual’s right to due process to the demands of 
political expediency, which persisted under Mao, stymied subsequent efforts to codify 
criminal procedure law in China. Moreover, whereas the Soviet Union promulgated a 
criminal code and criminal procedure code within the first five years following the 
Bolshevik revolution, the nascent PRC continued to operate without such laws.375 In 
the first thirty years of the PRC officials largely governed without the benefit of any 
legal codes.376 Not until 1954 did the National People’s Congress adopt a constitution 
                                                
373 Interview, 9/13/2010; see also William T. de Bary, et al., SOURCES OF CHINESE 
TRADITION (1960); BODDE & MORRIS (1973); THE GREAT QING CODE, William C. 
Jones, trans. (Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1994). 
374 See COHEN (1968), at 9.  
375 WEI LUO, THE AMENDED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW AND THE CRIMINAL COURT 
RULES OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION, 
INTRODUCTION, AND ANNOTATION (2000), at 3. 
376 See 统一纲领 [Common Program of the Chinese People’s Consultative 
Conference] (the CCP promulgated this document in 1949 to serve as the interim basic 
law of the PRC) (“All laws, decrees and judicial systems of the Kuomintang 
reactionary government oppressing the people are abolished and laws and decrees 
protecting the people shall be enacted and the people’s judicial system shall be set 
up.”); see also Stanley Lubman, “Looking for Law in China,” 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 
  103 
and promulgate a handful of statutes describing the role of courts and procuratorates as 
well as procedural rules governing arrests and detentions.377  
Not long after the PRC adopted its first Constitution, work began on the first 
criminal procedure law of the PRC.378 These efforts, however, which amounted to as 
many as twenty-two drafts of a comprehensive code of more than 200 articles and the 
passage by the NPC of an interim criminal code,379 quickly ended with the arrival the 
Anti-Rightist Campaign (ARC) of 1957, the target of which included many in the 
legal profession.380 The few criminal procedural regulations that did exist were limited 
to internal distribution only (内部) and officials never, with few exceptions, openly 
cited them as binding legal authority.381 Legal drafters who resumed the work of 
compiling a criminal procedure code in the aftermath the ARC—the brief period in 
which Liu Shaoqi assumed many of the day-to-day responsibilities of governance382— 
had to again shelve their work during the disruption caused by the Cultural 
Revolution.383 This effort to develop a comprehensive system of law did not begin 
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again until after the death of Mao Zedong.384  
At the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP, 
convened in 1978, China’s leadership highlighted the immediate necessity of legal 
development in the wake of Mao’s death.385 The central goal of Deng Xiaoping and 
other surviving leaders was to rebuild the shattered legal system in order to provide 
the legal framework necessary for the reconstruction of the socialist economy.386 
Deng, who experienced personally the confusion and destruction of law brought about 
by the Cultural Revolution, maintained that socialist democracy must be both 
“institutionalized and written into law.” He added, “there must be laws to go by; laws 
must be observed and strictly enforced; and breaches of the law must be pursued.” 387 
In the aftermath of the Gang of Four trial, which served as an early attempt to display 
to domestic and international audiences the appearance of criminal procedure,388 the 
National People’s Congress set about drafting China’s first Criminal Procedure Law in 
1979.389 Chinese officials hailed these laws as an important component of China’s 
modernization,390 and foreign observers noted them as part of a sweeping law reform 
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movement.391  
The 1979 version of China’s code of criminal procedure, while comprehensive 
with over 160 articles stipulating procedures for all stages of the justice system (from 
the filing of a case, investigation, prosecution, adjudication, and sentencing), was not a 
true product of post-Mao China. Instead, officials hastily compiled the law from the 
various preliminary drafts prepared in the relative international isolation of the 1950s 
and the relative chaos of the 1960s. As such, it is largely a product of the early, more 
ideological period of PRC history rather than a manifestation of China’s post-Mao 
experimentation with opening and reform.392 This discrepancy is due in large part to its 
being created without the presence or advice of transnational advocates. In 1978, 
China played host to fewer than 240,000 foreigners in total. In 1996, the year before 
the formal passage of the second CPL, China saw as many as 6,744,300 cross its 
border.393 Nor did China in the late 1970s possess the domestic legal elites necessary 
to study and import these foreign innovations into its civil law system. The disruptive 
political campaigns of the Mao period had eviscerated the legal profession, leaving 
China with few experts to contribute to a revised draft. Denounced as the worst kind 
of “stinking intellectuals,” lawyers remained muzzled until Mao’s death.394 By the 
time of the promulgation of the 1979 CPL, China possessed only a few thousand 
defense attorneys. Of the remaining legal practitioners, their principal task was to 
serve the state and aid the public security bureaucracy in the suppression of class 
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enemies.395  
The hastily drafted 1979 CPL endured repeated amendments throughout the 
1980s,396 most of which served to strengthen the position of the state during the 
investigation and adjudication of crime. As at least one Chinese scholar observed, the 
NPC amendments in the 1980s were part of a trend toward reducing the rights of 
defendants while “expanding the power of both the police and judiciary and making 
investigation, prosecution, and adjudication more convenient” for state actors.397 The 
following subsections describe the political, social, and legislative context within 
which the subsequent 1997 reforms developed. As the discussion illustrates, Chinese 
reformers in a number of policy domains studied many of the reforms advocated by 
transnational actors to strengthen defendant rights, despite considerable domestic 
pressures to retain certain limitations on defendant rights and ensure the continued 
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dominance of the state. 
 The Context of the 1997 Criminal Procedure Law 
1. Legal Context: Confusion and Conflicts in Law 
The project of drafting the 1997 CPL occurred amidst unease about finding 
legal solutions to the instability caused by the economic reforms of the 1980s and 
1990s, which included rising inequality, the disruptive migration of rural residents into 
cities to find work,398 and growing public support for “strike hard”(严打) campaigns 
against a perceived spike in crime.399 Anxious public security officials called for 
procedural rules governing the investigation and prosecution of crime that would grant 
them greater flexibility to address this new criminal element. Legal scholars 
responsible for the drafting of the 1997 law expressly noted that the PRC’s economic 
liberalization instigated crimes and criminals not envisioned by the drafters of the 
original 1979 CPL.400 As one scholar involved in the reforms put it, “sixteen years of 
profound changes in all areas of society has left the existing criminal procedure law, 
including the system for defendants, lagging behind and in need of modification” 
(“但是十六年来社会各领域的深刻变化,正使现行刑诉法的许多制度,包括辩护制
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度显得滞后,而需要修改”).401 In addition, fiscal measures of the 1980s and 1990s 
designed to reduce the budgets of most governmental organs in China created strong 
incentives to reduce the costs of pre-trial investigations and of trials themselves by 
limiting procedural obstacles raised by the expansion of defendant rights.402 The 
expansion of criminal defendant rights would thus be especially surprising because, 
unlike civil and administrative channels, in criminal proceedings only the state is 
permitted to initiate proceedings against a defendant. As such, the desired outcome for 
the state is always the same—conviction.  
Another motive prompting the reform of criminal procedure was the need for 
legal clarity. Over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, the 1979 CPL came to conflict 
with subsequently adopted law. The original 1979 CPL, for example, provided for a 
check on government power in the form of 人民陪审员 (“people’s assessors”) to 
work alongside judges during criminal cases (see 1979 CPL, art. 105). As early as 
1982, the revised Constitution removed this requirement by announcing that people’s 
courts “independently exercise the power of adjudication and are not subject to 
interference by administrative organs, social organizations, or individuals.”403 In 1983, 
moreover, the so-called Court Organization Law explicitly made such assessors 
optional.404 In addition, due to the vagueness of many of the 1979 CPL rules—which 
legal drafters assembled in the absence of legal experts—various bureaucracies such 
as the police, procuratorate, and courts issued numerous official interpretations or 
implementing rules that conflicted with provisions of the CPL. In total, the NPC and 
the State Council promulgated 24 separate criminal acts or regulations and 130 
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provisions that supplemented or directly conflicted with the 1979 CPL.405 
By the end of the 1980s the NPC faced a criminal procedure system full of 
internal contradictions and in glaring need for reform.406 In early 1991, the NPC’s 
Criminal Law Office of the Legal Work Committee discussed with law professors at 
China University of Politics and Law (CUPL), located in Beijing, the possibility of 
reforming the increasingly inadequate 1979 CPL.407 In the following year, Chen 
Guangzhong, then President of CUPL and the leading criminal procedure scholar in 
the PRC, received funding from China’s National Social Sciences Fund to study 
foreign criminal procedure systems.408 Selecting Chen, a prominent academic with 
many lines in the transnational stream of legal norms flooding into China, to lead the 
drafting process demonstrated the NPC leadership’s new willingness to incorporate 
domestic and foreign expertise in the legislative drafting process, as well as an 
example of the powerful role played by scholars in the legal development process in 
civil law countries.409  
Chen, tasked with leading the reform effort, and a team of other scholars from 
various elite Beijing law schools were both eager and well positioned to play the role 
of transnational legal broker, much as their scholarly counterparts in European civil 
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law countries had been doing for centuries (see Chapter 2). As Randall Peerenboom 
observed:  
Chen Guangzhong’s criminal law research center…played a pivotal role in 
raising awareness of criminal law standards under international law. 
Academics [in general] have also been instrumental in preparing judicial 
training manuals and developing other methods to help raise the level of 
competence of the judiciary and legal profession, such as holding mock 
trials conducted by actual judges and lawyers from both a common and 
civil law system.410 
Indeed, as estimated by one senior participant in the research team, roughly one-third 
of the team led by Chen had prior overseas experience with foreign law.411 Of the 
remaining members, almost all had PhDs in law and extensive exposure to 
comparative law and the foreign legal community present in Beijing.412  
In addition to elevating the role of scholars in the drafting process, officials 
relaxed their prohibition on the explicit consideration of foreign sources by these 
scholars. As one Chinese participant recounted:  
[L]egislators [and scholars] gave comparatively full consideration to the 
two or three hundred years of valuable experience of the two main legal 
families [common law and civil law] of the world. We did our best to take 
into account [these experiences] and bring our country’s views into line 
with the fruits of common experience and litigation culture, as well as a 
number of international standards. For example, in order to protect the 
litigation rights of defendants, we permitted lawyers to act for the 
defendant at a much earlier stage of the litigation process (during 
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detention by the public security organs). In publicly prosecuted cases, we 
increased the rights of victims to obtain legal representation and legal 
advice. Other examples [were] to transplant the Western presumption of 
innocence and the adversarial system into trial procedure.413  
Most other participants noted their extensive consultation of foreign sources, including 
foreign journals, foreign statutes, and even foreign case law.414 
By the time of the First Plenary Session of the Eighth National People’s 
Congress in 1993, sufficient support for a revised CPL had emerged among the 
various bureaucracies.415 The Criminal Law Department of the Legislative Affairs 
Commission (LAC), the legislative drafting organ of the NPC chiefly responsible for 
establishing a drafting group and responsible for recommending whether or not a draft 
should appear on the agenda of the NPC,416 soon after convened a series of meetings at 
which officials reached a consensus about the need—if not extent—of reform of the 
1979 CPL.417 
In October of 1993 the LAC, a body which can delegate legislative drafting to 
                                                
413 See Fan Chongyi, “The Process of Revising ‘The Criminal Procedure Law of the 
People’s Republic of China’ 1996,” at 4-5. 
414 Interview, 9/13/2010; 9/20/2010; 9/20/2010. 
415 See Fan Chongyi, “The Process of Revising ‘The Criminal Procedure Law of the 
People’s Republic of China’ 1996”; OPENING TO REFORM?, at 15. 
416 The Legislative Affairs Commission, which possesses a research staff of over 200 
people and specializes in various fields of law, including criminal law, reports to the 
NPC Law Committee on proposed draft laws and makes a recommendation as to 
whether or not the draft should be placed on the agenda of the NPC. The Law 
Committee, which consists of representatives from the NPC, many of which are 
appointed by the CCP directly, examines and discusses all draft laws. See Fu Jian, 
“China’s Legislative Affairs Commission,” HONG KONG LAWYER 38 (Apr. 1994); 
Peter Howard Corne, “Creation and Application of Law in the PRC,” 50 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 369-443 (2002); Marc Rosenberg, “The Chinese Legal System Made Easy: A 
Survey of the Structure of Government, Creation of Legislation, and the Judicial 
System Under the Constitution and Major Statutes of the People’s Republic of China,” 
9 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 225 (2001).  
417 Interview, 9/13/2010. 
  112 
experts, formally tasked the team of scholars led by Chen to compose a first draft of 
the revised CPL. In the meantime, as one participant recalled, these scholars traveled 
to the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, 
Korea, and Russia to research various criminal procedure systems of both civil and 
common law countries.418 In addition, with the financial assistance of the Ford 
Foundation, they convened several conferences in Beijing with foreign experts such as 
Jerome Cohen, all of whom, one participant recalled, were extremely influential in 
shaping the views of the research team.419 Especially influential, several participants 
noted, were the American experts and the sources they supplied.420 This influence was 
due in large part to the linguistic skills of the participants. While some spoke German, 
Japanese, and Russian, most spoke and read English.421 Moreover, another participant 
recalled, at least seventy percent of these scholars already had legal experiences 
abroad, primarily in the United States.422 The more foreign exposure these scholars 
had, she noted, the more likely they were to incorporate it explicitly—with no attempt 
to ‘localize’’ it—into their suggestions for criminal procedure reform.423  
Upon its return to China, the research team submitted to the central organ of 
the CCP a report of the views of various leading legal scholars on suggested reforms 
to the CPL in a so-called “Report of Important Matters.” By July of the following 
year, Professor Chen submitted a draft, complete with annotated commentary, to the 
LAC.424 This version formed the basis of the LAC’s subsequent draft, released as a 
                                                
418 Interview, 9/20/2010. 
419 Interview, 9/20/2010.  
420 Interview, 9/20/2010. 
421 Id. 
422 Interview, 9/20/2010. 
423 Id. 
424 See 中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法修改建议稿与论证 [ANNOTATED PROPOSED 
DRAFT OF THE REVISED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA] (Chen Guangzhong & Yan Duan, eds., 1995); Fan, “The Process of Revising 
‘The Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China’ 1996,” at 2. 
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“draft for comment” (“征求意见稿”) in 1995.425 In January 1996, the Standing 
Committee of the NPC delegated Wang Hanbin, Ren Jianxin, and Luo Gan to confer 
with the leadership cadres of the Political Committee of the Central Committee. 
According to one participant, very little of the proposed final draft generated much 
debate.426 As another recalled, the officials to whom they reported had very little legal 
experience and were quite open to the suggestions raised by the research team,427 even 
to new ideas such as the presumption of innocence and a system akin to plea 
bargaining.428 The revised draft was then submitted to the 18th Meeting of the Eighth 
Standing Committee of the NPC for final review. President Jiang Zemin formally 
promulgated the final draft in Presidential Order #64 and the law went into effect on 
Jan. 1, 1997. 
2. Legal Family as Legal Structure: Global Advocates, 
Local Scholars  
The context of China’s legal family also sheds light on the conditions under 
which China’s CPL reform took place. China’s openness to foreign legal influence, 
which occurs at the highest levels,429 stems in part from the fact that the Chinese legal 
system derives from civil law origins and is today created by a relatively small handful 
                                                
425 At most points of this legislative process, the draft revision of the CPL was 
scrutinized by the CCP. As Murray Scot Tanner has observed, CCP rules provide that 
all “important laws” (“重要法律”) are to be reviewed by the entire Politburo or its 
Standing Committee before being submitted to the NPC. See Murray Scot Tanner, 
“How a Bill Becomes a Law in China: Stages and Processes in Lawmaking,” CHINA 
QUARTERLY 39-64 (1995). Under the Constitution, the CPL exists as a so-called Basic 
Law, which is the most authoritative form of law and must be enacted by the full NPC 
rather than merely the Standing Committee of the NPC. See 1982 CONSTITUTION, arts. 
62(3) and 67(2). 
426 Interview, 9/13/2010. 
427 Interview, 9/20/2010. 
428 Interview, 9/20/2010. 
429 See KENNETH LIEBERTHAL & MICHEL OKSENBERG, POLICY MAKING IN CHINA: 
LEADERS, STRUCTURES, AND PROCESSES 31 (1988). 
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elites,430 each with varying degrees of legal expertise.431 The Politburo Standing  
Committee, for example, the de facto highest political decision-making body in the 
country, has never included a single member educated in law. Moreover, less than one 
percent of the 3,000 delegates to the national legislature are lawyers.432 As one 
participant with extensive experience as a legal representative of international 
commercial interests noted, “legislators do not have the relevant experience to write 
the law themselves.”433 In addition, she continued, “there’s very little for them to draw 
from in China, so they turn to attorneys or scholars from abroad [for advice].”434  
These foreign attorneys and scholars, eager to impress upon and “specifically 
target” such inexperienced domestic actors tasked with developing and drafting 
China’s laws, currently constitute a sizable international and transnational epistemic 
community in Beijing.435 Their efforts range from lobbying directly for certain legal 
                                                
430 This “handful” does not refer to members of the larger body—comprised of at least 
eleven different sources—that oversees the increasingly large number of non-
statutory, administrative or regulatory laws. Over the past decades, administrative 
regulations have become a major component of China’s legal system. These 
regulations amount to more than twice the number of laws enacted by the National 
People’s Congress. See William P. Alford & Yuanyuan Shen, “Limits of Law in 
Addressing China’s Environmental Dilemma,” 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125 (1997). This 
large body of domestic legal actors , however, are similarly open to the influences of 
transnational legal advocates. In addition to the recent Administrative Litigation Law, 
which introduced a more pluralist approach to regulation, the very drafters of that law, 
including Luo Haocai, studied at Columbia University under Walter Gelhorn, the 
principal drafter of the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act. See R. Randle Edwards, 
“Thirty Years of Legal Exchange with China: The Columbia Law School Role,” 23 
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 3 (2009), at 12. 
431 The top tier of China’s government is filled primarily with technocrats. The Law 
Committee of the National People’s Congress, for example, currently includes only 
one official with legal training, Xu Xianming. His colleagues are primarily engineers, 
physicists, and former military officials. See CHINA VITAE, LAW COMMITTEE OF THE 
NPC, available at http://www.chinavitae.com/institution/PC/1610.208.   
432 See Alford, “A Second Great Wall?,” at 202. 
433 Interview, 9/14/2010. 
434 Id. 
435 See id. at 200; see also Andrew Mertha, “Shifting Legal and Administrative 
Goalposts: Chinese Bureaucracies, Foreign Actors, and the Evolution of China’s Anti-
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reforms to draft laws published for comment to shaping indirectly Chinese legal 
discourse through the socialization of new attorneys and scholars.436 One respondent 
cited as a recent example of direct lobbying for reform the recent Partnership Act, 
which saw the inclusion of many aspects of U.S. corporate law desired by foreign 
commercial interests. Demonstrating the indirect effect of the transnational legal 
community, she cited the socialization of Chinese attorneys by the presence of 
Western law firms. Such gradual socialization, she noted, has thoroughly altered the 
constitutive notions among Chinese attorneys of how law firms are supposed to 
function, as well as how the law itself operates, including the nature and form of the 
contract.437 Figure 3.1, pictured below illustrates the basic structure of the Chinese 
legislative process and the types of actors endeavoring to shape the outcome of 
Chinese legal development.  
As a civil law country, in which legal innovation falls more to legal scholars 
than it does judges, China’s expanding pool of law professors and legal experts played 
a central role in the shaping of CPL reform and the introduction of foreign norms. 
Indeed, while most law reform is instigated by government officials, a considerable 
amount stems from active legal scholars seeking to set the reform agenda.438 
                                                                                                                                       
Counterfeiting Enforcement Regime,” in ENGAGING THE LAW IN CHINA: STATE, 
SOCIETY, AND POSSIBILITIES FOR JUSTICE 161 (Neil J. Diamant, Stanley B. Lubman, & 
Kevin O’Brien eds., 2005) (noting the “growing importance of foreign actors within 
the context of China’s legal development.”). This considerable variety among the 
types of foreign actors involved, which includes supranational, international, and 
transnational variants, allows for controls on the character of the foreign actor. 
Examples include supranational organizations such as the United Nations 
Development Programme, the World Bank, the E.U.-China Human Rights Dialogue; 
international efforts such as the U.S.-China Rule of Law Initiative; and transnational 
groups such as the Yale China Law Center, American Bar Association Asian Law 
Initiatives Council, Ford Foundation, Asia Foundation, American Society of 
International Law, and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit. 
436 Interview, 9/14/2010. 
437 Interview, 9/14/2010. 
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Figure 3.1. PRC Government Structure and Legal Advocates439 
 The increasing independence of scholars and experts during the early 1990s 
meant the drafting of the 1997 CPL was, unlike the drafting of its predecessor, far 
more open to the introduction of foreign legal norms via a transnational epistemic 
community committed to China’s legal development. Indeed, according to various 
participants in the reform process, the contribution of academics to the shape of 
reform was far more significant than has been described in some scholarship 
concerning the process of legal reform in China.440 In many instances, the public 
discussion of legal reform does not occur until it is clear what the central leadership of 
                                                
439 Figure adapted from MURRAY SCOT TANNER, THE POLITICS OF LAWMAKING IN 
POST-MAO CHINA: INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES, AND DEMOCRATIC PROSPECTS (1999). 
440 Interview, 9/13/2010; 9/20/2010; 9/20/2010. 
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the party prefers as the outcome. In the case of the Labor Law, for instance, public 
discussion was curtailed until party leaders had decided how to proceed.441  
In the case of the reform of the criminal procedure system, however, 
participants in the mid 1990s criminal procedure reform recalled being relatively 
unconstrained with respect to discussing certain aspects of the law, especially those 
issues that were not already points of concern in Chinese political discourse. Thus, 
while the legal epistemic community in Beijing could not advocate openly for reform 
of the death penalty in the pages of Chinese law journals,442 they could discuss more 
novel and entrenched practices such as the presumption of innocence, the right to an 
attorney, adversarial reforms, and plea bargaining.443 While such discussions were 
somewhat rare, it is still no surprise that the presumption of innocence was discussed 
openly in academic journals as early as 1980.444 Discussions of plea-bargaining and 
summary procedure started later that same year.445 Analyses of adversarial systems 
followed soon after in 1982.446 The following subsection describes the creation and 
growth of this epistemic community in the years preceding the promulgation of the 
1997 CPL.  
a. The Development of a Legal Epistemic 
Community in the PRC 
The 1980s was an active period in the development of China’s legal 
community. During this period, the PRC began to experiment with various 
international human rights institutions and instruments. China joined the United 
Nations Human Rights Commission and acceded to various human rights treaties, 
including the Convention Against Torture, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
                                                
441 Correspondence with Daniela Stockmann, 9/29/2010. 
442 Interview, 9/7/2010. 
443 Interview, 9/13/2010; 9/20/2010; 9/20/2010. 
444 See 康树华, 苏维埃刑事诉讼法中的“无罪推定”原则, 1 国外法学  (1980). 
445 See 陈建国, 日本司法制度简介, 4 国外法学 (1980). 
446 See 汪纲翔, 民事诉讼中举证责任问题小议, 8 法学 (1982). 
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and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women.447 These international commitments, and the socializing among transnational 
advocates that they brought about, did much to expand the vocabulary of China’s legal 
elite. As early as 1989, legal scholars were publishing calls to “revise and perfect” 
(“修改与完善”) the 1979 CPL to meet global standards.448  
In addition to China’s state-level engagement with international treaty 
organizations, which created an immediate demand for international legal expertise, 
and in the face of widespread international condemnation after 1989, the CCP lifted its 
informal ban on domestic research and publications on human rights issues. To bring 
“order out of chaos” (“拨乱反正”), Beijing permitted a much broader comparative 
search for legal solutions and, as criminal procedure scholar Chen Ruihua described it, 
“the forbidden zone of legal research shrank” (“法学研究的‘禁区’日益缩小”).449 
Subsequent scholarship scoured the globe for foreign theories of civil and political 
rights.450 Legal scholars began actively looking and traveling overseas—to France, 
Germany, Italy, Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, and elsewhere—to 
examine how other states administered criminal justice.451  
                                                
447 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.; 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention 
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448 See 法学 [LEGAL STUDIES], 1–6 (1989), at 125. 
449 陈瑞华 [Chen Ruihua], “二十世纪中国之刑事诉讼法学” [20th Century Chinese 
Criminal Procedure], 中外法学 [PEKING UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL], (June 1997). 
450 See, e.g., Pang Sen, 当代人权ABC [THE ABCS OF CONTEMPORARY HUMAN 
RIGHTS] Institute of Law, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, eds. (Social Sciences 
Documentary Press, Beijing: 1993); 西方人权学说 [WESTERN THEORIES OF HUMAN 
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451 Interview, 9/20/2010; see also Sida Liu & Terence C. Halliday, “Recursivity in 
Legal Change: Lawyers and Reforms of China’s Criminal Procedure Law,” 34 LAW & 
SOCIAL INQUIRY 911, 919 (2009). 
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In this newly expanded intellectual environment, however slight the expansion, 
Chinese universities quickly became active conduits of foreign legal norms by 
convening conferences dedicated to the subject of comparative criminal procedure law 
at which members of an active transnational movement to reform China’s legal system 
participated alongside Chinese scholars.452 Members of this movement included: 
liaisons from supranational organizations such as the United Nations,453 the World 
Bank,454 and the European Union-China Human Rights Dialogue;455 representatives of 
international efforts such as the U.S.-China Rule of Law Initiative456 and the German 
aid agency Gemeinschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit;457 and members of 
                                                
452 Interview, 9/20/2010; see also Cui Min, 中国刑事诉讼法的新发展—
刑事诉讼发修改的全面回顾 [NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA’S CRIMINAL 
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and contract. See, e.g., Tim Hanstad & Guiping Lu, “Rural Land Use Rights: Property 
or Contract Rights?,” in Hanstad & Schwarzwalder ed., CHINA'S RURAL LAND 
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456 See Paul Gewirtz, “The U.S.-China Rule of Law Initiative,” 11 W. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 602 (2003); Matthew Stephenson, “A Trojan Horse in China?” in PROMOTING 
THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD, Thomas Carothers ed. (2006) (discussing the China Rule 
of Law Initiative started under Clinton), at 191. 
457 The GTZ operates a full-time office in Beijing complete with several lawyer-
staffers. On GTZ’s legal reform efforts in China, see: http://www.law-reform.cn/ (last 
visited: April 29, 2010). While GTZ has operated in China for many years, Gerhard 
Schroder and Jiang Zemin did not formalize the Rule of Law Dialogue with the 
Germany’s Federal Ministry of Justice until 1999. See Press Office of the Federal 
Ministry of Justice, available at: http://www.bmj.bund.de/, (last visited: April 29, 
2010). 
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transnational groups such as various national bar associations,458 the Ford 
Foundation,459 and the Asia Foundation.460  
These nascent bi- and multilateral linkages to the global legal community 
established during the 1980s resembled similar efforts by international epistemic 
communities to affect outcomes and alter the balance of power among domestic 
groups in other policy domains, including Chinese attitudes toward issues as varied as 
the environment,461 gender rights,462 and foreign policy.463 These linkages, many of 
                                                
458 The American Bar Association began sending delegations to China through its 
Asian Law Initiatives Council in 1978, the first led by Stanley Lubman. See ABA Rule 
of Law Initiative: China, available at: http://www.abanet.org/rol/asia/china.html (last 
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E. MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL 
LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE (2006).  
463 See 国际政治理论探索在中国 [EXPLORATIONS OF THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS IN CHINA], (Shanghai People’s Publisher: 1998) (this book was itself a 
compilation of essays prompted by an international conference of IR scholars 
convened in Beijing in 1991); 新时期中国国际关系理论 研究 [RESEARCH ON 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES IN CHINA’S NEW ERA] (1999); GERALD CHAN, 
CHINESE PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
ANALYSIS (1999); Samuel Kim, “China and the United Nations,” in CHINA JOINS THE 
WORLD: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS (Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg, eds., 
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which were sought after by Chinese officials eager to import expertise on pressing 
legal and foreign policy issues, had a substantial effect on China’s epistemic 
community of foreign policy and legal scholars.464 China’s participation in the U.N. 
Conference on Disarmament and the U.N. Human Rights Commission, to cite just two 
examples, socialized a steady stream of Geneva-trained arms control and human rights 
experts in China that in turn affected Chinese policy throughout the 1980s and 
1990s.465 As Evan Medeiros recently observed, this socialization of Chinese 
policymakers has continued at an even greater rate in the past few years. China now 
enjoys an arms control community numbering in the hundreds and located across a 
range of governmental bureaucracies.466 In a way similar to the expansion and 
socialization of China’s arms control community that Medeiros describes, the 
transnational socialization of China’s legal community likewise developed over three 
stages—creation, engagement, and professionalization.  
i. Creation 
During the first stage of China’s contemporary legal development, the arrival 
of foreign legal expertise was a product of two domestic and international factors: 1.) 
the immediate need for expertise stemming from the commitment of post-Mao leaders 
to formalize China’s damaged legal system and the initiation of the ‘open door’ 
                                                                                                                                       
1999), at 74; THE MAKING OF CHINESE FOREIGN SECURITY POLICY IN THE ERA OF 
REFORM, 1978-2000 (David M. Lampton ed., 2001), at 284; Song Xinning, “Building 
International Relations Theory with Chinese Characteristics,” 10 JOURNAL OF 
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465 See KIM (1999), at 74. 
466 See EVAN S. MEDEIROS, RELUCTANT RESTRAINT: THE EVOLUTION OF CHINA’S 
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  122 
policy;467 and 2.) the efforts of foreign law scholars and practitioners eager to learn, 
teach, and exploit new business opportunities in China.  
In an effort to improve China’s position in the international system, one of 
Deng Xiaoping’s first moves was to reverse what Rosemary Foot described as China’s 
“separation from the main currents of international discourse.”468 Indeed, by the late 
1970s, less than one-third of officials serving on the Supreme People’s Court had any 
legal training, let alone training in foreign and international law.469 To join the 
international dialogue, Beijing recognized the need for an expert class of legal 
scholars. The lack of legal expertise was first addressed with the introduction of the 
entrance examination system for universities. To supplement the return of higher 
education, Beijing also, for the first time, opened its doors to foreign legal experts. 
Over the first half of the 1980s, foreign legal scholars entered China on the heels of 
pioneers like Jerome Cohen, who was invited to live in China and lecture on the 
fundamentals of U.S. law in 1979.470 Cohen’s successful arrival in Beijing to teach law 
and serve as the first Westerner permitted to practice law since 1949 was made 
possible by the initiative of Xiao Yang, then head of the Beijing Economic 
Commission and eager to improve the legal resources of China’s growing number of 
                                                
467 This is not to say foreign lawyers had no success in affecting policy in China in the 
previous decade. U.S. lawyers were instrumental in the founding of the U.S.-China 
Trade, Inc. (the precursor to the U.S.-China Business Council), the first NGO to 
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commerce officials.471 On Cohen’s coattails, foreign legal scholars came from 
jurisdictions as diverse as the United States, Japan, West Germany, France, and the 
Netherlands.472 In a review of transnational legal exchanges with China written in 
1985, Randle Edwards noted that the PRC enthusiastically hosted visits of legal 
scholars from prestigious U.S. law schools and proved eager to “train a body of 
Chinese lawyers familiar with U.S. law and legal procedures.”473 Despite the lack of 
any formalized legal structure, these foreign lawyers also opened law firms and 
quickly emerged as the primary source of legal representation in major transactions.474 
According to one twenty-five-year veteran of the foreign legal community in Beijing, 
as early as the 1980s foreign lawyers were actively solicited by government officials 
to offer technical assistance in legal development and legislative drafting.475 “In the 
wake of the Cultural Revolution,” he noted, “they were shorthanded” when it came to 
domestic legal expertise. “Officials,” he continued, “would bring [foreign lawyers] in 
and subject them to a Socratic dialogue” in order to better understand and absorb 
foreign legal tools. In the absence of both domestic staff and legal knowledge, foreign 
lawyers were thus well positioned to introduce large amounts of foreign law. It is 
likely due to this vulnerability, he observed, that the PRC’s first Labor Contract Law 
so largely mirrored Anglo-American “at-will” legal traditions.476 
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In addition to this newfound openness to foreign visitors, Chinese scholars also 
began going abroad for continued legal education and returning with new legal 
solutions to address the governance concerns of China’s leadership. Sponsored by the 
U.S.-based Committee on Legal Educational Exchange with China (CLEEC) and the 
PRC Ministries of Education and Justice, with funding from the Chinn Ho, Ford, and 
Luce Foundations, as well as the National Endowment for Democracy, as many as 
seventy-five Chinese law professors from the top Chinese law faculties participated in 
legal training in the United States between 1983 and 1988, including LL.M. programs 
at Columbia University, New York University, and elsewhere. Other Chinese scholars 
attended law schools in Japan, Canada, Europe, and Australia.477 By the late 1990s, as 
many as 250 Chinese academics were provided a U.S. legal education under the 
sponsorship of CLEEC.478  
Aided by their extensive exposure to foreign law schools, legal scholars, and 
legal doctrine, Chinese legal experts supported by CLEEC developed into a 
formidable source of judicial expertise in China ready to challenge the entrenched 
positions of the highly controlled state institutions.479 Indeed, by 2002, students from 
the CLEEC program headed at least six of China’s top law schools.480 Eminent 
scholars such as Gong Xiangrui of Peking University and Wang Mingyang of China 
University of Political Science and Law pursued advanced legal education overseas 
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and brought back with them novel American doctrines of due process and 
administrative procedure.481 It was even noted by several participants that the legal 
reforms by the 1997 CPL drafters were deeply affected by their common-law 
training.482 This biased exposure also accounts for why reforms in the field of criminal 
law include so many common-law terms, including intent, reckless, knowledge, 
negligence, foreseeability, and causation.483 
In addition to these early efforts, the State Council’s Bureau of Legislative 
Affairs (BLA) reached out to the United Nations Development Programme to request 
a foreign consultant to assist the training of Chinese legislative drafters in foreign law. 
The extensive training that resulted included three summer workshops involving as 
many as 300 BLA drafters and many foreign advisors, primarily from the United 
States. In addition, 180 participants were sent on two-week overseas study tours and 
50 more were sent to a 4-month course in law at Boston University.484 
ii. Engagement 
Overlapping with the creation of China’s transnational legal community in the 
decade following Deng’s ascension to power, China’s legal community began 
formally engaging with the transnational epistemic community of legal scholars in the 
late 1980s.  Central to the institutionalization of this engagement was the explosion in 
the number of law schools in China, rising from as few as two in 1977 to more than 
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100 by the time of the 1997 revisions.485 China’s national pool of only 600 law 
students quickly numbered in the thousands.486 These institutions and their students, 
both of which attracted considerable attention from the transnational legal epistemic 
community, served as nodes of norm diffusion by engaging deeply with various 
foreign bar associations, funding organizations such as the Ford Foundation, and 
numerous other non-state actors. China law scholars from American institutions like 
Jerome Cohen, Stanley Lubman, and William Alford, were particularly well suited 
and eager to engage with their Chinese counterparts, having already invested years in 
educational exchanges with Taiwan.487 Some of their counterparts in Beijing, 
including Rui Mu, were eager to reciprocate with visits to the United States. Rui’s 
post-Mao visit to Columbia University was his first since 1948.488  Such efforts to 
engage the Chinese legal academics achieved even greater penetration with the 
support of CLEEC, who financed the creation of law libraries and legal information in 
print and electronic form during this period.489 
Like Rui, by the mid-to-late 1980s, rank-and-file members of the Legislative 
Affairs Commission were also sent abroad to observe their foreign counterparts.490 In 
addition, a small number of foreign nongovernmental organizations were allowed to 
form institutional relationships and exchanges with Chinese think tanks that housed 
dedicated legal research programs such as the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
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(CASS).491 In 1988, the Ford Foundation, with its well-funded program dedicated to 
comparative legal research, became the first international NGO to establish an office 
in China.492 The following year, the U.K. Department for International Development 
initiated a twenty-year project to train Chinese attorneys in the United Kingdom. As 
agreed to in a memorandum of understanding—signed by the Ministry of Justice, the 
All China Lawyers Association, the Office of the Lord Chancellor, and the China Law 
Council of the British Law Society—the School of Oriental and African Studies in 
London accepts fifteen Chinese attorneys each year for classroom training and 
practical experience in the offices of a British solicitor and barrister.493 Through this 
program alone as many as 280 Chinese lawyers have gained extensive international 
legal experience. In this way, Beijing in the 1980s was answering Chen Guangzhong’s 
early calls to “fill the gaps in Chinese criminal procedure law by learning from foreign 
criminal procedure law” (“提出通过借鉴国外刑事诉讼法学的理论成果填补中国 
刑事诉讼法学基本理论空白的想法”).494 As the dean of one of China’s most 
prestigious law schools noticed, this experience had a direct effect on the development 
of Chinese law: “It was obvious that those who went abroad have drawn from those 
experiences [in their legislative drafting work].”495  
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Additional European efforts to expose China to foreign law were later 
pronounced by Article 177.2 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 
which declares that it is community policy to develop the rule of law around the 
world.496 Europe’s early efforts to do so then expanded dramatically after the passage 
of Council Resolution 443/92, a resolution establishing financial and technical legal 
assistance to developing Asian states.497 Europe’s goal of engaging and persuading 
their Chinese counterparts in matters of legal reform was made transparent by the 
statements of EU officials: “China’s political importance makes its stability of great 
concern both to its neighbors and to the world community at large. We believe that 
this stability is best served by political, economic, and social reform in line with 
international norms.”498 As David Lampton noted with respect to China’s IR 
community, such an increasing exposure to foreign legal advocates led China’s 
community of legal scholars to “search ever more broadly for information upon which 
to fashion decisions.”499 The comparable professionalization of China’s legal scholars 
and the expanding exposure to foreign law meant that “the instruments of this search 
are multiplying, as is the distance from the Center at which information is being 
sought.”500 In addition to these European agents, U.S. groups established in Beijing 
and providing technical Rule of Law assistance include International Bridges to 
Justice, the American Bar Association’s Rule of Law Initiative, the Natural Resources 
Defense Council, the Carter Foundation, and numerous others. The assistance these 
groups came to offer ranged from legal briefing techniques to the drafting of full 
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provisions of law.501 
To entrench this expanding pool of domestic legal expertise still further, the 
early 1990s witnessed the rapid expansion of China’s legal educational institutions, 
much of which was modeled on American law schools. In 1993, officials from the 
Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Education pooled their efforts to improve legal 
education in the PRC through a study of various foreign legal education programs, but 
most especially the American juris doctorate graduate degree program.502 As Huo 
Xiandan explains, legal reformers were keen to “draw lessons [for China’s juris master 
model] from the success of legal education in the United States” (“注意借鉴 
美国的JD教育的成功 经验”).503 The Academic Degree Committee of the State 
Council, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Justice approved the model in 
1993. By that year, China’s efforts to professionalize its legal community amounted to 
as many as 135 law schools or departments, 114 schools of higher education providing 
law training, and 58 judicial and public security schools.504 This effort to 
“Americanize” its legal education system has continued, most recently with the 
imposition of certain requirements for legal faculty in China. In 2010, for example, the 
Beijing University of Transnational Law announced the requirement that candidate 
professors have a “native fluency” in English and hold a JD degree, which as few as 
three countries outside the United States award. Such a requirement, which was 
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possibly introduced in order to secure ABA accreditation, nonetheless entrenches the 
role of legal scholars serving as conduits of foreign law in China. 
iii. Professionalization 
In the final stage in the development of China’s transnational epistemic 
community of legal scholars, the late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed the 
professionalization of a “cosmopolitan”505 community of legal elites with access to 
both foreign legal expertise as well as domestic decision-makers. Attempts to 
professionalize this elite corps began with the introduction of the National Bar 
Examination in 1987. However, given the persistently low passage rates among takes 
of this exam (less than seven percent in 2002),506 many of China’s law graduates went 
on to non-attorney positions in various corners of the Chinese bureaucracy, thereby 
diffusing this legal knowledge throughout the bureaucratic apparatus.507 Just as in 
Evan Medeiros’s description of the professionalization of China’s epistemic 
community of international relations experts, these graduates, trained in various 
aspects of law, spread out through the halls of various powerful branches of 
government, including the judiciary, procuracy, the Ministries of Justice and Public 
Security, NPC and State Council support offices like the Legislative Affairs 
Commission and Legislative Affairs Office, as well as the academic community. As 
one respondent similarly noted, many members of LAC, the body primarily 
responsible for legislative drafting, often have advanced legal degrees, extensive legal 
experience abroad, and considerable exposure to the transnational legal actors that 
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flock to Beijing.508 
With the continued institutionalization of transnational legal exchanges among 
legal professionals in China, the socialization of China’s leading law scholars overseas 
has likewise continued apace. Among the top ten law schools in China today,509 at 
least eight are directed by deans with extensive experience overseas in the form of 
serving as visiting scholars (7),510 publishing in English international law journals 
(3),511 or receiving a legal education (2).512 The transnational socialization of Chinese 
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legal practitioners has likewise become entrenched during the professionalization of 
China’s legal community. With large Anglo-American law firms having led the way 
during the resurrection of the legal profession in China, the Anglo-American culture of 
lawyering has very much taken root among Chinese legal professionals in Beijing and 
elsewhere in China.513 The early influence of Western law firms, one American lawyer 
in Beijing noted, established a “percolation of knowledge” about common law legal 
traditions and ways of lawyering. “We were there before they were,” he noted, “and so 
we have very much affected what has come since.”514 
The professionalization and stabilization of such an extensive body of foreign 
legal knowledge in China, spread broadly throughout the politico-legal system, was 
made possible in large part by the settling of the regime’s commitment to economic 
development and the requisite transnational legal knowledge such growth requires.515 
This commitment, however, which was entrenched by Deng’s nanxun and the 
subsequent leadership of figures such as Zhu Rongji, was visible even as early as 1985 
with the decision of the State Council to conform its copyright system to two principal 
international copyright conventions, the Berne Convention and the Universal 
Copyright Convention. During this lead up to the ultimate promulgation of the law in 
1990, the drafting committee of the National Copyright Administration solicited the 
advice of several international legal experts and even submitted a draft for comment to 
the leadership of the World Intellectual Property Organization.516  
Similar Chinese legal development projects supported by expertise abroad 
included the first legal aid clinic modeled on the U.S. law school format funded by the 
Ford Foundation in 1992, three years after the opening of their first branch office in 
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China.517 This type of clinical legal training, often described as an originally American 
phenomenon, quickly spread among Chinese law schools around the country.518 Other 
foreign legal development efforts in China included: Ford Foundation grants to 
improve the law-drafting capabilities of the Legislative Affairs Commission; 
exchanges led by the U.S.-Asia Law Institute to provide drafting advice to the 
Ministry of Labor, which sought assistance in the drafting of a forthcoming general 
labor law; and formalized transnational relationships with the Ministry of Justice, the 
Supreme People’s Court, the mainland-based International Academy of Trial Lawyers, 
and the All China Lawyers Association, which functions as China’s bar association.519 
These efforts were given further support in the mid 1990s with the establishment in 
the United States of the rule-of-law initiative and the creation of the post of special 
coordinator for global rule of law within the U.S. Department of State.520 Together, 
respondents noted, the efforts of these foreign organizations—which range from 
matters as diverse as criminal law, raised by advocates from the Yale China Law 
Center, to private and commercial law—have shaped the legal mindsets of China’s 
legal elite.521  
Finally, awareness of foreign law among China’s legal professionals has been 
entrenched still further by the extensive overseas training of China’s next generation 
of legal scholars, a generation which has, one member noted, “has enjoyed far more 
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opportunities to go abroad.”522 As estimated by another member of this generation, 
who himself studied in Europe, roughly fifty percent of China’s elite legal scholars go 
abroad for advanced legal study.523 Another member noted that, if disaggregated, as 
many as ninety percent of top law professors younger than fifty years of age have 
overseas legal experience.524 Moreover, one respondent surmised, at least ninety 
percent of scholars involved in legal drafting speak and read English. This great 
exposure to foreign law, he noted, results in a greater appreciation for and acceptance 
of foreign legal norms.525 Indeed, various respondents noted that they had incorporated 
the law learned abroad into their work at home.526 One respondent described her 
experiences as a visiting scholar at the Vern Institute of Justice, a New York-based 
criminal procedure think tank and advocate of empirical legal studies. This experience, 
she noted, resulted in the adoption of a pilot law project in China and has attracted 
positive responses from Beijing officials. In addition, she recalled being exposed by 
Vern colleagues to U.S. jurisprudence on criminal law and mental health. This 
exposure, she noted, may significantly affect upcoming reforms adopted in the wake 
of the recent “cop killer” event in Shanghai. Such foreign influence continues after 
these professionals return home to China and continue to read U.S. legal publications 
through Hein Online, which nearly every respondent noted as a significant influence, 
and various foreign legal blogs, which Chinese scholars view through internet 
providers that evade the government-enforced firewall.527  
The domestic impact of such exposure of China’s legal elite to foreign law was 
recently made clear at the highest levels of the Chinese court system when the 
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Supreme People’s Court was faced with a novel civil claim sought by a woman whose 
life was parodied in a television drama. With no clear Chinese law providing for such 
protections of primacy, the Court invited various scholars to brief the them on how to 
proceed. One such scholar, who had extensive experience with U.S. jurisprudence, 
introduced novel legal arguments from U.S. case law favoring reputational and 
privacy rights. The Court, persuaded by the scholar, found in favor of the plaintiff.528 
In another recent instance, courts have begun issuing restraining orders to help combat 
domestic violence against women. The arrival of this legal device in China is largely 
due to the efforts of Chen Min, an attorney affiliated with a think tank attached to the 
Supreme People’s Court and who studied in Canada, where she was first exposed to 
such injunctions.529 Yet another recent example of foreign legal influence can be seen 
in pilot programs led by Chinese scholars of U.S. environmental law scholarship to 
relax the standing rules applied by certain environmental tribunals. As one director of 
a transnational legal assistance organization described, “a lot if not all cases [of 
successful reform] comes in part from exposure [to international and foreign law].”530 
The following section examines the writings of Chinese legal observers during the 
course of this professionalization and sheds light on how foreign law was discussed in 
the years prior to the reform of China’s criminal procedure laws. 
 
IV. Legal Discourse in Chinese Periodicals 
During the lengthy process of reforming China’s criminal procedure law, legal 
journals throughout China published articles both supportive of and resistant to the 
prospect of expanding defendant rights. Figure 3.2, which depicts frequency counts of 
articles concerning the eight key criminal procedure reforms that were published in 
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Chinese legal and political journals, presents a useful comparison illustrating how the 
political landscape surrounding criminal procedure changed in the years prior to the 
passage of the 1997 CPL.  
  
Figure 3.2. Legal Discourse in Post-Mao China 
The graphs above depict articles related to criminal procedure that include in-
depth discussions of particular policies.531 With respect to “points of concern,” one can 
see that Chinese legal commentators participated in active discussions of certain 
policies throughout the entire post-Mao period, even in the years preceding the arrival 
of transnational legal advocates in the late 1980s. These contested policies qua points 
of concern—death penalty, detention, the exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence, 
and the right to appeal—generated debate as early as the passage of the 1979 CPL and 
continued all the way through the to the eventual revision of that law in 1997. The 
persistence of this discussion suggests that once legislators were presented a draft of 
the 1997 CPL, those resistant to pro-defendant reforms could draw from the extensive 
vocabulary of opposition generated over the previous years.  
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With respect to novel polices, however, it is clear that those policies that did 
ultimately survive the drafting process—the presumption of innocence, the right to 
legal aid, plea bargaining, and adversarial procedure—were far less salient in China’s 
legal discourse in the years prior to CPL reform. These novel policies and challenges 
to entrenched practices do not often appear in the pages of journals until the early 
1990s when domestic and transnational advocates place them on the agenda. 
Opponents of these reforms thus had little extant discourse with which to resist those 
policies and the persuasive foreign reasoning raised in support of them.532 One 
respondent directly familiar with legal drafting in China noted that it is these novel 
issues that attract the most thorough considerations of foreign law. “We always,” he 
noted, “resort to foreign law when presented with a new issue.”533 
Before conducting a more rigorous content analysis of Chinese legal discourse 
in the following Chapter, it is worth first conducting an additional plausibility probe 
through a manual survey of these Chinese legal periodicals to see if the two-tailed 
model of diffusion supplies any analytical leverage in the context of Chinese criminal 
procedure reform. The following subsections examine the discourse of legal analyses 
of criminal procedure law published in major Chinese publications prior to the 1997 
CPL reform. As Allen Carlson similarly noted in the context of Chinese 
interpretations of the norm of sovereignty, such a survey of influential publications 
provides a useful discursive measure of how elite political actors viewed Chinese legal 
reform at the time.534 Moreover, by examining the observations of China’s leading 
legal scholars and practitioners in the original Chinese, and intended for Chinese 
audiences, such a survey avoids the selection problem of reading only English-
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language publications that are repackaged for foreign audiences. As Daniel Lynch has 
observed, such primary source material better meets the call by Thomas Christensen, 
Alastair Iain Johnston, and Robert Ross to “see China and the world the way that 
influential Chinese see China and the world.”535 While of course, Lynch notes, “there 
is no straight line from what elites say and write to what China will actually do,” a 
survey of Chinese language materials by the relevant Chinese actors nonetheless 
reveals important insights into what the political environment is actually like.536 As 
described in the subsections below, the writings of Chinese legal observers further 
suggest a tension between extant discourse and the adoption of foreign legal norms 
and confirm, as one Chinese lawyer described, that “China certainly has a legal 
culture, but certain parts can be influenced by foreigners.”537 At the same time, 
moreover, the texts show many of the same scholars adopting foreign legal discourse 
to frame new legal protections or challenge entrenched legal practices rather than 
localizing the norm within existing Chinese legal practices.  
a. Points of Concern in Chinese Legal Discourse 
In the immediate aftermath of Deng’s ascension to power, Chinese legal 
observers were quick to recognize the need for a new legal regime. As Zhang Zipei 
displayed as early as 1979 in the pages of Legal Research, Chinese legal scholars 
generally agreed with the pronouncement of the Third Plenum that “There must be 
laws to follow, and the laws must be strictly observed” (“有法可依,有法必依”).538 
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How to answer this call, however, varied by policy. Even in articles promoting the 
introduction of foreign adversarial procedures such as the participation of defense 
counsel in the collection and presentation of evidence, much of the discourse 
resonated with China’s traditional pro-state position in which “criminal procedure is 
designed to safeguard the socialist legal system” (“刑事诉讼目的都是为了维护 
社会主义法制”).539 Many observers advocated instead for the consideration of 
China’s “specific experience” (“具体经验”)540 and of the need, as described Zhang 
Guoqing, a professor of law at Peking University (Beida), to consider the “concrete 
practice of China’s criminal procedural experience” (“结合我国刑事诉讼的具体 
实践经验”).541 Even more pointedly, scholars such as Yue Liling of the China 
University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) and Chen Ruihua of Beida, cautioned 
against “blind legal transplants that belittle [their] laws” (盲目地进行法律移植和对 
本国法律的妄自 菲薄).542 
On matters about which China already possessed an extant discourse—e.g. the 
right to appeal, the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, and the death penalty—
opponents of pro-defendant reforms were quick to voice their opposition, claiming the 
protection of a “criminal procedure system with Chinese characteristics” (“中国特色 
的刑事诉讼制度和体系”) that is reluctant to extend legal protections to criminal 
                                                
539 李文君 [Li Wenjun], “律师应当享有收集刑事证据的权利” [Counsel Should 
Have the Right to Collect Evidence], 当代法学 [CONTEMPORARY LEGAL STUDIES], 
(Apr. 1994). 
540 See Zhang Zipei (1979). 
541 See 张国庆 [Zhang Guoqing], “论刑事诉讼中公,检,法三机关的关系” [On 
Criminal Proceedings, the Public Prosecutor, and the Relationship Between the Three 
Organs], 洛阳大学学报 [LUOYANG UNIVERSITY JOURNAL], (Sept. 1994).  
542 岳礼玲 & 陈瑞华 [Yue Liling & Chen Ruihua], 
“刑事程序公正的国际标准与修正后的刑事 诉讼法” [International Standards of 
Criminal Due Process and the Amended Criminal Procedure Code], 政法论坛 
[POLITICAL SCIENCE & LAW], (Mar. 1997). 
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defendants (“强调防卫行为只有在明显超过必方 与犯罪分子的对抗日益加剧”).543 
Likeminded scholars such as Xia Youping of Fudan University noted that “all criminal 
proceedings are rooted in the appropriate socio-economic, political, environmental, 
and historical background” (“任何刑事诉讼模式,都根植于相应的社会经济,政治 
环境和历史背景”) marked by China’s “unique cultural traditions” (“独特的文化 
传统印记”).544 He notes that this background, as well as China’s resistance to foreign 
efforts to influence legal reform, dates back at least to the Qing Dynasty (“从清末到 
民国所引进和移植的外域诉讼制度,由于受到中国传统诉讼文化的顽强抵抗而难
于对其产生影响”).545 By his description, Chinese resistance to the importation of 
certain procedures stems from the “inner spirit and external style” (“内在精神和 
外在样式”) of Chinese law, an argument not dissimilar from Bordieau’s habitus.546  
Issues about which Chinese legal observers were most likely to raise concerns 
regarding the adoption of foreign rules were those about which there was already a 
long-standing discourse, such as the right to appeal and the exclusion of evidence 
unlawfully obtained. These authors claim the suitability of existing Chinese 
procedures, noting that the “procedural errors are few” and that there need not be such 
external checks on the traditional cooperation among the procuratorate, prosecutor, 
and court (“法三机关 互相配合做得好,工作效率就高,错误就少”).547 Moreover, 
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these scholars attest that Chinese traditions concerning such rules have always 
emphasized procedural law as a source of “social control” (“社会控制”), and that such 
a pro-state approach is “to a large extent inherited and reflects [China’s] history and 
traditional cultural requirements” (“在很大程度上继承和反映了这一历史文化传统 
的内涵和要求”).548 This link to China’s procedural past, Xie Youping claims, “cannot 
be broken” (“不可 割裂的联系”), nor should procedural reforms erase the 
“differences reflected in Chinese and Western models of criminal procedure law” 
(“区别的显著的差别表现在中国与西方 刑事诉讼模式”).549 Chinese criminal 
procedure law, it follows, “cannot leave [its] national conditions” (“我国刑事诉讼 
模式选择不能离开我国的国情”).550 
Many other authors appeared similarly reluctant to import certain procedural 
devices that challenged extant “points of concern.” Song Yinghui, a professor of law 
at CUPL who otherwise lauds China’s adoption of a “right to silence” (“沉默权”), 
“Anglo-American plea-bargaining” (“英美国家的辩诉交易”), and “the Anglo-
American adversarial system” (“英美当事人主义的引进”), nonetheless notes that 
“the more difficult question is whether we should give victims the right to appeal” 
(“困难的问题是应否赋予被害人上诉权”).551 Moreover, in order to support his 
argument that China should not introduce the exclusionary rule, the author misstates 
the application of the doctrine in the United States, stating that the rule has resulted in 
countless acquittals and “greatly inhibited criminal punishment” ("这就极大地抑制了 
刑事诉讼在惩治犯罪方面的 功能").552 Other authors similarly misstate facts in order 
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to raise opposition to reforms directed toward contested practices, including the 
number of countries that retain the death penalty. One such scholar advocating against 
the abolition of the practice does so by arguing falsely that “a majority of the countries 
in the world retain [capital punishment]” (“目前世界上保留死刑的国家仍稍占 
多数”).553 Scholars such as Wang Jianmin similarly noted that “the approach to capital 
punishment within party and the country” (“我们党和国家对待死刑”) has deep roots 
that should not be uprooted.554 Even reform-minded scholars such as Chen 
Guangzhong of CUPL did not support its abolition, stressing instead the “ancient 
history” of the practice in China dating back to the Sui dynasty (“死刑制度正式 
开始于隋朝”).555 It is thus not surprising that many of the rules governing the 
administration of the death penalty were lifted out of the CPL reform process and 
shifted to administrative regulations, a move that often occurs “in controversial areas 
where a consensus among the drafters or between powerful interest groups has not 
been forged.”556 
b. Novel & Entrenched Practices in Chinese Legal Discourse 
As anticipated by the two-tailed model of norm diffusion, however, appeals to 
national tradition and resistance to the importation of foreign law were less 
                                                
553 阮学智 [Ruan Xuezhi], “新刑法简介及评析” [Introduction and Evaluation of the 
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more than two-thirds of countries have abolished the death penalty in law or in 
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pronounced in Chinese legal periodicals discussing novel legal procedures or 
proposals to reform entrenched cultural practices. Moreover, such discussions did not 
attempt to localize those reforms with existing Chinese legal practices. Indeed, many 
scholars spoke positively of the human rights protections afforded by modern criminal 
procedure, noting that those rights stand as the central “purpose of criminal procedure 
law in modern civilized countries” (在现代文明国家刑事诉讼法的任务,是在强调... 
人权的保护), a category of which China was attempting to become a member.557 
Several scholars, including Yue Liling of CUPL and Chen Ruihua of Beida, even 
noted and bemoaned the efforts of legal nationalists who “think the so-called 
international standards of fair trial of certain Western countries are actually tools to 
impose legal standards on developing countries” (“有人认为,所谓公正审判的国际 
标准实际上是些西方国家通过联合国的法律文件强加给发展中国家的法律标准”) 
and who likewise “insist that in the field of criminal justice there do not exist any 
‘international’ or ‘basic standards,’ only ‘national conditions’” (“在刑事审判领域 
根本不存在什么"国际标准","最低标准"或"基本标准"每一个国家都有自己的 
国情”).558 Such legal nationalists and localizers of foreign norms, they note, “ignore 
the universality of criminal justice” (“它们忽视了各国刑事审判制度的普遍性和 
共性”).559  
Many of the same legal observers who protested the adoption of Western 
transplants contrary to China’s criminal justice traditions cited in the previous 
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subsection nonetheless voiced enthusiastic support for the novel reforms proposed by 
the 1997 CPL. Moreover, they did so without attempting to localize the reforms and 
even while noting expressly that such reforms “were transplanted from the West” 
(“都是从西方借鉴和移植”) and based “on the Western system of litigation” (“西方 
诉讼模式内部来说”).560 More specifically, they noted with praise that the “draft 
amendment references and absorbs the experiences of foreign countries” 
(“草案的重大改革,参考和吸收了外国的经验”) and serves to further integrate China 
into the international system of legal norms and practices (“国际法接轨”).561 
Among the passages lending support to the adoption of foreign law, most legal 
scholars offered little resistance to the adoption of the presumption of innocence. This 
support came in spite of the recognition among those scholars that China traditionally 
offered no such benefit to defendants, operating instead under what Xie Youping of 
Fudan University referred to as a “presumption of guilt” (“有罪推定”).562 Zhang 
Guoqing of Beida, for example, noted prior to the passage of the 1997 CPL that 
“under the existing criminal system, the defendant is essentially treated as guilty from 
the outset through the investigation, prosecution, judicial detention, arrest and all the 
way through the trial”:  
在现有的刑事诉讼制度之下,从一开始被告人,基本上就被当作有罪的
人来对待...侦查,检察,审判机关对于被告人的拘留,逮捕,起诉,审判都是
基于被告人有罪这个前提才决定的.563 
Suggesting China’s growing acceptance of the universal right to be presumed 
innocent, however, he noted that, “with the development of human civilization, 
more and more people are beginning to agree with the presumption of innocence” 
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(“随着人类文明的发展,越来越多的人开始赞同无罪推定的主张”) and 
advocated that “the presumption of innocence should be implemented in China” 
(“在我国刑事诉讼中,保护当事人的合法权益,就应当实行无罪推定”).564  
This support for such a reform among Chinese legal practitioners and 
scholars did not come via a process of norm localization or through the grafting of 
the norm onto extant Chinese discourse. Rather, Zhang and others gave complete 
credit to foreign actors as the source, recognizing that in “major Western capitalist 
countries”565 and among “capitalist class thinkers” (“资声阶级思想家”)566 “no 
one can be described as a criminal” until a court adjudicates a defendant as such 
(“西方主要资本主义国家…任何人都不能被称为罪犯”).567 Other scholars 
supportive of the presumption of innocence similarly identified the doctrine of 
“being presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law” (“被依法证明 
有罪之前推定无罪”) as a principal “criterion of international human rights law” 
(“作为国际人权法律的一个准则”). Support for the reform cited by these 
scholars included a range of foreign law and international legal instruments, 
including measures adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (联合国 
大会), the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (联合国公民 
权利和政治权利国际公约), the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (禁止酷刑和其他残忍,不人道 
或奋辱人格的待遇或处罚公约), the United Nations Congress on the Prevention 
of Crime and Treatment of Offenders (联合国预防犯罪和罪犯 待遇大会), the 
United Nations Human Rights Commission (联合国人权委员会), the African 
                                                
564 Zhang (1994). 
565 Zhang (1994). 
566 通蜀 [Tong Shu], “刑诉法修改:中国律师的渴望” [Procedural Reform: A Chinese 
Lawyer’s Longing], 中国律师 [CHINA LAWYER], (March 1996). 
567 Zhang (1994). 
  146 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (非洲人类及人民权利宪章), the Inter-
American Convention on Human Rights (美洲人权公约), and the European 
Court of Human Rights (欧洲人权法院), as well as foreign scholarship such as 
American legal theorist Ronald Dworkin (美国学者德沃金), among others.568 
Still others recognized these reforms included in the 1997 CPL as the direct 
“absorption of and reference to overseas experience” (“吸收并参考了国外的 
经验”).569 Professor Hong Daode of CUPL, for example, likewise described the 
presumption of innocence as the “embodiment of civilized procedural law” 
(“体现诉讼文明”).570  
 Another challenge to an entrenched legal practice that enjoyed widespread 
support in Chinese legal periodicals was the introduction of Anglo-American 
adversarial procedures such as cross-examination and the expansion of the right to 
an attorney. Support for such reforms was expressed along with the understanding 
that China traditionally employed an inquisitorial approach derived from the civil 
law tradition.571 Li Weiping, for example, a scholar at Henan University School of 
Law, noted that the 1997 CPL “adopted much from accusatorial procedures in the 
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West” (“我们的庭审方式是借鉴西方的控辩式”).572 Other scholars similarly 
noted that a defendant’s right to an attorney derives not from China’s traditional 
procedural rules, but rather “international human rights law”573 and the 
constitutional principles of Western countries (“被告人有权获得辩护,便成为 
西方各国一项 重要的宪法原则”).574  
The openness to the adoption of these procedural reforms extended 
beyond the legal academy. Indeed, one scholar noted the broad support for foreign 
adversarial reforms observed by CPL drafters attending meetings with hundreds 
of citizens from as many as twenty-two provinces, autonomous regions, and 
municipalities. These drafters received as many as eighty papers advocating 
certain legal reforms, most of which advocated “learning from the successful 
absorption of foreign experience” (“改革固然应当借鉴外国的成功经验”) and 
“conform[ing] to world trends in the development of criminal procedure law” 
(“顺应世界各国刑事诉讼制度的普遍发展趋势”), including the introduction of 
defense attorneys earlier in the investigatory proceedings.575 Other legal observers 
voiced support for similar adversarial reforms while noting openly that “such 
procedures were mainly practiced in Anglo-American common law countries” 
(“当事人主义诉讼模式,主要实行于英美法系国家”) and that they should be 
adopted even though they conflicted directly with China’s “long history and 
unique culture of law” (“悠久的历史和 独特的法律文化”).576 Still others such as 
Tao Mao of Suzhou University School of Law cited directly to a suspect’s right to 
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an attorney established under the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case Miranda v. 
Arizona577 (“米兰达案件”) and the fact that “most other countries allow lawyers 
to participate at the investigative stage of the proceedings” (“在国外多数国家 
允许律师在侦查阶段参与诉讼”), including the United States, France, and 
Japan.578  
 Finally, a manual survey of Chinese legal periodicals suggests similarly 
broad support for the adoption of American-style plea-bargaining. As with other 
discussions of novel legal reforms introduced by the 1997 CPL, the authors 
openly recognize the foreign origins of the law and make no discernable effort to 
graft the reforms onto extant legal norms or to otherwise localize the procedures. 
Yang Xiuli, for example, drew extensively from the writings Richard Posner, 
whom he described as the “representative scholar of the Western School of Law 
and Economics” (“西方经济分析法学派的代表”).579 Other scholars voiced 
enthusiastic support for the procedure despite similarly noting its origins in 
Anglo-American countries.580 These authors did not localize the reform by 
grafting it onto existing procedural tools to improve the efficiency of criminal 
litigation, but rather openly cited it as part of a “worldwide trend” (“世界性 
趋势”) in the realm of criminal procedure.581 This recognition of the procedure as 
a foreign import continues today with the cooperation of the China Prosecutors 
Association with the Ford Foundation. Xie Pengcheng, a lead Chinese researcher 
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on the project openly notes the American origins of plea bargaining and is 
conducting a broad comparative study of other continental legal systems to see 
how the procedure can be adopted successfully into a civil law system.582 
 
V. The Way Forward 
As anticipated by the two-tailed model of diffusion, this descriptive 
comparison of the discussion of proposed legal reforms among Chinese legal scholars 
suggests that those proposals that were the most novel or challenged entrenched 
practices proved the most able to survive the legislative process. Those proposals that 
evoked the preestablished cognitive scripts and vocabulary of opponents were, by 
contrast, less successful. In the next Chapter, I explore these publications further 
through a computer-aided content analysis of articles related to criminal procedure 
law. This CATA analysis shows that in China’s increasingly open legislative process, 
domestic and transnational advocates were able to introduce various pro-defendant 
reforms onto the political agenda. Moreover, it shows that the presence of an extant 
domestic discourse affected the likelihood that Chinese officials, academics, and legal 
practitioners viewed a proposed policy favorably or unfavorably. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
DEFENDANTS AND DISCOURSE: A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE  
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DEBATE IN THE PRC 
 
 
I. Introduction 
During several periods in the 1980s and 1990s, China’s legal scholars enjoyed 
more freedom to debate the relative merits of law than many of them had experienced 
in decades.583 Scholars openly discussed issues ranging from evidentiary problems,584 
to China’s legal culture,585 to the basic purposes and functions of courts.586 In the pages 
of China’s legal and political periodicals, these scholars debated criminal procedure 
reforms and actively engaged with the question of whether China is, or should be, 
governed by the “rule of law,” a debate stoked by both domestic587 and foreign 
actors.588 This Chapter explores the dynamics of this discussion, examining the 
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relationship between discourse and the ability of domestic and transnational legal 
advocates to shape policy outcomes during moments of legal reform. As will be 
shown, the analysis demonstrates the power of extant discursive language as well as 
the usefulness of the two-tailed model of legal diffusion.   
 
II. Data & Methodology 
China presents a fertile domain of inquiry for this study. Firstly, China’s legal 
system, modeled after the centralized, code-based systems of continental Europe and 
the Soviet Union, presents a useful setting to examine processes of diffusion to civil 
law countries. As a civil law country, the judicial opinions of judges are rarely 
published in China, and these opinions do not possess any official precedential effect 
on subsequent parties or courts.589 Instead, legal evolution occurs in the political and 
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beyond “informal patterns of precedent” concerning sentencing guidelines and the 
definition of certain legal concepts over which Chinese courts can assert legal 
precedent. Moreover, Xiao Yang, the recent president of the Supreme People’s Court 
stated unequivocally that any judicial interpretation is to be sent to the NPC for its 
official review as the supreme authority on law and legal interpretation. See Tian Yu, 
“Promote the Judicial System Scientifically, Resolve Ten Issues Scrupulously: 
Interviews with President Xiao Yang of the Supreme Peoples’ Court,” Xinhuanet (Jan. 
5, 2005), available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-
01/05/content_4014729.htm; Benjamin L. Liebman, “China’s Courts: Restricted 
Reform,” in Donald C. Clarke ed., CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM: NEW DEVELOPMENTS, 
NEW CHALLENGES (2008); Chris X. Lin, “A Quiet Revolution: An Overview of 
China’s Judicial Reform,” 4 ASIAN-PACIFIC LAW & POLICY JOURNAL 255, 301 (2003); 
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party branches. The hierarchy of laws reflects this centralized arrangement. Officially, 
the most authoritative laws in the country are Basic Laws passed by the NPC 
(including the Criminal Procedure Law), followed by non-Basic Laws and legislative 
interpretations passed by the Standing Committee of the NPC. Moreover, legal 
development and drafting responsibilities are concentrated in a similarly centralized 
fashion among national-level party and political organs.590 While ultimate power of 
course rests with the CCP, the Standing Committee of the NPC nonetheless, through 
the operation of Legislative Affairs Commission (LAC), occupies an influential role 
during the process of legislative drafting.  
This is not to say China does not possess complex center-local relations or 
areas of law that have experienced significant degrees of decentralization in recent 
years. While China’s current Constitution proclaims it to be a “unitary” state with its 
local state organs governed by “the unified leadership of the central authorities,”591 
Mao Zedong himself noted that “centralized power and devolved power exist 
simultaneously.”592 Indeed, China’s traditional structure of authority emphasized 
diffuse authority with the county government serving as the source of most aid and 
administration, with the central government playing a very limited role.593 In the 
contemporary period, scholars continue to debate whether China’s political 
arrangement is best described as decentralization, local capture, central incapacity, de-
                                                                                                                                       
R.H. Fallon, Jr., “Adopting and Adapting: Clinical Legal Education and Access to 
Justice in China,” 120 HARV. L. REV. 2134, 2144 (2007). 
590 CONSTITUTION arts. 3, 62, 67 (PRC). 
591 CONSTITUTION art. 3(1982) (P.R.C.), available at: 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html.  
592 Mao Zedong, “Talks at the Chengtu Conference,” in SELECTED WORKS OF MAO 
ZEDONG: VOL. VIII, available at: www.marxists.org. 
593 Jae Ho Chung, “Studies of Central-Provincial Relations in the People’s Republic of 
China: A Mid-Term Appraisal,” 142 CHINA QUARTERLY 487 (1995). 
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concentration, devolution, or delegation.594 Whatever the outcome of this debate, 
China’s central government nonetheless lacks durable restrictions on its authority in 
the realm of policymaking, especially with respect to NPC Basic Laws.595  
In addition to possessing broad centralized power in its law-making authority, 
China is also an apt case for this study because it has during several modern and 
contemporary periods undergone massive projects of legal reconstruction (and 
subsequent destruction) that ultimately proved quite open to influence from 
transnational actors.596 China’s ongoing legal reform in the post-Mao era thus presents 
a useful setting to examine whether legal diffusion is more likely to occur when 
                                                
594 Zheng Yongnian, “Institutional Economics and Central-Local Relations in China: 
Evolving Research,” 3 CHINA: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 240 (2005); Gabriella 
Montinola, Yingyi Qian, & Barry R. Weingast, “Federalism, Chinese Style: The 
Political Basis for Economic Success in China,” 48 WORLD POLITICS 50 (1995); 
Ehtisham Ahmad, Li Keping, & Thomas Richardson, “Recentralization in China?,” 
presented at the IMF Conference on Fiscal Decentralization (2000); Yasheng Huang, 
“Central–Local Relations in China During the Reform Era: The Economic and 
Institutional Dimensions,” 24 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 655, 665 (1996). 
595 MICHAEL OKSENBERG & KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, POLICY MAKING IN CHINA: 
LEADERS, STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES 338 (1988). 
596 Interview, 9/7/2010; 9/13/2010; 9/20/2010; see also William P. Alford, “A Second 
Great Wall?: China’s Post-Cultural Revolution Project of Legal Reconstruction,” 11 
CULTURAL DYNAMICS 193, 198 (1999). In the 1940s, Guomindang [GMD] officials 
adopted Japan’s strategy of importing aspects of German civil procedure to replace 
local rules. See Alison W. Conner, “The Comparative Law School of China,” in 
UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM 212 (C. Stephen Hsu ed., 2003). Areas 
under communist control, meanwhile, were subject to different rules aimed at serving 
the purpose of the party’s revolutionary ideology. See William C. Jones, “Trying to 
Understand the Current Chinese Legal System,” in UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S LEGAL 
SYSTEM 29 (C. Stephen Hsu ed., 2003). Once victorious in the civil war, the CCP 
ultimately abolished all law, including statutes prohibiting murder or rape. See 
WRONGS AND RIGHTS: A HUMAN RIGHTS ANALYSIS OF CHINA’S REVISED CRIMINAL 
LAW (1998). Since the introduction of economic liberalization in the post-Mao period, 
legal reconstruction and a perceived need to draw from foreign laws has with an 
enthusiasm not seen since GMD reforms. See Liang Zhiping, “Tradition and Change: 
Law and Order in a Pluralist Landscape,” 11 CULTURAL DYNAMICS 215, 215 (1999); 
Pitman B. Potter, “Legal Reform in China: Institutions, Culture, and Selective 
Adaptation,” 29 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 465, 465 (2004). 
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transnational legal advocates promote the introduction of norms that are: 1.) novel to 
the targeted legal system; 2.) associated with an established normative discourse; or 
3.) opposed to entrenched normative practices. The following section outlines the 
challenges of explaining this diffusion and proposes a remedy.  
A more compelling research design than the one outlined below would consist 
of a close analysis of primary documents detailing the debates among interested 
legislators and participants in the drafting process, as well as extensive interviews with 
those lawmakers. China, however, presents researchers with the empirical challenge of 
studying the diffusion of law into a regime that is especially reluctant to discuss the 
process of lawmaking.597 Moreover, it presents a regime that has not made official 
records of the deliberations publicly available and makes any open discussion of such 
deliberations vulnerable to charges under China’s state secrets law.598 Moreover, as 
one respondent noted, “It is especially hard for any foreigner to study [Chinese 
criminal procedure] reform.”599 Indeed, more than one respondent requested that the 
battery of my mobile phone be removed so that the device could not be used by 
security agents as a remote microphone. Another requested that we meet on the 
opposite side of Beijing from her workplace so that she would not be seen discussing 
the issue with a foreigner. Given these challenges, this Chapter aims to supplement the 
limited number of firsthand accounts available through the additional use of proxies: 
published accounts of the deliberations leading up to the revised 1997 CPL written by 
                                                
597 This is not to say, though, that such pressure has not been successful. Former NPC 
Vice-Chairman Wang Hanbin noted that the 1997 revisions to the 1979 Criminal 
Procedure Law would serve to refute “Western countries’ smears and slanders” 
against the PRC’s lack of human rights protections in its justice system. See 
刑诉法修改意义重大 [The Great Significance of the Criminal Procedure Law 
Reforms], 法制日报 [Legal Daily], Feb. 1, 1996. Nonetheless, candidness on such 
matters is difficult to come by. 
598 Interview, 7/30/2008. See also Law on the Protection of State Secrets of the 
People’s Republic of China, art. 8 § 2 (1989). 
599 Interview, 9/7/2010. 
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both domestic and transnational participants, as well as Chinese scholarship and 
commentary concerning the proposed revision of the CPL published by members of 
various interest groups, including public security officials, prosecuting and defense 
counsels, academics, military officials, and legislative actors.  
A content analysis of transcripts of drafting sessions or memoranda exchanged 
among the legislative drafters would supply the greatest insight into the discursive 
activity of the relevant actors involved in the 1997 CPL reform, but such material is 
not available to the public. To compensate for this, the content analysis described 
below examines articles concerning CPL from a multitude of different media sources. 
While such media content may generate questions about the “true” positions of the 
publishers of that content, it nonetheless, through an objective assessment of the 
language used by the authors and allowed by the editors, supplies some evidence as to 
policy positions and allows us to make a number of context-specific inferences.600 
Indeed, this form of analysis has yielded many insights about the tone and tenor of 
elite and popular opinion in China. Most recently, scholars such as Daniela Stockmann 
and James Reilly have applied such methods to track Chinese media discussions of 
Japan.601 As Stockmann explains, a broad analysis of media sources reveals a fuller 
picture of Chinese attitudes toward an issue than would a thorough reading of any 
single publication. In her study, a content analysis of both the relatively staid People’s 
Daily and the relatively unrestrained Beijing Youth Daily revealed a rich discursive 
terrain that contained both the state’s official position as well as expressions of 
                                                
600 See CARLSON (2008), at 22-23. 
601 See Daniela Stockmann, Who Believes Propaganda? Media Effects during the 
Anti-Japanese Protests in Beijing, 202 THE CHINA QUARTERLY 269 (2010), at 278-79; 
and James Reilly, China’s History Activism and Sino-Japanese Relations, 4 CHINA: 
AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 189 (2006), at 215 (citing 
中国报纸对日本报导内容分析 [A Content Analysis of Chinese Newspapers’ 
Reporting on Japan], available at: http://www.comrc.com.cn/crc/cmdc/bz/002.htm.). 
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popular anger against Japanese policy.602  
Following Stockmann’s lead, I have arranged a unique database of 
approximately 320 Chinese-language journals related to law, public security, military 
affairs, and politics that were published during the period of criminal procedure reform 
(1978-1997). This database is comprised of journals included in the China Academic 
Journals (CAJ) database, the largest full-text database of Chinese journals.603 (See 
Appendix) I selected these journals for the sample in order to include both national 
and regional coverage as well as to supply a broad spectrum of institutional and 
normative positions: executive or legislative publications; judicial publications; 
CCP/Party publications; and ostensibly non-governmental publications.  
Together, 161 of the journals derive from non-governmental sources (42 
university journals and 119 other non-government publications), while 159 are 
published by various ministries, congresses, courts, or party organs (103 CCP 
publications and 56 others from executive, judicial, legislative, and military bodies). 
As for geographic distribution, illustrated in figure 4.1, the database of journals covers 
29 of China’s 31 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions.604 This 
customized database offers a novel solution to a methodological problem identified by 
Stockmann.605 As she explains, content analysis of Chinese media outlets suffers from 
a selection bias due to the different technologies by which those outlets distribute their 
                                                
602 See Stockmann (2010), at 278-79. 
603 As Taylor Fravel explains, CAJ is “one of the most important sources [of 
information about China] available on the web.” See M. Taylor Fravel, “Online and on 
China: Research Sources for the Information Age,” 163 CHINA QUARTERLY 821 
(2009), at 831. 
604 Only Tibet and Hainan are not represented in the sample. Beijing, not surprisingly, 
is overrepresented in the origin of publications related law, government, and security 
(115 of the sample are printed in Beijing). 
605 See Daniela Stockmann, “Information Overload?: Collecting, Managing, and 
Analyzing Chinese Media Content,” in CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS SOURCES, 
METHODS, AND FIELD STRATEGIES (Allen Carlson, Mary Gallagher, Kenneth 
Lieberthal, & Melanie Manion eds. [forthcoming]), at 191. 
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content. Some, she notes, allow for searches based on keywords of txt-files. Others, 
however, provide non-searchable pdf-files ill-suited to existing content analysis 
software.  
 
Figure 4.1. Geographic Distribution of Database Periodicals 
In the database created here, I address the issue of selection bias by applying 
the most recent optical character recognition (OCR) software to pdf-files published by 
Chinese media outlets. OCR software, which can recognize the sequence of lines and 
curves of a hand-written or typed Chinese character, transforms the shapes of Chinese 
text into a searchable, computerized font. This transformation allows for a unique 
large-n computer-aided content analysis of Chinese journals from the earliest years of 
the reform period. Technologies of Chinese OCR have improved greatly, resulting in 
recognition rates above ninety-five percent.606 Any systematic error in character 
                                                
606 See Jason J.S. Chang & Shun-der Chen, “The Postprocessing of Optical Character 
Recognition Based on Statistical Noisy Channel and Language Model,” Language, 
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recognition, moreover, is likely distributed uniformly throughout the sample of texts, 
and so should not bias the results. 
Using statistical analysis with data derived from Yoshikoder software, a 
computer-aided textual analysis (CATA) developed as part of the Identity Project at 
Harvard University’s Center for International Affairs, the analysis below includes a 
content analysis of a sample of more than 3,000 articles concerning criminal procedure 
law for discussions of key legal innovations suggested by domestic and Western legal 
advocates prior to the adoption of the 1997 Criminal Procedure Law. 607 CATA, here 
facilitated by Yoshikoder, provides several advantages over traditional content 
analysis. Firstly, like any content analysis software, Yoshikoder offers consistency, 
avoiding the many problems associated with human coding such as intercoder 
variation, coder inattention, and coder fatigue.608 Secondly, CATA software like 
Yoshikoder improves accuracy by avoiding the problem of prior knowledge.609 A 
human coder approaches a text with knowledge of its source and of the author’s 
institutional position, and so the coder may be inclined to code certain text units 
accordingly. CATA, by contrast, codes text out of any socio-political context, and 
                                                                                                                                       
Information, and Computation: Proceedings of the 10th Pacific Asia Conference (Dec. 
27, 1995), at 128. 
607 Content analysis has been successfully applied to understand the opinions of a 
variety of Chinese political and legal actors. See, e.g., Daniela Stockmann & Mary 
Gallagher “Mass Media Mobilization as a Means of Legal Reform in China,” Paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
Chicago (2007); Edward X. Gu, “The Economics Weekly, the Public Space and the 
Voices of Chinese Independent Intellectuals,” CHINA QUARTERLY 147 (1996); Cheng 
Li & Lynn White, III, “China’s Technocratic Movement and the World Economic 
Herald,” 17 MODERN CHINA 3 (1991); Andrew G. Walder, “Press Accounts and the 
Study of Chinese Society,” CHINA QUARTERLY 79 (1979); Kuang-sheng Liao & Allen 
S. Whiting, “Chinese Press Perceptions of Threat: The U.S. and India, 1962.” CHINA 
QUARTERLY 53 (1973); Carlson (2008); and Johnston and Stockmann (2006). 
608 See KIMBERLY A. NEUENDORF, THE CONTENT ANALYSIS GUIDEBOOK (2002), at 
112.  
609 Id. at 113. 
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thereby limits such biases to the development of the content dictionary. 
While advancements in content analysis software continue apace, most 
recently with the introduction of an advanced software for cluster analysis developed 
by Gary King and Justin Grimmer, Yoshikoder offers the added value of employing 
useful Chinese-language dictionary reports to measure the positive and negative words 
contained in a Chinese text.610 These reports are thus useful tools to gauge the tone of 
large numbers of written materials from the PRC.611 References to key terms, and the 
manner in which the authors discuss them as measured by these reports, provide 
valuable insights into the perspectives of various institutional interest groups and 
individuals by identifying positively and negatively valenced words.612 For example, 
an essay in the China Law Journal (中国法学) by Chen Jianguo, an official from the 
Supreme People’s Court, arguing that the proposed CPL reform should incorporate the 
presumption of innocence (what he refers to in the article as “无罪假定”) would be 
coded as a positive citation to the norm.613 In addition, the software includes a so-
called “tokenizer plugin” that performs the necessary segmentation for Chinese words, 
as spoken in the PRC, to ensure that Chinese texts are segmented into words 
appropriately.614 
                                                
610 See Justin Grimmer and Gary King, Quantitative Discovery from Qualitative 
Information: A General-Purpose Document Clustering Methodology, presented at the 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2009. 
611 See Stockmann; Hassid. 
612 For further discussion of the uses of Yoshikoder: see Alastair Iain Johnston & 
Daniela Stockmann, “Chinese Attitudes toward the United States and Americans,” in 
ANTI-AMERICANISMS IN WORLD POLITICS, Peter J. Katzenstein & Robert O. Keohane, 
eds. (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY: 2007); Ian Lamont, Making a Case for 
Quantitative Research in the Study of Modern Chinese History: The New China News 
Agency and Chinese Policy Views of Vietnam, 1977-1993 (unpublished thesis) (2008). 
613 陈建国, 应把无罪假定原则入刑事诉讼法 [Criminal Procedure Law Should 
Import the Presumption of Innocence Principle], 6 中国法学 (1994), at 35. 
614 The use of such a “segmenter” is necessary for Chinese because Chinese text does 
not include spaces between words in a sentence.  
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Table 4.1. Coding Chinese Legal Periodicals 
 
Normative position  
(of the author) 
[continuous variable] 
 
1. Positive 
2. Negative 
3. Neutral  
 
Rational interest  
(of the author) 
[binary variable] 
 
1. Official 
2. Unofficial 
 
Geographic association 
(with the proposed reform) 
[continuous variable] 
1. Foreign origin 
2. Domestic origin 
3. Neutral as to origin 
 
Geographic location  
(of the publication) 
[binary variable] 
 
1. National/Beijing 
2. Regional/Non-Beijing 
 
Proposed Legal Reform 
[continuous variable] 
 
1. Rules of Evidence   5. Adversarial 
2. Rules of Detention  6. Innocence 
3. Right to Counsel     7. Death Penalty 
4. Plea Bargaining       8. Appeal 
 
I compiled the complete list of eight legal reforms (see table 4.1 above) 
emphasized by transnational actors by drawing from publications by domestic legal 
advocates involved in China’s reform process, as well as leading legal publications 
from various foreign state and non-state actors.615 These publications include useful 
citations to specific articles of the Criminal Procedure Law that foreign advocates 
targeted for reform, as well as drafts of changes proposed by those advocates.616  
                                                
615 Such a list introduces a risk of selection bias. For example, not every advocate 
translates the presumption of innocence, as Chen Jianguo does, as 无罪假定. 
Variations include 无罪推定, 清白, 无辜, 不得确定有罪, 推定他是无罪, 是否有罪, 
to name but a few. To address this concern, the content analysis will apply synonymy 
and translation to key concepts of interest—e.g. wj = wk and wl is the translation of wm. 
616 Such publications include, inter alia: CHINA: TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT OF 
PRISONERS, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, EDS. (1987); GOING THROUGH THE MOTIONS: 
THE ROLE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN THE TRIALS OF THE 1989 PROTESTORS, Human 
Rights in China, eds. (1989); Report of the Australian Human Rights Delegation to 
China, 14-26 July 1991 (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra: 1991); 
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In order to test the hypotheses specified in Chapter 3, I coded any mention in a 
selected Chinese publication of a legal reform advocated in the abovementioned 
publications (e.g. “presumption of innocence,” “due process,” “plea bargain”) 
according to the attributes listed in table 4.1. Next, to conduct the opinion extraction, 
I employed Yoshikoder to code each article for the positive, negative, or neutral 
positions of the author by measuring the proportion of pro- and anti-reform terms that 
I selected through a manual search of Chinese legal writing. I also coded each article 
for the proportion of terms developed for such CATA analysis by linguists at National 
Taiwan University.617 These scholars have translated and expanded upon the General 
Inquirer (GI) approach to content analysis. Dictionary-based GI programs, first 
developed by Philip Stone, assesses emotional tone, cognitive orientation, and word 
patterns present in a text.618 The GI approach thus adopts a method of analyzing the 
“sentiment degree” of Chinese characters by specifying sensitive annotation tags to 
identify author opinions toward a list of key terms.619 Yoshikoder performs tasks 
similar to GI, examining word frequencies, analyzing overall tone, and allowing for 
the custom development of content dictionaries in order to operationalize key aspects 
                                                                                                                                       
PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION, Amnesty International, 
eds. (1991); Visit to China by the Delegation led by Lord Howe of Aberavon: Report 
(HMSO, London: 1993); CRIMINAL JUSTICE WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS, 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (1993); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE COUNTRY 
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1994 (Washington, DC: 1995); Ann 
Kent, “China and the International Human Rights Regime: A Case Study of 
Multilateral Monitoring, 1989-94,” 17 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY (1995); CHINA: 
NO ONE IS SAFE, Amnesty International (1996). 
617 See Ku, et al.; Stockmann (forthcoming).  
618 See PHILIP J. STONE, DEXTER C. DUNPHY, MARHSALL S. SMITH, AND DANIEL M. 
OGILVIE, THE GENERAL INQUIRER: A COMPUTER APPROACH TO CONTENT ANALYSIS 
(MIT Press: 1966).   
619 See, e.g. KIMBERLY A. NEUENDORF, CONTENT ANALYSIS GUIDEBOOK. 
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of document meaning.620  
 
III. Content Analysis 
a. Citations to Foreign Law in the Era of Legal Reform 
The first step of this content analysis establishes the frequency with which 
Chinese publications related to law, politics, and security discussed foreign law in 
articles concerning criminal procedure. This preliminary analysis is designed to 
determine the policy emphasis of Chinese reformers by examining the salience of 
particular sources of law. The salience of foreign law in articles discussing criminal 
procedure law in China sheds light on the relative emphasis placed on those actors as a 
source of inspiration or—at the very least—a site of comparison.621 The substantive 
policy positions held by Chinese reformers, and their engagement with extant 
domestic discourse, will be examined in step two of the content analysis. It should be 
noted, however, that this method of analysis assumes that researchers can infer 
meaningful insights from the frequency with which certain words appear in a 
particular political text. Such an assumption is not problematic in analyses such as the 
one conducted below in which the goal is simply to determine the overall discursive 
landscape of a particular political community—i.e. the shared language with which 
actors discuss particular policies. This assumption, however, would be untenable if 
such a frequency count were applied to measure the relative influence of competing 
domestic discourses—i.e. a study to determine whose language was most influential 
among the various legal scholars. For such an analysis, one would have to apply 
                                                
620 See Will Lowe, Yoshikoder: An Open Source Multilingual Content Analysis Tool 
for Social Scientists, paper presented at the American Political Science Association, 
2008. 
621 See IAN BUDGE, HANS-DIETER KLINGEMANN, ANDREA VOLKENS, JUDITH BARA, & 
ERIC TANENBAUM, MAPPING POLICY PREFERENCES: ESTIMATES FOR PARTIES, 
ELECTORS, AND GOVERNMENTS 1945–1998 (Oxford University Press: 2001). 
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forensic linguistic tools to examine word patters over time, tracing the path of a 
particular term or argument back to a seminal text. Here, by contrast, the variable of 
interest is the shared discursive environment in which legal commentators debate legal 
norms and practices. As such, word frequency data, which merely posits that “the 
greater the importance of the variable to the source, the more often it will be 
mentioned,” supplies an appropriate measure.622 
In order to determine the population of articles for this frequency analysis, I 
first collected every article related to criminal procedure law contained in CAJ 
publications related to law, politics, and security between 1978 and 1997. This search 
uncovered a total of 3,231 articles related to CPL out of 659,048 articles published by 
those journals over the course of the two decades preceding the 1997 CPL reform.623  
Next, I searched the population of CPL-related articles for articles that mentioned 
foreign countries or international organizations. Specifically, I searched the full texts 
of articles for mentions of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
and the United Nations. I searched for mentions of these countries for several reasons. 
Firstly, the inclusion of the archetypical civil law and common law countries allows 
me to test whether Chinese media discussions of CPL appeal to solutions from one 
legal family more than another—i.e. whether such similarities ease the ability of legal 
advocates to localize procedural norms. Secondly, the list includes only those Western 
countries mentioned in the abstracts of the 3,121 articles related to criminal procedure 
law. To determine which search terms would be most relevant I examined the 
abstracts of articles as a proxy for their full textual content. This allowed me to focus 
                                                
622 See HARRY T. REIS AND CHARLES M. JUDD, HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH METHODS IN 
SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY (Cambridge University Press: 2000), at 322. 
623 This proportion is comparable to the number of articles devoted to civil procedure 
reform during the same time period. The same journals published 2740 articles related 
to civil procedure law between 1978 and 1997, a period that includes the major 
overhaul of China’s civil procedure code in 1991.  
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the subsequent full-text inquiry on only those countries and institutions of major 
importance to the Chinese media discussion of CPL and remove from the analysis 
those countries mentioned only in passing.624  
Table 4.2. Number of Citations to the UN and Foreign States in CPL Articles625 
 ‘78-‘82 ‘83-‘87 ‘88-‘92 ‘93-‘97 
U.S. 6 28 61 
 
279 
 (2.5%) (6.4%) (9.9%) 
 
(13.9%) 
U.K. 10 29 54 
 
207 
 (4.3%) (7.4%) (8.8%) 
 
(10.3%) 
France 12 36 64 
 
263 
 (5.1%) (9.2%) (10.4%) 
 
(13.2%) 
Germany 7 19 58 
 
218 
 (3%) (4.8%) (9.4%) 
 
(10.9%) 
U.N. 0 5 7 
 
157 
 — (1.2%) (1.1%) 
 
(7.8%) 
                                                
624 This method has been used in similar event-count studies in both IR and 
comparative politics and is an effective way to identify highly aggregated trends. See 
Scott L. Althaus, Jill A. Edy, & Patricia F. Phalen, “Using Substitutes for Full-Text 
News Stories in Content Analysis: Which Text Is Best?,” 45 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
POLITICAL SCIENCE 707 (2001); Christian Davenport, "Multi-Dimensional Threat 
Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry into Why States Apply Negative 
Sanctions," 39 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 683-713 (1995); Doug 
McAdam, "Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency," 48 AMERICAN 
SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 735-754 (1983); and Lance Bennett "Toward a Theory of 
Press-State Relations in the United States," 40 JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION 103-125 
(1990). 
625 Numbers in parentheses represent the number of citations as a proportion of the 
total number of articles related to criminal procedure. 
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Finally, I counted references to the United Nations to gauge the frequency with 
which the Chinese media included references to what many scholars consider the 
principal source of international legal norms regarding civil and political rights. Table 
4.2 and figure 4.2 detail the number of articles with references to the United Nations 
and the four common and civil law countries as well as the proportion of articles that 
discussed a foreign jurisdiction or the United Nations. Contrary to the expectation that 
the laws of other civil law systems should be more salient in the legal development of 
a fellow civil law state, the data suggest no statistically significant relationship other 
than an overall growing interest in foreign and international law overall. 
 
Figure 4.2. Proportion of Citations to the UN and Foreign States in CPL Articles 
To examine whether authors discussed foreign or international law together as 
a whole corpus of alternative law, or whether some countries’ legal norms stood apart, 
I also searched the universe of articles related to CPL for exclusive mentions of the 
United Nations or of particular legal systems. This search reveals whether Chinese 
legal commentators give some foreign and international sources greater attention than 
others. Figure 4.3 and table 4.3, which examine exclusive citations to certain foreign 
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and international sources, depict the results of this search. 
 
Figure 4.3. Exclusive Citations to the UN and Foreign States  
Table 4.3. Exclusive Citations to the UN and Foreign States in CPL Articles626 
 ‘78-‘82 ‘83-‘87 ‘88-‘92 ‘93-‘97 
U.S. 0 4 9 
 
61 
 — (1.7%) (1.4%) 
 
(3%) 
U.K. 3 5 6 
 
36 
 
 
(1.2%) 
 
(1.2%) 
 
(0.9%) 
 
(1.8%) 
France 6 11 16 
 
41 
 (2.5%) (2.8%) (2.6%) 
 
(2%) 
Germany 2 3 14 
 
45 
 (0.8%) (0.7%) (2.2%) 
 
(2.2%) 
 
U.N. 
 
0 
 
0 
 
4 
 
59 
 — — (0.6%) 
 
(2.9%) 
                                                
626 Numbers in parentheses are citations as a proportion of the total number of articles 
related to criminal procedure. 
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 Contrary to the hypothesis that the legal family of a state determines the 
jurisdictions into which that state will look for inspiration for reforms of its own laws, 
these descriptive statistics suggest that neither civil law nor common law systems 
weigh more heavily in Chinese media discussions of criminal procedure law. Indeed, 
the proportion of CPL-related articles that discuss common law countries in general or 
exclusively (24.2%; 4.8%) is slightly greater than of those articles discussing civil law 
systems (24.1%; 4.2%), thus further contradicting the expectations of both legal 
family and norm localization theories. Moreover, the data suggest, counterintuitively, 
that the United States stands as the most influential source of foreign law in China. 
This finding, while surprising, confirms the observation of multiple respondents, all of 
whom cited the United States as the most frequent source of legal solutions adopted by 
Chinese legal reformers.627 Moreover, the data does not reveal the additional subtle 
ways in which U.S. law affects legal reform in the PRC. More specifically, it does not 
capture citations to U.S. law obscured by legal innovations transplanted to legal 
systems such as Taiwan, Japan, and Korea that are then subsequently adopted by 
China.628  
 To analyze this finding more rigorously, as well as to test additional 
hypotheses described in Chapter 3, I conducted multiple tests of the frequency count 
data. The analysis of these hypotheses, however, presented several issues because the 
dependent variable—citation to a foreign or international source—is a rare event 
count. Event counts are variables that represent the number of times a particular event 
occurred during a certain time period—arbitrarily marked by month, year, or some 
other convenient period—and so take on a value of some positive integer or zero.629 
                                                
627 Interview, 9/7/2010; 9/10/2010; 9/20/2010. 
628 Interview, 9/10/2010. 
629 See Gary King, “Event Count Models for International Relations: Generalizations 
and Applications,” 33 INT’L STUD. QUARTERLY 123 (1989). 
  168 
The distribution of such data precludes the use of methods such as standard mean 
difference tests or ordinary least squares regression that assume population normality 
of the dependent variable.630  
Table 4.4. Negative Binomial Regression of Citations of Foreign Law in Chinese 
Periodicals631 
TOTAL MENTIONS UNIQUE MENTIONS 
VARIABLE   VARIABLE   
Economic and 
Military Aid  
 
0.0001007 
(0.0004733) 
Economic and 
Military Aid  
 
-0.0002456 
(0.0005593) 
Constitutional 
Maturity 
0.0590324*** 
(0.0100945) 
 
Constitutional 
Maturity 
0.063162*** 
(0.0166867) 
Legal Family  - 0.0110026 
(0.2691848) 
 
Legal Family  0.1622735 
(0.1753918) 
Wald chi 
square 
41.53*** Wald chi 
square 
15.52*** 
Given the nature of the data, the most appropriate means of analysis is a 
negative binomial panel regression with robust variance estimators. Such a model can 
manage data that is both cross-sectional and time-series, as well as a dependent 
variable truncated at zero. As table 4.4 illustrates, the relationship between the 
frequency with which Chinese legal scholars and commentators appealed to foreign 
sources bore no statistically significant relationship to the amount of aid received from 
a state or the legal family of the foreign jurisdiction. Instead, the finding confirms the 
impression shared by several respondents that it was simply the persuasiveness of 
                                                
630 See id. at 126. 
631 Conducted in Stata using the following command: xtnbreg [variables], 
exposure(total # of CPL articles), vce(robust). Note: *** significant at the 1% level, p 
< 0.01.  
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foreign law, not its origin, that mattered.632 
In addition, the only statistically significant result counters the expectation that 
as a state’s constitution ages, the frequency with which legal scholars and officials 
appeal to foreign jurisdictions goes down. Here, China proved more open to foreign 
sources as it reentered the international community following Mao’s death. Contrary 
to many expectations of comparative law scholars, China did not grow more confident 
of its domestic jurisprudence. Rather, China grew more curious about the 
jurisprudence of other states.     
These results reveal that the most common explanations of legal diffusion do 
not survive rigorous scrutiny and suggest conditions such as distributions of power 
and legal family have no statistically significant relationship with the ultimate sources 
of legal influence. To examine the role played by discourse in determining the source 
and content of law, the following subsection performs additional content analysis of 
Chinese articles concerning criminal procedure reforms prior to the adoption of the 
1997 CPL. 
b. Opinion Extraction and Support for Criminal Procedural Reform 
At the time of the drafting of the 1997 CPL, which began in 1991, just two 
years after the Tiananmen Square massacre, officials in Beijing did not appear eager to 
introduce procedural reforms that would serve to restrain their ability to marshal the 
resources of the state against perceived criminals. As Anthony Dicks observed in 
1989, prior to the reform of the CPL, “In the field of law and order, there is little 
necessity for any change in the law to accommodate the immediate needs of the 
leadership.”633 Such cynicism toward the CCP-dominated legal system proved well-
founded by the final version of the 1997 CPL. Indeed, as Stanley Lubman observed 
                                                
632 Interview, 9/7/2010; 9/13/2010; 9/20/2010. 
633 Dicks, “Chinese Legal System,” at 462. 
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just after its promulgation, “The criminal process in the 1990s, although it has 
undergone reform, still displays greater continuity between current institutions and 
practices and those of the Maoist period than any other area of the law.”634 
Nonetheless, several scholars maintain that through the 1997 CPL reforms China’s 
legal system made many strides towards a convergence with the best practices of the 
international community.635  
In order to examine the relationships among discourse, advocacy, and 
procedural reform, as well as to uncover why some reforms succeeded while others 
failed, it is first necessary to identify which reforms transnational advocates proposed 
prior to the passage of the 1997 CPL. It is also necessary to identify which of the 
proposed reforms already existed within a domestic discourse, and which did not. In 
the following sections, I outline this variation and conduct a computer-aided content 
analysis to demonstrate the relationship between support for a particular reform and its 
discursive environment. As will be shown, while the 1997 CPL did import several of 
the so-called best practices of the transnational legal community, the law made fewer 
advances in matters of state power about which an active discourse already existed 
among Chinese officials and legal actors. Moreover, it demonstrates that the two-tailed 
model of diffusion explains aspects of the reform that other models cannot. 
The revised 1997 CPL expanded the number of articles in the code from 164 to 
225. In these new articles, as well as in the revised articles that remained (the 1997 
CPL included more than 110 amendments), legislative drafters worked to transplant 
the many new legal concepts that survived the scrutiny of the mark-up process.  Based 
on a review of transnational and Chinese legal writings about the 1997 CPL, the key 
issues of reform that drew the attention of foreign and domestic advocates in the 
                                                
634 LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE, p. 71. 
635 See, e.g., RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TO THE RULE OF LAW 
(Cambridge University Press: 2002). 
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drafting process fell into the eight following categories: 
Rules of Evidence—including the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine  
(i.e. the admissibility of evidence derived from coercive measures); 
Rules of Detention—including the practice of “detention for  
investigation; 
Right to Counsel— including the division of authority between police  
and the courts with respect to investigation and trial; 
Plea Bargaining—including the procuratorate power of conviction  
without punishment; 
Adversarial Procedures— including the expanded role of defense  
counsel; 
Presumption of Innocence—including the right of the accused to  
maintain innocence until adjudicated guilty;  
Death Penalty—including procedures governing enforcement of the  
death sentence; and 
Appeal—including the right of defendants to seek higher review of an  
adverse decision.636 
In the following subsections, I describe the presence (or absence) of each of these 
policies in China’s legal history prior to the 1997 CPL. This review demonstrates that 
these policies vary in the degree to which an active domestic discourse preexisted the 
post-Mao push to reform China’s criminal procedure law. Moreover, it suggests that 
those policies about which little discourse existed were most amenable to reform. 
i. Bureaucratic Politics and the 1997 CPL 
Before examining what role discourse played in determining whether certain 
proposed reforms survived the drafting process, it is worth first considering whether a 
bureaucratic politics perspective can fully explain the variation. In certain policy 
domains, the difference between reforms that ultimately survive the drafting process 
and those that fail often lies not in the discursive environment but rather in the fact 
that: 1.) successful reforms do not involve overlapping bureaucratic or institutional 
interests and so are easier for officials to revise or ignore; and 2.) reluctant officials 
                                                
636 See Fan, at 4; Biddulph, at 228 n.11; R. KEITH & ZHIQIU LIN, LAW AND JUSTICE IN 
CHINA’S NEW MARKETPLACE (Palgrave, New York: 2001). 
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anticipate that such reforms will not be implemented by the responsible government 
organs.637 Accordingly, bureaucratic actors mollify transnational and domestic 
advocates by agreeing to certain provisions at time t-1 that they do not expect will 
constrain them at time t. 
Whether proposed reforms were ultimately adopted or resisted during the 
drafting process of the 1997 CPL, however, cannot be fully explained by such a 
bureaucratic model. Firstly, as with the successful procedural reforms such as the 
presumption of innocence, adversarial procedures, the right to counsel, and plea-
bargaining, resisted procedures such as the right to seek an appeal, the decision of 
whether to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained, and the administration of capital 
punishment are all procedures that operate primarily within the authority of a single 
bureaucratic organ—the people’s courts. As such, these resisted procedural reforms 
did not significantly implicate the policy portfolios of other bureaucracies that 
possessed competing interests or rulemaking power. Unlike the negotiation of an 
international treaty, wherein officials at the national-level are involved in the 
negotiation of an agreement that is to be implemented by provincial and local 
government agencies and bureaus outside the policy portfolio or interests of national-
level officials, the 1997 CPL was drafted with the direct involvement of the judiciary 
and mainly concerned procedures limited to that bureaucratic entity.638 If adopted, the 
application and reach of the proposed rules would thus not have encroached upon the 
functions of other agencies in significant ways. It comes as no surprise, then, that a 
content analysis of attitudes toward the proposed reforms reveals no statistical 
difference among the various bureaucracies involved in the criminal justice system.  
Moreover, while an exclusionary rule administered by court officials could 
                                                
637 See Mertha & Pahre (2005).  
638 See Luo (2000), at 7. 
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affect the manner by which officials within the Ministry of Public Security or the 
People’s Procuratorate gather evidence, there are a number of internationally 
recognized exceptions to the doctrine and numerous ways for a court to circumvent 
such a rule, should it desire to do so. European countries, for example, have long 
applied a balancing test whereby a court need only consider whether the introduction 
of evidence unlawfully obtained would result in the denial of a defendant’s right to a 
“fair trial,” as guaranteed by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.639 In 1950, for example, a Scottish court faced with such a question applied a 
test to balance “(a) the interest of the citizen to be protected from illegal or irregular 
invasions of liberties by the authorities, and (b) the interest of the State to secure that 
evidence bearing upon the commission of crime and necessary to enable justice to be 
done shall not be withheld from Courts of law on any merely formal or technical 
ground.”640  In the United States, which developed some of the strictest rules 
concerning unlawfully obtained evidence during the latter years of the Warren Court, 
courts nonetheless recognize various exceptions, including the inevitable discovery 
rule, independent source doctrine, good faith, and dissipation of taint.641 As such, the 
difficult interagency deal-making that can frustrate attempts at legal reform was less 
pronounced in the case of reforming China’s criminal procedure law than in cases 
where legal reforms to be implemented by one party were agreed to by another. It 
follows that a bureaucratic politics explanation of why some reforms were deemed 
acceptable, while others were not, does not fully explain the variation in the reforms 
ultimately adopted in the 1997 CPL.  
In addition, the respective interests of center and local judicial officials are not 
                                                
639 See Stephen C. Thaman, ‘Fruits of the Poisonous Tree’ in Comparative Law, 16 
Sw. J. Int’l L. 333 (2010), at 352. 
640 Id. (citing Lawrie v. Muir [1950] J.C. 19, at 26 (Scot.)).  
641 See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984); Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 
533 (1988); and United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
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as opposed as center and local administrative officials responsible for the 
implementation of rules governing commercial and trade matters such as intellectual 
property rights (IPR). In IPR matters, national-level officials are interested in 
resolving foreign trade disputes, preventing future ones, and avoiding economic 
sanctions, whereas local officials tasked with implementing the national policy are 
beholden to local governments rather than their national-level counterparts.642 As such, 
local protectionism can trump national interests in commercial and arbitral 
proceedings.643 Similarly, in administrative proceedings, wherein a citizen files suit 
against corrupt local government officials, those local government officials can 
influence the proceedings in their favor and against the wishes of national-level 
officials interested in rooting out local corruption. 
 In the case of criminal procedure law, by contrast, the fact that judges are 
hired, paid, promoted, and fired by local officials does not necessarily exacerbate to 
the same extent the tensions between judicial obligations to local governments (kuai) 
and administrative superiors (tiao).644 In criminal matters, in most cases the priorities 
of national and local officials are largely the same—convicting the accused. Moreover, 
when central and local interests do conflict they primarily conflict not on matters of 
criminal procedure implicated by the proposed 1997 reforms, but rather on the 
antecedent decision of whether to arrest or prosecute at all.645 Indeed, Murray Scot 
Tanner and Eric Green recently observed that one of the greatest obstacles to the 
development of the “rule of law” in China and to the effective enforcement of 
                                                
642 See Mertha & Pahre (2005), at 705. 
643 See Lubman (2006), at 30. 
644 On tiao/kuai tensions see Andrew Mertha, China’s Soft Centralization: Shifting 
Tiao/Kuai Authority Relations, 184 CHINA QUARTERLY 791, 792 (2005). On the local 
control of judges, see Jerome A. Cohen, Chinese Legal Reform at the Crossroads, 169 
FAR E. ECON. REV. 23, 25 (Mar. 2006); LUBMAN (1999). 
645 Criminal Procedure Law, arts. 83, 86. 
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Beijing’s criminal justice priorities has been China’s highly localized policing system 
in which local government officials retain considerable organizational, financial, and 
personnel power over local security officials, thus thwarting the policy priorities of the 
central government. This relationship, which is described by Chinese policymakers as 
“the integration of vertical and horizontal leadership, with horizontal leadership as 
primary,” creates powerful institutional incentives for “local police abuses, corruption, 
predation, and ‘protectionism.’”646 As they describe, the control by local governments 
over the resources and management of local security officials results in various local 
criminal activities evading prosecution in lower level courts.647 In these cases, local 
governments intervene to prevent the relevant local officials from the Public Security 
Bureau or the People’s Procuratorate—the state organ responsible for approving 
arrests and investigating criminal cases—from prosecuting the case or to compel them 
to prosecute poorly rather than leaving it to judges to find the defendants innocent.648 
In this way, as He Weifang describes, “reliance on the judiciary has been not more 
than secondary” to other institutional channels available to policy makers trying to 
dictate outcomes.649  
Secondly, given the unequal distribution of power in favor of the state within 
the Chinese political system, however, all of the reforms—both successful and 
unsuccessful—can be, and have been, easily circumvented by state actors affected by 
the proposed reforms. Chinese officials at all levels have, when expedient for them to 
                                                
646 Murray Scot Tanner, & Eric Green, Principals and Secret Agents: Central versus 
Local Control Over Policing and Obstacles to t”Rule of Law” in China, 191 CHINA 
QUARTERLY 644 (2007).  
647 Id., at 669. 
648 See He Weifang, The Police and the Rule of Law: Commentary on “Principals and 
Secret Agents, 191 CHINA QUARTERLY 671, 672 (2007). Ira Belkin, China’s Criminal 
Justice System: A Work in Progress, 6 WASH. J. OF MODERN CHINA 61, 74 (2000). 
The Procuratorate itself rarely conducts trials. The last trial conducted by the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate was the Gang of Four trial in 1979. 
649 He (2007), at 673. 
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do so, circumvented the existing rules governing the number of appeals permitted, the 
administration of the death penalty, and rules governing detention. Even since the 
introduction of decentralizing reforms, central authorities retain the power to reopen 
any case in any jurisdiction. Moreover, Chinese law contains broad and ill-defined 
retrial procedures, allowing multiple national actors, including the CCP, the 
Procuratorate, and higher courts, to reopen final lower-court decisions.650 In the 2003 
Liu Yong Mafia Case, for example, an intermediate court in Liaoning tried Liu Yong 
and found him guilty of organized criminal activity, bribery, and illegal possession of 
weapons, sentencing him to death. The Liaoning Higher People’s Court subsequently 
commuted the death penalty, finding that his confession had been extracted through 
torture. Facing a public outcry for such leniency and, more importantly, pressure from 
the CCP to alter the decision,651 the Supreme People’s Court invoked a questionable 
procedural device to again revise the decision of the intermediate court in order to 
achieve the desired result, thus re-imposing the death penalty for Liu.652  
Regulations governing detention have likewise proved easy for officials to 
circumvent through appeals to the opaque rules governing matters of “state secrets,” 
which are expansively defined and, in the absence of statutory guidance, equip 
authorities with considerable power to detain citizens at will and without review.653 In 
addition, any obstacles posed by an exclusionary rule could likewise be easily avoided 
by the adoption of the numerous exceptions to the inadmissibility of evidence 
unlawfully obtained, as is the practice in most countries that apply a version of the 
                                                
650 Id. at 138. 
651 Interview, March 5, 2009. 
652 最高人民法院再审刘涌案刑事判决书(全文) [Criminal Judgment of the Supreme 
People's Court on the Retrial of Liu Yong's Case], available at: 
http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php? id=96393  (last visited June 18, 2010). 
653 Human Rights in China, State Secrets: China’s Legal Labyrinth (Sheridan Press, 
2007); Amnesty International, “State Secrets: A Pretext for Repression,” available at: 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa170421996#SSL. 
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doctrine. With PRC authorities thus so readily able to circumvent the “notoriously 
flexible”654 criminal procedures already in place, it is unclear why officials would 
resist the adoption of additional easily avoided procedures while accepting others.  
ii. Novel Reforms: Successful Transplants into the 1997 CPL 
1. Presumption of Innocence 
One of the greatest innovations included in the 1997 CPL is the inclusion of 
the general principle that the defendant is innocent until found guilty by a properly 
administered court of law. Traditionally, it was uncontroversial to deem a citizen a 
criminal as soon as he or she was in the custody of public security officials. Nor was it 
controversial to presume the detained guilty until he or she could prove innocence in 
the course of a trial.655 The principle that those charged with a crime by the state may 
be innocent is relatively new to criminal law discourse in the PRC. Indeed, prior to 
1992, one respondent noted, “[Chinese legal scholars] were not even permitted to 
discuss the issue.”656 According to at least one former public security official, the term 
“suspect” had been purposely avoided by government officials in order to affirm the 
underlying belief that a detained person is guilty of a crime rather than just suspected 
of one.657 While the term “presumption of innocence” (“无罪假定”)  does not appear 
in the 1997 CPL reforms, the underlying principle is present throughout the revised 
law. For example: 
          第十二條 [Article 12]: 
未經人民法院依法判決,對任何人都不得確定有
罪 [No person shall be found guilty without being 
                                                
654 See Cohen (2003). 
655 See, e.g., Henry M. Field, “Criminals Before the Judge,” in FROM EGYPT TO JAPAN 
(Scribner, New York: 1877), at 378. 
656 Interview, 9/7/2010. 
657 See David Finkelstein, “The Language of Communist China’s Criminal Law,” 27 
JOURNAL OF ASIAN STUDIES 503, 507 (1968).  
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judged as such by a People's Court according to 
law]. 
 
          第一百六十二條 [Article 162]: 
在被告人最后陳述后,審判長宣布休庭,合議庭進
行評議,根據已經查明的事實,證據和有關的法律
規定,分別作出以下判決 [After a defendant makes 
his final statement, the presiding judge shall 
announce an adjournment and the collegial panel 
shall conduct its deliberations and, on the basis of 
the established facts and evidence and in 
accordance with the provisions of relevant laws, 
render one of the following judgments]: 
(一)案件事實清楚，證據確實、充分，依
據法律認定被告人有罪的,應當作出有罪
判決 [(1) if the facts of a case are clear, the 
evidence is reliable and sufficient, and the 
defendant is found guilty in accordance with 
law, he shall be pronounced guilty 
accordingly];  
(二)依據法律認定被告人無罪的，應當作
出無罪判決 [(2) if the defendant is found 
innocent in accordance with law, he shall be 
pronounced innocent accordingly];     
(三)證據不足,不能認定被告人有罪的,應
當作出證據不足,指控的犯罪不能成立的
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無罪判決 [(3) if the evidence is insufficient 
and thus the defendant cannot be found 
guilty, he shall be pronounced innocent 
accordingly on account of the fact that the 
evidence is insufficient and the accusation 
unfounded]. 
Under such provisions, despite retaining tools such as long-term detention 
without trial, a people’s court cannot officially deem a criminal defendant guilty prior 
to a lawful judgment by a people’s court. Nor can a court deem a criminal defendant 
guilty where the evidence fails to substantiate such a claim. In addition to this 
additional language stressing the need to first prove a defendant guilty through a 
procedurally sound process, the 1997 CPL makes the important distinction between 
suspects and defendants. In the 1979 CPL, persons suspected of committing a crime 
are uniformly referred to as defendants. After 1997, persons suspected of committing a 
crime are merely “suspects” until criminal proceedings against them begin, at which 
point they become “defendants.” 
This is not to say the practice of achieving “lawful” judgments in China meets 
the substantive and procedural elements of a fair trial required under Article 14 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, of which China is a signatory.658 
Indeed, despite amounting to “a significant stride towards guaranteeing [PRC] citizens 
                                                
658 China became of a signatory of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights just one year after the promulgation of the 1997 CPL. China, however, is still 
yet to ratify the covenant. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
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the right to a fair trial,”659 the procedural rights afforded by the 1997 CPL have been 
violated routinely by various government actors.660 Rather, the reformed provisions of 
China’s criminal procedure law such as an expansion of the presumption of innocence 
merely afford the promise—not necessarily the practice—of broader rights protection.  
2. Plea-Bargaining 
One entirely novel (and surprising) innovation in the 1997 CPL is the so-called 
“summary procedure” (“简易程序”).661 This practice essentially mirrors aspects of the 
American plea-bargaining system. The transplanted Chinese variant applies where the 
punishment applicable to the crime amounts to less than three years in prison and the 
prosecutor consents to the use of the summary procedure. The subsequent trial consists 
of a single judge rather than a full collegiate bench and the prosecutor need not be 
present.662  
The arrival of a plea-bargain-style procedure to China, while not necessarily a 
reform that is pro-defendant in character,663 nonetheless surprised comparative legal 
scholars who claimed civil law and common law systems are founded upon two 
incompatible procedural cultures premised upon “two different sets of basic 
understandings of how criminal cases should be tried and prosecuted.”664 Civil law 
systems, scholars note, are generally averse to the practice of plea-bargaining because 
of their conception of criminal procedure as an official investigation performed by 
court officials in pursuit of the “truth.” Adversarial common law systems, by contrast, 
                                                
659 Jennifer Smith & Michael Gompers, “Realizing Justice: The Development of Fair 
Trial Rights in China,” 2 Chinese L. & Pol’y Rev. 108, 111 (2007).  
660 2009 Annual Report for China, Amnesty International, available at: 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id=ar&yr=2009&c=CHN.  
661 See 1997 CPL, arts. 174-179. 
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663 See Albert W. Alschuler, “Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: 
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System,” 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 931 (1983). 
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deem the purpose of criminal procedure to be the impartial governance of a dispute 
between two parties—prosecution and defense.665 Contrary to such views, China has 
proved readily accepting of a variant on American plea-bargaining procedures despite 
its structure as a civil law system.666 The adoption of the procedure, it follows, suggests 
the successful challenge of local constitutive notions of the purpose of law and the 
legal system.667 Indeed, as one participant in the reforms recalled, the drafting group 
were not concerned with finding legal solutions from fellow civil law systems. “Civil 
law systems are simply not as developed [as common law systems],” he noted.668 
3. Adversarial Procedure 
Due perhaps to the considerable familiarity with the U.S. legal system among 
the research team led by Chen Guangzhong, if not their “general preference” for U.S. 
law,669 the 1997 CPL greatly expanded the official role played by defense counsel in 
the process of gathering evidence and participating in courtroom trials.670 Traditionally, 
China’s dynastic legal system provided little procedural guidance as to the role of 
counsel in the representation of private individuals or the notion of defendant rights.671 
In contrast to the Anglo-American, accusatorial tradition, which pits the accuser as the 
adversary of the accused, judicial proceedings in China did not depend on the 
initiative of the parties or their legal representatives.672 Instead, inquisitorial systems 
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666 See Máximo Langer, “Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of 
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such as that of traditional China are premised on the notion that courts best achieve 
truth and public confidence through the disinterested inquiry of a judge. Much like the 
inquisitorial approach in other civil law systems, when an imperial Chinese magistrate 
took jurisdiction over a case he summoned all interested parties and interrogated them 
himself.673 Lawyers were not involved in the process.674 If the case involved non-
testimonial evidence that could not be brought into court, he would go and examine it 
personally.675 Adversarial systems, by contrast, are premised on the notion that zealous 
advocacy by two opposed parties, mediated by a neutral arbiter of the law, best 
promotes just outcomes and public confidence in the procedural process. 
The similarities of China’s traditional justice system to the continental, 
inquisitorial style became more apparent when reformers of China’s waning Qing 
dynasty consciously imported German-inspired legal codes via Japan.676 These 
continental influences continued through both the Republican and Maoist periods that 
followed, wherein the court itself took the lead in interrogating witnesses and 
gathering evidence.677 Even today, it is noted that “China’s civil law, criminal law, and 
procedural codes clearly reflect a continental influence.”678 This stems in part not only 
from the importation of continental codes via Japan, but also because under the 
principle of “democratic centralism,”679 statutory law promulgated by the legislative 
                                                
673 See William Alford, “Arsenic and Old Laws: Looking Anew at Criminal Justice in 
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branch stands as the highest legal authority, not the judgments of a reviewing court.680  
Despite this legal tradition, the 1997 CPL reforms reflect the considerable 
influence of Anglo-American common law philosophy that advocates adversarial 
adjudication.681  The reforms alter the burden of collecting evidence and presenting the 
legal questions from the presiding judge onto the procuratorate and defense counsel.682 
Only if there is sufficient doubt about the evidence should the court investigate 
evidence itself.683 Otherwise, judges are to remain, at least ostensibly, the impartial 
umpires of the contest between the prosecution and defense.684 Moreover, under the 
1979 CPL rules, a defense counsel could not cross-examine a witness, instead relying 
on the chief judge to raise questions.685 Under the amended 1997 CPL, defense counsel 
may cross-examine any witness,686 present opinions on the evidence, and raise doubts 
about the prosecutors case.687 “The court,” as one scholar describes the effect of the 
1997 CPL reforms, “has [since] had to learn to accept a more impartial role as a 
neutral adjudicator.”688 This shift from the court-led inquisitorial system to the more 
public, adversarial approach has, at least officially, “put defense counsel in a more 
equitable position with public prosecutors in courtroom hearings” than it was prior to 
the 1997 CPL reforms.689 It is worth noting again that while such reforms represent a 
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shift, however gradual, toward greater protections of the accused, the implementation 
of those reforms has proved variable when the interests of the state are challenged.690 
As William Alford noted, “many [PRC] judges seem to be experiencing considerable 
difficulty in accepting the type of novel, if still modest, adversarial role provided to 
defense counsel in the 1996 revisions to the criminal procedure law.”691 Nonetheless, 
the novel reforms erected a rudimentary adversarial framework within which 
adversarial legal claims can be raised. 
4. Right to Counsel 
A related reform that similarly shifted the structure of criminal procedure in 
China from the inquisitorial toward a more adversarial style, and which successfully 
survived the 1997 CPL drafting process, is the expanded right of accused persons to an 
attorney, even by those that cannot afford one. The justice system in imperial China 
did not rely on a trained class of lawyers or legal professionals to advocate for a 
defendant. Rather, as He Weifang explains, “[t]he traditional Chinese legal concept 
was a direct result of a judicial process dominated by laymen.”692 Those subjected to 
the justice system faced not a legally trained judge, but the moral condemnation of a 
magistrate educated in the classic Confucian texts in preparation for the Imperial Civil 
Service Examination (科举考试).693 As Randall Peerenboom describes, “Traditional 
China held neither law nor lawyers in high esteem.”694 Instead, society operated from 
the Confucian premise that any reliance on lawyers would lead to a ruinous society in 
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which individuals acted in pursuit of their own interests at the expense of others.695 The 
defendant’s role in a criminal trial was thus not the assertion of his or her rights via 
legal counsel, but instead to embody the “virtues of concession and yielding.”696 
Officials encouraged defendants to confess their presumed guilt rather than contest the 
charges leveled against them with the aid of a legal representative. Indeed, prior to the 
1997 CPL and the 1996 Lawyers Law, which together gave criminal defendants the 
right to the assistance of legal counsel,697 no legal aid system existed to supply 
defendants with such attorneys.698 Since 1997, however, the Chinese judicial system 
has adopted this novel approach to dealing with defendants processed through the 
criminal justice system.699 Under the revised law, the court must now consider the 
“economic difficulties” of the defendant as well as provide counsel to a broader class 
of defendants, including the disabled.700 The reforms would have gone even further 
toward Miranda-like rights to counsel, one participant recalled, were it economically 
feasible for China to do so at the time.701 
In addition to legal aid, under the 1979 CPL, defense counsel entered the 
proceedings only upon the initiation of the trial, thus minimizing the ability of the 
defendant to gather and investigate evidence. After 1997, however, defendants in most 
cases have a right to an attorney “after receiving the first interrogation from an 
investigative organ or from the day of receiving a compulsory measure.”702 This 
enables defendants to receive counsel even prior to being formally charged. Again, 
                                                
695 Id. 
696 Joseph Chan, “A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary 
China,” in Joanne R. Bauer & Daniel A. Bell, eds., THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS (Cambridge University Press: 1999), at 226. 
697 1997 CPL art. 34. 
698 See PEERENBOOM, at 160.  
699 See PEERENBOOM, at 359. 
700 1997 CPL, arts 34(1)–(3).  
701 Interview, 9/14/2010. 
702 Art. 96. 
  186 
while the implementation of this reform has certainly not been uniform among all 
criminal trials in China, the reform nonetheless introduces a novel procedure and 
discourse to which defendants can appeal. 
iii. “Points of Concern”: Failed Transplants into the 1997 CPL 
The drafters of the 1997 CPL did not, however, accept all of the pro-defendant 
reforms proposed by domestic and transnational legal advocates. As described below, 
the variation between those procedural reforms that proved successful and those that 
did not reveals a diffusion process that cannot be fully explained by rational choice or 
bureaucratic models. More specifically, given that state actors could easily circumvent 
the various procedural reforms at the implementation stage, such models cannot 
explain why the state ultimately adopted some reforms that ostensibly reduced the 
coercive power of the state but failed to adopt others. The following subsections 
outline these failed proposed reforms and suggest that greater resistance to reform 
emerged around those policies with cognitive discursive templates already in place.  
1. Death Penalty 
Despite the widespread criticism raised by foreign actors of policies governing 
the death penalty in China, the 1997 CPL saw very little movement on this issue. 
Indeed, as one respondent noted, “the death penalty is the hardest policy to reform.”703 
In the end, the 1997 amendments “neither increased nor decreased the number of 
death sentences prescribed in the 1979 Criminal Code or other criminal supplementary 
laws.”704 The few reforms to the death penalty that officials did add to the 1997 reform 
included the requirement that all death sentences must first be reviewed and approved 
by the Supreme People’s Court.705 This was less a reform than a reversion to the 
original 1979 CPL article 144 which had been amended by a subsequent interpretation 
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of the law.706  
The efforts of advocates attempting to reform provisions concerning the death 
penalty in the 1997 CPL emerged within already rich discursive context. The death 
penalty may be a constant element of China’s penal code throughout its known 
history. It has not, however, been an unchanging one; the number of capital offenses 
has fluctuated throughout China’s history, up to and including shifts since the 
establishment of the PRC.707 The first known public execution in China occurred as 
early as 2601 B.C.708 Ever since, the need for and appropriateness of the death penalty 
has been questioned by domestic advocates such as Confucius, with the debate taking 
clear form early on during the discursive exchanges between the Confucianist and 
Legalist philosophers that followed him.709 Capital punishment as a recurring “point of 
concern” in imperial China is demonstrated further by the varying ways each dynastic 
regime defined capital crimes and identified the categories of peoples to which it could 
be applied.710 The sensitivity of capital punishment even predates the imperial age, at 
which time officials believed capital crimes should be held only during autumn and 
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winter months because they are the appropriate seasons of decay.711 The requirement 
of higher review in death penalty cases also traces back to dynastic China. In pre-
industrial China, where geographic distance exacerbated the problems of insufficient 
transportation, criminals convicted of capital offences were required to be transported 
to the provincial capital and could only be executed with the approval of the 
governor.712 Officials adhered to this cumbersome rule even in the aftermath of the 
Taiping Rebellion, during which officials in Guangzhou executed as many as 81,000 
people over a fourteen-month period.713 
The PRC’s official position on the death penalty has similarly varied over time, 
reflecting its status as a continued “point of concern” in Chinese society.714 Chairman 
Mao, concerned about the execution of counterrevolutionaries falsely arrested, 
cautioned against capital punishment and considered it a short-term measure to be 
used selectively.715 A leading early criminal law text released by the regime similarly 
warned: “a correct estimate of the death penalty’s active role in the struggle against 
crime by no means implies the need to retain the death penalty forever. On the 
contrary, our country is in the process of creating conditions for the gradual abolition 
of this penalty.”716 Since these early commitments to reduce the application of capital 
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punishment, the number of capital offenses has increased from as few as twenty-nine 
following the passage of the 1979 Criminal Procedure Law to as many as sixty-eight 
today.717 While some exploratory public opinion studies find a majority of people 
supportive of the death penalty, these studies lack sufficient survey data and offer no 
consensus view.718 Demonstrating the public unease with capital punishment still 
further, officials ended televised and public executions after they grew concerned by 
public dissatisfaction with the practice.719  
Figure 4.4. Executions and Death Sentences in the PRC 
To the extent possible in a society with a controlled media, public discourse 
concerning the practice of the death penalty has continued apace in contemporary 
China. As one Chinese scholar who participated in a recent research trip abroad to 
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examine foreign death penalty systems noted, the death penalty is just one of those 
issues that has “Chinese characteristics.”720 Wei Luo writes that the debate regarding 
the application of the death penalty in the lead-up to the 1997 CPL reforms remained 
“on-going” among “Chinese legal experts, law enforcement officers, and the 
public.”721Although official statistics of the number of executions performed each year 
is classified as a state secret, data collected from media accounts of executions further 
reflect the contested nature of the practice, as evidenced by large annual fluctuations 
in the number of death sentences and executions imposed over the past fifteen years. 
(See figure 4.4 above) Under the two-tailed model proposed here, the continued 
contested nature of the practice suggests foreign advocates of abolition faced a 
formidable domestic opposition able to tap into discourse forged over centuries of 
capital punishment in China. Such a normative explanation merits exploration given 
that more than ninety percent of criminologists find that capital punishment is not an 
effective policy tool to deter proscribed behavior.722 In addition, numerous states that 
have otherwise clung to coercive tools of governance have effectively abolished the 
death penalty, either by law or in practice, including Myanmar.723  
2. Detention 
The debate over arbitrary detention, while not as prolonged as the debate over 
the death penalty, has similarly recurred in China throughout the twentieth century.724 
This active discussion of authorized detention for examination continued after the 
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founding of the PRC and the subsequent formal sanctioning of the practice by an 
internal document of the CCP Central Committee.725 In the lead-up to the 1997 CPL, 
participants in the drafting process continued this debate over the appropriate amount 
of power of public security officials to detain citizens without the prior approval of the 
procuratorate. The 1979 CPL provided for as many as five forms of pre-trial detention. 
Many foreign and domestic observers grew especially critical of the controversial 
practice of “detention for examination” (“ 收容审查”),726 a commonly abused 
provision that often resulted in the detention of innocent people for long periods 
without ever being charged. Under the 1979 CPL, public security officials were 
empowered to detain a suspect for investigation for as many as ten days.727  
China’s detention policy generated considerable discourse in the domestic and 
foreign media and so the strategy of officials was to conceal information concerning 
cases of detention for examination.728 Despite the mounting foreign condemnation of 
the practice, and the active domestic discourse surrounding its reform, the 1997 CPL 
revisions leave public security officials with considerable flexibility with respect to 
detention powers, even though extant restrictions on the practice are easily 
circumvented. While “ostensibly abolished,”729 the expansive ability to detain citizens 
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survived, with drafters merely revising the language to read: 
第六十一條 [Article 61]: 
公安機關對于現行犯或者重大嫌疑分子,如果有下列 
情形之一的, 可以先行拘留 [Public security organs may 
initially detain an active criminal or a major suspect under any 
of the following conditions]:…. 
(六)不講真實姓名, 住址, 身份不明的 [(6) if he does 
not tell his true name and address and his identity is 
unknown; and];   
(七)有流竄作案, 多次作案, 結伙作案重大嫌疑的 [(7) 
if he is strongly suspected of committing crimes from 
one place to another, repeatedly, or in a gang] .730 
In addition to avoiding a direct challenge to the practice of detention for examination, 
the 1997 CPL relaxes the standards for arrest and greatly extends the period of pre-
arrest detention.731 
3. Right to Appeal 
Advocacy for the right of a defendant to appeal a judgment has likewise 
fluctuated throughout China’s legal history. These oscillations stem in part from the 
competing influences of Confucianist and Legalist strains of legal philosophy—li and 
fa. During imperial periods in which traditional Confucian discourse prevailed, parties 
enjoyed almost unlimited opportunities to appeal a sentence.732 A party, or members of 
the party’s family, could beg the benevolence of the magistrate’s superior at the 
prefecture or circuit level. Parties could even go so high as to appeal to the moral 
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superiority the emperor.733 These expansive and flexible opportunities for parties to 
appeal a decision, though, declined during periodic swings toward a more Legalist 
approach, wherein codified regulations governing administrative power reduced the 
discretion of officials and the effectiveness of appeals to mercy. For these Legalists, 
law (fa), not morality (li), was the ordering principle of society. 
The 1979 CPL contained no provisions for a hearing to allow a defendant to 
argue before an appellate court. Drafters remedied the absence of guidelines governing 
the appeal process only slightly in the law’s second iteration. After the revisions to the 
1997 CPL, the appellate court may now hear a defendant’s appeal and cannot, upon 
reconsideration, increase his or her sentence. In addition, it provides that the appeal 
should occur in an open courtroom rather than via written motions. Nonetheless, the 
NPC rejected numerous proposals to expand the rights of defendants to appeal and to 
make the process less risky for those defendants willing to challenge the decision of 
the court.734 Knowing that they were unlikely to see much movement on death penalty 
and detention issues, several advocates in the drafting team pushed hard for appellate 
reform. These efforts were repelled by a stiff opposition to the expansive abuses of 
appeals experienced China’s imperial legal system.735 
4. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree: The Exclusion of 
Unlawfully Obtained Evidence 
Another common debate that emerged in discourse preceding the promulgation 
of the 1997 CPL concerned the exclusion of “fruits of the poisonous tree”—i.e. 
improperly obtained evidence. In the modern era, many societies have established 
laws excluding certain evidence in order to prevent improper police conduct such as 
coercing confessions. The pressure in these societies to protect the rights of the 
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accused at the expense of successfully extracting a confession, however, chafes 
against certain traditional criminal procedural rules that have been long debated in 
China. The 1979 CPL, for instance, contained no provision concerning the 
admissibility of illegally obtained evidence, providing instead that evidence should be 
gathered “according to legal procedures.”736  
The reluctance of PRC officials to introduce a provision concerning illegally 
obtained evidence from court proceedings stems in large part from the common, 
though controversial, use of torture to illicit confessions. In both traditional and 
contemporary Chinese law, confession and self-criticism has been an essential part of 
administrating justice. According to the Confucian concept of li, the proper behavior 
of an accused person was to confess his or her guilt before the ruler.737 This premise 
stems from the principle that through the act of confession, criminals express a 
willingness to be reformed and contribute to the restoration of social harmony.738 In the 
Qing period, for example, no person could be executed unless he or she first confessed 
to the crime charged. This requirement of contrition compelled many magistrates to 
compel such testimony through forceful means.739 Indeed, some magistrates 
maintained that, “in China there can be no administration of justice without 
[torture].”740 Despite the importance of confessions, officials never uniformly accepted 
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the practice of compelling confessions and numerous exceptions to the rule developed 
over time. During certain periods of Chinese history, officials relaxed the confession 
requirement, and the application of torture to extract such a confession, in cases 
involving the elderly, juveniles, or members of the elite.741  
Article 43 of the 1997 CPL expressly forbids coerced confessions. This 
reform, however, does nothing to deter the practice because it fails to address the more 
general problem of what to do with illegally obtained evidence.742 The 1997 CPL, as 
written, does not stipulate what a magistrate is to do when the legality of evidence is 
challenged by a party. As such, a confession illegally extracted through torture or 
coercive means, when submitted into evidence by the prosecution, is unlikely to be 
excluded by the court. If procedure does not require a trial judge to consider the 
exclusion of a tortured confession, that judge is unlikely to do so.743 
iv. Discourse and Dissent: Analyzing Attitudes to Criminal 
Procedure Reform in Chinese Legal Periodicals 
In this second step of the content analysis, I applied Yoshikoder CATA 
software to measure the tone of discourse related to the proposed CPL reforms 
discussed above by using custom-developed positive and negative dictionaries of 
terms commonly used by Chinese scholars of law.744 By measuring the attitude of the 
different samples of Chinese media analysis of the proposed CPL reforms, this 
approach gauges the degree to which certain proposals generated controversy among 
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Chinese legal commentators.745 After selecting the appropriate CATA software for 
reasons described in the data and methodology section above, it is necessary to 
develop a content analysis dictionary suited to the task of analyzing Chinese media 
related to legal development. The following section describes this process. 
1. Customizing the Content Analysis Dictionary 
Most quantitative content analysis methods allocate units of text according to 
fixed criteria defined by a so-called “dictionary” of words or phrases associated with 
certain coding categories. The process of designing such a custom dictionary for 
content analysis of Chinese media in the 1980s and 1990s presents a difficult 
challenge that involves both a priori and empirical reasoning. The first step is to select 
root words consistent with the concepts of interest. Then, the researcher must specify 
all variations of these root words.746 Operationalizing these root concepts requires the 
development of categories that are both exhaustive and mutually exclusive.747 I 
performed this task in several ways, including the human and computer coding 
schemes discussed below.  
The many changes to criminal procedure in China brought about by the 1997 
CPL can be categorized into the few major categories explained above: pre-trial 
detention; presumption of innocence; plea bargaining; the use of illegally-gathered 
evidence; the right to an appeal; the death penalty; the right to counsel, and the right to 
appeal. To specify the terms that would capture discussions of these reforms, I 
conducted a manual review of various Chinese-language texts written by participants 
                                                
745 See, e.g., Michael Laver & John Garry, “Estimating Policy Positions from Political 
Texts,” 44 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 619 (2000). 
746 See, e.g., Descriptions of Inquirer Categories and Use of Inquirer Dictionaries, 
available at: http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~inquirer/homecat.htm. 
747 See NEUENDORF. 
  197 
in the drafting of the proposed criminal procedure laws.748 I also included the Chinese 
terms used by Western legal advocates during the period preceding the 1997 CPL, as 
well as a review of Chinese language legal dictionaries available in the PRC during 
that same period.749  
To supplement this custom dictionary, I next examined a computer-generated 
list of key words and phrases from the text sample.750 First, I separated the texts to be 
analyzed into two categories: 1.) articles published in official publications such as 
party journals and government reports; and 2.) articles published in nonofficial 
publications, such as university journals and political magazines.  I then generated a 
word frequency report of the number of times all words occurred in a systematic 
random sampling of the two sets of texts.751 This allowed me to more easily compare 
the relative frequencies of certain words used to discuss particular legal reforms by 
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authors supportive and opposed to the proposed legal reforms.752  
Next, I allocated words to the dictionary according to whether authors typically 
used the word in question as a pro- or anti-reform word. I did not deem a word 
positive or negative unless it had a substantive meaning in terms of that category. 
Some key words, such as “victim,” occurred in both sets. However, authors stress the 
word far more frequently in publications holding a more conservative approach to 
legal reform. As such, I assigned the word to the category of words opposed to 
criminal procedure reform. For similar reasons, articles that spoke more frequently of 
defendants tended to support procedural reforms. As such, I included the term 
“defendant” in the dictionary of pro-reform terms. While this may not always be the 
case, the number of times it is right far outweighs the number of times it is wrong.753 
To measure the degree to which an author taps into an extant discourse or 
discusses a “point of concern” in society, I also compiled, via a systematic random 
sample of the texts, a list of words that indicated the author believed himself or herself 
to be engaging with an extant discourse. This list includes words or phrases such as 
“so called,” “many comrades believe,” “some comrades think,” etc.  
Finally, I included in the dictionary of positive and negative valence terms 
those words and phrases compiled by linguists at National Taiwan University. This 
dictionary of more than 20,000 positive and negative terms includes a translation of 
the content analysis dictionary first developed for the General Inquirer as well as a 
collection of additional relevant Chinese vocabulary. When combined with the 
positive and negative words included in my custom dictionary, these charged terms 
can be counted for their relative frequency along with discussions of key variables (i.e. 
                                                
752 This method of comparison has been used by Laver and Garry in their content 
analysis of political manifestos. They found, for example, that certain words such as 
“tax” and “choice” were used with great frequency in conservative manifestos, and 
almost never in liberal ones. See Laver & Garry (2000).  
753 For a defense of this method, see Laver & Garry (2000).  
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proposed reforms). The tone of discourse concerning a reform can then be measured 
as a score of negative terms to positive terms in the text surrounding the synonyms of 
that reform. I created this “Opinion Score” by subtracting the ratio of negatively 
valenced terms contained in the text from the ratio of positively valenced terms. Each 
article is thus coded with an opinion score above or below zero. The distribution of 
opinion scores of the selective random sample of articles (n=375) is depicted in figure 
4.5, which suggests the distribution of Opinion Scores is, while almost normal, 
slightly too peaked and the tails too thin (i.e. a high kurtosis measure). As such, the 
models below include the robust option to determine the same R2, b’s, and betas, but 
with standard errors that do not assume normality. 
Figure 4.5. Distribution of Dependent Variable 
2. Content and Contestation in Chinese Politico-Legal 
Periodicals 
As hypothesized by the two-tailed theory of diffusion, the models described 
below demonstrate that the more an author discusses policies about which an active 
discourse already existed, the more likely that article earned a negative opinion score. 
Put another way, articles containing discussions of contested practices such as 
detention, the death penalty, or the right to appeal included more language critical of 
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criminal procedure reform than did articles that devoted more discussion to novel 
policy innovations. Moreover, the models cast doubt on norm-localization theorists 
who hypothesize that contextualizing reforms within Chinese normative discourse 
improves the chances of domestic support for such reforms.  
To test my claim that authors positioning themselves within an extant domestic 
discourse are more likely to resist efforts of political reform, I first examined whether 
there exists a statistical relationship between the overall opinion score of an article and 
the presence of words indicating that the issue is a “point of concern.” To examine this 
relationship, I performed a simple regression against the Opinion Score of each article, 
controlling for such factors as the length of the article, which would increase the 
chance of any word being used, whether the article was published by an official arm of 
the government, and whether that publisher was based in Beijing.  
As table 4.5 indicates, the more an author taps into or brings attention to an 
existing discourse, the more likely the author holds a negative position on the prospect 
of reforming criminal procedure. In addition, the findings offer only limited support 
for any interest-group explanation. Publications issued by official judicial organs 
appear to advocate in support of criminal procedural reform (though it is without 
strong statistical significance—p < 0.09). This finding corroborates the observation of 
one participant in Chinese legal reform who noted that the judiciary adopts “the most 
liberal approach to legal reform.”754 This general liberal approach, she noted, is due 
most likely to the disproportionate degree to which members of that ministry have 
attained higher education and, another respondent noted, obtained foreign legal 
experience and exposure.755  
                                                
754 Interview, 9/7/2010. 
755 Interview, 9/10/2010. 
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Table 4.5. Effect of Extant Discourse on Opinion Score756 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT 
 
Extant Discourse -0.1971145** 
 
(0.0862502) 
 
# of Words 1.62e-07 
 
(1.29e-07) 
 
Beijing-Based -0.0020806 
 
(0.0013081) 
 
Legislative/Executive -0.0038691 
 
(0.003507) 
 
Judiciary 0.0041249* 
 
(0.0024341) 
 
Public Security 0.0000251 
 
(0.0029466) 
 
Unofficial 0.0011541 
 
(0.0022751) 
 
Another participant in CPL drafting similarly recalled that while each ministry 
was open to the adoption of foreign law during the negotiations, the judiciary was 
slightly more active in soliciting it.757 The degree to which this generally more liberal 
attitude is institutional rather than personal, however, is uncertain. A domestic 
participant in Chinese legal reform as well as a foreign director of a transnational legal 
assistance organization in Beijing both noted that there has been a discernable 
conservative shift in the openness to foreign legal solutions since the prior director of 
the judiciary, a lawyer, was replaced by a nonlawyer.758 This shift, which supports 
Alan Watson’s insight that laws travel across boarders by way of those with legal 
                                                
756 * significant at the 10% level, p < 0.1; ** significant at the 5% level, p < 0.05. 
757 Id. 
758 Interview, 9/17/2010; 9/9/2010. 
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training, suggests that openness to foreign law is a result of personal experience, not 
national culture. The weak significance of the finding, though, lends support to the 
notion that the variation in legal reform was due to the discursive differences among 
the policies themselves and not institutional interests. Indeed, as one participant in the 
process recalled, actors from all manner of government agencies generally agreed and 
debated little of the proposed draft.759 It is thus not surprising that legislative and 
executive branches, as well as public security organs, indicate no statistically 
significant opposition to pro-defendant reforms.  
Even if the proposed reforms ultimately did not survive the drafting process, 
one would expect such proposed reforms to nonetheless receive disapproving 
treatment in the journals of the bureaucratic organs implicated by them. This contrary 
result, in which those political institutions directly weakened by the proposed reforms 
appear to express no strong position on the direction of reform, challenges any interest 
group explanation of criminal procedure reform. 
Secondly, to analyze the relationship between the policy content of an article 
on the positive or negative tone of the author, I conducted a pair of general linear 
models (GLM). These models compare the degrees to which a discussion of particular 
criminal procedures affected the proportion of positive- and negative-associated terms 
to test the hypothesis that certain policies triggered more negatively associated terms, 
whereas others elicited neutral or even positive language.760  
To corroborate the findings of the GLM models still further, I also conducted a 
multiple linear regression to examine the relationship of these policies to the overall 
                                                
759 Interview, 9/13/2010. 
760 The analysis here utilizes GLM regression because the dependant variable is not 
the opinion score of each article, but rather the number of positive or negative terms as 
a proportion of the entire article. Proportion data, which consists of values that fall 
between zero and one, is better analyzed through GLM because it predicts values that 
also fall between zero and one. 
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opinion score of the article. As shown in table 4.6, articles that discussed policies 
lacking any historically rooted discourse in China (see table 3.1) demonstrated a 
generally positive attitude toward the subject of criminal procedure reform, whereas 
articles that discussed those policies entangled with a long-standing domestic 
discourse expressed a far more negative tone. In the words of one participant in 
Chinese legal reform, who nicely captured an insight of the two-tailed model of 
diffusion, “culture does not always decide the law.”761  
Table 4.6. Discourse and Dissent762 
VARIABLE 
POSITIVE 
TONE 
NEGATIVE 
TONE 
OPINION 
SCORE 
Discourse -0.1388372** 0.0654531 -0.2042904*** 
 (.0623205) (0.0737944) (0.0803882) 
 
Official Publisher 0.0004514 -0.0000236 0.0004749 
 (0.0006709) (0.000897) (0.0010198) 
 
# of Words -3.18e-08 -8.20e-08 5.02e-08 
 (6.11e-08) (9.37e-08) (1.04e-07) 
 
Beijing Based -0.0008196 0.0002462 -0.0010658 
 (.0006527) (0.0009273) (0.0010427) 
 
Novel Reforms 
 
0.3325654*** 
 
0.0446924 
 
0.287873* 
 (0.1356657) (0.1174518) (0.163699) 
 
“Points of Concern” -0.07597 0.4193954** -0.4953714*** 
 (0.0817349) (0.1956623) (0.1862333) 
Finally, as shown in the Opinion Score column, both sets of reforms proposed 
prior to the 1997 CPL appear related to the combined opinion score of each article in 
the direction hypothesized.  
As such, the level of discursive content—i.e. whether the author taps into an extant 
                                                
761 Interview, 9/7/2010. 
762 * significant at the 10% level, p < 0.1; ** significant at the 5% level, p < 0.05; *** 
significant at the 1% level, p < 0.01. 
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discourse—has a statistically significant relationship with the score, as did whether the 
author discussed certain reforms more than others.  
In the next model, I looked to see if the norm localization hypothesis held up 
under rigorous analysis. To perform such a test, I examined whether any relationship 
existed between the presence of nativist language and the degree to which the author 
taps into existing cognitive scripts or discursive content. To do this, I examined the 
texts for the use of terms referring to Chinese law and historical tradition (e.g. 
“culture,” “tradition,” “Chinese people”). As anticipated by the two-tailed model of 
diffusion, as table 4.7 suggests, there is a strong positive association between the 
amount of space the author devotes to discussions of China’s normative landscape and 
the degree to which an author taps into or refers to preexisting cognitive script. This 
finding, contrary to the expectations of norm localization theory, indicates that the 
presence of words evoking China’s normative traditions and prevailing attitudes is 
associated with resistance to transnational influence, not efforts to import such 
influences.763 Moreover, this finding confirms the observations of several respondents 
who noted that they never needed to conceal the foreign source of a proposed reform. 
As one respondent put it, that Chinese legal scholars advocating for a particular reform 
“will always refer to foreign law to support their suggestions.”764 Indeed, as another 
put it, “when presenting a reform to the government you never hide the foreign source 
of the law, even if [the reform] is against tradition.”765 This finding differs markedly 
from the approach employed by opponents of foreign legal reform, who, as one 
respondent stated, “will often resort to the excuse of needing to develop law with 
                                                
763 Not seeing a statistical relationship between the citation of international sources of 
law or legal norms is not surprising, given the political climate in which direct appeals 
to foreign sources of law are discouraged. 
764 Interview, 9/7/2010. 
765 Interview, 9/7/2010. 
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‘Chinese characteristics.’”766 This trope, she noted, is often raised in opposition to 
reform when the opponent “does not have a good argument against the policy and they 
want to retain the low standard.”767 As another Chinese attorney and legal advocate 
questioned: “law with ‘Chinese characteristics’—what does that even mean?”768  
Table 4.7. Discourse and Localization769 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT 
 
# of Words -4.80e-06 
 (.0000149) 
 
Beijing-Based .0909548 
 (.1462966) 
 
Official 0.0227136 
 (.1467638) 
 
National Appeals 59.82188*** 
 (25.362) 
 
International Appeals 10.49557 
 
(39.08094) 
 
It thus follows that there is neither a convincing theoretical reason to expect or 
evidence to suggest that legal advocates made an effort to ‘localize’ foreign legal 
concepts or attempted to adopt an ‘Asian values’ frame of proposed legal reforms. 
Indeed, as various respondents noted, while there has been some borrowing by China 
from the legal systems of its Asian neighbors, the systems are generally “not regarded 
well” in comparison to their Western counterparts. This resistance to local law exists 
despite the fact that many of those Asian systems are themselves a derivation of 
                                                
766 Interview, 9/7/2010. 
767 Id. 
768 Interview, 9/10/2010. 
769 *** significant at the 1% level, p < 0.01. 
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Western models.770 One respondent even stated outright that officials in Beijing prefer 
U.S. examples over examples from elsewhere in Asia.771 One senior participant in the 
drafting process similarly noted that U.S. legal procedure was the most common 
source during the 1997 CPL reform process, despite ostensible differences between 
the legal systems. As he explained, it was not a matter of localizing ideas to parallel 
Chinese legal norms. Rather, the preference for U.S. law was prevalent among 
reformers and officials because the large majority of participants understood English, 
U.S. legal sources were most readily available for study, and many of the ideas 
contained with those sources were the most persuasive, especially, he recalled, ideas 
such as the presumption of innocence and access to legal representation.772 In addition 
to these resources, he noted, there were also numerous U.S. legal experts present in 
Beijing saying “we want to help you.”773 Moreover, government officials to whom the 
drafters reported, several participants described, did not care about the source of the 
legal solution.774 Instead, one recalled, “the government wants you to open their eyes” 
with foreign law.775 As another longtime foreign advisor explained, Beijing officials 
are often open to foreign legal solutions, especially when they are encountering novel 
problems or otherwise uncharted legal terrain. In such situations, he continued, one 
need not “localize” the law. One merely need “explain to [the officials] why it is 
useful.”776 
It should be noted that almost every respondent cited the overwhelming 
influence of U.S. law on China’s legal reform. As one typical respondent described, 
                                                
770 Interview, 9/10/2010. 
771 Id. 
772 Interview, 9/14/2010. 
773 Id. This participant could not recall who they were, though he described them as 
“U.S. legal experts and professors.” 
774 Interview, 9/13/2010; 9/17/2010. 
775 Interview, 9/13/2010. 
776 Interview, 9/15/2010. 
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the distinction between common law and civil law “evaporated” in the minds of 
Chinese legal reformers.777 To get the attention of Chinese legal actors, transnational 
rule of law organizations from Europe thus now operate exclusively in English and 
seek out U.S. legal examples when making their case to their Chinese counterparts. 
The Canadian Bar Association in Beijing, moreover, is “largely ignored.”778 In a 
similar display of U.S.-centrism among China’s legal elite, a legal scholar at a French 
rule of law organization based in Beijing recently wrote a book on U.S.-China 
relations and its legal implications with the knowledge that any focus on France would 
attract few Chinese readers. Only one Chinese respondent dismissed the idea that U.S. 
law influenced his work. Instead, he noted, he turned primarily to Germany and Japan 
for law. “They’ve thought of everything,” he described. “Ideas I’ve never thought of.” 
When pressed as to why he chose those countries as his sources of novel legal 
solutions, he conceded that his limited English ability deterred him from delving into 
U.S. legal scholarship. In addition, his legal experience overseas was limited to 
research trips sponsored by the governments and organizations of those countries.779 
Finally, controlling for whether an article was published by an official organ of 
the state and for the level of discursive language contained in the text, I examined the 
role of policy issue in the overall positive tone of a publication. As table 4.8 shows, 
novel and entrenched policy reforms had no statistically significant relationship with 
the overall positive tone as it evoked no pre-existing normative discourse. The only 
exception is a demonstrated support for the adoption of adversarial procedures, which 
elicited strong positive support among authors and is a finding confirmed among 
respondents. By contrast, discussions of practices already embedded within a 
discursive landscape such as the death penalty and detention earned a statistically 
                                                
777 Interview, 9/10/2010. 
778 Interview, 9/9/2010. 
779 Interview, 9/13/2010. 
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negative opinion score.  
Table 4.8. Opinion Score by Policy780 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT VARIABLE COEFFICIENT 
# of Words 2.84e-07 Adversarial System .0023829** 
 (1.51e-07)  (.0011688) 
 
Beijing-Based -.0025135 Death Penalty -.0033046** 
 (.0013677)  (.0015144) 
 
Extant Discourse -.2482901*** Detention -.0048691*** 
 (.0826132)  (.0011121) 
 
Rules of Evidence -.001493 Legislative/Executive -.0043493 
 (.00102)  (.0030993) 
 
Right to Counsel -.0010407 Judiciary .0044049** 
 (.0013665)  (.0023044) 
 
Plea Bargaining .0013278 Public Security .0016114 
 (.0022794)  (.0028118) 
Presumption of 
Innocence .0002704 Unofficial .0014916 
 (.001354)  (0.0020248) 
 
Right to Appeal -.000616 
  
 (.0010112)   
While discussions of other contested practices, such as rules governing the 
admissibility of evidence and appeal, demonstrated no statistically significant 
relationship with the overall opinion score, the coefficients for these policies are, as 
hypothesized, negative.781 Thus, the findings above suggest that in periods of 
                                                
780 ** significant at the 5% level, p < 0.05; *** significant at the 1% level, p < 0.01. 
781 It should be noted that Taiwan has recently demonstrated equally strong support for 
the adoption of adversarial practices. Despite being, like China, a member of the civil 
law legal family, Taiwan has over the past decade introduced significant adversarial 
reforms. Moreover, these reforms were similarly the product of Taiwan reformers 
“actively look[ing] abroad” and transnational advocates pushing for expanded 
defendant rights. See Margaret K. Lewis, “Taiwan’s New Adversarial System and the 
Overlooked Challenge of Efficiency Driven Reforms,” 49 Va. J. Int’l L. 651, 663 
(2009) 
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uncertainty, legal reformers can succeed in importing novel foreign legal norms to 
pressing domestic issues. Indeed, “with new problems,” one respondent noted, “we 
always look abroad because we don’t often known what would be the most suitable 
solution.”782 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 The findings presented above suggest domestic legal observers, many of whom 
can be described as legal nationalist rebels, can shape a debate about proposed legal 
reforms by referring to a preexisting discursive vocabulary. It is thus not surprising 
that the proposed reforms most resisted by authors were those that had emerged as 
“points of concern” in society. Novel reforms, or those that challenged entrenched 
domestic practices about which little discourse existed, drew far less resistance. 
Indeed, the model suggests such reforms had no statistically significant effect on the 
negative position of an author. Extant “points of concern,” by contrast, were far more 
likely to shape an author’s opinion towards the reform of criminal procedure. 
 
                                                
782 Interview, 9/7/2010. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
DISCOURSES OF DIFFERENCE:  
LEGAL DEVELOPMENT IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA 
 
“The different approaches adopted in the different national jurisdictions 
arise not only from different textual provisions and from different 
historical circumstances, but also from different jurisprudential and 
philosophical understandings of equality.” 
—Justice Kate O’Regan,  
Constitutional Court of South Africa783 
 
“Our respective histories, social context, constitutional design differ 
markedly….We must therefore exercise great caution not to import, 
through this route, inapt foreign equality jurisprudence.”  
—Justice Dikgang Moseneke, 
Constitutional Court of South Africa784 
 
Justices Kate O’Regan and Dikgang Moseneke illustrate in the above 
quotations a shared awareness of the thorny historical context in which South African 
judges operate. Justice O’Regan, a white woman born in the United Kingdom and 
educated at both the University of Sidney and the London School of Economics, 
joined the newly established Constitutional Court of South Africa after serving as a 
professor of civil procedure and labor law at the University of Cape Town.785 Dikgang 
Moseneke, by contrast, received most of his education domestically while serving a 
sentence for anti-apartheid activity at Robben Island—the prison made notorious by its 
most famous inmate, Nelson Mandela.786 Despite the starkly different biographies of 
the two justices, their appreciation for South Africa’s unique history, evident in their 
                                                
783 See Brink v. Kitshoff, 1996 4 SALR 197 (CC). 
784 See Minister of Finance v. Van Heerden, 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC). 
785 See THE UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN LAW FACULTY: A HISTORY, 1859-2004 
(Denis Cohen & Daniel Visser, eds., 2004); Constitutional Court of South Africa, 
available at: http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/home.htm (last visited: May 
17, 2010).  
786 See KENNETH S. BROUN, BLACK LAWYERS, WHITE COURTS: THE SOUL OF SOUTH 
AFRICAN LAW (2000). 
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statements above, illustrates the challenges faced by transnational and domestic legal 
advocates attempting to affect legal reform amidst such a distinct national context.  
This Chapter aims to apply the two-tailed model of legal diffusion described in 
previous chapters to the recent history of South African legal development and to 
explore further the effects of discourse and legal structure in the trafficking of legal 
norms in the international system. In so doing, this Chapter and the next seek to 
understand the role of discourse in legal development, as well as the manner by which 
legal structure affects the actual process by which transnational advocates engage with 
domestic legal actors. More specifically, through the introduction of a “cosmopolity 
score” that measures the degree to which a judge is exposed to the international legal 
community, it examines the behavior of common-law judges operating in what some 
have described as an “increasingly homogenous epistemic community of international 
jurists.”787  
To investigate the relationship between this transnational community of jurists 
and domestic judicial decision-making, this Chapter makes analytical use of two 
features of the South African legal system that both distinguish it from and align it 
with legal development in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Firstly, with a 
common law structure left over from the colonial presence of the English, South 
Africa presents a useful case study to examine legal family as an intervening variable 
in the process of legal diffusion. Secondly, South Africa has in the post-apartheid 
period, just as the PRC has done in the post-Mao era, undertaken the substantial task 
of legal reconstruction. The hundreds of judicial decisions published during this period 
thus offer a valuable glimpse into the discourse of legal development in South Africa 
and common law systems more generally. Analyzed together, this collection of South 
                                                
787 See Adam M. Smith, “’Judicial Nationalism’ in International Law: National 
Identity and Judicial Autonomy at the ICJ,” 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 197 (2005). 
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African case law yields important insights for the understanding of norm diffusion and 
for IR theory more generally. 
 
I. Laying Down the Law: Judges & the Two-Tailed Theory of Legal 
Diffusion in South Africa 
As explained in the Chapters above, the two-tailed model of legal diffusion 
attempts to contribute to our understanding of norm diffusion through an examination 
of the conditions under which foreign legal norms succeed or fail to travel across 
sovereign borders. The basic insight of the model is that while increased exposure to 
international and transnational advocates—and the legal reforms they promote—
activates domestic supporters, so too does it activate extant discourses available to 
those opposed to such reforms. In addition, it suggests that legal advocates can 
succeed in diffusing legal norms without a process of norm localization stems from the 
observation in cognitive psychology that when actors have no pre-established scripts 
to follow, the more open they are to persuasion and the discursive challenges of 
political opponents. It follows that new legal rights can spread more easily than other 
models of diffusion anticipate. In matters of female genital mutilation, for example, 
advocates achieved little success when framing the issue as a matter of communal 
child abuse. Rather, one advocate observes, success has been achieved by avoiding 
such “cultural arguments,” relying instead on a novel framing of FGM as a new form 
of discrimination.788 In a similar way, research by scholars of the U.S. Supreme Court 
finds that legal advocates arguing before U.S. Supreme justices are less successful 
when raising salient issues about which the justices have preestablished cognitive 
commitments. In nonsalient cases, by contrast, the justices appear less resolute and so 
“more amenable to legal persuasion.”789 This Chapter attempts to extend a similar 
                                                
788 Interview, 8/17/2010. 
789 See Andrea McAtee & Kevin T. McGuire, “Lawyers, Justices, and Issue Salience: 
When and How Do Legal Arguments Affect the U.S. Supreme Court?,” 41 LAW & 
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examination to justices on the Constitutional Court of South Africa. 
There is no reason to suspect the two-tailed model of diffusion will apply in 
the contemporary South African context. In his impressive survey of South African 
legal history leading up to apartheid, Jens Meierhenrich finds that legal actors in 
episodes of uncertainty relied on mental models derived from the South African legal 
tradition.790 By his description, politico-legal adversaries operating with a shared 
understanding of the law and its constitutive purpose—such as in the racial divide it 
reflects and in its ability to “purify and cure [its] evils”791—can achieve stability by 
resorting to those shared legal legacies, even in the chaos and uncertainty of a 
transitional period. This Chapter aims to further this finding through an investigation 
of the South African legal culture in the post-apartheid era.792 As will be shown, the 
post-apartheid socialization of certain South African justices in the global community 
of jurists has caused a partial rift in the legal backgrounds these justices once shared. 
This rift has altered the constitutive frameworks within which justices operate in 
nonsalient and novel cases. During periods of uncertainty, it follows, foreign-trained 
South African jurists are able to draw from legal discourses beyond the South African 
tradition, including those introduced to them in international conferences, seminar 
rooms, and overseas tribunals. Indeed, one such internationally engaged former justice 
describes foreign law in such situations as “immensely helpful” to him when he faced 
                                                                                                                                       
SOCIETY REVIEW 259 (2007), at 260. McAtee and McGuire find that these results 
remain significant even after controlling for each judges’ policy preferences and 
ideological sympathy for the litigants.  
790 See JENS MEIERHENRICH, THE LEGACIES OF LAW: LONG-RUN CONSEQUENCES OF 
LEGAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1652-2000 (2008), at 220. 
791 Karl E. Klare, “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism,” 14 S. AFR. J. 
OF HUMAN RTS. 146, 168-69 (1998). 
792 While Meierhenrich’s study offers a valuable survey of apartheid-era 
jurisprudence, only 3 percent of the cases he analyzes were decided after the 1996 
Constitution. 
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novel questions before the Court.793 As such, we can anticipate Constitutional Court 
decisions on novel issues to more closely reflect aspects of this global judicial 
dialogue than the legacies of South African legal discourse.  
a. Different Stage, Different Actors 
In the examination of the diffusion process in a common law system below, the 
key actors endowed with the power to serve as the principal conduits and contributors 
of foreign law are judges. Judges on constitutional courts—such as the one created in 
South Africa fifteen years ago—are especially well-positioned to serve this facilitating 
role as they often rely on comparative constitutional jurisprudence to aid them in 
answering the constitutional questions before them.794 Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, a 
justice on the Supreme Court of Canada, noted as much during her tenure on the court: 
“More and more courts, particularly within the common law world, are looking to the 
judgments of other jurisdictions, particularly when making decisions on human rights 
issues.”795 British barrister Anthony Lester, discussing the “overseas trade” in U.S. 
constitutional jurisprudence, noted similarly that “the landmark judgments of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, giving fresh meaning to the principles of the Bill 
of Rights, are studied with as much attention in New Delhi or Strasbourg as they are in 
Washington, D.C., or the State of Washington, or Springfield, Illinois.”796 
                                                
793 Interview, 8/26/2010. 
794 This phenomenon occurred most recently in the U.S. Supreme Court decision of 
Graham v. Florida, No. 08-7412, slip op. at 29, 560 U.S. ___ (2010). In his majority 
opinion, Justice Kennedy noted that “in continuing to impose life without parole 
sentences on juveniles who did not commit homicide, the United States adheres to a 
sentencing practice rejected the world over.”  
795 Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, “The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the 
International Impact of the Rehnquist Court,” 34 TULSA L.J. 15 (1998). 
796 See Anthony Lester, “The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 537 (1988), at 541. This does not mean, however, that there is not a 
recursive relationship among these courts. Indeed, U.S. courts are frequently 
influenced by the effect of its jurisprudence abroad. See L’Heureux-Dubé, at 17 
(1998) (noting that the “reception” of U.S. law is “turning into dialogue.”); see also 
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This trafficking in law is especially common when judges on constitutional 
courts face periods of decisional uncertainty created by novel legal issues or new 
challenges to deeply entrenched practices brought by innovative litigants. Such 
challenges are especially common in the wake of new constitutions or bills of rights, 
as seen in Canada since the passage of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, in 
Hong Kong since the passage of the Bill of Rights Ordinance in 1991, in the United 
Kingdom since the passage of the Human Rights Act in 1998, and in South Africa 
since the passage of the Interim Constitution in 1993. In the absence of extensive 
domestic jurisprudence to provide meaning to the new legal protections afforded in 
these rights charters, judges pressed for time by a mounting court docket look for 
illumination in the jurisprudence of foreign constitutional courts. New Zealand faced a 
number of such novel interpretive questions after the introduction of its Bill of Rights 
Act in 1990. Amidst this uncertainty, New Zealand justices looked abroad to answer 
novel questions such as whether police officers should advise a person involved in a 
motor vehicle of his or her right to counsel before taking a blood sample.797 South 
African judges interpreting that country’s new constitution—which Hassen Ebrahim 
has called the “birth certificate of a nation”798—have similarly turned to decisions of 
various foreign courts, including the Supreme Court of India, a country similarly 
struggling with the protection of rights amidst stark economic inequalities, to develop 
its own socio-economic jurisprudence,799 even go so far as to openly inquire during 
                                                                                                                                       
Heinz Klug, “Model and Anti-Model: the United States Constitution and the “Rise of 
World Constitutionalism,” 2000 WISC. L. REV. 597 (2000). 
797 See, e.g., Police v. Smith & Herewini, [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. 306 (C.A.) (rejecting the 
Canadian approach).  
798 See HASSEN EBRAHIM, THE SOUL OF A NATION: CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN SOUTH 
AFRICA (1998), at 251.  
799 See, e.g., Union of Refugee Women v. Director, 2007 (4) BLCR 339 (CC); 
Mashava v. President of the RSA, 2004 (12) BCLR (CC); S. v. Lubisi, 2003 (9) BCLR 
1041 (T).  
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oral arguments how foreign jurisdictions handle the same problem.800  
As litigants around the world bring more and more novel issues before the 
court, judges are using foreign law, as they have throughout history, as a tool of 
interpretation “deployed where it sheds new light on an issue.”801 In recent years, there 
has been an increase in the search abroad for legal innovations as courts face novel 
legal questions raised by new technologies (e.g. the regulation of the electronic 
communication and advancements in biotechnology). Indeed, courts are now more 
than ever dealing with novel legal questions, rendering them increasingly open to 
persuasive legal arguments from abroad. In the face of such uncertainty, litigants 
themselves often stand as the principal sources of novel arguments drawn from foreign 
law.802  
In addition to grappling with novel questions of law, judges have also faced 
innovative challenges to entrenched cultural practices. As Heinz Klug notes, courts 
around the globe are engaging in an “interactive discussion through which 
longstanding assumptions about traditional constitutional values are being rethought in 
order to understand their role in the construction and maintenance of different 
constitutional orders.”803 This transnational push against old practices has, for 
example, produced substantial challenges to old case law governing aboriginal rights, 
especially in the courtrooms of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.804 Courts in these 
                                                
800 Interview, 8/17/2010. 
801 See Devika Hovell & George Williams, “A Tale of Two Systems: The Use of 
International Law in Constitutional Interpretation in Australia and South Africa,” 29 
MELB. U. L. REV. 95 (2005), at 128. The increase in the amount of novel issues before 
the court may explain why the U.S. Supreme Court decisions most often cited by 
foreign courts are not the oldest, but rather the landmark decisions from the second 
half of the twentieth century. See also L’Heureux-Dubé, at 20. 
802 Id. 
803 See Klug, at 612. 
804 See L’Heureux-Dubé, at 23 (citing Wik Peoples v. State of Queensland [1996] 141 
A.L.R. 129 (Austl.); Mabo v. Queensland [175] C.L.R. 1 (Austl.); Delgamuukw v. 
British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (Can.); R. v. Van der Peet [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 
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countries have thus proved remarkably open to novel framing of these entrenched 
issues introduced by litigators and willing to cite approvingly to legal solutions 
developed in foreign jurisdictions.  
Judges on constitutional courts are also introduced to these foreign and 
international legal solutions through a process of socialization within the informal 
settings of international conferences and member organizations—what Anne-Marie 
Slaughter calls “communities of judges.”805 The global socialization of judges is not 
unfamiliar to judges in South Africa.806 South African judges have participated in 
international legal conferences in jurisdictions as varied as Australia, Austria, Bosnia, 
Cambridge (U.S. and U.K.), Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
and dozens of other countries. South Africa has even played the host to such events, 
including the Society of Constitutional Court Judges.807 Richard Goldstone, a former 
justice on the Constitutional Court of South Africa, even cited the work of Anne Marie 
Slaughter when he likened his experience of being a Constitutional Court justice to 
being a member of the “invisible college,” which Slaughter describes as the 
increasingly common meetings of judges from all over the world.808 Moreover, this 
judicial socialization does not only occur among English-speaking judicial actors. 
Justice Johann van der Westhuizen, one of the several members of the Court able to 
speak German, recalled participating in an international conference of high court 
justices and discussing with a German member of the “invisible college” a novel 
                                                                                                                                       
(Can.); Te Runanganui o Te Ika Whenua Society v. Attorney-General [1994] 2 
N.Z.L.R. 20 (C.A.)). 
805 See Slaughter, 2003.  
806 See Bentele, at 244. 
807 Reflecting the subordinate role of academics in common law systems, legal 
scholars were not invited to the event. Interview, 8/18/2010. 
808 Examples include, inter alia, the International Organization for Judicial Training, 
see http://www.iojt.org/; the International Bar Association, see: http://www.ibanet.org; 
and the International Judicial Training Program, see: 
http://www.uga.edu/ruskcenter/ijtp.html.  
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question of law posed by a case pending before the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa.809 This experience parallels L’Heureux-Dubé’s observation that “while until 
recently it was uncommon for judges on different continents to get to know each other, 
let alone communicate regularly about issues of mutual concern, close interactions are 
now becoming commonplace.”810 Increasingly, South African justices are going 
abroad not only for international conferences, but also for entire periods of their 
education. Indeed, as many as one in three South African Constitutional Court justices 
received some form of legal education abroad. Upon their return, these cosmopolitan 
judges have then proved able and willing to refer to their foreign coursework for 
jurisprudential guidance in their written opinions.811  
It should be noted that this “global community of courts”812 is not comprised 
solely of judges. The intermediary agents circulating foreign legal ideas may indeed be 
judges themselves, but it is also their clerks or eager litigators who, aware of the 
results of similar litigation abroad, introduce to judges the details of foreign precedent. 
A survey of briefs submitted to U.S. courts by attorneys suggests this practice of legal 
importation is not unique to judges from new constitutional courts.  
As figure 5.1 illustrates, appellate attorneys arguing before the U.S. Supreme 
Court have over the past decade dramatically increased the frequency with which they 
appeal to judgments from international tribunals. Such references, which spiked 
dramatically in 2005 due to the number of briefs filed for the case of Medellin v. 
                                                
809 See Bentele (2008), at 244. 
810 See L’Heureux-Dubé, at 26. Some U.S. Supreme Court justices themselves stand as 
notable participants. Justice Antony Kennedy, for example, has regularly taught a 
summer program for law students in Austria. This effort has come to be known as the 
“Marshall Plan of the Mind.” See JEFFERY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET 
WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT (2008), at 183. 
811 See L’Heureux-Dubé (citing Pnina Lahav, “American Influence on Israel’s 
Jurisprudence of Free Speech,” 9 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 21 (1981)). 
812 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, “A Global Community of Courts,” 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
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Dretke,813 a case involving the question of whether federal courts are bound by a ruling 
announced by the International Court of Justice, expose justices to relevant foreign 
and international jurisprudence and provide them with new facts for analogical 
reasoning in the cases before them. 
 
Figure 5.1. Cites to International Authorities in Briefs to the U.S. Supreme Court814 
The South African court system has institutionalized a mechanism to ensure 
that foreign law is made known to the Constitutional Court—foreign clerks.815 These 
clerks, several interviewees noted, typically come from the United States, as each 
foreign clerk must supply his or her own funding for the term.816 South African 
justices have cited these clerks as key conduits of foreign law when the Court 
encounters novel questions.817 Foreign clerks, one former South African clerk noted, 
                                                
813 544 U.S. 660 (2005).  
814 Source: U.S. Supreme Court Briefs Database. 
815 Initially, the Court accepted foreign aid to support the provision of South African 
law clerks. Since this program has since been taken over by the South African 
government, alongside two South African law clerks, Constitutional Court justices 
have the choice of up to five foreign law clerks. 
816 Interview, 8/18/2010. 
817 Id. 
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“brought with them their experiences from their home countries.”818 Former Justice 
van der Westhuizen, for example, when faced with constitutional questions raised by a 
search of a gambling establishment by government inspectors in Magajane v. 
Chairperson, recalled the valuable explanations delivered by his American clerk from 
Harvard Law School on the history of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence on the 
constitutionality of administrative searches.819 Former Justice Albie Sachs similarly 
recalled including in a judgment an argument drawn from U.S. feminist scholarship on 
critical race theory, a literature introduced to him by his American clerk.820 Other 
Justices, such as Laurie Ackermann, often retained German clerks, and so on several 
occasions drew on German law to support, if not supply, his argument.821 A current 
foreign clerk describes her role similarly, noting that her work for the Court largely 
involves her training in American and public international law.822 Indeed, foreign 
clerks proved so useful to the supply of foreign legal ideas that one Constitutional 
Court justice reportedly moved to extend their terms from six months to a full year.823 
Foreign clerks, several interviewees noted, have proved especially useful—and 
influential—in supplying foreign law to the Court not only because fewer and fewer of 
the justices are themselves able to read or speak German or other continental 
languages, but also because the legal education of the South African clerks includes 
only a cursory survey of foreign and international law. Despite the South African 
Constitution itself requiring the consideration of international law and permitting the 
extensive use of foreign law when adjudicating matters under the Bill of Rights, the 
                                                
818 Interview, 8/23/2010. 
819 See Benetle, at 244 (citing Magajane v. Chairperson, N.W. Gambling Bd. 2006 (5) 
SA 250 (CC)). 
820 Interview, 8/26/2010. 
821 Interview, 8/23/2010. 
822 Interview, 8/18/2010. 
823 Interview, 8/17/2010. 
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director of the University of Witswatersrand Law School, a prestigious law school in 
Johannesburg, noted that the training of South African law students in international 
and comparative law is limited primarily to their brief coursework in constitutional 
law.824 As another constitutional scholar and professor explained, South African law 
students are likely to get training in the process of comparative law only if they have 
an especially good lecturer who explains to students how a particular law is actually 
“the distillation of a comparative process.”825 For those South African law students 
that go on to be clerks at the Constitutional Court, the research and application of 
foreign law is thus a “trial by fire,”826 leaving them particularly open to the research 
and legal arguments of foreign clerks, litigants, amicus briefs, and the judges 
themselves.827 One former Constitutional Court clerk, recalling her training in 
comparative law upon joining the Court, remembered receiving only a short 
orientation on how to search for foreign law through electronic media.828 Foreign 
clerks, by contrast, were typically more experienced in navigating such databases as 
well as more familiar with many of the foreign law sources shelved in the 
Scandinavian-funded library of the Constitutional Court.829  
To supplement the knowledge of the domestic and foreign clerks, several 
clerks each year are tasked as serving as liaisons with the global judicial dialogue 
                                                
824 Interview, 8/19/2010. 
825 Interview, 8/25/2010. 
826 Interview, 8/20/2010. 
827 This is not to say that American law students receive superb training in 
comparative law. Indeed, they receive it only if they elect to do so. The important 
difference, though, is that the South African Constitution expressly provides for the 
consideration of law from other free and open societies, and thus judges and clerks 
face foreign law regularly, if not “in every case,” as one Justice put it. 
828 Interview, 8/23/2010. 
829 In addition to the considerable assistance of the Scandinavian countries in filling 
the shelves of the library of the Constitutional Court, the library is also a product of 
Richard Goldstone, an early justice on the Constitutional Court bench and one of the 
most active international human rights lawyers working today. Interview, 8/25/2010. 
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facilitated by the Venice Commission. This judicial body arranges the publication and 
sharing of summaries of key constitutional decisions of member states so that judicial 
actors can learn of—and possibly adopt—novel solutions to similar legal issues. One 
clerk described the effect of this forum on South African law in a recent case 
involving a common law rule allowing the government to detain persons suspected of 
fleeing the country to evade debt repayment. The Court’s review of this law, which 
had not been tested in the post-apartheid constitutional era, triggered a search for 
foreign solutions. The Court ultimately adopted the position of foreign jurisdictions 
and abrogated the law.830 
To say, though, that South African clerks at the Constitutional Court do not 
assume their positions on the Court as ready conduits of foreign law does not mean 
that they do not develop into such conduits over time. As one former clerk and current 
attorney before the Constitutional Court observed, there is now “a whole generation” 
of former clerks who, after their term at the Court ended, went abroad to the United 
States or the United Kingdom for graduate training in law. These former clerks, she 
noted, “are steeped in foreign law” and capably use it in their advocacy before South 
African courts.831 Such transnational engagement, she observed, stands as an important 
“nonlegal reason for why so much foreign law appears before the bench.”832 This 
boomerang-like pattern of clerks going abroad for graduate work in law has continued, 
with roughly half (at least six of thirteen) of the Constitutional Court clerks from the 
2008-09 term going abroad for advanced foreign legal education immediately 
following the completion of their clerkship.833 It is unknown how many of the 
remaining clerks pursue graduate work abroad at a later date, but at least one former 
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831 Interview, 8/23/2010. 
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clerk observed that an overwhelming number do ultimately pursue further legal 
education overseas.834  
Upon receiving advanced degrees and experience in foreign and international 
law, these clerks return to South Africa to serve as litigators. Litigators, most 
respondents noted, have become a principal source of foreign law that appears in 
South African jurisprudence.835 As one former justice noted, the ability of litigators to 
serve as conduits of foreign law is especially powerful at lower-level courts because 
those courts have no clerk system.836 One South African litigator, who retained an 
LLM from NYU and litigated for eight years in the United States, observed that 
foreign law appears in her legal briefs to lower courts “all the time.”837 Many of her 
colleagues, moreover, are members of the bar in both South Africa as well as a bar 
overseas, most commonly the United Kingdom, and they too draw extensively from 
foreign law in their work before the courts.838 When presented with a hypothetical 
wherein a U.S. court considers a novel argument concerning the expansion of civil 
remedies for domestic gender violence, one South African attorney said such an 
argument would “absolutely” appear in any capable attorney’s brief to the South 
African court, even if the U.S. court had ultimately rejected the argument.839 
A comparison of two subsections of a legal brief recently submitted to the 
Constitutional Court in a case concerning the freedom of expression reveals the extent 
to which South African litigators raise foreign legal arguments before South African 
                                                
834 Interview, 8/23/2010. 
835 Former Justice Sachs noted that litigators provide the first selection of foreign law 
a judge would receive in a case. This is then supplemented by the judge’s own 
research. Interview, 8/26/2010. 
836 Interview, 8/26/2010. 
837 Interview, 8/26/2010. 
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courts. Indeed, the brief downplays South African jurisprudence concerning the issue, 
citing only three domestic precedents. In a section titled “International and Foreign 
Law,” by contrast, the attorneys cite as many as seven, including even a case from the 
Texas Supreme Court.840 This reliance on foreign legal arguments by litigators was 
confirmed further during their oral arguments before the Court, when more than half 
of the cases cited during their opening statement were from abroad.841  
In addition to their formal education in foreign law, several South African 
litigators reported learning of foreign law in international law conferences. One such 
respondent noted her exposure to Colombian socio-economic rights jurisprudence 
during a recent comparative law conference convened by David Kennedy at Harvard 
Law School. As she described, ones exposure and openness to foreign law 
“absolutely” relates to ones exposure to it.842 
In addition to the influence of law clerks and litigators on judicial decision-
making, legal scholars can also play a supporting role. In South Africa, scholars try to 
influence outcomes through their participation in the South African Law Commission, 
a statutory advisory body involved in the development of law and recommendations of 
legal reforms.843 In addition, some constitutional scholars on occasion participate in 
the drafting of so-called rights charters, which, if adopted by the legislature, must be 
considered by the courts when adjudicating a matter related to a particular right.844  
Nonetheless, these scholars are less essential to the direct diffusion of foreign law than 
they are in many civil law systems because the Constitutional Court itself stands as the 
                                                
840 See Le Roux v. Dey, Applicant’s Written Argument, Case No. 45/10. 
841 Observation, 8/26/2010. 
842 Interview, 8/26/2010. 
843 See LOURENS DU PLESSIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW (3d ed. 1999). 
844 One such transnationally active respondent, a constitutional law scholar and drafter 
of the South African Constitution, is currently consulting with Brigham Young 
University law scholars regarding the drafting of a rights charter concerning religious 
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most powerful body in the shaping of South African common law and in the process 
of constitutional review. Unlike their civil law counterparts, however, scholars rarely 
play a direct role in the diffusion of law on their own, instead preferring to act as a sort 
of “fourth or fifth estate.”845 
The most important role of these scholars comes in the form serving as an 
advocate before the bench through law clinics housed in prestigious law schools, or by 
acting in a coalition with local and transnational NGOs submitting amicus briefs to the 
Court.846 Amicus briefs submitted by NGOs, which generally rely on substantial 
transnational financial and research support, have proved a fertile resource of foreign 
law in various important South African cases.847 Their usefulness and influence on the 
Court, one interviewee noted, stems from the fact that they are required to present 
“something novel” in terms of legal argument.  
Amicus briefs, moreover, generally draw extensively from comparative 
jurisprudence, and are even on occasion solicited by the Court to provide a survey 
exclusively on foreign law.848 In addition, these briefs can have a powerful effect as 
amici rules at the South African Constitutional Court are such that there is often only 
one per case. Foreign advocates have made important inroads through such briefs, 
often allying with local NGOs to make their arguments before the Court. On occasion, 
these transnational actors even apply directly to the Court, most recently in the case of 
a Harvard Law School clinic moving to submit an amicus brief regarding the issue of 
apartheid reparations.849  
In common law states, the influence of legal scholars is often most pronounced 
in times of constitutional framing in transitional states. The role of the legal scholar 
                                                
845 Interview, 8/18/2010. 
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qua legal conduit during these times can range from delivering completed versions of 
constitutions, to merely commenting on drafts.850 Legal scholars certainly served as 
able conduits of foreign legal norms during the drafting of South African constitution. 
The notable influence of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the South 
African Constitution,851 for example, stems in part from the presence in South Africa 
of David Beatty, a Canadian visiting professor at the University of Cape Town.852 
Beatty’s mark is most apparent on the Charter of Social Justice, an influential draft of 
the Bill of Rights circulated by eight prominent South African attorneys and consulted 
extensively by the constitutional drafters.853 This serendipitous Canadian influence 
was supplemented by a similarly indirect U.S. influence at a later stage, which owed 
much to the intervention of Halton Cheadle. Cheadle, who was then South Africa’s 
                                                
850 See John C. Reitz, “Export of the Rule of Law,” 13 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. 
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Freedoms). 
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point because its structure, unlike the U.S. Constitution, is very much modeled on the 
various international human rights instruments of the twentieth century. Some 
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power to construe later on. See Klug. On the international human rights instruments 
such as the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Convention on Economic and Social Rights as the common ancestor of 
the South African Constitution, see J. Kentridge, at 245-46. 
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most eminent labor lawyer, had just returned from a year at Harvard Law School.854 
Upon arrival, he introduced a novel conceptualization of judicial scrutiny by drafting a 
provision guaranteeing that certain rights could be constitutionally limited if the 
limitation was both reasonable and necessary.855 South African jurists have similarly 
noted a German influence via the presence of various German legal scholars in South 
African law schools, including Francois Venter and Gerhard Erasmus at the 
prestigious Stellenbosch University.856 In the sections that follow, I will attempt to 
describe the influence of these foreign players to better understand the relationships 
among the socialization of judicial actors, the domestic discursive context, and the 
influence of foreign law. 
 
II. Case Selection 
The selection of South Africa as a common-law counterpart to the analysis of 
legal development in the PRC attempts to address an oversight in the expanding 
literature concerning legal diffusion. While much has been written on the growing 
global judicial community and the socialization of judges, many contributors to this 
field of study give short shrift to notions of controlled comparison and case 
selection.857 To remedy this, the study below incorporates a “most different cases” 
case logic.858 Under this approach, it is necessary to select cases with characteristics 
                                                
854 Davis, at 187. 
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856 See Ackermann (2005), at 180. 
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that vary on variables not central to the study. This method of selection serves to 
emphasize the ability of the key independent variable in explaining similar outcomes. 
In this way, South Africa, which possesses a constitutional court rooted in a common 
law system of English origin, stands as a useful test case of conclusions drawn from 
the analysis of legal diffusion to the civil law system of the PRC in Chapters 3 and 4.  
Beyond serving as an appropriate setting to supplement the study of criminal 
procedure reform in China, South Africa’s post-apartheid legal development also 
presents a useful setting to test alternative explanations of legal diffusion more 
broadly. As described in Chapter 1 and illustrated in Chapters 3 and 4, scholars have 
proposed various explanations for why countries recognize or resist foreign legal 
innovations. The dominant explanation of diffusion in international relations maintains 
that the legal rules to which states commit themselves reflect the distribution of 
material power in the international system. Accordingly, states import the so-called 
best practices of the international system when the overall power structure compels 
them to do so. Such power-based explanations of legal development in South Africa 
maintain that foreign influences of post-apartheid legal reforms reflect patterns of 
international economic aid. According to this reasoning, scholars maintain that the 
appearance of Canadian and German constitutional doctrines in the 1996 Constitution 
of South Africa suggests that diffusion is not a product of persuasion, but material 
resources.859 Rationalist explanations that look internally to domestic distributions of 
power similarly attribute legal outcomes to forces apart from persuasion. By such 
logic, court decisions in South Africa reflect not the reasoned judgment of the court, 
but rather the result of “pressure from small but politically powerful interest groups 
                                                                                                                                       
(1982); Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and Comparative Method,” 65 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 682 (1971). 
859 See Du Bois, at 631. 
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opposed to certain rights.”860 
In addition to providing a testing ground for these common rational-choice 
explanations, South Africa, with its extensive body of customary and common law, 
serves as a useful setting to examine two additional explanations of legal diffusion—
norm localization and legal family. Norm localization theorists of international 
relations maintain that foreign legal norms and practices transplant from one body 
politic to another only in the presence of proximate local discourse upon which foreign 
legal advocates can graft the candidate reform. A related theory developed in 
comparative legal studies maintains that the legal family from which a national legal 
system determines the source of foreign law. This explanation is familiar to 
comparative scholars of South African law. As they explain, the targets of 
comparative research conducted by South African jurists “have been either 
jurisdictions from which South Africa received large chucks of mostly statutory law, 
notably England, or those on the continent of Europe with which it shares part of its 
legal history.”861  
a. South Africa & the Common Law Legal Family 
Before proceeding with an analysis of South African legal discourse, it is 
necessary to first establish that South African legal institutions are appropriate for 
such a comparative study. Common-law systems are comprised of several basic 
attributes: a case-based system of law administered through analogical reasoning; 
doctrine of stare decisis;862 sources of law that include both statutes and cases; typical 
                                                
860 Mitra Ebadolahi, “Using Structural Interdicts and the South African Human Rights 
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861 See du Bois & Visser, at 645; see also du Bois, “Introduction: History, System, and 
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legal institutions such as trust, tort law and agency; improvisatory legal style; and no 
substantive public/private law distinction.863 In this way, South Africa’s legal system 
fulfills the essential structural requirements of a common law system.864 South African 
law is comprised of a mixture of Roman-Dutch and English common law elements, 
with institutions and legal procedures characteristic of England’s common law grafted 
onto substantive laws rooted in continental pre-Napoleonic Code civil law.865 
Moreover, the model of the British legal profession structured the constitutive 
“imagining and understanding” of the South African lawyers in the early state-making 
period.866 
As discussed in Chapter 2, although legal family categorizations such as 
“common law” and “civil law” usefully capture broad structural differences between 
and among the various legal systems of the world, specific attributes of legal systems 
within a single legal family may differ. These differences have led some scholars to 
debate the utility of such classifications.867 The long, complicated colonial history of 
South Africa leaves it open to such categorical debates. Most notably, while most 
political scientists and comparative law scholars—and South African justices 
themselves868—consider South Africa a common law system,869 Vernon Palmer 
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recently suggested that while most jurisdictions of the world fall into either the civil or 
common law tradition, South Africa arguably belongs to a “third legal family”—i.e. a 
mixed jurisdiction.870  
Palmer’s important contribution to the legal family literature, however, is of 
only passing importance to the study below. He maintains that the distinctive legal 
characteristics of mixed jurisdictions lie mainly in their isolation from members of the 
other two legal families. “[M]ixed jurisdictions,” he argues, “up until relatively 
recently, have lived their entire existence in a kind of physical and intellectual 
isolation, cut off from family members around the world.”871 This category, however, 
is more a matter of degree than of kind, and reflects long-running debates about the 
extent to which the substantive laws of any state are truly derived from common or 
civil law.  
More important for this study is the overall institutional structure, not 
substance, of the legal system. In terms of such an institutional structure, South Africa 
ancestry in the English common law legal family is unquestioned. Dutch settlers were 
the first to impose substantive law in South Africa, but British settlers were quick to 
erect English practices of adjudication in the colony. In colonial tribunals established 
in the late-seventeenth century, faced with the question of whether the colonial courts 
had jurisdiction over the indigenous population and, if so, what law applied, the Dutch 
reasoned from supposed principles of natural law that the local populace was subject 
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to the application of Dutch law. The English, arriving in the late 1700s, did not impose 
substantive English law on the territory. Rather, they “impose[d] English public law 
and procedure (including a judicial system based on the English model)” on top of 
what the Dutch had put in place.872 In this way, the “natural dominating tendency of 
English law,” including the decisions of English courts, English constitutional and 
procedural rules, English statutes, English texts and English-trained lawyers, had 
“enormous influence” on South Africa’s legal system.873 In addition, the English 
colonial experience in South Africa Anglicized the judiciary and the legal profession. 
François du Bois and Daniel Visser, both preeminent South African jurists, observed 
that, “[t]he introduction of English-style courts and adjectival [i.e. procedural] law was 
accompanied by the restriction of judicial appointments and membership of the legal 
profession to those trained and permitted to practice in Britain, and the importation of 
British judges.”874 After independence from British rule, the legal system did not 
fundamentally change except for the passage of laws to further institutionalize the 
system of racial exclusion begun under British rule. Occasional periods of anti-English 
legal reform did occur among nationalist Africkaners, but their efforts were primarily 
limited to the area of private law.875 
The contemporary South African legal system remains similarly tethered to 
common law rather than civil law traditions, most especially because many important 
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laws are not codified by a legislature. As du Bois and Daniel Visser note, “In South 
Africa, as in Britain and other common law jurisdictions, the basic framework of legal 
principles is today found in a combination of judicial precedents established by 
decisions of the superior courts and legislation with a relatively narrow compass, the 
latter often merely adding further detail and elaboration to the former.”876 Moreover, 
just as post-Mao legal reconstruction in China has left the fundamental structure of 
China’s civil law legal system in place, the legal revolution of the post-apartheid era 
has not revolutionized the common-law attributes of South African adjudicative 
procedure,877 or its system of strong judicial review.878 Indeed, as Arthur Chaskalson, 
former President of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, observed in In re Ex 
Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: “There are not two systems of 
law,…each operating in its own field with its own highest court. There is only one 
system of law. It is shaped by the Constitution which is the supreme law, and all law, 
including the common law, derives its force from the constitution and is subject to 
constitutional control.”879 
b. Legal Construction & Reconstruction in Post-Apartheid South 
Africa 
In addition to serving as a valuable common-law counterpoint to China’s civil 
law system, South Africa is usefully similar to China in both the scale of its ongoing 
project of legal reconstruction as well as its location within an active and well-
resourced transnational legal advocacy campaign. Indeed, after subjecting its black 
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citizens to half a century of brutally inhumane treatment under apartheid, South Africa 
has, since efforts to promulgate a new constitution began in 1991, drawn extensively 
from comparative constitutional jurisprudence to develop what is arguably “the most 
admirable constitution in the history of the world.”880  
The creation of this landmark document could not have occurred without the 
constant and courageous sacrifices of the South African people. Nonetheless, this 
domestic struggle drew frequently from various international, transnational, and 
foreign notions of legal rights such as those codified in the International Convention 
on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid of 1973 and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. This engagement with foreign and 
international law by South Africa’s freedom fighters was not a wholly modern 
phenomenon in South Africa. Victor Sampson, an attorney-general of the Cape 
Colony, wrote in 1887 that, “To say that there is not a book of law in the whole 
civilized world which may not possibly be an authority in the…[South African] 
Courts, is not to go beyond the truth.”881 Within such a syncretist legal setting, Martin 
Chanock observes, “judges were the primary agents” of laying down foreign law in 
South African courts despite nativist resistance.882 A crucial characteristic in the 
contemporary era, moreover, is that references to foreign and international law are 
more voluntary. That is, “the consultation of foreign law in South Africa’s process of 
strengthening the rule of law and supporting multiparty democracy is symbolic of its 
final liberation from a past marked by the imposition of foreign law.”883 
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The project of drafting South Africa’s post-apartheid constitution began in 
1991 with the establishment of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa 
(CODESA).884 These negotiations, which began amidst both domestic and 
international pressure, and only a year following the lifting of legal restrictions on 
political opponents of President F.W. De Klerk, quickly unraveled as periods of 
government repression and street demonstrations—the so-called “rolling mass action” 
organized by the African National Congress (ANC)—quickly disrupted the initial 
progress made under the auspices of CODESA.885 When stability returned, the 
collective efforts of various South African interest groups reconvened as the Multi-
Party Negotiating Process in 1993. This reconstituted body delegated the drafting of 
an enumerated bill of rights to a technical committee of South African justices, 
attorneys, and constitutional scholars.886  
Unlike the experience of the Constitutional Framers in the United States, who 
were strongly divided over the creation of the Bill of Rights,887 the creation of such a 
charter was not controversial in the South African political climate. With South 
Africa’s long history of rights violations and the prospect of a distrusted white 
minority losing political control, the prospect of introducing strong 
countermajoritarian constitutional protections did not derail the constitutional 
convention. The greatest challenge was a temporal one, as the National Party, the 
political party responsible for the imposition of apartheid in 1948 and soon to be out 
of power in the new South Africa, hoped to ensure such protections as soon as 
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possible so as not to lose them once the new legislature voted on the draft charter.888 
Ultimately, negotiations over constitutional rights occurred in two phases. In 
the initial phase, CODESA adopted an Interim Constitution compiled by the technical 
advisors.889 Once adopted, the Constitutional Court was formally established and 
parliamentary elections were held in 1994. This first parliament functioned as a 
Constitutional Congress with the task of ratifying within two years a new constitution 
that conformed to thirty-four constitutional principles agreed to by CODESA.890 All 
thirty-four of these principles survived the codification process with only minor 
revisions.891 To ensure the final document best reflected the interests of society, this 
draft was then presented to and accepted by the South African public.892 To achieve 
this, the Constitutional Assembly distributed materials via the internet and delegated 
“theme committees” to incorporate public opinion.893 Finally, the Constitutional Court 
subsequently ruled that the Constitution complied with the thirty-four Constitutional 
Principles agreed to by the CODESA negotiations.894 
To contextualize the analysis of South African judicial opinions below and to 
describe still further the process of South Africa’s legal reconstruction, it is also worth 
noting the role of foreign advisors during this period of constitutional transition and 
legal reconstruction. In the actual drafting process, foreign experts were formally 
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excluded from the process.895 This purposeful exclusion emerged in large part from the 
salient anti-foreign discourse that developed from South Africa’s exposure to the post-
colonial experiences of other sub-Saharan African states. Vijayashri Sripati, quoting 
Bereket Habte Selassie, who helped draft the 1997 constitution of Eritrea, notes that 
“in the 1950s, Europeans summoned African leaders from twenty-five to thirty 
countries to capitals like London, Paris, and Brussels and shoved constitutions down 
their throats.” He continues, “The lingering memory of this illegitimate, postcolonial, 
constitution-making practice may well explain the South African ban on foreign 
advisors.”896 
Though formally excluded, however, there were numerous foreign hands 
involved in the drafting of South Africa’s constitutional document. The formal ban 
meant merely that the voices of foreign advocates were heard at “hearings” before the 
Constitutional Assembly rather than during the more formal “drafting sessions.”897 In 
addition to participating in foreign fact-finding tours, members of the Assembly 
acknowledged direct support from the governments of Australia, Britain, Holland, 
France, Germany, and the United States in the form of sponsorship of workshops and 
provision of experts. Indeed, observers report numerous “indirect, and nuanced (but 
persuasive) modes of interaction” with foreign advocates during this period,898 
including a dramatic expansion of official links between South African and foreign 
law schools from the United States, Holland, Canada, Belgium, and both England and 
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Scotland.899  One additional lasting influence was the relationship of several key South 
African reformers with transnational advocates such as Jack Greenberg, the former 
counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund involved in such landmark U.S. civil 
rights cases as Brown v. Board of Education. Mr. Greenberg’s influence, channeled 
through his friendship with former South African Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson, 
proved essential in shaping the Legal Resources Centre (LRC), now a leading South 
African advocacy group, modeled after the NAACP.900 The LRC, former Justice Albie 
Sachs described, “trained a new generation of lawyers”901 and has grown to become a 
powerful legal advocate in the country, deeply engaged transnationally with 
organizations like the Legal Assistance Trust as well as dozens of other foreign 
funding sources, including the Australian High Commission, the Ford Foundation, 
Open Society, and Oxfam. 
 
III. Judicial Discourse in South African Case Law 
Before conducting a more rigorous content analysis of South African judicial 
decision-making in the following Chapter, it is worth first conducting a plausibility 
probe through a manual survey of South African judicial discourse to see if the two-
tailed model of diffusion supplies any analytical leverage outside of the Chinese 
context. Indeed, South Africa is an ideal setting to test such a theory. Like China, 
South Africa is immersed in an active national discourse concerning its national 
identity while simultaneously challenged by novel legal questions raised by its new 
constitution. This transition presents justices with, as Justice O’Regan described it, “a 
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shift of grundnorm, a change in the founding legal principle that animates the state.”902  
The following survey of judicial opinions, ranging from matters as diverse as 
torts, equal protection, executive authority, and capital punishment, suggests South 
Africa has, like China, imported norms with respect to certain issues more than others. 
As one South African lawyer described it, when South African jurisprudence is 
“deficient in language and law,” foreign law and the novel framing it provides offer 
“cognitive focal points” for political actors. When those actors lack any cognitive 
script to resist that framing, foreign law proves harder to defend against. Novel legal 
jurisprudence, and the articulation of arguments in support of it, thus proves attractive 
to judicial advocates hoping to develop domestic law in a particular direction. As one 
lawyer active in the South African judiciary noted, the structure of the Constitution 
permits judges to import “innovative” legal arguments in support of their positions and 
“when there is nothing in South Africa to support [their] argument, [some justices] 
have looked abroad.”903 Similarly, another attorney and former clerk at the 
Constitutional Court observed that in controversial cases, a novel framing in foreign 
law can provide a “bulwark” against local opposition. Otherwise, she continued, “it’s 
too difficult to draw from South African culture; it’s too divisive.”904 
a. Points of Concern in South African Law 
Despite the fertile atmosphere that characterized South Africa’s post-apartheid 
moment, many jurists expected little normative movement in the South African 
judicial system. Others, such as the foreign-trained Justice Edwin Cameron, noted that 
“The survival of law and legal regulation [in post-apartheid South Africa] can by no 
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means simply be assumed.”905 One leading South African legal scholar speculated 
during the transitional period that “one should expect a large measure of continuity 
with the past, not radical alteration of substantive law or applicable legal philosophy. 
[In addition], cases pre-dating any legislative alteration of the law will retain their 
validity as precedents for common law.”906 In this way, while the Constitution marked 
a radical socio-political break with the past, there was no formal legal break.907  
Demonstrating the tension between extant discourse and the importation of 
new rights, the Constitutional Court, in one of its first actions as a judicial body, ruled 
that the Bill of Rights ultimately codified by the Constitutional Assembly should 
account for South African culture. In its words, the Constitution was permitted to 
“supplement the universally accepted fundamental rights [imported into the text] with 
others not universally accepted.”908 In another early decision of the Constitutional 
Court, after surveying the global landscape of separation of powers jurisprudence, the 
Court announced the development of a “distinctly South African model” that would 
take into account salient South African concerns.909  
This awareness of points of concern and their salience in South African society 
is consistently evident in the language of judicial opinions published by the South 
African justices. Justice Johann Kriegler, for example, contrasting South African law 
with U.S. jurisprudence on freedom of expression warned, “[c]omparative study is 
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always useful, particularly where Courts in exemplary jurisdictions have grappled with 
universal issues confronting us….But that is a far cry from the blithe adoption of alien 
concepts or inappropriate precedents.”910 Justice Chaskalson similarly observed that 
the role of justices on the South African Constitutional Court is “to construe the South 
African Constitution…with due regard to our legal system, our history and 
circumstances.”911 Justice Sydney Kentridge similarly observed, “Foreign comparisons 
may inform a national court of possible solutions to the problem before it and equally 
of the difficulties which might attend any solution.”912 He noted elsewhere, however, 
reflecting the importance of “points of concern” on the ability of those foreign 
comparisons to persuade him, that “regard must be paid to the legal history, traditions, 
and usages of the country concerned.”913 Justice Laurie Ackermann similarly noted 
that, “Constitutional law in the twentieth century…is not a wholly nationalistic and 
exclusively historical enterprise, but embodies a certain universally normative 
minimum core, or at least aspires thereto. There are, of course, limits to the impact of 
rationality and ethical persuasion that make further discourse impossible.”914 Judge 
Dennis Davis framed the matter rather simply, noting that South Africa’s “indigenous 
history of the country plays a vital role in the interrogation of constitutional concepts 
of the nation state and, accordingly, in the development thereof.”915 The following 
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subsections highlight judicial discourse concerning two policy areas especially salient 
in post-apartheid South Africa—equality and separation of powers. 
i. Equality 
South African jurist Etienne Mureinik has noted that the increasingly 
cosmopolitan jurists of the South African judiciary have transformed South Africa into 
“a community based on persuasion not coercion.”916 This observation, though, ignores 
the differences that have emerged across policy areas. Indeed, many salient policies 
qua points of concern sit uncomfortably on the “frontiers” between global and local 
legal discourses, and thus stand as points of contestation.917 According to a survey of 
South African case law, as well as the observations of most respondents, this rift has 
proved especially divisive with respect to legal questions concerning equal protection. 
Given South Africa’s experience with law as a tool of oppression over the previous 
century, laws and constitutional provisions designed to address matters of equality 
have been a point of concern and contestation in the post-apartheid era. Judges are 
especially sensitive to these discourses given that judges were frequent targets of anti-
apartheid activists. 918 As a leading scholar of South African legal culture described, 
“[i]n the state built after 1902 law and order were secured by the creation of a 
paramilitary force which was to combine the roles of policing and internal 
occupation.”919 As early as 1923, the ANC responded to this subjugation by publishing 
in protest against the white regime the so-called African Bill of Rights. Upon 
assuming control in 1948, the National Party stacked the courts with judges 
sympathetic to the project of apartheid and passed comprehensive legislation to bar 
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courts from reviewing executive action in matters of domestic security.920 In 1955, the 
ANC, along with its allies in the South African Indian Congress, responded again, this 
time with the Freedom Charter. By the 1980s, as opposition to the National Party 
grew, the apartheid government instituted a variety of measures to secure executive 
authority outside the scope of the judiciary.921 The courts in turn shaped doctrine in 
order to provide the executive branch with the greatest possible latitude to act outside 
judicial review.922  
South African jurist Dennis Davis, describing the influence of this contentious 
history on contemporary South Africa, notes that, “the concept of equality lies at the 
center of the South African constitutional idea.”923 Indeed, equality rights were listed 
first in order to stress their primary significance in the constitutional agenda and their 
position as the “spirit, purport and object” of the South African Bill of Rights.924 In the 
post-apartheid era, however, the extant discourse concerning equality has divided 
political actors, thus making adjudicating questions of equality “complex, problematic, 
and contentious” and leaving justices open to criticisms similar in discursive content 
to those made during the apartheid era.925 In this way, Constitutional Court justices 
facing contentious legal questions concerning equality have in cases such as New 
National Party  “refus[ed] to engage in a fair comparison” in order to reach their 
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desired political outcome. In some instances, Davis notes, the Court’s avoidance of 
certain issues and poor reasoning “tested the most talented of lateral jurisprudential 
thinkers.”926  
Equality jurisprudence in the domain of socio-economic rights has proved 
especially contentious in post-apartheid South Africa. Indeed, as the director of SERI, 
a leading public interest law firm, contends, equality rights with respect to socio-
economic issues are “THE case” in which the Court is reluctant to accept foreign 
laws.927 In these cases, amicus interventions in equality cases that bring in 
international and foreign law have been largely unsuccessful.928 It is no surprise, then, 
that one former Justice remarked that “foreign [equality] jurisprudence was more 
baffling than helpful.”929 
The matter of how to establish equality in post-apartheid South Africa was 
heavily contested during the drafting of the new Constitution. As Richard Spitz and 
Matthew Chaskalson observe, “the equality clause was as much a focus of arguments 
as any other clause, not because of disagreement over the principle of equality itself, 
but because of differences between parties over the way best to promote equality.”930 
Each party participating in the negotiations presented competing versions of the 
equality provision, with stark differences emerging as to protections or proscriptions 
of affirmative action. While most other provisions of the Bill of Rights were “agreed 
to without undue difficulty,” disputes concerning equality emerged quickly, drawing 
readily from preexisting libertarian and liberationist discourses.931 Libertarians, 
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supported mainly by whites writing actively about rights issues since the 1970s,932 
pushed for rights premised on individual liberty, not equality.933 Put simply, their 
supporters seek the security of a libertarian, noninterventionist Constitution that leaves 
undisturbed their financial gains made under apartheid. Liberationists, by contrast, 
who emerged in black South African discourse from the ranks of the anti-apartheid 
ANC, contended that South Africa required an interventionist state to ensure equal 
distribution of means and protection under the law.934 These competing discursive 
positions of formal versus substantive equality thus provided the vocabulary by which 
both groups could later challenge legal questions concerning equality presented to the 
court. In fact, the very language of the interim Constitution, which provided for the 
limitation of rights justifiable in “an open and democratic society” based on both 
“freedom and equality,” ensured the competing discourses would continue to be raised 
in opposition to one another in South African courtrooms. These competing discourses 
thus continue to breathe life into long-running courtroom debates about what 
distinguishes “fair” and “unfair” discrimination.935 
In this historical context, Justice Kate O’Regan, surveying a variety of foreign 
laws dealing with matters of equality, noted, “The different approaches adopted in the 
different national jurisdictions arise not only from different textual provisions and 
from different historical circumstances, but also from different jurisprudential and 
philosophical understandings of equality.” She continued: “Our history is of particular 
relevance to the concept of equality….The deep scars of [apartheid] are still visible in 
our society. It is in the light of that history and the enduring legacy that it bequeathed 
                                                
932 DU PLESSIS & CORDER (1999), at 25. 
933 DU PLESSIS & CORDER (1994), at 23. 
934 Lourens du Plessis, “A Background to Drafting the Chapter on Fundamental 
Rights,” in BIRTH OF A CONSTITUTION (Bertus de Villies, ed., 1994), at 91-92. 
935 See MARK S. KENDE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN TWO WORLDS: SOUTH AFRICA 
AND THE UNITED STATES (2009), at 162. 
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that the equality clause needs to be interpreted.”936 Justice Moseneke similarly 
cautioned that when considering foreign case law concerning remedies for 
discrimination, an especially salient mater for South African jurists:  
Our respective histories, social context, constitutional design differ 
markedly…. We must therefore exercise great caution not to import, 
through this route, inapt foreign equality jurisprudence which may inflict 
on our nascent equality jurisprudence American notions of ‘suspect 
categories of State action’ and of ‘strict scrutiny.’ The Afrikaans 
equivalent ‘restellende aksie’ is perhaps more consonant with the remedial 
or restitutionary component of our equality jurisprudence.937 
Such attention to and contention over extant “points of concern” has been similarly 
apparent in cases concerning the political rights of members of the successor to the 
party most closely associated with the system apartheid, the National Party.938 In 
addition, cases concerning socio-economic equality have proved especially contested 
in South African courts. Indeed, every interviewee asked noted that this field of law 
was one in which foreign law was especially resisted. One active attorney experienced 
in litigating such rights recalled that she could only think of “one case or so” in which 
the court was persuaded by and drew upon foreign jurisprudence.939 
ii. Separation of Powers & Federalism 
Legal questions involving the separation of powers and checks on state 
                                                
936 See Brink v. Kitshoff, 1996 4 SALR 197. 
937 See Minister of Finance v. Van Heerden, 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC). On the influences 
of German Constitutional Law on the SA Const, see Kentridge, at 246, comparing the 
Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, art. 1 with S. Afr. Const. 1996, ch. 
1 §10. 
938 See generally JOANNE DUFFY, POLITICS OF ETHNIC NATIONALISM: AFRIKANER 
UNITY, THE NATIONAL PARTY, AND THE RADICAL RIGHT IN STELLENBOSCH, 1934-
1948 (2006). 
939 Interview, 8/23/2010. 
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coercion have proved as heavily contested as equality jurisprudence.940 Indeed, one 
participant in the constitutional negotiations observed that “[i]n the debates leading up 
to the new Constitution few, if any, topics were as hotly debated as the creation of 
provinces with constitutionally guaranteed powers.”941 This is not surprising given the 
frequent failures of apartheid-era courts to restrict the oppressive policies of the 
executive branch. As famed Constitutional Justice Albie Sachs noted during apartheid, 
the “reputation [of judges] for tempering harsh legislation, moderating inequitable 
executive action, and restraining irregular police conduct” was frequently tarnished by 
aligning too closely with and mollifying the Nationalist Party regime.942 Indeed, this 
discourse, which extended to discussions of federalism and other institutional 
mechanisms used to check state power, triggered the first breakdown of CODESA 
negotiations of the interim Constitution in 1992.943 In CODESA’s first report, 
representatives noted that questions concerning the separation of powers and 
federalism constituted the “core issue in the negotiations.”944 The Inkatha Freedom 
Party (IFP), founded by former members of the ANC, and drawing from language 
suggested to them by their American legal advisor, stated that it would reject any 
transitional constitution that did not provide for federalism and the “ground-up 
democracy building sub-processes.”945 The IFP’s position drew support from other 
groups such as the KwaZulu and Bophuthatswana representatives. Talks resumed only 
                                                
940 Interview, 8/18/2010. 
941 See Bertus de Villiers, Introduction, in Bertus de Villiers ed., REVIEW OF 
PROVINCES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA: CONSTITUTIONAL 
FOUNDATIONS AND PRACTICE (2008), at 1. 
942 See ALBIE SACHS, JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA (1973), at 245. 
943 See SIRI GLOPPEN, SOUTH AFRICA: THE BATTLE OVER THE CONSTITUTION (1997), 
at 201. 
944 See RICHARD SPITZ & MATTHEW CHASKALSON, THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION: A 
HIDDEN HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA’S NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT (2000), at 9.  
945 See SPITZ & CHASKALSON (2000), at 129 (citing “Regions in South Africa: 
Constitutional Options and their Implications for Good Governance and a Sound 
Economy,” Consultative Business Movement Report, March 1993, at 33). 
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after a compromise was pieced together from amendments designed to secure the 
power of provinces, the possibility of a volkstaat,946 and a Constitutional role for a 
Zulu monarch.947 This compromise, which established five additional provincial-status 
territories,948 was necessary to avoid a complete breakdown in the negotiations.949 The 
Technical Committee tasked with drafting materials for the provision of constitutional 
rights reported that this ultimate political solution “offer[ed] a compromise between 
the two conflicting positions on a basis which seems to be both reasonable and rational 
in the circumstances which exist in South Africa.”950  
The heated debate over the extent to which federalism and legal guards against 
state power should be incorporated into the Constitution dates back to the formation of 
the Union of South Africa in 1910 and has become one of the “most critical and 
intractable problem which faces any constitutional dispensation in South Africa.”951 A 
leading participant in the Constitutional drafting process recalls that a constitutional 
solution was only brokered when, during a winter holiday during the CODESA 
negotiations, the German government flew the relevant drafting committee to 
Germany and presented them with a new framing of the issue at hand. As a result of 
this trip, the drafters returned home and adopted serveral German principles.952 The 
debate over the separation of state powers in South African society, however, did not 
end with the drafting of the Constitution, and indeed picked up again as soon as the 
                                                
946 The volkstaat proposal requests the establishment of a federal or independent 
territory for the Afrikaner minority. See Stephen Ellman, “The New South African 
Constitution and Ethnic Division,” 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 5 (1994). 
947 See ACCORD ON AFRIKANER SELF-DETERMINATION, 23 April 1994. 
948 See ZIYAD MOTALA & CYRIL RAMAPHOSA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ANALYSIS AND 
CASES (2002). 
949 See In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(10) BCLR 1253 (CC). 
950 See SPITZ & CHASKALASON (2000), at 142. 
951 See DU PLESSIS & CORDER (1994), at 20. 
952 Interview, 8/25/2010. 
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issue was raised before the Court. The debate continues in Constitutional 
jurisprudence in which “principle appears to make way for pragmatism.” In some 
separation of powers cases, the court notably applied “highly questionable”953 judicial 
reasoning to reach the politically favored result of reducing the degree of judicial 
scrutiny applied to presidential pardoning power. As recently as 2008, the majority 
party moved to amend the Constitution with a view to instate their desired 
arrangement of governmental power. 
b. Novel & Entrenched Practices in South African Case Law 
In this way, South Africa’s Constitutional Court has given “a friendly but 
cautious welcome to international law.”954 Nonetheless, in many cases it has been 
foreign jurists and advocates, not South African history, that have supplied the 
discourse with which South African attorneys and judges approached certain 
jurisprudential questions. The South African Law Commission, for example, 
introduced to the Court the German concept of drittwirkung, a theory involving the 
appropriateness of a horizontal application of the Bill of Rights as opposed to a 
vertical one which applies such rights primarily in cases involving state action.  
This new way of framing constitutional questions, which South Africa 
ultimately adopted, is the German formulation of the question and as such has 
“provided the vocabulary in terms of which this question has been discussed and 
conceptualized ever since.”955 Similarly, in many early cases difficult and 
controversial issues were resolved by the importation of the “Oakes test,” a Canadian 
doctrine to assess the constitutionality of state infringements on individual rights.956 In 
the uncharted legal terrain of cyberlaw, the United States has served as the main, if not 
                                                
953 See Davis (1999), at 80. 
954 See Erika de Wet, at 1564. 
955 See du Bois & Visser, at 635. 
956 Interview, 8/19/2010. 
  250 
only, source of guidance.957  In addition, in the case of Fourie v. Minister of Home 
Affairs, it was also the novel formulation by Massachusetts judge Marshall of the 
same-sex marriage issue that supplied much of the compelling language for the 
opinion.958 In this way, foreign law is often used not only to identify a “trend” in the 
international community. Rather, advocates often use foreign law to supply novel 
arguments for their cause.959 
i. Tort Law 
In matters of tort law, the Constitutional Court has demonstrated an openness 
to new challenges to long-entrenched South African law, even when those challenges 
conflicted with established common law and, in the Court’s own words, “even when 
those rules have been invested with the highest stature of pre-constitutional judicial 
authority.”960 This proved especially true in cases raising the issue of the ability of the 
Court to enforce socio-economic rights, a role which many similar courts are reluctant 
to assume.961 In another area in which justices have demonstrated an openness to 
foreign insights, South Africa has radically altered its customary jurisprudence with 
respect to government liability for the actions of its agents. Traditionally, under South 
African common law, the tort liability of government agents was nullified by the 
application of administrative law protections for most government action. Under South 
African administrative law, any statute that grants the executive discretion to act 
                                                
957 Interview, 8/25/2010. 
958 Interview, 8/18/2010. Chief Justice Marshall’s language came to the attention of 
South African advocates not only because her landmark opinion was the first of any 
high court to rule so unequivocally in favor of same-sex marriage, but also because 
Marshall is herself a South African émigré who herself cites the role of foreign 
experiences on her understanding of U.S. law. See “Margaret Marshall, Author of 
Mass. Gay Marriage Decision, to Retire,” BOSTON GLOBE, July 21, 2010 
959 Interview, 8/26/2010. 
960 See Holomisa v. Argus Newspapers Ltd. 1996 (2) SA 588 (CC). 
961 See Mark S. Kende, “The South African Constitutional Court’s Embrace of Socio-
Economic Rights: A Comparative Perspective,” 6 CHAP. L. REV. 137 (2003). 
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burdens the government with a duty of care only with respect to activity that “would in 
the circumstances have been irrational not to have exercised the power, so that there 
was in effect a public law duty to act.”  
In Carmichele v. Minister of Safety & Security, in which a woman was 
severely injured by a man released by police officers who knew he had history of 
violence against women, the petitioner raised the question as to whether the state 
should be liable for harms resulting from the conduct of its agents.962 As Christopher J. 
Roederer noted, the Court in Carmichele did not limit itself to the text of the South 
African Constitution in deciding if the police had a duty towards Ms. Carmichele. 
Instead, the court considered its international commitments under the Convention on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, as well as the 
innovative solution that the establishment of such liability would provide to address 
the historically vulnerable place of South African women.963 The Constitutional Court, 
citing case law from Australia, Canada, England, the European Court of Human 
Rights, India, and the United States, ultimately chose to allow the new remedy to 
address such harms disregarding its common-law approach. Two years later, a South 
African court adopted a similar approach, noting that “the principle of accountability 
is intrinsic to…our transformed legal culture, it must follow that a remedy should be 
available to a person wishing to hold an authority accountable for actions which he or 
she can show were negligent and satisfied the requirements of legal causation and 
damages.”964  
ii. Defamation 
A similarly forceful challenge of entrenched common-law practices appeared 
                                                
962 2001 (10) BCLR 995 (CC). 
963 See Carmichele (4) SA at 965 n.67. 
964 See Faircape Prop. Developers Ltd. v. Premier, Western Cape, 2000 (2) SA 54 (C); 
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in Khumalo & Others v. Holomisa.965 In the years prior to constitutional reform, South 
African common law did not require plaintiffs in defamation suits to prove the falsity 
of the alleged defamatory statements made by the defendant. Rather, it was for the 
defense to show the truth of the statement. The case of Holomisa involved the 
permissibility of a defamation suit brought by a South African politician. The plaintiff 
filed suit seeking redress for injury caused by a newspaper article claiming he was 
under investigation for his involvement with a gang of bank robbers. In its opinion, the 
court quoted extensively from Justice Brennan in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, but 
also noted the many jurisdictions that rejected the U.S. approach, including Germany, 
Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The court ultimately revised the common 
law rule, holding that any defamatory statement relating to “free and fair political 
activity is constitutionally protected, even if false, unless the plaintiff shows that, in all 
the circumstances of the publication, it was unreasonably made.”966 The court chose a 
middle-of-the-road approach inspired by the solutions of various countries. The 
foreign-trained Justice O’Regan, writing for the Court, articulated a rejection of South 
Africa’s common-law approach and the introduction of a novel solution to remedy the 
persistent problems of South African society. She declared, “The value of dignity in 
our Constitutional framework cannot . . . be doubted. The Constitution asserts dignity 
to contradict our past in which human dignity for black South Africans was routinely 
and cruelly denied. It asserts it to inform the future, to invest in our democracy respect 
for the intrinsic worth of all human beings.”967  
This openness to foreign law in matters of defamation were on display again in 
the most recent defamation case faced by the Court. As described above, the heads of 
argument submitted by the appellant cited more than twice as often foreign law as 
                                                
965 See 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC). 
966 See 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC); see also du Bois & Visser, at 647. 
967 See 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC). 
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domestic law in the paragraphs concerning legal support. In their opening argument, 
moreover, the appellant again appealed to arguments from foreign law more than 
twice as often.968 
iii. Capital Punishment 
In perhaps its most controversial ruling thus far, the Court proved similarly 
open to novel arguments in a case challenging the constitutionality of the death 
penalty. Capital punishment in South Africa dates at least to the seventeenth century 
with the arrival of the Dutch East India Company.969 The unanimous decision of the 
Court to abolish the practice occurred despite rising levels of crime and entrenched 
popular support for the long-practiced punishment.970 In addition, the Court abolished 
the practice without being required to do so by the Constitutional Framers, who had 
intentionally left the question open to a subsequent judicial decision. By including a 
general “right to life” but no explicit provision regarding capital punishment, the 
codified Bill of Rights developed by CODESA left the matter of its constitutionality 
open to judicial interpretation. The novel “right to life” provision, and its obvious 
intrusion on the entrenched practice of capital punishment, is considered “one of the 
curious outcomes of the Multi-Party Negotiation Process.”971 Participants in the 
discussions noted that, “the right to life was the subject of surprisingly little dispute 
during the multi-party talks” and the drafting committee “took little time to decide that 
the right to life should be unqualified.”972 This stemmed in large part to the fact that 
the drafters simply could not decide on whether South Africa should abolish the 
                                                
968 Observation, 8/27/2010. 
969 See MARK S. KENDE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN TWO WORLDS: SOUTH AFRICA 
AND THE UNITED STATES (2009), at 55. 
970 While there were several concurring opinions, nearly every opinion ruled on the 
grounds that the practice constituted a cruel, inhuman, and degrading form of 
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971 See DU PLESSIS & CORDER (1999), at 148. 
972 See SPITZ & CHASKALASON (2000), at 332. 
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practice.973 
The ambiguity as to what a “right to life” meant for the constitutionality of the 
death penalty left the court with the task of hearing legal arguments from both sides. 
The Court could easily have allowed the entrenched practice to continue, especially 
given the Court’s previous jurisprudence which  allowed for reasonable infringements 
on basic constitutional rights. Moreover, the Court explicitly noted that in nearly all 
states where capital punishment was abolished, it was almost always done so by the 
legislature, not a high court. The outcome of the Court’s decision was thus not bound 
by any clear intent of the Constitutional Framers, nor was their much prior domestic 
case law on the subject. Nonetheless, the young and politically weak court, relying on 
novel jurisprudence from Canada interpreting that country’s constitutional charter, 
risked its public legitimacy by voting in accordance with the mass of international 
human rights instruments and transnational advocates.974  
The Court’s decision flew in the face of a high rate of violent crime and the 
opinions of “the vast majority of South Africans, including the ANC’s political 
support base, [who] favored the retention of the death penalty.”975 The Court’s opinion 
framed the matter as a novel issue of constitutional interpretation of the general 
limitations provision provided in §39, rather than as a cultural issue steeped in South 
Africa’s contentious apartheid past. The “globe-trotting”976 Justice Chaskalson, whose 
persuasive efforts were essential to obtaining a unanimous decision among the 
justices, even though the decision “could have gone either way,”977 declared: “Public 
opinion may have some relevance to the inquiry, but in itself, it is no substitute for the 
duty vested in the courts to interpret the Constitution and to uphold its provisions 
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without fear or favour. If public opinion were to be decisive there would be no need 
for constitutional adjudication.”978 Justice Ackermann even turned to the writings of 
American legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin to justify his moral reading of 
constitutional rights provisions. To offer a novel framing of the issue, the Court 
adopted Canadian jurisprudence (the Oakes test) on the general limitations 
provision.979 This succeeded in shifting the legal issue away from the death penalty 
itself to the then less-contested elements of the general limitations doctrine.980 As 
Mark Kende points out, the Court’s behavior resembles that of U.S. justices in the 
seminal case Marbury v. Madison, in which the U.S. Supreme Court turned to foreign 
law to address a significant constitutional issue left ambiguous by the framers of the 
U.S. constitution. Just as U.S. justices did in that early judgment, their South African 
counterparts analogized from foreign examples, surveying capital punishment 
jurisprudence from diverse foreign courts, including Botswana, Canada, the European 
Court of Human Rights, Hungary, India, and others in order to discern what direction 
South African law should take.981  
It should be noted that the importation of the Canadian jurisprudence on how 
to interpret South African’s new general limitations clause opened the door to other 
landmark human rights advances such as South Africa’s admirable case law 
concerning LGBT rights, which otherwise, like the death penalty case, was an issue 
that “could have gone either way.”982 In both matters, the compelling Canadian case 
law elicited unanimous opinions that overturned deeply entrenched cultural practices 
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and overcame “huge conservative elements of society.”983 Indeed, in the case of 
Fourie v. Minister of Home Affairs, which legalized same-sex marriage, one justice 
involved in the decision recalls being presented with “a mass” of foreign law by 
advocates.984 A similar transnational effort succeeded during the CODESA 
negotiations, during which political parties unexpectedly agreed to a provision—the 
first in the world—that expressly prohibited discrimination based on sexual 
orientation. This “surprising” achievement, Dennis Davis and Michelle le Roux note, 
occurred in large part from the “carefully argued and erudite memorandum of Edwin 
Cameron and Kevin Botha” that expertly drew from foreign law on equal protection.985 
Davis and le Roux also recount a telling episode of how opponents to the proposed 
constitutional protections, faced with a novel framing of the issue, stumbled in their 
efforts to resist the provisions. As they describe:  
There is also an illuminating story of late-night negotiations concerning 
the inclusion of sexual orientation as a ground of discrimination…. Late 
into the night, [Kobie Coetzee, the then Minister of Justice in the apartheid 
government]…was obscurely objecting to the inclusion of this provision 
in the anti-discrimination clause. Finally, the ANC negotiators realized 
that the objection was based on the argument that a clause which outlawed 
discrimination against sexual orientation would allow for a constitutional 
attack on the crime of bestiality. One of the ANC negotiators the put it to 
Mr. Coetzee that, while he might be worried about the sexual activities of 
some of his voters, the ANC had no such problems. A roar of laughter 
broke the tension and the deadlock.986  
                                                
983 Id. 
984 Interview, 8/26/2010. 
985 See DENNIS DAVIS & MICHELLE LE ROUX, PRECEDENT AND POSSIBILITY: THE 
(AB)USE OF LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA (2009), at 181. 
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Minister Coetzee’s hastily formulated articulation of why the provision should not 
be included proved unable to draw upon a salient oppositional frame and thus was 
the last serious objection to the provision raised during the negotiations.  
 
IV. The Way Ahead 
As anticipated by the two-tailed model of diffusion, the descriptive analysis in 
the sections above of the types of discourse—both foreign and domestic—employed 
by South African justices suggests that the Court proved open to foreign and 
international law when presented with legal issues that were the most novel or 
challenged deeply entrenched practices. Those legal questions that evoked the 
preestablished cognitive scripts and discursive vocabulary of extant political 
adversaries, by contrast, were less affected by the legal solutions and reasoning 
offered by foreign jurists. Put another way, when the legal questions before the court 
involved equality, federalism, or checks on state power, domestic opponents were able 
to successfully thwart the adoption of certain transnational legal reforms. When the 
court faced less salient issues, about which less domestic discourse existed, domestic 
opponents were less well-equipped to protest and foreign jurisprudence diffused more 
easily into South African courts. 
In the next Chapter, I explore the judicial opinions of South African 
Constitutional Court justices more systematically via a computer-aided content 
analysis of judicial opinions related to criminal procedure law. This analysis will show 
that in South Africa’s increasingly open judicial system, domestic and transnational 
advocates have been able to introduce various foreign-inspired jurisprudence into 
judicial discourse via the transnational socialization of Constitutional Court justices. 
Moreover, it will show that the presence an extant domestic discourse affected the 
whether a proposed policy was viewed favorably or unfavorably by the Court. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
POLYJURAL JUSTICE: 
A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF SOUTH AFRICAN JUDICIAL OPINIONS 
 
 
 Arthur Chaskalson, the former Chief Justice of the South African 
Constitutional Court, describes the history of South Africa’s apartheid regime as a 
“contested terrain.”987 One heavily contested point on this historical landscape, and 
one that “hangs heavily over the courts,”988 is especially salient for judges such as 
Chaskalson—the use of law to enforce apartheid.989 Jurists in the post-apartheid era 
now enjoy greater political freedom to debate the legacy of injustice under apartheid, 
openly discussing issues such as the development of South African legal culture,990 the 
purposes and functions of the legal system,991 and the court’s role in securing the 
“recognition of human rights, democracy, and peaceful coexistence.”992 More 
specifically, justices such as Chaskalson and Albie Sachs are now free to discuss 
openly “how fully to achieve these principles and how to ensure that within the overall 
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democratic scheme, the cultural diversity of the country is accommodated and the 
individual rights of citizens is respected.”993 
This Chapter explores the dynamics of this ongoing discussion among South 
African judicial actors in two stages: 1.) a citation analysis of the foreign 
jurisprudence cited by South African judges; and 2.) a computer-aided content 
analysis of the language of South African judicial opinions. In the first stage, a 
statistical analysis of citations to foreign law casts doubt on several alternative 
explanations of legal diffusion, most especially the claim that material resources affect 
the flow and direction of law in the transnational exchange of law. In the second stage, 
a content analysis of judicial opinions concerning a variety of legal issues suggests the 
salience of a particular discourse as well as the foreign and international legal 
experiences of a judge can determine whether foreign legal norms succeed or fail to 
diffuse into a new legal system. This analysis introduces a new measure of 
international socialization of judicial actors—the “cosmopolity score.” This index, 
which serves as a measure of a judge’s involvement in the global judicial community, 
will demonstrate the importance of the transjudicial epistemic community, the power 
of extant discursive language, as well as the usefulness of the two-tailed model of 
legal diffusion. 
 
I. Data & Methodology 
An analysis of norm diffusion in judicial decision-making, much like the study 
of Chinese legal discourse in Chapters 3 and 4, requires a strategy of methodological 
eclecticism that includes a content analysis of political texts. The study of the ability 
of legal advocates to revise the constitutive or cognitive commitments of high court 
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justices raises difficult methodological challenges highlighted recently by Rawi 
Abdelal and others.994 Collective identities, they note, consist of two dimensions—
content and contestation. Content includes the more entrenched elements of identity, 
including constitutive norms, shared social purposes, relational comparisons, and 
extant worldviews. Contestation, by contrast, consists of salient points of 
disagreement within a group, or what has been described throughout this project as 
“points of concern.”995 To understand the diffusion of new constitutive norms, it 
follows that one must study political language because, as Abdelal et al. note, “much 
of identity discourse is the working out of the meaning of a particular collective 
identity through the contestation of its members.”996 Content analysis provides the 
analytical tools necessary to understand this contestation.997 
a. Software 
Content analysis has been used widely in various corners of political science,998 
and its applicability to the study of judicial opinions has not been lost on legal 
scholars.999 As explained in Chapter 4, content analysis software such as Yoshikoder 
offers useful tools to examine and understand the dimensions of identity “crucially 
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important for understanding contemporary life.”1000 These tools in turn supply a 
valuable “ research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or 
other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use.”1001  
In addition to Yoshikoder, this Chapter also takes advantage of another 
innovative content analysis tool—Wordscore. This computerized coding tool 
generates useful spatial information about the content of political texts.1002 As the 
developers of Wordscore explain, the software applies the a priori known dimensions 
of reference texts to locate the position of so-called “virgin” texts: “Essentially, each 
word scored in a virgin text gives us a small amount of information about which of the 
reference texts the virgin text most closely resembles.”1003 The conceptual distance 
between and among texts is thus located by knowing the position of two specified 
reference texts. Reference text one, for example, may make numerous references to 
“global,” whereas reference text two, by contrast, may place a similar emphasis on 
“local.” The comparative frequency of either word in a virgin text, as identified by 
Wordscore, thus contributes to a Wordscore closer to or further from one of the 
reference texts. This Bayesian method to locate texts along a discursive scale allows 
us to rigorously test the various influences on judicial decision-making.  
A recent test of Wordscore’s accuracy in spatially locating the content of legal 
                                                
1000 Abdelal at 695, 704 (citing Yoshikoder as an example of the substantial 
improvements in content analysis made in recent years). 
1001 See KLAUS KRIPPENDORFF, CONTENT ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS 
METHODOLOGY (2d ed. 2004), at 18. For foundational works on content analysis, see 
THOMAS F. CARNEY, CONTENT ANALYSIS: A TECHNIQUE FOR SYSTEMATIC INFERENCE 
FROM COMMUNICATIONS (1972); William A. Scott, “Reliability of Content Analysis: 
The Case of Nominal Scale Coding,” 19 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY 321 (1955). 
1002 See Michael Laver, Kenneth Benoit, & John Garry, “Extracting Policy Positions 
from Political Texts Using Words as Data,” 97 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 
311 (2003).  
1003 See Laver et al. (2003), at 313. It should be noted that this raw score is then 
transformed so that it has the same dispersion metric as the reference text. Thus, to 
more reliably interpret the results of the content analysis, the wordscores listed below 
reports the texts transformed rather than raw score. 
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texts conducted by Michael Evans et al. provides a useful example of how Wordscore 
works.1004 As they explain, to extract the relative policy position of political texts 
researchers must first select reference texts to which they have manually assigned a 
score according to theoretically grounded classification based on a particular research 
question. In their case, the researchers were interested in determining the pro- or anti-
affirmative action positions of certain political texts. As such, they selected as 
reference texts the litigant briefs submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court in a landmark 
affirmative action case, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.1005 Each of 
the two reference texts thus advocates a position that directly conflicts with the 
position of the other.  
To test the ability of Wordscore to extract reliable information about other 
texts, Evans et al. then examined the Wordscores of amici briefs submitted to the 
Court in support of one of the two parties before the Court. Through a Wordscore 
analysis of the lexical usage of an amicus brief, they were able to reliably specify the 
relative distance of that brief from the reference texts and to thereby predict the party 
supported by the author of that brief almost nine times out of ten.1006 The success of 
Wordscore stemmed from its ability to distinguish lexical differences between and 
among the texts. Amici briefs submitted in opposition to affirmative action, for 
instance, had far greater occurrences of words such as “benign,” “amorphous,” and 
“race-based,” whereas those briefs submitted in support of affirmative action policies 
tended to include greater frequencies of words such as “desegregation,” “community,” 
                                                
1004 See Michael Evans, Wayne McIntosh, Jimmy Lin, & Cynthia L. Cates, 
“Recounting the Courts? Applying Automated Content Analysis to Enhance Empirical 
Legal Research,” available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=914126.  
1005 438 U.S. 265. 
1006 Wordscore successfully predicted the policy position 86.6% of the time. See id., at 
11. 
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and “race-conscious.”1007 The following section describes the data that will be 
employed for a similar Wordscore analysis of South African judicial opinions. 
b. Data 
Matters of case selection present a great challenge to scholars of political 
phenomena.1008 In this case study, I examine the content of judicial opinions, which, 
like any political text, are the by-product of contested political activity that reveal 
important information about the identity of their authors.1009 Legal practitioners 
typically consult judicial opinions as a resource to discern a court’s holding, the 
reasoning of justices, and the order of the court. The legal authorities referred to in a 
judge’s opinion are also of interest to attorneys trying to distinguish or align the facts 
of a future case, but only rarely have political scientists examined such citations.1010 
Citation analyses by political scientists and other social scientists have instead tended 
to focus more on knowledge communities and the influence of certain scholars and 
journals within their respective fields.1011 
                                                
1007 See id., at 23. 
1008 Harry Eckstein, “Case Studies in Theory and Political Science”; Arend Lijphart, 
“Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” 65 AMERICAN POLITICAL 
SCIENCE REVIEW 682 (1971). 
1009 See Laver et al. (2003), at 311.  
1010 Legal scholars have not overlooked the usefulness of judicial citation practices. 
See, e.g, Robert J. Hume, “The Impact of Judicial Opinion Language on the 
Transmission of Federal Circuit Court Precedents,” 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 127 
(2009); William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig, Michael E. Solimine, “Judicial 
Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges,” 27 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 271 (1998); William M. Lessig, “Appendix to Evaluation of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,” 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 825 (1994); Richard A. 
Posner, “The Learned Hand Biography and the Question of Judicial Greatness,” 104 
YALE L.J. 511 (1994); RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY OF REPUTATION 
(1990). 
1011 See, e.g., Hendrik P. van Dalen & Kéne Henkens, “How Influential are 
Demography Journals,” 25 POP. AND DEV. REVIEW 229 (1999); James N. Druckman, 
et al., “The Growth and Development of Experimental Research in Political Science,” 
100 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 627 (2006); Robert E. Goodin, “The State 
of the Discipline,” in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (Robert E. 
Goodin ed. 2009), at 17.  
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Beyond the legal citations contained in judicial opinions, there remains another 
variable of interest left under-examined in these political texts—discourse. As Kevin 
McGuire and Georg Vanberg observe, studies of courts by political scientists 
“typically do not concern themselves with the substantive content of written 
opinions.”1012 Not surprisingly, legal scholars have applied content analysis to judicial 
opinions far more often than have political scientists. As early as the 1960s and 1970s, 
scholars such as Karl Llewellyn and Richard Posner applied content analysis to 
judicial decision-making in both trial and appellate court writing.1013 Nonetheless, 
much of the content analysis performed in legal scholarship focuses on purely 
descriptive, frequency-count analysis. While important, and applied below, it is both 
necessary and useful to also consider the substantive content of opinion writing, 
including its discursive content.1014 Wordscore facilitates just such an analysis. 
i. Wordscore 
Wordscore presents an especially useful statistical tool to examine the 
discursive content of political texts in South Africa. To generate confident results, 
Wordscore requires that the selected reference texts draw from the same lexicon as the 
virgin texts to be studied. This means one cannot easily compare the content of a 
political speech to the content of a legal statute. Such a restriction is not surprising 
given the different manners of speech employed in manifestos, constitutions, and 
political speeches. Moreover, legal lexicons themselves are often described as an 
                                                
1012 See Kevin T. McGuire & Georg Vanberg, “Mapping the Policies of the U.S. 
Supreme Court: Data, Opinions, and Constitutional Law,” paper prepared for the 
American Political Science Association Annual Conference, Sept. 1-5, 2005 
(Washington, D.C.).  
1013 See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 
(1960); Richard A. Posner, “A Theory of Negligence,” 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). 
1014 Hall & Wright, at 96. 
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especially distinct language.1015 In a civil law country, where legal scholarship and the 
law itself often draw from different lexical traditions, one cannot reliably compare 
legal scholarship or commentary to the language of arcane statutory code. In the same 
way, one cannot compare the language of contemporary legal scholarship to the types 
of judicial opinions published in civil law countries such as France, where, as John 
Dawson observes, “the format of the 1790’s continues unchanged.”1016 Being a 
common law country with a strong emphasis on legal precedents laid down by case 
law, South African law and legal commentary are often interwoven in the text of 
judicial opinions. It is thus possible through the use of judicial opinions as reference 
texts in Wordscore to simultaneously examine the language of a justice’s reasoning as 
well as the language of the law itself.1017  
A key issue raised by Wordscore developers Laver, Benoit and Garry is the 
selection of appropriate reference texts.1018 Researchers employing Wordscore must be 
mindful of selecting reference texts that differ with respect to the variable of interest. 
When trying to extract the degree to which a judicial opinion is conservative or liberal, 
a researcher need merely select texts from known conservative or liberal justices. 
Here, though, the spectrum of interest is not the ideology of justices but rather the 
legal issue presented before the court and whether it evokes an extant political or legal 
discourse. More specifically, we are interested in determining the conceptual openness 
                                                
1015 See H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE 
DIVERSITY IN LAW (2007), at 154.  
1016 JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW (1968), at 431 (quoted in Mitchel de 
S.-O.-I’E Lasser, “Judicial (Self-) Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the French Legal 
System,” 104 YALE L.J. 1325 (1995), at 1332). 
1017 To measure the effect of transnational legal discourse I considered for this study 
the use of foreign texts as reference texts. However, given the notable inter-country 
differences in judicial discourse, such texts would violate the assumption that the 
reference texts are drawn from the same legal lexicon. On the national differences of 
legal argumentation, see Mitchel de S.-O.-I’E Lasser (1995).  
1018 Laver, Benoit & Garry, at 314.  
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of a judge to foreign legal reasoning.  
Selecting reference texts along this spectrum presents a difficult challenge, but 
a careful examination of South Africa’s relatively short judicial history offers two 
useful cases to serve as reference texts. Two such cases are National Coalition for Gay 
and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice and New National Party of South Africa v. 
Government of the RSA.1019 These two cases, which were published within six months 
of each other, and so control for the composition of the court,1020 provide a useful 
spectrum of judicial openness in the face of legal challenge. In the former, not a single 
justice voiced a dissenting opinion in a case that settled the unconstitutionality of 
prohibitions of sodomy, despite an extensive legacy of strict prohibitions against 
sodomy in South Africa.1021 The justices examined foreign jurisprudence and discussed 
at length what it meant for South Africa’s “new constitutional order” and the challenge 
it posed to the “entrench[ed] stigma” and “entrench[ed] inequality” of South Africa’s 
gays and lesbians. In that case, as well as in the process of drafting the 1996 
Constitutional provision discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation, the leading 
advocate had been Oxford-educated South African jurist Edwin Cameron. Justice 
Cameron, who himself is openly gay and HIV-positive, and an active member of the 
transnational gay-rights movement, drew extensively from various foreign and 
international jurisprudence to present novel challenges to the entrenched prohibitions 
of homosexuality.1022 Reflective of his service as a conduit of ideas from this 
transnational movement, the various opinions in the case refer to sexuality 
                                                
1019 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC), Oct. 9, 1998; 1999 (5) BCLR 489 (CC), Apr. 13, 
1999. 
1020 Both cases shared the same line-up of justices, except for Justice Kentridge, who 
was not involved in the New National Party decision. 
1021 MARK S. KENDE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN TWO WORLDS: SOUTH AFRICA AND 
THE UNITED STATES (2009), at 135. 
1022 See EDWIN CAMERON, WITNESS TO AIDS (2005). 
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jurisprudence from Canada, the European Court of Human Rights, as well as feminist 
scholarship from the United States and even Michel Foucault.   
The Court’s subsequent decision New National Party of South Africa just five 
months later presents a useful counterpoint to this reference text. In that case, the New 
National Party, the successor party to the apartheid regime, raised a challenge to the 
Electoral Act, which required citizens who wanted to register to vote in the national 
election to be in possession of a particular form of identification. The Court, in the 
face of extensive foreign case law to the contrary, ruled against the apartheid 
successors by holding the identification requirements were constitutional and not an 
infringement on the free exercise of the right to vote. Tellingly, the majority opinion 
failed to engage in its customary practice of citing and distinguishing any foreign law. 
In her dissenting opinion, Justice O’Regan admonishes the majority for succumbing to 
the dominant discourse and perpetuating the racial tension of South Africa’s “long 
struggle.” She adds that the majority, by giving in to popular will, fails to “establish a 
culture of participation” or overcome “South Africa’s chequered history.” In this way, 
New National Party stands as a useful case to serve as a “point of concern” reference 
text.1023 
The selection of reference texts from outside the domain of criminal procedure 
as reference texts is useful here because the Wordscore is derived only from the words 
that they share with the selected reference texts. With reference texts that share little in 
common with the relatively arcane matters of criminal procedure, the words of interest 
                                                
1023 After selecting and calculating the relative frequency of each word for each of the 
reference texts, I assigned National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality a score of 
1 and New National Party of South Africa a score of -1. This range allows me to score 
all other judicial opinions issued by the Constitutional Court of South Africa relative 
to these two discursive extremes. That is, the more the discursive content of a 
particular text resembles that of the reference text, the closer its Wordscore will be to 
that reference text. 
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against which the virgin cases will be measured are those integral to the judicial 
reasoning of reference texts rather than the substantive law at issue.  These reference 
texts are thus useful to determine the positions of virgin texts because their contrasting 
reasoning (one emphasizing the “new global context…profoundly shap[ing] the 
constitutional framework”1024 of South Africa and the challenge to entrenched cultural 
practices, the other engaging in technical statutory interpretation in order to publish a 
judgment supportive of the dominant discourse in society) leads them to both use 
significantly different words or at least similar words with significantly different 
frequencies.1025 
ii. Sampling of South African Case Law 
For legal scholars, especially for scholars of judicial systems as young as post-
Apartheid South Africa, the total sampling frame is typically small enough to manage 
in a single data set.1026 Many policy-specific legal questions, moreover, can be 
answered with analysis of a relatively small universe of cases, thus obviating the need 
for statistical analysis because there is no need to determine the probability that a 
sample case reflects reality in the overall population.1027 The methodological approach 
here, however, requires the careful selection of texts for Wordscore analysis. More 
specifically, it is necessary to standardize the legal topic addressed by the court in 
order to maximize the degree to which the cases draw from the same legal lexicon but 
differ with respect to legal reasoning. That is, if all the cases deal with the general 
topic of criminal procedure, the observable linguistic differences among the texts 
detected by Wordscore will be due to syntactical differences related to the author’s 
reasoning rather than topical differences. Moreover, cases selected from a narrow set 
                                                
1024 CHANOCK (2001), at 511. 
1025 McGuire & Vanberg, at 11. 
1026 See Hall & Wright, at 102. 
1027 See Hall & Wright, at 118. 
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of legal issues improve the reliability of the subsequent regression analysis.1028 For 
these reasons, as well as for analytical consistency with Chapters 3 and 4, the analysis 
below again examines the role of discourse in the matter of criminal procedure law.  
The distribution of the Wordscores of virgin texts (n=382) is depicted in figure 
6.1. While almost normal, the distribution of Wordscores suggests a lightly tailed 
distribution (i.e. a low kurtosis measure, 2.23), but not far outside the range of 
normality. As such, the models below include the robust option to determine the same 
R2, b’s, and betas, but with standard errors that do not assume normality of the 
dependent variable. 
 
Figure 6.1. Distribution of the Dependent Variable 
In addition to addressing methodological concerns and supplying analytical 
consistency, an analysis of constitutional decisions concerning criminal procedure law 
serves to further our understanding of what some scholars identify as a global trend 
toward “the emergence, in national, regional, and international courts, in common law, 
                                                
1028 Id. at 119.  
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civil law, and mixed systems, of a shared, a constitutional, criminal procedure.”1029 
This observed trend is worthy of further study for at least two reasons. Firstly, the 
expansion of rights supplied to defendants challenges normative assumptions about 
rights considered constitutive of civil society in a variety of cultural domains.1030 
Secondly, rules governing criminal procedure relate closely to matters of national 
security and the coercive capacity of a state, and thus the observed success of any 
transnational or international group to affect reform in such matters challenges 
assumptions about sovereignty and the role of the state in the international system. As 
anticipated by the two-tailed model of norm diffusion, however, the convergence of 
criminal procedural rights has been neither monotonic nor without regional variation. 
Indeed, Diane Marie Amann has noted that in countries as varied as China, Islamic 
states, France, and the United States, “adherence to sovereignty and national tradition 
may prevent a full embrace of a global standard.”1031 The following subsections 
examine whether the same is true in South Africa. 
To ensure I selected for the Wordscore analysis only those judicial opinions 
dealing with matters of criminal procedure, I had to overcome the additional challenge 
of coding the hundreds of opinions published by the Constitutional Court. As Mark 
Hall and Ronald Wright observe, a simple textual search for a particular term is rarely 
refined enough to narrow a sample to the relevant cases.1032 To apply a more 
discriminating eye to the content of each case, I reviewed the descriptive headnotes of 
every case published by the Constitutional Court of South Africa. These headnotes, 
written and edited by South African attorneys highly knowledgeable of the issues 
                                                
1029 Diane Marie Amann, “Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal Procedure 
in an International Context,” 75 IND. L.J. 809 (2000) (citing as an example the arrival 
of cross-examination in courts as different as Cambodia and the Hague). 
1030 Amann, at 814. 
1031 Amann, at 811. 
1032 Hall & Wright, at 106. 
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raised before the Court and of how the justices resolved them, provide an insightful 
explanation of each judicial opinion.1033 I coded each opinion according to this 
description supplied by the South African attorney reviewing the case (see table 6.1). 
Together, the 380 cases published by the Court fall into roughly 8 categories.1034  
Table 6.1. Coding South African Court Opinions 
 
1. Criminal Procedure 
2. Equal Protection 
3. Customary Law 
4. Standing 
5. Appeal Process 
6. Separation of Powers 
7. Torts/Private Law 
99. Other 
 
An additional concern raised by the application of Wordscore to judicial 
opinions from a common law state is that the similarity of language among and 
between cases may be the result of time, as common law jurisdictions cases build upon 
prior case law and thus often refer to the language of previous cases.1035 This can be 
addressed by looking at a random sample of texts to see if Wordscores accumulate 
over time. As figure 6.2 below suggests, a random sample of Wordscores of criminal 
procedure cases do not appear to be chronological or a function of temporal 
relationships.1036 This variability in Wordscores over time thus suggests precedential 
language is not a factor in determining the discursive tenor of South African justices. 
                                                
1033 Some of these highly trained editors have gone on to become justices on the 
Constitutional Court. See Biography of Justice Kate O’Regan, available at: 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/ (last visited: 5/11/2010).   
1034 The sample includes all cases officially published by the court in Butterworths 
South Africa Constitutional Court Reporter. 
1035 McGuire & Vanberg, at 23.  
1036 I drew a random sample of twenty-five percent of cases selected by applying the 
sample command in Stata. 
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Figure 6.2. Random Sample of Wordscore Data1037 
Finally, for any analysis of judicial opinions, it is also necessary to compile a 
sample of cases from the type of court most conducive to answering the research 
question at hand. As a guideline, several scholars recommend surveying all decisions 
from throughout the entire legal system when mapping the overall political landscape 
of a legal system, but narrowing on appellate decisions when examining more specific 
political questions.1038 As such, the following analysis of citation practices of South 
African judges examines all cases concerning criminal procedure law from all South 
African courts, whereas the subsequent content analysis is limited only to opinions 
published by the Constitutional Court of South Africa on matters of criminal 
procedure. 
The consideration of courts and cases described above also takes into account 
the political context in which the court in question sits. As several scholars have noted, 
                                                
1037 The value of standard errors presents an additional concern for Wordscore 
analysis. Here, the overwhelming number of Wordscores are considerably greater than 
their respective standard errors, and so we can be confident that the scores reflect real 
and significant differences between the judicial opinions.  
1038 See Hall & Wright, at 103.  
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“judges in certain legal systems may vote strategically, especially in politically 
charged cases, in order not to diminish their chances for promotion.”1039 In South 
Africa, this issue is especially relevant given that judges serve finite terms and so must 
consider their political futures beyond their tenure on the Court. To reduce this 
potentially biasing factor, the judicial opinions selected for the content analysis below 
are opinions announced only by the Constitutional Court of South Africa, where, due 
to age, such reputational concerns are less pronounced.   
 
V. Content Analysis 
a. Citations to Foreign Law in the Era of Legal Reform 
Before examining the discursive practices of South African Constitutional 
Court justices, the following section examines several of the alternative explanations 
of legal diffusion in the context of South African legal development through an 
analysis of citations to foreign law in South African judicial opinions. This initial 
phase of the content analysis is designed to determine the influence of foreign and 
international law on South African justices as well as the salience of particular sources 
of foreign law. Such an analysis of foreign law in judicial opinions discussing criminal 
procedure law in South Africa will both shed light on the relative emphasis placed on 
those actors as a source of inspiration or—at the very least—a site of comparison, as 
well as contribute to our understanding of where foreign norms in South African law 
are coming from. (The substantive policy positions held by South African justices, and 
their engagement with extant domestic discourse, will be examined in the second step 
of the content analysis.) In order to determine the population of articles for analysis, I 
first collected every case that dealt with matters of criminal procedure published by all 
                                                
1039 In the Japanese context, see Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen, “Why are Japanese 
Judges So Conservative in Politically Charged Cases?,” 95 AMERICAN POLITICAL 
SCIENCE REVIEW 331 (2001).  
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South African courts between 1994 and 2008 (n=212) (See table 6.2 and figure 6.3.)  
Table 6.2. Number of Citations to Foreign States in Criminal Procedure Cases1040 
 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08 Total 
Canada 223 118 34 375 
 (0.111%) (0.086%) (0.053%)  
U.S. 234 100 36 370 
 (0.117%) (0.072%) (0.055%)  
U.K. 166 56 23 245 
 (0.083%) (0.041%) (0.036%)  
E.C.H.R. 50 19 1 70 
 (0.025%) (0.014%) (0.001%)  
Australia 21 19 0 40 
 (0.01%) (0.013%) (0)  
Germany 30 7 0 37 
 (0.015%) (0.005%) (0)  
India 3 30 0 33 
 (0.001%) (0.022%) (0)  
New Zealand 13 5 4 22 
 (0.006%) (0.004%) (0.006%)  
Int'l Tribunal 0 4 12 16 
 (0) (0.003%) (0.019%)  
Zimbabwe 9 4 0 13 
 (0.004%) (0.003%) (0)  
Ireland 8 1 0 9 
 (0.004%) (0.001%) (0)  
Namibia 8 0 0 8 
 (0.004%) (0) (0)  
Botswana 8 0 0 8 
 (0.004%) (0) (0)  
Guam 0 3 0 3 
 (0) (0.002%) (0)  
Hong Kong 0 2 0 2 
 (0) (0.001%) (0)  
Israel 1 0 0 1 
 (0.001%) (0) (0)  
Gambia 1 0 0 1 
 (0.001%) (0) (0)  
                                                
1040 These cases included a total of 1,253 citations to foreign or international law out of 
4,017 case citations (roughly one in three). Numbers in parentheses represent the 
number of citations as a proportion of all citations in cases related to criminal 
procedure. 
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Figure 6.3. Number of Citations to Foreign States in Criminal Procedure Cases 
This initial citation analysis does not distinguish between positive, negative, or 
distinguishing citations because the mere reference to foreign law by a judge is itself 
analytically significant. As one South African justice put it, “comparative human 
rights jurisprudence, carefully used, is at least informative, is often enriching and, at 
best, can be inspiring.”1041 Scholars of legal influence have similarly noted that any 
citation—critical or favorable—to a judicial opinion or source from outside of a 
court’s line of authority reflects the foreign authority’s judicial influence because the 
author, regardless of his or her agreement with the foreign source, nonetheless feels 
compelled to address it. Foreign legal doctrines are otherwise easily ignored or 
disregarded, and there is no requirement for a judge to articulate reasons for not 
following its reasoning. The appearance of a citation to a foreign ruling in a judicial 
opinion thus suggests at the very least a judge’s intent to address its persuasive (as 
                                                
1041 See Kentridge (2005), at 251. 
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opposed to precedential) effect.1042  
South African judges are, in certain circumstances, mandated to conduct such a 
review of foreign law. The sources to which they turn thus provide useful insights for 
researchers. These insights are made especially clear in South African jurisprudence as 
the Constitution expressly provides for the consideration of foreign and international 
materials.1043 Section 39(1) states:  
When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum— 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality, and 
freedom; 
(b) must consider international law; and 
(c) may consider foreign law. 
Accordingly, all South African judges, when faced with a question under the Bill of 
Rights, are required to take into account international law. At the same time, these 
judges are given discretion as to whether or not to consider foreign law.1044 The degree 
to which a study of foreign law is optional, however, is debatable under subsection 
39(1)(a), which requires courts to promote the “values that underlie open and 
democratic society.” Such a provision requires a court facing a question of individual 
constitutional rights to conduct a comparative study of democratic societies writ large 
before rendering a judgment.  
Other sections of the Constitution similarly require a comparative approach, 
                                                
1042 Landes, Lessig, & Solimine (1998), at 273. 
1043 South Africa’s formal provisions for monism distinguished the 1996 Constitution 
from the previous South African Constitutions of 1910, 1961, and 1983. See Erika de 
Wet, “The ‘Friendly but Cautious’ Reception of International Law in the 
Jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court: Some Critical Remarks,” 28 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1529 (2005). 
1044 See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 39(1). 
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though less directly. Section 36(1), for example, provides a limited derogation from 
the Bill of Rights: “To the extent…reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality, and freedom.” As such, despite 
the requirement to consider international law and ruling in early cases that the 
Constitution would serve as the “supreme” law of the land, the Court has since made 
“extensive” use of foreign law in its judgments.1045 As noted in the previous Chapter, 
judges tend to engage more with foreign law and to avoid grappling with international 
law in part because the former comes with elaborated jurisprudence articulating novel 
arguments for particular outcomes, whereas the latter is largely just a body of rules.1046 
With such a Constitutional mandate, justices on the Constitutional Court have, since 
its creation, issued more than 300 opinions, more than half of which cited foreign law. 
This appeal to foreign sources is not limited to justices on the Constitutional Court. 
Indeed, as many as one in three case citations in all South African judicial opinions 
concerning criminal procedure law is to a foreign or international jurisdiction.  
  
Figure 6.4. Citations to Foreign Law in Constitutional Court Opinions 
While figure 6.4 suggests the relative proportion of citations to common and 
non-common-law countries has remained relatively stable over time, the rate of 
                                                
1045 Interview, 8/25/2010. 
1046 Interview, 8/18/2010; interview, 8/20/2010. 
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citation to foreign jurisprudence has declined, as many scholars and South African 
justices anticipated.1047 Nonetheless, given the monist requirement in the Constitution 
providing for the consideration of international and foreign material, foreign law is 
likely to remain a substantial influence in the shaping of South African law. Scholars 
of India, which underwent a similarly extensive constitutional reform in 1955, made 
similar forecasts about the inevitable decline of citations to foreign law. However, 
even with the longest constitution in the world, with almost 400 articles and 83 
amendments, India’s continued citation to foreign law suggests there remain legal 
questions requiring the continued consideration of foreign solutions.1048 Indeed, as 
suggested in figure 6.5, which illustrates South African citations to several of the most 
common sources of foreign law in South Africa, South African judges still frequently 
turn to foreign jurisdictions to supplement their legal reasoning. 
 
Figure 6.5. Citations to Key Jurisdictions in Constitutional Court Opinions 
                                                
1047 See Ursula Bentele, “Mining for Gold: The Constitutional Court of South Africa’s 
Experience with Comparative Constitutional Law,” 37 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 219 
(2009), at 229.  
1048 See Adam M. Smith, “Making Itself at Home: Understanding Foreign Law in 
Domestic Jurisprudence: The Indian Case,” 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 218 (2006). 
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a. Statistical Analysis of South African Citations 
While many scholars of legal diffusion identify power as a determinant of 
judicial citation practices, the analysis below suggests such variables may be only 
weakly associated with the judicial behavior of South African judicial officials.1049 To 
analyze this hypotheses more rigorously, I conducted multiple tests of the frequency 
count data. The analysis of these hypotheses, however, presented several issues 
because the dependent variable—citation to a foreign or international source—is a rare 
event count.1050 As discussed in Chapter 4, the most appropriate means to analyze such 
data is a negative binomial regression.  
Table 6.3. Negative Binomial Regression of Citations of Foreign Law in South 
African Case Law 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT 
 
Economic and 
Military Aid  
 
 
0.0021326 
(0.0016524) 
Constitutional 
Maturity 
-0.1248917 *** 
(0.0235893) 
 
Legal Family  2.178642*** 
(0.5019532) 
 
Wald chi 
square 
50.19*** 
      Note: *** significant at the 1% level,  
      p < 0.01. 
As table 6.3 illustrates, the relationship between the frequency with which 
South African justices appeal to a particular foreign source of law bears no statistically 
significant relationship to the amount of aid received from that state. In 2008, for 
                                                
1049 See, e.g., WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964) (citing 
“persuasive rhetoric” as a key factor in improving the frequency with which 
subsequent judges cite to other judicial opinions).  
1050 See Gary King, “Event Count Models for International Relations: Generalizations 
and Applications,” 33 INT’L STUD. QUARTERLY 123 (1989). 
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example, South African justices cited Canadian case law as often as they did U.S. law 
(twelve times), even though Canadian aid to South Africa amounted to less than five 
percent of what the United States supplied that year.1051 Even more tellingly, in 2001 
South African justices turned to the jurisprudence of India fifty percent more often 
than they did England, despite receiving millions of U.S. dollars in aid from the 
United Kingdom and none from India. Thus, as observed in the analysis of legal 
reform in the PRC, states do not appear coerced by more powerful states into 
importing law and legal norms. Nor do they appear compelled to signal at the 
domestic level a shared political commitment—the so-called second-image reversed 
phenomenon.1052 Such a finding lends support to skeptics of so-called rule of law 
programs,1053 and is especially surprising given the substantial amount of aid funded 
into rule of law programs by certain states.1054 Moreover, the decline in the number of 
citations has occurred during a period of increasing aid devoted to legal development 
in South Africa1055—a period which has been dubbed by some the “Third Moment” of 
the Law and Development movement.1056  
                                                
1051 Figure based on OECD data on annual international development statistics. See 
OECD International Development Statistics, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/17/5037721.htm.  
1052 See C. Layne, “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace,” 19 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 5 (1994).  
1053 See, e.g., Stephen Holmes, “Can Foreign Aid Promote the Rule of Law?,” E. EUR. 
CONST. REV. (1999), at 68; BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES 
TO THE RULE OF LAW (ERIK G. JENSEN & THOMAS C. HELLER, eds., 2003); THOMAS 
CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD (1999); Stephen J. Toope, “Legal and 
Judicial Reform through Development Assistance: Some Lessons,” 48 MCGILL L.J. 
(2003). 
1054 See generally CAROTHERS (1999); Hiram E. Chodosh, “Reforming Judicial 
Reform Inspired by U.S. Models,” 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 351 (2002). 
1055 Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, “The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the ‘Rule 
of Law,’” 101 MICH L. REV. 2275 (2003). 
1056 David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos, in “An Introduction: The Third Moment in 
Law and Development Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice,” in THE 
NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (David M. Trubek 
and Alvaro Santos, eds., 2006). 
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The analysis presented in table 6.3 also suggests, as anticipated, that as the 
South African constitution ages, the frequency with which judges feel compelled to 
appeal to foreign jurisdictions goes down. This finding alone, however, does not tell 
us much about their attitude to foreign law or legal doctrines. In South Africa’s 
common law structure, once a foreign precedent is imported into South African case 
law, subsequent rulings need only cite to the foreign law by way of the South Africa 
case that imported it. Thus, the influence of a foreign legal norm persists, but its 
presence is more difficult to detect. It follows that a statistically significant finding 
that citations to foreign law decline as a constitution matures does not provide an 
accurate enough measure of foreign influence in the early significant constitutional 
decisions. This explanation was confirmed by several leading South African 
constitutional scholars and justices who noted, as one put it, that citation to foreign 
law is happening “less and less as [justices] develop their own jurisprudence.”1057 
“Judges,” he noted, “love to quote themselves” rather than cite again to some foreign 
authority.1058  
As discussed below, however, the decline in citations to foreign law relates 
also to the decreasing international experience of the Constitutional Court bench, 
which is increasingly comprised of justices that rose through the court system from 
initial appointments in the “provinces” and “heartland.”1059 This more parochial 
experience, one interviewee noted, “makes a difference” in their appreciation for 
foreign law. Courts of first instance, moreover, are less interested in resolving 
doctrinal questions than merely applying South African law.1060 These judges, another 
respondent observed, are simply more inclined to apply a “perfect precedent” 
                                                
1057 Interview, 8/18/2010; interview, 8/19/2010. 
1058 Interview, 8/18/2010. 
1059 Interview, 8/20/2010. 
1060 Id. 
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approach, drawing exclusively from South African law and devoting little if any 
intellectual effort to the consideration of foreign law unless it is presented to them. 
Due to this changing composition of the Constitutional Court, she continued, it is now 
the “intellectually weakest” bench ever and overcome by a growing parochialism.1061 
The frequency and nature of South Africa’s citation practices in the descriptive 
data present an additional challenge to the dominant explanations of legal diffusion. 
More specifically, the consistent consideration of judgments from outside purely 
common law systems undermines both legal family explanations and the observation 
of South African Justice Dikgang Moseneke that “we rarely go beyond what we 
know—common law jurisdictions…. Many, many years of association and historical 
links make it quite easy for one to be quite certain that one understands an English 
judgment. American judgments we understand—we read [them] all the time.”1062  
While table 6.3 indicates that legal family is statistically significant in determining 
what case law a judge is likely to turn to when drafting a judicial opinion, figure 6.5 
suggests the annual proportion of case law from outside of pure common law systems 
has been substantial and relatively steady over time, averaging roughly seventeen 
percent of foreign citations per year.1063 Moreover, this sizeable amount of ideas from 
outside the common law does not include the many references in judicial opinions to 
foreign statutory law. The Constitutional Court has, for instance, reviewed legal 
solutions in France for questions such as prisoner disenfranchisement,1064 accomplice 
liability,1065 and the use of force during arrest.1066 Indeed, most respondents noted that 
                                                
1061 Interview, 8/26/2010. 
1062 See Bentele, at 243. 
1063 The average annual proportion of foreign citations to pure common law systems is 
83.64%.  
1064 See Minister of Home Affairs v. National Institute for Crime Prevention and the 
Re-integration of Offenders, 2004 (5) BCLR 445 (CC).  
1065 See Thebus v. S., 2003 (10) BCLR 1100 (CC).  
1066 See In Re: S. v. Walters, 2002 (7) BCLR 663 (CC).  
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no bias toward common law exists in their comparative work, citing inspiration from 
sources as varied as Chile, Holland, Germany, and Colombia. Several also noted that 
there is no preference for a particular country’s jurisprudence. Instead, they observed, 
it is the persuasiveness of the jurisprudence. It is for similar reasons, several 
respondents noted, that foreign law has been more popular in the South African courts 
than has international law, even though the Constitution requires consideration of 
international law and only permits the survey of law practiced in free and open 
democratic societies. As they describe, foreign law and the judicial opinions that 
underlie them come complete with an articulated justification around which South 
African judges and lawyers can build an argument. Similarly, several respondents 
noted that variation among and within countries as to the concision and clarity of their 
jurisprudence also affected the likelihood that those respondents would draw from it 
when compiling an argument. It is for this reason of “plain language clarity,” one 
antitrust attorney noted, that U.S. competition law was imported by South Africa 
almost wholesale.1067 The concision of a foreign legal argument applied to a novel 
legal matter that is otherwise devoid of precedent proves especially powerful before 
the Court, she observed. Former Justice Albie Sachs noted similarly that he was often 
taken by the arguments of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Brennan, Jackson, and 
Blackmun because they presented arguments “so well and so clearly,” especially in 
matters of criminal procedure jurisprudence.1068 International law, by contrast, 
typically exists in the form of statute-like rules without the supporting reasoning that 
case law provides. Thus, Justice Edwin Cameron, whom some South African judicial 
actors describe as especially “activist” has on occasion dismissed international law and 
appealed instead to the novel legal arguments applied by only one country in order to 
                                                
1067 Interview, 8/26/2010. 
1068 Interview, 8/26/2010.  
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shape the discourse of a particular legal debate before the Court.1069  
This preference for foreign law over international law was on display during 
oral arguments for a recent case involving freedom of expression and the rights of the 
child. Despite the fact that there is international law germane to issue before the court, 
it was not mentioned once during the appellant’s opening argument.1070 Foreign law, 
by contrast, constituted more than half of the cases presented to the Court. 
Finally, a review of those citations to outside the common law reveals that 
jurisprudence from civil law states has supplied many of the most important elements 
of South Africa’s constitutional doctrine. As mentioned above, South African courts 
have on many occasions sought legal solutions from how the Federal Constitutional 
Court of Germany construes its Basic Law.1071 In this way, it is the novelty of the 
foreign legal argument, not its authority, that is most important in a litigator’s 
calculation to import a foreign legal idea.1072 As stated by one former Constitutional 
Court clerk, “foreign law can provide the basis for understanding the central concepts 
in S. African law -- particularly when those concepts are fairly novel issues for the 
Court and for the constitutional system more generally.”1073 According to many 
interviewees, no particular foreign court carried more weight than another. In former 
Justice Albie Sach’s words, “It was not the case that one U.S. opinion equaled two 
from Canada, and that two from Canada equaled three from England.”1074 Rather, it 
                                                
1069 Interview, 8/18/2010. 
1070 Observation, 8/26/2010. 
1071 Under the Constitutional Court’s two-step doctrine of constitutional review, the 
court first establishes that the South African constitution recognize the fundamental 
right at issue in the case. Next, the court considers the degree to which that right may 
be lawfully infringed upon by the state or others for the benefit of society. Justice Kate 
O’Regan notes this doctrine as a reason South Africa does not rely on U.S. decisions 
concerning the strict exclusionary rule of evidence (including derivative evidence). 
See Bentele, at 246; see also Ferreira v. Levin & Others, 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC). 
1072 See Justice Sach’s argument in S. v. Ferreira (discussing U.S. v. Morrison). 
1073 Correspondence, 10/2/2010. 
1074 Interview, 8/26/2010. 
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was more a matter of whether the jurisprudence from that court could be used to 
supply novel solutions to legal questions before the court. Certain foreign 
jurisdictions, he continued, serve as a “constellation to guide you, but they do not draw 
you in.” Rather, they “took you out of the simplistic [domestic] political debates.”1075 
The consistent search for German solutions to novel questions of constitutional law, 
rather than solutions from the common law, is thus likely to continue.1076 
The steady rate and continued consideration of U.S. jurisprudence illustrated in 
figure 6.5 also undermines Justice Richard Goldstone’s observation that South African 
courts could no longer look to U.S. case law to help construe the South African 
constitution because of the U.S. treatment of detainees during the War on Terror.1077 
While figure 6.5 does suggest a decline in citations to the U.S. case law since 2001, 
the same is also true for foreign law in general. More importantly, figure 6.5 shows 
that during the War on Terror the United States even resumed its position as the most-
cited source of law in South African judicial opinions.  
The citation analysis in the section above provides useful tests of several of the 
most common explanations of legal diffusion. None, however, proved especially 
helpful in understanding when and what foreign laws appear in judicial reasoning. To 
answer this question, the next section examines the substantive content of judicial 
opinions as well as the international experiences of South African judges.  
b. Opinion Extraction and Support for Foreign Law 
For the purposes of assessing more than the mere citation to foreign law in a 
                                                
1075 Id. 
1076 See Kentridge, at 246 (comparing Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland art. 1 (“Human dignity is inviolable. To respect and protect it is the duty 
of all state authority.”), with S. Afr. Const. 1996, ch. 1, §10 (“Everyone has inherent 
dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected.”). 
1077 See Richard Goldstone, “Speech at the J. Byron McCormick Lecture: The 
Consequences of the United States Abdicated Its Moral and Political Leadership of the 
Free World,” 24 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 587 (2007). 
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domestic judicial opinion, it is essential to also investigate the author’s discursive 
treatment of that law. Using statistical analysis with data derived from Yoshikoder and 
Wordscore software, the analysis below includes a content analysis of every judicial 
opinion concerning criminal procedure law published by the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa between 1995 and 2008.  
In addition to the many advantages offered by computer-aided textual analysis 
software discussed in Chapter 4, Yoshikoder produces useful dictionary reports to 
measure the proportion of certain words contained in a text. To take advantage of this 
technique, and to develop a measure of the degree to which each opinion engaged with 
the global judicial discourse as opposed to a more parochial syntax, I created a 
dictionary of terms used by judges in discussions of national law and South African 
legal culture. To specify the terms that would capture such discussions, I conducted a 
manual review of both official and unofficial texts written by South African jurists 
during the post-apartheid period. To supplement this custom dictionary, I next 
examined a computer-generated wordlist of key words and phrases from the South 
African judicial opinions and generated a word frequency report of the number of 
times all words occurred in a systematic random sampling of the texts. I then added to 
the custom dictionary those words used in the South African legal lexicon used to 
invoke certain judicial concepts. In the next subsection, I describe how I examined the 
relationship between the use of this language with a judge’s socialization in the 
international judicial community.  
c. Cosmopolity Score 
A common explanation of judicial decision-making among scholars of the U.S. 
Supreme Court is political ideology.1078 Others have even suggested that judicial 
                                                
1078 See Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, “Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices,” 83 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 557 (1989).  
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decision-making relates to whether a judge was a first- or second-born child.1079 
Whatever the preferred explanation, to understand the role of foreign and international 
law in the work of South African judges, one must, as former South African Justice 
Albie Sachs notes, “look beyond mere constitutional changes” that occurred in the 
transition out of apartheid.1080 For the purposes of this study, it is necessary also to 
investigate the role of transnational norms and practices on judicial decision-making. 
To examine the claims that judges are the key socializing actors in the diffusion of law 
in common-law systems and that exposure to foreign and international law can affect 
judicial outcomes under certain circumstances, the analysis below includes a 
“cosmopolity score”—a measure of each justice’s international experience and 
demonstrated engagement with the global judicial community.  
The “globalized judicial discourse”1081 among judges increasingly possesses a 
“cosmopolitan character,” with comparative jurisprudence assuming a central place in 
constitutional adjudication.1082 Like any epistemic community, the global legal 
epistemic community consists of a “network of knowledge-based experts” bound by a 
“shared belief or faith in the verity and the applicability of particular forms of 
knowledge.”1083  This community does much to create contacts between and among 
judges from countries with vastly different legal norms and practices, and may even 
help narrow the gap between civil and common law systems.1084 As observed by 
                                                
1079 See Kevin T. McGuire, “The Adapted Judicial Mind: The Psychological Origins 
of Legal Change on the U.S. Supreme Court” (unpublished manuscript), available at: 
http://www.unc.edu/%7Ekmcguire/adapted.html (last visited: May 21, 2010).  
1080 Interview, 8/26/2010. 
1081 See Ran Hirschl, “The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional 
Law,” 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 125 (2005), at 128. 
1082 See Sujit Choudhry, “Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of 
Comparative Constitutional Interpretation,” 74 IND. L. REV. 820 (1999), at 820. 
1083 See Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International 
Policy Coordination,” 46 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 1 (1992). 
1084 See THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MEN AND WOMEN 
WHO DECIDE THE WORLD’S CASES (Daniel Terris, Cesare P.R. Romano, & Leigh 
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Daniel Terris et al., the community is “partly a matter of common patterns of 
education, partly a matter of common professional experiences in the world of law, 
academia, and diplomacy, and partly a matter of increased opportunities for 
meaningful dialogue among the various courts.”1085 These shared characteristics 
among members of this cosmopolitan community lead them to see each other “not as 
servants or representatives of a particular polity, but instead as fellow professionals in 
a common judicial enterprise that transcends international borders.”1086 Even among 
U.S. Supreme Court justices, these gatherings have developed into “regular contacts 
and established professional relationships with their judicial counterparts in other 
nations.” Indeed, analyses of judicial opinions written by these justices and off-bench 
statements reveal their support for a greater resort to foreign precedent.1087 A similar 
relationship between overseas experience and use of foreign law is likewise observed 
in South Africa. As one former foreign clerk a the Constitutional Court observed, 
“many of the justices themselves have experiences abroad from education, teaching, or 
just traveling that influence their use of foreign law.”1088 The cosmopolity score 
described below thus offers a way to examine this relationship beyond the anecdotal 
and provides a useful way to determine whether the extent of a judge’s exposure to 
foreign law corresponds with his or her openness to normative challenges of novel or 
                                                                                                                                       
Swigart, eds., 2007), at 224; see also JUDGES IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACY: AN 
INTERNATIONAL CONVERSATION (Robert Badinter & Stephen G. Brever, eds., 2004). 
1085 Terris et al., at 223.  
1086 Terris et al., at 63. 
1087 Mark C. Rahdert, “Comparative Constitutional Advocacy,” 56 AM. U. L. REV., at 
574 (citing ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 96 (2004) (noting the 
participation of Justices O’Connor, Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Rehnquist in 
international exchange programs). See also Ron Brown, “Legal Exchange With 
China,” 1995 HAW. BAR J. 22 (1995); ABA Central European and Eurasian Law 
Initiative, http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/; Norman Dorsen, “Achieving International 
Cooperation: NYU’s Global Law School Program,” 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 332 (2001); 
James G. Apple, “British, U.S. Judges and Lawyers Meet, Discuss Shared Judicial, 
Legal Concerns,” 2 INT’L JUD. OBSERVER (Jan. 1996).  
1088 Correspondence, 10/2/2010. 
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entrenched practices. 
i. Coding Method 
The question of the degree to which judicial attitudes to legal questions are 
shaped by exposure to foreign law and legal arguments resembles the attempts of 
political scientists to understand the effects of personal attributes on judicial decision-
making. A problem that plagues this attitudinal research, however, is the difficulty in 
developing valid and reliable measures of political ideology. Some scholars attempt to 
address this problem by inferring political attitudes of judges by their voting behavior. 
To avoid the obvious endogeneity problems generated by such inferences, however, 
other scholars have developed indices of biographical attributes as a measure of a 
judge’s likely ideology on a particular legal issue. The analytical contribution of such 
indices, of course, rests on the assumption that “pre-court life experiences play a 
prominent role in shaping the personal values and policy preferences of judges, and 
that such biographical factors can be useful in predicting judicial decisions.”1089 Based 
on the statements of interviewees, this assumption is justified in the South African 
context. Indeed, interviewees almost unanimously agreed with the observation that 
those judges who were more involved in the transnational community of judges were 
more likely to import and accept aspects of foreign law. Simply put, one respondent 
observed, “What the judge’s experience is makes all the difference.”1090 As one active 
attorney before the Constitutional Court and a former Constitutional Court clerk 
observed, “what their experience was [abroad] formed their interest in comparative 
law.”1091 Expressing a similar impression of Constitutional Court justices, one leading 
constitutional scholar observed that “the justices are the product of a process…the 
                                                
1089 See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, “Designated Diffidence: District Court 
Judges on the Courts of Appeals,” 35 LAW & SOC. REV. 565 (2001) at 570-71; see 
also Tate & Handberg, 1991; Tate, 1981. 
1090 Interview, 8/20/2010. 
1091 Interview, 8/23/2010. 
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wider read they are, the wider their influences.”1092 This assumption was confirmed 
further by former Justice Albie Sachs, who easily recalled instances in which he was 
introduced to foreign jurisprudence at an international conference and then able to 
draw on the that jurisprudence in a subsequent decision for the South African 
Constitutional Court.1093 
Given that personal attributes serve as useful surrogates for variables otherwise 
too difficult to operationalize,1094 these indices have proved a pragmatic and useful tool 
that has been successfully applied to studies of various national courts, including the 
United States, the Philippines, and Canada.1095 These studies, which assume that 
“judicial decision-making is an activity in which experience and adult socialization 
counts,”1096 have marshaled compelling evidence that judicial attitudes to questions of 
individual civil, political, and economic rights, is determined in part by attribute 
variables measuring certain characteristics of a judge’s birth, religion, socialization, 
geographic origin, and career.1097 C. Neal Tate and Roger Handberg, for example, 
drawing on the political behavior literature of Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan,1098 
developed a seminal study of whether a U.S. Supreme Court justice’s party 
                                                
1092 Interview, 8/25/2010. 
1093 Interview, 8/26/2010. 
1094 See Tate & Handberg (1991). 
1095 See Sheldon Goldman, “Voting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals 
Revisited,” 69 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 491 (1975); C. Neal Tate, 
“Personal Attribute Models of Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices: 
Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economic Decisions, 1946-1978,” 75 AMERICAN 
POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 355 (1981); Tate & Handberg, 1991; Donald R. Songer & 
Susan W. Johnson, “Judicial Decision Making in the Supreme Court of Canada: 
Updating the Personal Attribute Model, 40 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL 
SCIENCE  911 (2007). 
1096 C. Neal Tate & Roger Handberg, “Time Bending and Theory Building in Personal 
Attribute Models of Supreme Court Voting Behavior, 1916-88” 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
460 (1991) at 464. 
1097 Tate & Handberg (1991), at 461. 
1098 See SEYMOUR M. LIPSET & STEIN ROKKAN, PARTY SYSTEMS AND VOTER 
ALIGNMENTS: CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (1967). 
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identification, southern roots, family social status, religion, and birth order affected a 
justice’s willingness to sign on to a majority opinion.1099  
While instructive, the personal attribute literature concerning judges is not of 
direct value for this study because the research below is concerned less with the 
relative liberal or conservative ideology of a particular judge than it is with a judges’ 
degree of exposure and openness to foreign legal norms. Thus, a new index is 
required. To address this need, the cosmopolity score takes into account three types of 
personal attributes—legal education, professional experience, and transnational 
socialization. In this way, the cosmopolity score attempts to capture foreign aspects of 
the South African “legal culture,” which Martin Chanock defines as “an interrelated 
set of discourses about law: some professional, some administrative, some political, 
some popular.”1100  
In addition, the cosmopolity score attempts to address the concern raised by 
Gary Goertz and others regarding “concept-measure consistency”—i.e. the 
faithfulness of a measure to its theory.1101 Unfortunately, the data available is not 
amenable to a Guttman scale, a method that allows for aggregation of measures 
without having to assign weights to each component. Guttman scales are less useful in 
cases such as the cosmopolity score, which measures actors according to a 
multidimensional scale.1102 Given that the underlying theory of the score is of an 
additive concept, and not of necessary or sufficient conditions, a simple addition 
measure will suffice. 
To measure the various factors identified by Chanock above, I first conducted 
                                                
1099 See Tate & Handberg, (1991).  
1100 See CHANOCK (2001), at 23. 
1101 See GARY GOETZ, SOCIAL SCIENCE CONCEPTS: A USERS GUIDE (2006), at 95.  
1102 See Gerardo L. Munck & Jay Verkuilen, Conceptualizing and Measuring 
Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices, 35 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES 5 
(2002), at 23. 
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a content analysis of the extensive biographies of the justices. These biographies, 
which the justices use to explain their judicial qualifications to the South African 
public, offer a useful glimpse of a justice’s self-reported engagement with the global 
judicial community.1103 It follows that the proportion of words a justice uses to 
describe their international legal work and memberships in international legal 
organizations serves as a useful gauge of that justice’s international exposure. This 
content analysis thus captures the socializing experience of working in a transnational 
firm or participating in legal cases or controversies abroad. Iterative interactions with 
courts such as these serve to socialize attorneys in the structures of meaning 
constitutive of those courts.1104 For repeat players that participate in transnational legal 
work, foreign legal tribunals or proceedings serve as a system of production and 
reproduction of structures of meaning.1105 As such, professional legal work beyond the 
jurisdictional reaches of South African courts is likely to increase a judge’s exposure 
to and knowledge of foreign legal materials. This work often includes participating in 
private commercial litigation with parties or disputes from outside South Africa, 
serving as an adjudicator in a foreign tribunal, or representing South African interests 
in the negotiation of an international treaty. Each of these experiences is likely to 
expose a judge to various foreign laws, lexicons, and practices. 
To supplement this content analysis of judicial biographies, I also manually 
coded the international educational experiences of each justice. Legal education 
outside of South Africa, like a professional experience with a foreign court, is a key 
factor in increasing a judge’s exposure to and knowledge of foreign legal materials. 
Indeed, legal education is arguably the “primary means by which a legal actor 
                                                
1103 See Constitutional Court of South Africa, available at: 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/.  
1104 See Langer (2004), at 12. 
1105 See Phillips (2007), at 923. 
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internalizes a particular understanding of the shape and purpose of ‘the law.’”1106 As 
Máximo Langer notes, the socialization process that students of law experience leads 
to an “internalization of the procedural structures of interpretation and meaning.”1107 
This exposure to alternative cognitive processes supplied by a foreign legal education 
equips transnational legal students with new tools of interpretation and understanding, 
a “constitutive polyjurality.”1108 This polyjural education thus enables jurists to 
contextualize and challenge their own “legal tradition,” which John Henry Merryman 
defines as “a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about the role of 
law in the society and the polity.”1109 I thus operationalize a justice’s legal education as 
follows: 
1.00 = More than three foreign law-related degrees (e.g. B.A., J.D., or L.L.M.). 
0.75 = Two foreign law-related degrees. 
0.50 = One foreign law-related degree. 
0.25 = Short-term legal training/certificate. 
0.00 = No foreign legal training. 
Another aspect of legal education worth including in any index capturing the 
international educational experiences of a judge includes publishing in an international 
journal dedicated to the study of international or comparative law. Many such 
publications seek expressly to “facilitate dialogue among international communities of 
scholars in law, politics, economics, anthropology, philosophy, and other disciplines 
with intersecting concerns bearing on new forms of global law.”1110 It follows that 
publication in such a journal indicates a judge’s engagement with the international 
                                                
1106 See Emma Phillips, “The War on Civil Law? The Common Law as a Proxy for the 
Global Ambition of Law and Economics,” 24 WISC. INT. LAW J. 923 (2007).  
1107 See Langer (2004), at 12. 
1108 See Roderick A. Macdonald & Jason MacLean, “Navigating the Transystemic: No 
Toilets in Park,” 50 MCGILL L.J. 721 (2005). 
1109 See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE (2d ed. 1985), at 2. 
1110 See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., “Introduction,” 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (1993), 
at 2. 
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community of legal scholars and stands as a useful proxy for that judge’s willingness 
to examine South African law in the context of other legal systems. I operationalize a 
justice’s publication experience as follows: 
1.00 = Ten or more publications in a foreign legal periodical. 
0.75 = Seven or more publications in a foreign legal periodical. 
0.50 = Three or more publications in a foreign legal periodical. 
0.25 = One publication in a foreign legal periodical. 
0.00 = No publications in any foreign legal periodicals. 
In addition to the educational experiences of foreign legal training or 
publication of legal scholarship in internationally renowned law journals, the 
experience of teaching law in a foreign law school also introduces actors to new ways 
of legal reasoning and pedagogy. It follows that justices who have served as faculty 
members abroad and taught foreign law students have been challenged to articulate 
and defend their understanding of the law to audiences from outside their own legal 
community. I thus operationalize this educational experience as follows: 
1.00 = Service as a full-time professor of law at a foreign legal institution. 
0.75 = Service as a board member of a foreign legal institution. 
0.50 = Service as a visiting professor of law. 
0.25 = Service as a visiting lecturer or scholar at a foreign legal institution. 
0.00 = No service at a foreign legal institution. 
d. Results 
i. Cosmopolity & Criminal Procedure 
As illustrated in table 6.4 below, the international experiences of South African 
justices self-reported in their Constitutional Court biographies vary considerably. 
Justices such as Richard Goldstone and Yvonne Mokogoro have garnered impressive 
overseas experience, from serving as the chief prosecutor of the United Nations 
International Criminal Tribunals for both Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia to 
receiving a master’s degree in law from the University of Pennsylvania. Others, such 
as Justice Chris Jafta, despite extensive legal experience as a prosecutor, magistrate, 
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and private attorney, have had comparatively fewer legal experiences abroad.  
Table 6.4. Summary of Judicial Data by Judge 
 
 
Int’l 
Work 
Int’l 
Degree 
Int’l 
Pub. 
Int'l 
Conf. 
Int'l 
M’ship 
Int'l 
Teach. 
Laurie Ackermann x x x x - x 
Edwin Cameron x x x x x x 
Arthur Chaskalson x x x x x x 
John Didcott x - - x - x 
Ben Du Plessis - - - x - - 
Richard Goldstone x x x x x x 
Chris Jafta - - - - - - 
Sydney Kentridge x x x x x x 
Johann Kriegler x - x x x x 
Frank Kroon - - - - - - 
Pius Langa x x x x x x 
Tholie Madala - - - x - - 
Mbuyisile Madlanga x x - - - - 
Ismail Mahomed - x - - - x 
Yvonne Mokgoro x x x x x x 
Dikgang Moseneke x - x x x x 
Lex Mpati x - - - - - 
Mahomed Navsa - - - - - - 
Sandile Ngcobo x x x x - x 
Bess Nkabinde x - x x - - 
Kate O'Regan x x x - - - 
Albie Sachs x x x x x x 
Thembile Skweyiya x - - x - - 
Cecil Somyalo - - - - - - 
Belinda van Heerden x x x x - - 
Johann van der Westhuizen x - - x x - 
Zak Yacoob - - - x - - 
While many of the justices appointed to the Court in recent years have been 
promoted through the national court system, thus beginning their careers in lower 
courts far from the metropolises of South Africa, many of the judges from the early 
years of the Court brought with them considerable transnational exposure, despite the 
difficult position of judges under apartheid. Rather than collaborate with the racist 
regime, many of the judges that assumed positions in the early years of the post-
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apartheid court had instead chosen to serve as scholars. These scholars-turned-justices 
were able under apartheid to be far more active transnationally and engaged in global 
judicial conferences than were their counterparts on the bench.1111 One such important 
conference was convened in 1986 by John Dugard, a renowned international law 
scholar deeply engaged in the transnational judicial community and who was then 
head of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies, an important legal clinic at the 
University of Witwatersrand that to this day serves as a power source of foreign and 
international law for the court.1112 
To examine the degree to which such exposure to international and foreign law 
affects the likelihood that a justice would draw from and write a judicial opinion that 
evoked novel legal arguments or challenged entrenched local jurisprudence, the 
following analysis regresses the cosmopolity score of every justice against the 
Wordscore of judicial opinions. The analysis below also takes into account alternative 
explanations of judicial decision-making by controlling for the age of the constitution 
and the amount of economic aid South Africa received in that year. Finally, to control 
for other possible factors that may bias the results, the analysis also includes control 
variables for the length of the judicial opinion and the length of the judicial career of 
the justice.  
 According to the two-tailed model of diffusion, we can anticipate the 
international experiences of a justice to be positively related to the Wordscore of cases 
related to criminal procedure. Put another way, a judge’s participation in the 
increasingly global justice community should increase the likelihood that a judicial 
opinion employs foreign legal reasoning to engage with the legal question brought 
before the Court. 
                                                
1111 Interview, 8/23/2010. 
1112 See DAVIS & LE ROUX (2009), at 11. 
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 Table 6.5 presents the cosmopolity model of judicial decision-making in cases 
concerning criminal procedure law. These findings confirm that the socialization of 
justices within the global legal epistemic community affects the manner in which 
justices discuss the law. More specifically, the greater the exposure a justice has to 
foreign and international legal reasoning and discourses, the more likely that justice is 
to write a judicial opinion with a Wordscore reflective of novel concepts and foreign 
doctrine. This finding corresponds with the observations of various respondents, 
including attorneys, clerks, and legal scholars that the more involved a judge is with 
the transnational community of judicial officials, the more open to an aware of foreign 
law they become. Such variation among the justices is similarly supported by the 
varying amounts of foreign citations observed among the different levels of South 
African courts. Lower court judges, who are less engaged with the international 
community, “care more about what South African law is,” and less about the direction 
in which it should go.1113 For this reason, litigant briefs at lower courts devote less 
space to matters of foreign law. Litigants before the higher courts, by contrast, would 
have to be “stupid,” as one South African attorney put it, not to appeal to foreign 
arguments.1114 One justice who is particularly active in the transnational community 
confirmed this impression, noting that he could not think of a single case at the 
Constitutional Court in which foreign law was not considered. A clerk for a less 
internationally active justice, however, noted that the justice to which she reports 
rarely takes foreign law into serious consideration. This variation among the justices 
was demonstrated most recently in the case of Khosa, wherein Chief Justice Ngcobo 
went against a majority opinion that rejected U.S. jurisprudence concerning the 
curtailment of certain rights. Ngcobo, who has clerked for a U.S. federal judge as well 
                                                
1113 Interview, 8/17/2010. 
1114 Id. 
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as studied and taught in the United States, found the American doctrine more 
compelling than did his less internationally engaged colleague in the majority.1115 
Table 6.5. Cosmopolity and Judicial Decision-Making in Criminal Procedure 
Jurisprudence1116 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT 
 
Economic Aid .0009852 
 (.0010258) 
Word Count -3.24e-06 
 (5.84e-06) 
National Discourse 88.18236 
 (64.364) 
Years of Experience .0049169 
 (0.0070174) 
Cosmopolity Score .4526109*** 
 (0.1541574) 
Constitutional Age -0.1106845** 
 
(0.0541815) 
 
Once again, the amount of foreign assistance the country receives and the 
length of the justice’s judicial experience appears to bear no relationship to the manner 
in which justices decide the constitutional questions before them. This finding, which 
supports the results in the citation analysis above and the analysis of Chinese legal 
development in Chapters 3 and 4, further undermines any claim that material support 
determines the attractiveness of foreign law. More specifically, it refutes claims of a 
relationship between “funding and influence” in South Africa’s post-apartheid 
development.1117 
As uncovered in the frequency analysis above, the age of the constitution again 
                                                
1115 Interview, 8/19/2010. 
1116 ** significant at the 5% level, p <  0.05; *** significant at the 1% level, p <  
 0.01. 
1117 See du Bois & Visser (2003), at 632 (suggesting an indirect relationship between 
financial flows and normative influence in the cases of Germany and Canada).  
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appears to correspond with the amount of discussion of novel foreign legal doctrine. 
Once again, however, this finding alone does not tell us much about their attitude to 
foreign law because once a foreign legal doctrine is imported into South African case 
law, subsequent rulings will cite to the foreign law indirectly by way of South Africa 
case that imported it. Thus, the influence of a foreign legal norm persists, but its 
presence is more difficult to detect. 
Table 6.6. Cosmopolity and Judicial Decision-Making in Criminal Procedure 
Jurisprudence—Alternative Aggregation1118 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT 
 
Economic Aid .0006411 
 (.0008778) 
Word Count -2.94e-06 
 (5.92e-06) 
National Discourse 79.60216 
 (64.9121) 
Years of Experience .0032397 
 (.0078361) 
Cosmopolity Score .0041409*** 
 (.0010483) 
Constitutional Age -.0653206 
 
(.0537937) 
 
Finally, the cosmopolity model provides a useful test of norm localization 
theory. Under norm localization theory, which explains diffusion by the presence of 
preexisting normative discourse, one would expect that a judicial opinion 
contradicting an established common law doctrine would include language attempting 
to graft the new practice on to national practices. The finding in table 6.6 suggests no 
such relationship exists. Instead, justices appear not to resort to terms such as “South 
African culture,” “South African history, or “national context” in opinions that draw 
                                                
1118 *** significant at the 1% level, p < 0.01. 
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from foreign sources. 
To assess the concept-measure consistency of the analysis above, as well as to 
see whether the posited relationship among the data is compelling, it is worth also 
conducting an alternative aggregation of the data, including, as Gerardo Munck and 
Jay Verkuilen suggest, multiplying rather than merely adding the various additive 
measures. As anticipated, the cosmopolity score remains a compelling measure of 
judicial openness to foreign and international law. Indeed, as table 6.6 illustrates, it 
remains strongly statistically significant (p < 0.01), while the other variables express 
no such relationship to judicial openness. Most importantly, national qua localized 
discourse appears to have no significant relationship with judicial decision-making. 
This finding corroborates statements by many present at the founding of South 
Africa’s new constitution that legal development should mirror universal, not local, 
notions of law. One former justice and a drafter of the Constitution, for example, once 
noted, to his own surprise, that “[a]fter decades of arguing for and believing in a law-
in-context perspective,…I was surprised at the vehemence with which I pleaded for 
universal values.”1119 
To examine still further the relationship between exposure to foreign legal 
discourses and the judicial decision-making of South African justices, it is also worth 
running corresponding models that examine judicial discourse in Constitutional Court 
cases that address points of concern in South African society. The following section 
applies the cosmopolity model to two of the greatest points of concern in post-
apartheid South Africa—equality and checks against state power. We can anticipate 
under the two-tailed model of diffusion that the transnational experiences of South 
African judges will have a less significant relationship with the judicial decisions 
concerning these issues. More specifically, we should see no relationship between the 
                                                
1119 See ALBIE SACHS, THE SOFT VENGEANCE OF A FREEDOM FIGHTER (2000), at 161. 
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Wordscore of an opinion and the author’s cosmopolity score. 
ii. Cosmopolity & Points of Concern 
As discussed in Chapter 5, judicial decisions concerning equal protection and 
separation of powers have been targets of fierce contestation both during and after 
apartheid. These issues sit uncomfortably on the frontiers of global and local 
discourses of legal reform, and thus evoke extant opposing vocabularies. Under the 
two-tailed model of norm diffusion, we should expect no statistical relationship 
between a justice’s cosmopolity score and the Wordscore of the judicial opinion 
authored by that justice. Instead, when faced with legal issues concerning salient 
matters such as equality and the checking of state power, a justice, even one with 
extensive oversees experience, will more likely turn to the extant domestic discourses 
and the “legacies of law” related to those issues rather than look abroad for solutions, 
as similarly shown in Jens Meierhenrich’s analysis of apartheid-era jurisprudence. 
Table 6.7. Cosmopolity and Judicial Decision-Making by Legal Issue1120 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 
JURISPRUDENCE 
EQUAL PROTECTION 
JURISPRUDENCE 
VARIABLE  VARIABLE  
Economic Aid 0.0008509 Economic Aid 0.0009215 
 (0.0007428)  (0.0023648) 
 
Word Count -6.38e-06 Word Count 0.0000393 
 (3.35e-06)  (0.0000212) 
Years of 
Experience -0.0433074*** 
Years of 
Experience 0.0014788 
 (0.0089243)  (0.0118895) 
Cosmopolity 
Score -0.12535 
Cosmopolity 
Score 0.1707901 
 (0.1044817)  (0.2093327) 
 
Constitutional 
Age -0.0039603 
Constitutional 
Age 0.1916182 
 (0.0474063)  (0.1035647) 
                                                
1120 *** significant at the 1% level, p < 0.01. 
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As anticipated, table 6.7 illustrates that no relationship exists between the 
exposure to foreign and international law and an opinion’s Wordscore when the legal 
question before the court triggers the pre-established cognitive scripts of the justices 
and litigants involved. 
This finding suggests that the more a legal question before the court evokes 
South Africa’s history of violations of equal protection and abuses of executive 
authority, the less likely a justice will rely on the express language or reasoning of 
foreign legal discourses. It follows that transnational legal advocates will face greater 
domestic opposition to influence outcomes in these policy domains. Given that the 
length of a justice’s domestic legal career appears negatively associated with the 
Wordscore of his or her judicial opinions, this opposition to transnational advocacy on 
certain policies appears to grow even more recalcitrant over time. Finally, the 
alternative model confirms still further the absence of any relationship between 
normative influence and the flow of aid or material resources.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
The analysis above lends support to the findings in Chapter 4 that domestic 
legal discourse can shape the debate about legal issues presented before the court by 
referring to a preexisting discursive vocabulary. This ability to shape the debate, in 
turn, can affect the outcomes of those judicial decisions. In so doing, domestic 
opponents—legal nationalist rebels—can obstruct the importation of foreign rules and 
reforms. It is thus not surprising that the judicial opinions least likely invoke 
transnational legal discourses and novel legal solutions were those that concerned 
preexisting “points of concern” in society. Novel legal issues, or those that challenged 
entrenched domestic practices about which little discourse existed, drew far less 
resistance in the judicial discourse of South Africa’s Constitutional Court. In this way, 
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jurisprudence concerning criminal procedure proved open to transnational influences, 
whereas equality and separation of powers doctrine remained circumscribed by the 
legacies of South African history. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION: THE TWO-TAILED THEORY  
OF NORM DIFFUSION 
 
 
 Legal reform often occurs under conditions of limited time and limited 
resources. In this frenetic atmosphere, actors whose interests are implicated often 
invoke shopworn discourses to challenge proposed reforms. As reform agendas are 
subsequently drawn and redrawn by the participants, the presence or absence of such 
discourses can determine whether or not a reform is successful. When unavailable, as 
is the case when an actor is presented with a novel legal innovation or a challenge to a 
long-entrenched cultural truism that lacks any articulated justification, opponents 
struggle to formulate a rebuttal to a proposed reform. When available, such discourses 
can prove formidable to any campaign to affect legal change.    
The above depiction of transnational legal reform, whereby legal norms diffuse 
not via a process of localization with a domestic discourse but rather when such 
discourse is most minimal, is best described as a two-tailed model of norm diffusion. 
This heuristic model, as illustrated in the Chapters above, provides useful insights for 
campaigners of human rights reform. More specifically, it suggests that transnational 
legal advocates, constrained by limited budgetary resources, need not emphasize a 
norm localization strategy that prioritizes those legal reforms that can most easily graft 
onto an extant domestic discourse. Counterintuitively, such a strategy may prove 
unsuccessful due to the presence of domestic opponents already equipped with the 
discursive tools necessary to articulate a defense. Legal advocates should instead 
remain hopeful that their efforts can successfully transform long-entrenched legal 
practices of the target state. As illustrated by an analysis of legal development in states 
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as different as South Africa and the People’s Republic of China, the two-tailed model 
of diffusion suggests that legal advocates can wield significant influence even in 
matters as fundamental to the coercive power of the state as criminal procedure law.  
In this concluding Chapter, I revisit and expand upon the theoretical, 
conceptual, and applicable implications of the model of diffusion presented in the 
Chapters above. The discussion is divided into three parts, presenting in turn a review 
of the main findings, a discussion of possible future research, and a consideration of 
possible implications of this research.  
 
I. Two-Tailed Relationship between Diffusion and Domestic Discourse 
Proposed legal reforms often challenge constitutive components of a political 
community. If not constitutive of that society, the laws targeted for reform may 
nonetheless be essential tools furthering the interests of certain powerful constituent 
groups. Either way, legal reform becomes a heavily contested process in which 
domestic actors are activated in support or defense of the proposed changes. In the 
political contest that follows such a campaign for legal change, the outcome often 
turns on whether opponents have discursive tools already available to them to counter 
the proposed reforms. As hypothesized by the two-tailed model of diffusion, when 
opponents are essentially “at a loss for words”—i.e. have no pre-established cognitive 
scripts to deploy—they are often less likely to succeed in their efforts to obstruct legal 
reform. The failure of domestic opponents to discursively resist legal reform is thus 
most pronounced when the legal reforms proposed offer novel legal solutions or 
challenge entrenched cultural truisms about which actors “have had little motivation or 
practice in developing supporting arguments to bolster [them] or in preparing 
refutations for the unsuspected counterarguments.”1121 
                                                
1121 See McGuire & Papgeorgis (1961), at 327.  
  306 
This political contest over legal reform is shaped further by the domestic 
structure of the state in which the political contest occurs. National legal systems, 
which can vary in important ways such as the location of key decision makers and the 
binding authority of judicial opinions, can affect the points at which transnational legal 
advocates find their targets—e.g. judges in courtrooms or legal drafters in legislatures 
and universities. In civil law countries, for example, legislators and their support staff, 
when tasked with revising a complex national statutory code, are often so pressed for 
time and lacking experience in the area of law in question that transnational legal 
advocates can “so dominate the agenda of the drafting committee that it greatly 
influences the importing country’s legislation.”1122 In common law states, by contrast, 
foreign law often travels through judicial officials similarly pressed for time. These 
judges, magistrates, and law clerks, burdened by a mounting court docket, on occasion 
face a lack of legal precedent while being at the same time presented with solutions 
from foreign law either through a litigant’s brief or through socialization amidst the 
expanding global community of cosmopolitan judges. If the opposing litigant or the 
judge herself lacks the discursive vocabulary to counter the persuasive force of the 
candidate foreign legal norm, such norms can penetrate the unique legal habitus of a 
political community.1123  
The Chapters above offer an analysis of the role of discourse in the diffusion of 
law and the intervening role played by legal family through an examination of 
criminal procedure reform in post-Mao China and post-apartheid South Africa. These 
two states, which together represent a civil and a common law system, are both 
situated within a dense network of transnational legal advocates campaigning for the 
adoption of various emergent international legal principles concerning criminal 
                                                
1122 See John C. Reitz, Export of the Rule of Law, 13 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 429, 454 (2003). 
1123 See Bourdieu (1986), at 807. 
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procedure. In the end, some of these procedural reforms have been adopted by the 
targeted legal actors, while others have been shunned. An analysis of this variation of 
policy adoption suggests the presence of discourse in each state played a role in 
determining the content of reform.  
As illustrated in these two case studies, the variation in policy adoption cannot 
be explained by the several explanations of diffusion common in international 
relations literature. Firstly, and in contrast to realist scholarship, the variation does not 
correspond with aid flows, as the sources of foreign law did not correlate with the 
sources of material assistance. In the experiences of both China and South Africa, 
flows of foreign aid bore no statistically significant relationship to the content of 
reform. Indeed, in the case of China, the coefficient was even negative (though not 
statistically significant). It follows that the pace and direction of legal reform is not a 
direct function of the distribution of material power in the international system. 
In addition, the variation in policy reform cannot be explained by norm 
localization, as legal actors were shown to be more likely to invoke international and 
foreign law in support of a proposed legal reform than they were domestic conditions, 
cultures, and contexts. Contrary to norm localization theorists, legal actors did not 
appeal to local norms or discourse to make candidate reforms more palatable for 
domestic audiences. More tellingly, those domestic conditions, cultures, and contexts 
were more likely to appear in the writings of Chinese legal observers who opposed 
legal reforms that invoked points of concern with society. Similarly, those South 
African justices that displayed an extensive engagement with the international 
community were more likely to import foreign law than were their less cosmopolitan 
counterparts. In addition, the variation among policies does not appear fully 
attributable to shared legal family, a variant of norm localization theory. As the review 
of citation practices in both China and South Africa suggests, the salient sources of 
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law from outside each state’s legal family were not statistically significant in all cases. 
Moreover, ontologically opposed legal norms and practices from the two systems—
e.g. adversarial and inquisitorial procedures—did not prove impervious to influence 
from one another.  
Finally, the variation cannot be fully explained by the constellation of domestic 
interests within a state. As described in Chapter 4, legal reforms resisted by domestic 
actors were not necessarily those that involved a more complex overlapping of 
domestic interests or bureaucratic portfolios. In many instances, the reforms that failed 
to be adopted were, like those that survived the drafting process, specific to one 
bureaucratic actor and applied at the trial court level. It is thus not necessarily the case 
that the variation in the reforms adopted resulted from the inability of drafters to 
negotiate a zero-sum game between bureaucratic actors jealously guarding their 
political authority. Moreover, the variation cannot be fully explained by the state’s 
unwillingness to forfeit a coercive tool of the state, as the candidate reforms could all 
be avoided at the implementation stage. Indeed, like the successful reforms, many of 
the failed candidate reforms were resisted despite being easy for reluctant officials to 
circumvent during a criminal trial. For example, just as the right to an attorney can be 
readily infringed upon by reluctant state actors, so too could the right to object to the 
submission of evidence unlawfully obtained be avoided by the court through the 
application of numerous exceptions or balancing tests. Nonetheless, the former right 
was strengthened by the 1997 CPL reform whereas the latter remained weak. Instead 
of these many possible explanations, the examination of legal reform in the preceding 
Chapters suggest the reforms that were resisted by state actors were often those that 
invoked an extant discourse to which opponents could appeal.  
While the Chapters above examine the applicability of the two-tailed discourse 
model of diffusion in the contexts of legislative drafting in civil law countries and the 
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development of jurisprudence in their common law counterparts, the model also 
extends to other domestic legal contests, including the development of new 
constitutional charters. In a dynamic similar to the one described in the Chapters 
above, established constitutions such as the U.S. Constitution, and the rights 
embedded therein, often serve as both a “model” and an “anti-model” in global 
constitutional development, as time-pressed constitutional drafters in transitional states 
are faced with questions of whether to adopt or reject certain legal norms.1124 As South 
African Judge D.M. Davis described the experience of South Africa’s Constitutional 
Congress, “Faced with stringent deadlines and having limited practical knowledge of 
the workings of a bill of rights, it was understandable that members of the technical 
committee would make extensive use of…previous work [such as the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms].”1125 Judges Spitz and Chaskalson describe a similar 
openness to foreign ideas born from mere inexperience in constitutional drafting: “The 
drafting process was very much a hit-and-miss affair. The simple fact was that South 
African lawyers had had no real experience of sovereign bills of rights prior to the 
Interim Constitution. With respect to the members of the Technical Committee, it had 
been difficult to find any five South African ‘technical experts’ who actually had the 
knowledge and expertise to draft a Bill of Rights in the short period required by the 
[Constitutional drafting process].”1126 In this vacuum, foreign law presented novel 
solutions to constitutional governance, challenged entrenched domestic legal norms, 
and provoked extant domestic discourses. The following section briefly illustrates how 
insights gleaned from the two-tailed model can extend in future research beyond such 
domestic political contests to the domain of international law.  
                                                
1124 See Heinz Klug, Model and Anti-Model: The United States Constitution and the 
‘Rise of World Constitutionalism,’ 2000 WISC. L. REV. 597 (2000). 
1125 See Davis (2003), at 187. 
1126 Id. 
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II. Discourse and Diffusion: Future Research 
a. Two-Tailed Model of Diffusion and the Development of an 
International Treaty 
The Chapters above provide useful theoretical and empirical tools to examine 
the diffusion of foreign law into domestic legal systems. As illustrated through a 
content analysis of legal periodicals and constitutional case law, the presence or 
absence of a domestic discourse can determine whether and how quickly a state 
targeted for reform will adopt a candidate legal norm. Moreover, as illustrated through 
the introduction of a so-called “cosmopolity score,” one can also see how the 
socialization of legal actors at the international level affects how those actors become 
domestic conduits of global law familiar with alternative legal doctrines and foreign 
legal norms. In the case of South Africa, this cosmopolity score shed useful light on 
the process by which legal norms diffused into common law systems via cosmopolitan 
judges socialized in a growing transnational network of legal knowledge.  
In future research, it is worth examining this phenomenon further and without 
the intervening variable of domestic legal system. More specifically, it is worth 
examining whether the two-tailed model of legal diffusion applies among legal actors 
involved in the negotiation of an international treaty. If discourse proves as important 
a factor in determining whether a particular provision is agreed to by participating 
sovereign states, then the applicability of the two-tailed model, which already supplies 
useful insights for international relations theory, will extend beyond the domain of 
comparative legal studies and into the realm of international law. In this way, it will 
demonstrate how the two-tailed discourse model of norm diffusion might serve to 
answer the call from Kenneth Abbott, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and others, for 
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interdisciplinary legal scholarship that incorporates international relations theory, 
comparative politics, and international legal studies.1127 While not necessarily 
satisfying Abbott’s goal of establishing a new “joint discipline” of politics and law, it 
may nonetheless serve as a small step in a long, collaborative journey. 
A plausibility probe of the negotiation of the 1993 Hague Convention on 
Intercountry Adoption suggests the model indeed possesses intellectual purchase 
beyond the confines of domestic legal systems. For several reasons, China’s 
ratification of the 1993 Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption stands as another 
useful case to examine the dynamics of legal norm diffusion.1128 Firstly, like criminal 
procedure, family law is a sensitive matter of domestic law often “resistant to change 
of any kind, including transplants,”1129 and thus presenting a “hard case” to test the 
proposed model.1130 Secondly, China has generally been a reluctant participant of the 
Hague Conference on Private International Law, the body responsible for the 
convention. Indeed, China has become a party to only four conventions enacted by the 
institution.1131 For the sake of comparison, the United States is a party to ten, the 
United Kingdom to thirteen, Australia to eleven, and Japan to seven. Finally, at the 
time of the Convention’s drafting, China lacked a comprehensive domestic legal 
regime governing adoption, let alone intercountry adoption. China’s first national 
                                                
1127 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello, and Stephan Wood, 
International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of 
Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 367 (1998); Kenneth W. Abbott, 
Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 
YALE J. INT’L L. 335 (1989).  
1128 Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry 
Adoption, adopted May 29, 1993, 1870 U.N.T.S. 181.  
1129 ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS 98 (2d ed. 1993). 
1130 On “hard cases” in social science research, see generally STEPHEN VAN EVERA, 
GUIDE TO METHODOLOGY FOR STUDENTS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (1996) (noting that 
“hard cases” are those where the prior probability of a theory being a correct 
explanation is low).  
1131 See Hague Conference on Private International Law: Status Charts, available at: 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/charts.htm.  
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adoption law was not promulgated until 1992. This not only makes any change in the 
legal regime governing the practice readily observable, it provides a useful test of the 
hypothesis that the less the domestic discourse related to a practice, the greater a 
state’s susceptibility to foreign persuasion.  
The Hague Convention had four ambitious aims: 1.) to promulgate legally 
binding standards governing adoption across international borders; 2.) to establish a 
system of supervision of those standards; 3.) to create channels of communication 
between authorities in both sending and receiving countries; and 4.) to cultivate a 
working relationship among the authorities involved.1132 As Richard Carlson describes, 
it was “receiving nations such as the United States [that] tended to be the most eager 
to endorse intercountry adoption and facilitate the adoption process.”1133 The United 
States, which at the time accounted for approximately one-third of all intercountry 
adoptions, lobbied extensively for a pro-receiving-state agreement.1134 U.S. 
representatives thus resisted efforts by the Special Commission at the Hague to 
mollify sending countries in early drafts with the borrowing of language from a prior 
United Nations Resolution declaring an absolute preference for placement in a child’s 
birth country.1135 Ratification by the PRC, a participating member of the Hague 
Conference, was thus not inevitable.  
Future research likely shows, however, that China’s ultimate ratification can be 
                                                
1132 See Bethany G. Parsons, Intercountry Adoption: China’s New Laws Under the 
1993 Hague Convention, 15 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 63, 74 (2009).  
1133 See Richard Carlson, The Emerging Law of Intercountry Adoptions: An Analysis 
of the Hague Conference on Intercountry Adoption, 30 TULSA L.J. 243, 256 (1994).  
1134 See id. at 263. 
1135 See id. at 259–69; see also Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to 
the Protection and Welfare of Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement 
and Adoption Nationally and Internationally, G.A. Res. 41/85, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess. 
(1986), Arts. 13–24; Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. 
GAOR, 61st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. a/44/25 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1148 (1989), 
Arts. 20–21. 
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explained by the two-tailed model of diffusion. Tellingly, the final version of the 
convention, which ultimately favors the interests of receiving countries,1136 obligated 
the PRC to an international regime that concerned a novel and unfamiliar area of 
private law.1137 Indeed, adoptions that did occur China in prior to the Hague 
Convention occurred largely in a legal vacuum. Traditionally, codified law in China 
prohibited all adoptions outside of surname lines and permitted adoption only for the 
purpose of providing an heir.1138 Formal adoption of foundlings, moreover, was both 
technically illegal and uncommon.1139 Efforts to change China’s adoption laws through 
the convention, however, proved largely successful. Prior to the Hague Convention, 
the PRC did not officially recognize intercountry adoption as a viable solution to 
parentless children.1140 Officials in Beijing instead took the position that the Chinese 
government itself should take care of its children.1141 In the period since its 
participation in the Convention, however, the PRC rose from being the country with 
the lowest number of reported intercountry adoptions of any sending state to the 
                                                
1136 See Carlson, The Emerging Law of Intercountry Adoptions, at 292. 
1137 See Nili Luo & David Smolin, Intercountry Adoption and China: Emerging 
Questions and Developing Chinese Perspectives, 35 CUMB. L. REV. 597, 602 (2004); 
Curtis Kleem, Airplane Trips and Organ Banks: Random Events and the Hague 
Convention on Intercountry Adoptions, 28 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 319, 320–21 
(2000). 
1138 See Kay Johnson, Huang Banghan, & Wang Liyao, Infant Abandonment and 
Adoption in China, 24 POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 469, 483 (1998); 
Jihong Liu,Ulla Larsen, & Grace Wyshak, Factors Affecting Adoption in China, 1950–
87, 58 POPULATION STUDIES 21, 22 (2004).  
1139 See Johnson, Huang, & Wang, Infant Abandonment and Adoption in China, at 
470; see also Nancy Riley, American Adoptions of Chinese Girls: The Socio-political 
Matrices of Individual Decisions, 20 WOMEN’S STUDIES INTERNATIONAL FORUM 87 
(1997); Anne Thurston, In a Chinese Orphanage, 27 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 28 (1996); 
and DEATH BY DEFAULT: A POLICY OF FATAL NEGLECT IN CHINA’S STATE 
ORPHANAGES (Human Rights Watch eds., 1995). 
1140 See Crystal J. Gates, China’s Newly Enacted Intercountry Adoption Law: Friend 
or Foe, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 369, 385 (1999). 
1141 See Luo & Smolin, Intercountry Adoption and China: Emerging Questions and 
Developing Chinese Perspectives, at 602. 
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United States, to the largest sending state in the world.1142 (See figure 7.1) Moreover, 
around the time of the Conference, advocates succeeded in convincing the National 
People’s Congress to pass its first Adoption Law, which in its first iteration went so 
far as to treat foreigners the same as any Chinese citizen wishing to adopt.1143 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Intercountry Adoptions in the PRC 
To say foreign legal advocates succeeded in shaping the construction of 
China’s adoption law is not to say China’s legal reform was not strategic. Indeed, the 
success in reforming China’s laws governing adoption may have been due not to the 
normative persuasion of transnational advocates but rather the strategic need of the 
Chinese state to deal with the mounting problems associated with caring for parentless 
children. Nonetheless, the two-tailed model of diffusion suggests opponents to the 
terms ultimately agreed to by PRC representatives at the Hague Convention lacked the 
discursive tools necessary to construct a timely, coherent rebuttal to the proposed 
                                                
1142 See Office of Children Issues, U.S. Department of State, available at: 
http://adoption.state.gov/news/notices.html.  
1143 See Kleem, Airplane Trips and Organ Banks: Random Events and the Hague 
Convention on Intercountry Adoptions, at 321.  
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agreement. A preliminary survey of Chinese language publications concerning law 
and politics reveals that the discussion of laws governing adoption was very limited in 
the years prior to the Hague Convention.1144 Indeed, less than one percent of articles 
related to law included extensive discussions of adoption law.1145 Since the adoption of 
the Convention governing intercountry adoption, the proportion of legal articles 
concerning adoption law (收养法) has increased by more than two-hundred percent. 
This disparity between the level of discussion before and after the Hague Convention 
suggests domestic opponents, initially ill-equipped to raise discursive challenges to the 
proposed legal reforms have, over the course of time, acquired the tools necessary to 
raise such challenges. China’s subsequent restrictions on persons eligible for 
intercountry adoption and the decline in rank as a sending state further suggest such 
opposition has developed a successful discursive framing to counter China’s 
participation in the Convention. 
As anticipated by the two-tailed model, an initial study of the negotiation of 
the Hague Convention suggests the ability of transnational legal advocates to draw 
additional support for the treaty proved less successful among countries within which 
adoption was already a more salient point of concern at the domestic level. More 
specifically, the final list of countries that ratified the agreement governing 
intercountry adoption reveals less support for the Hague Convention among 
predominantly Muslim states. As explained in an explanatory report prepared by staff 
of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, negotiations regarding the 
Convention met some of its stiffest resistance from such states because Islam 
                                                
1144 As in Chapters 3 and 4, the following survey of publications was conducting using 
the China Academic Journals database. 
1145 Articles with thorough discussions of death penalty procedures, a more contested 
point of concern among Chinese legal scholars, outnumbered adoption law more than 
forty-four to one.  
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expressly prohibits legal adoption.1146 Islamic law expressly provides that the legal 
parentage of a child cannot be modified and so adoption is forbidden. Opponents of 
the Hague Convention in these countries were thus able to readily invoke discourse 
from the Koran explaining their position.1147 Although comprising less than ten percent 
of the countries that participated in the negotiation of the treaty, predominantly 
Muslim countries accounted for roughly forty percent of the non-signatory 
participants.1148  
b. Discourse and Diffusion Over Time 
In addition to extending the examination of the relationship between discourse 
and diffusion to another level of analysis—i.e. international law—it is also worth 
extending the analysis over time to examine the dynamics of discourse employed by 
domestic supporters and opponents after a law has been successfully diffused to a 
target state. Such a consideration of the temporal effects of legal development would 
address several concerns. Firstly, the study of how a law is ultimately implemented by 
a state would provide useful detail for the broad theoretical outline described by 
Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink wherein reluctant state actors become ensnared 
within a transnational discursive spiral, positioned uncomfortably between: a.) legal 
reforms they strategically adopted with no intention to implement; and b.) the 
domestic advocates eager to appeal to those legal reforms.1149 The two-tailed model of 
diffusion presented above applies merely to the antecedent adoption of the law, 
wherein a reform is adopted because reluctant state actors or domestic opposition 
                                                
1146 See G. Parra-Aranguren, Explanatory Report on the Convention on Protection of 
Children and Co-Operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (n.d.).  
1147 See Surat ul Ahzab 33:4-5 (revealing the position of the Prophet Muhammad that 
“nor has He made those whom you assert to be your sons your real sons.”). 
1148 Five of the thirteen countries that participated in the Hague Conference but did not 
ratify the Convention were predominantly Muslim states—Egypt, Indonesia, Lebanon, 
Malaysia, and Senegal. 
1149 Risse & Sikkink (1999), at 11. 
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groups lack an extant discourse to oppose a proposed legal reform. The model can thus 
be improved by a closer examination of the discursive exchanges that occur after a law 
is adopted strategically by a state actor. 
In addition to shedding light on how domestic supporters use imported legal 
discourse to ensnare reluctant state actors after the adoption of foreign legal norms, an 
extension of the study over time will also shed light on how domestic opponents, 
initially lacking the discursive vocabulary to oppose a legal norm, can reframe a 
debate to fit an existing discursive framework in an effort to have the imported legal 
norm repealed, revised, or reduced. Such an examination of how conservative 
elements of society adapt to the novel framing of transnationally engaged advocates 
may help explain South Africa’s shift away from its progressive jurisprudence aiming 
to develop substantive socio-economic equality in post-apartheid South Africa toward 
a more conservative formal equality jurisprudence.1150 That is, it can shed light on how 
opponents of South Africa’s more progressive decisions were able to return the 
discourse back to the perennial tension in South Africa between libertarianism and 
liberationism after some initial gains by human rights advocates. 
An initial study of the development of China’s adoption law over time further 
reveals the value of such a study. In the wake of China’s adoption of the Hague 
Convention on Intercountry Adoption, opponents of the agreement have since 
managed to see China’s commitments under the agreement narrowed considerably 
through a successful reframing of issue. Such reforms include the introduction of 
limitations on single-parent and non-married adoption, a restriction pushed for in part 
by opponents concerned by the number of gay and lesbian individuals adopting under 
the policy.1151 This retrenchment of China’s adoption policy mirrors a similar process 
                                                
1150 Interview, 8/17/2010. 
1151 See Luo & Smolin (2004), at 607; Office of Children Issues, U.S. State 
Department, International Adoption in China, available at: http:// travel.state.gov/ 
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observed in Andrew Mertha’s study of domestic opposition to China’s hydropower 
policy. As he notes, variation in the ability of opponents to affect change related to the 
ability (and inability) of those actors to find a salient issue frame, such as when 
opponents affected by the government’s hydropower policy successfully appealed to 
salient notions of “cultural heritage.”1152 Moreover, it mirrors similar retrenchment in 
other sending countries such as Brazil, a country which likewise adopted conservative 
policies following a media reframing of the issue.1153 
Finally, the extension of the study over time will shed further light on the 
manner by which points of concern are themselves ultimately reformed. While the 
two-tailed model currently offers useful insights on how novel legal reforms and 
challenges to entrenched practices can counterintuitively diffuse relatively quickly 
through the international system, and why so-called points of concern prove more 
difficult for transnational actors to influence, it does not uncover the processes by 
which those points of concern ultimately do change. An initial look at the dynamics by 
which such reforms ultimately do come about suggests such reforms do relate to 
sustained transnational pressure, but also to exogenous triggering events in the target 
state that pose challenges to a particular discursive frame. In the Chinese case, for 
example, recent years have witnessed gradual changes to several points of concern, 
including detention policy,1154 procedures governing the review of death sentences,1155 
                                                                                                                                       
adoption_china.html (quoting the China Center for Adoption Affairs declaration that 
“[a]doption applications from homosexual families are not acceptable.”).  
1152 See Andrew Mertha (2009), at 1005. 
1153 See Claudia Fonseca, Transnational Influences in the Social Production of 
Adoptable Children, 26 INT’L J. OF SOC. & SOC. POL’Y 154 (2006), at 158. 
1154 See Keith Hand, “Using the Law for a Righteous Purpose: The Sun Zhigang 
Incident and Evolving Forms of Citizen Action in the People's Republic of China,” 45 
COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 1, 114 (2006). 
1155 See 最高人民法院关于复核死刑案件若干问题的规定, available at: 
http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=106249. 
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and exclusionary rules concerning evidence unlawfully obtained.1156 Each of these 
incremental reforms has occurred after the eruption of domestic disapproval in the 
wake of administrative and judicial abuses that introduced compelling empirical 
evidence into the discursive exchange regarding the policies. In the case of 
administrative detention, for example, it is worth noting that although China’s 
detention practices remain largely in effect, the death of internal migrant worker Sun 
Zhigang as a result of torture while held in administrative detention sparked an 
unprecedented citizen-led legal challenge that ultimately brought about a dissolution 
of China’s “custody and repatriation” laws.1157 The gradual reform of rules concerning 
the administration of capital punishment and laws of evidence has been similarly 
motivated by popular reactions to exposed abuses by the state,1158 including a series of 
wrongful convictions that resulted in harsh punishments—including the death 
penalty—such as the She Xianglin case, the Zhang Xinliang case, and the Sun 
Wangang case.1159 These triggering events provide compelling evidence for legal 
advocates engaged in a discursive exchange with opponents to reform, enabling them 
to overcome domestic resistance to a proposed legal change. An extension of the two-
tailed model to the implementation phase of legal development would thus further our 
understanding of how legal development ultimately does occur between the two tails. 
That is, it will shed light on how sustained transnational and domestic legal pressure, 
thwarted by extant opposing discourse, can succeed in the presence of episodic 
catalysts.  
 
                                                
1156 关于办理死刑案件审查判断证据若干问题的规定, available at: 
http://baike.baidu.com/view/3691408.html.   
1157 See Hand (2006). 
1158 Interview, 9/10/2010. 
1159 赵作海案中案警方曾拒认尸, 新京报 (June 4, 2010), available at: 
http://epaper.bjnews.com.cn/images/2010-06/04/A17/A17604C.pdf.  
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c. Possible Limitations 
While an initial inquiry suggests that the two-tailed model of diffusion may 
yield useful insights into the development of international treaties or the development 
of legal reform over time, the model developed in the chapters above may be 
conditional. That is, the model may be limited by the fact that proposed laws vary not 
only in terms of their attendant discourse, they vary also by the type of interests 
implicated by any proposed reform. This consideration is likely to be especially salient 
in the domain of contemporary Chinese economic and commercial law, a field of law 
with a rich discourse derived from socialist thought. A useful example of this is the 
recently promulgated Property Law, which did much to propel China’s economic legal 
framework towards a more capitalist model and away from its longstanding property 
relationships rooted in a socialist discourse. Indeed, the property law is described by 
many as “an important step away from communist collective ownership and towards a 
market economy.”1160   
To say economic laws may interact differently with extant domestic discourse 
is not to say discourse played no role in the ultimate content of the adopted reform. 
Rather, due to the central role of the concept of property in Marxist discourse, public 
opponents had a ready vocabulary from which to draw. As Andrew Mertha found in 
the debates surrounding the drafting of the new law, the active discourse surrounding 
the concept of property included at least three distinct and contested positions.1161 In 
total, as many as 181,000 citizens published online comments, including one 
especially influential letter from Beijing University professor Gong Xiantian. Drawing 
from traditional Marxist language on the role of the state in property relationships, 
Gong and his supporters effectively stalled the law for a year, forcing the NPC to 
                                                
1160 See China Passes New Law on Property, BBC News (Mar. 16, 2007). 
1161 See Andrew Mertha, From ‘Rustless Screws’ to ‘Nail Houses’: The Evolution of 
Property Rights in China, ORBIS 233 (2009), at 237. 
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remove the bill from its agenda and hold a series of symposia to investigate the 
legality of the law under the PRC Constitution. The influence of this band of so-called 
“New Left” scholars, while not enough to kill the bill, did compel the NPCSC 
chairman, Wu Bangguo, to release rare statements defending the constitutionality of 
the law and to note the subsequent amendments made to provide greater protections of 
state property. 
Another example of the possible importance commercial interests may play in 
the discursive process of legal reform is the most recent Labor Contract Law, 
announced in 2007. This law, like the Property Law reform, was the product of a 
lengthy internal contest within the CCP and generated as many as thirteen internal 
drafts before being released for public comment in 2006.1162 Once available for public 
comment, the draft received nearly 200,000 comments in the course of one month.1163 
Despite these similarities, in contrast to the Property Law, which constituted a 
considerable step toward a capitalist ordering of Chinese society and failed to address 
many of the concerns of China’s 780 million farmers, the final version of the Labor 
Contract Law is viewed as largely pro-worker and rooted in an anti-capitalist, socialist 
discourse, “the unanimous verdict” being that the law dramatically increases labor 
costs and elevates the rights of workers.1164 By its employee-friendly requirements—
which include open-ended rather than fixed contracts, severance pay, and limitations 
on restrictive covenants, which would otherwise allow companies to prevent 
employees from quitting and immediately taking employment with a competitor1165—it 
is considered by some as “hostile”1166 to foreign investors and domestic business alike, 
                                                
1162 See The New Labor Contract Law, 34 THE CHINA BUSINESS REVIEW 42 (2007). 
1163 See Wang (2008). 
1164 See China Regulations: New Labor Law, EIU, July 5, 2007. 
1165 See Lesli Ligorner, The Human Face of M&A Deals, 34 THE CHINA BUSINESS 
REVIEW 24 (2007). 
1166 See Liana Cafalla, The Costs of China’s Labour, 14 CHINA STAFF 8 (2008). 
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and a significant step back to the “iron rice bowl” era of the Maoist period of Chinese 
political economy.1167 Unlike in the case of the Property Law, the Labor Contract Law 
appears more effectively influenced by domestic opponents who convincingly 
employed socialist discourse supportive of labor. As several foreign labor lawyers in 
China have observed, the comments on the draft of the law released to the public had a 
“huge effect”1168 on the final product and were “revolutionary” in their tone. This 
public campaign in effect left “management...squeezed out of its autonomy in how to 
run a business.”1169 
 
III. Conclusion 
This dissertation introduces a new model of norm diffusion that hopefully 
offers useful observations for political scientists, legal advocates, and scholars of law. 
For the former, it presents novel methodologies and conducts innovative tests of 
various explanations of diffusion. Together, these two elements offer a novel 
discourse-based model of legal diffusion in the international system. Moreover, it 
meets the challenges posed by any attempt to understand the role of norms in political 
behavior by applying pioneering software such as Yoshikoder and Wordscore to the 
discursive practices of legal actors. These software tools provide new ways to examine 
how states acquire new interests or abandon long-held beliefs in the absence of or in 
opposition to clear material incentives to behave otherwise. This study, I hope, 
furthers the understanding in political science of how ideas spread. For legal advocates 
and observers of global human rights protections, it also helps anticipate instances 
                                                
1167 See Union of the State: China’s New Labour Law, 385 The Economist (Dec. 8, 
2007), at 67. 
1168 See Andrew Batson and Mei Fong, China Toils over New Labor Law, WALL 
STREET JOURNAL (May 7, 2007). 
1169 See China: New Labour Law Increases Employee Rights and Gives Party 
Influence over FIEs, ASIALAW (Sep. 2007), at 1. 
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under which foreign advocacy succeeds. This insight, I hope, offers helpful insights 
into what campaigns might succeed and how the discursive framing of such 
campaigns can contribute to their success. Finally, for scholars of law, this study 
demonstrates how methodological eclecticism can serve to join legal scholarship with 
political science. Through its rigorous review of texts intimately familiar to legal 
scholars (law journals and case law), I hope this study stands as a example of how 
legal scholars can generate valuable contributions to political science from material 
that, on its own, has been of limited interest to political scientists. 
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APPENDIX 
 
CHINESE JOURNALS SELECTED FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS 
 
 The following national, regional, and institutional journals comprise the 
universe of publications included in the full sample of journals published in the China 
Academic Journal database that concern issues related to law, public security, military 
affairs, and politics. Together, these journals supply a broad range of institutional 
positions, including executive and legislative publications, judicial publications, CCP 
publications, and non-governmental publications. Moreover, the consist of journals 
from twenty-nine of China’s thirty-one provinces, municipalities, and autonomous 
regions. 
 
Chinese Title: 八桂侨刊 
English Title: Overseas Chinese Journal 
of Bagui 
1987 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 北京党史 
English Title: History of the CCP 
in Beijing 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 北京观察 
English Title: Beijing Observation 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 北京人民警察学院学报 
English Title: Journal of Beijing People＇s Police 
College 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 北京政法职业学院学报 
English Title: Journal of Beijing College of Politics 
and Law 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 比较法研究 
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English Title: Journal of Comparative Law 
1987 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 兵团党校学报 
English Title: Journal of the Party School of XPCC 
of C.P.C 
1994 -2008 
 
Chinese Title: 兵团工运 
English Title: Military Labor Movement 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 长江论坛 
English Title: Yangtze Tribune 
1984 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 长白学刊 
English Title: Changbai Journal 
1985 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 重庆市人民政府公报 
English Title: Gazette of Chongqing Municipal 
People’s Government 
1950 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 传承 
English Title: Inheritance & Innovtion 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 创造 
English Title: Creation 
1958 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 春秋 
English Title: Chunqiu Birmonthly 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 楚天主人 
English Title: Chutian Zhuren 
1995 – 2008 
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Chinese Title: 大连干部学刊 
English Title: Journal of Dalian Official 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 党建研究 
English Title: Party Development 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 当代法学 
English Title: Contemporary Law Review 
1987 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 当代海军 
English Title: Modern Navy 
1994 – 2007 
 
Chinese Title: 当代青年研究 
English Title: Contemporary Youth Research 
1983 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 当代世界 
English Title: The Contemporary World 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 当代世界社会主义问题 
English Title: Issues of Contemporary World 
Socialism 
1983 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 当代世界与社会主义 
English Title: Contemporary World & Socialism 
1981 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 当代思潮 
English Title: Present Ideological Trends 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 当代亚太 
English Title: Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies 
1992 - 2008 
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Chinese Title: 党的建设 
English Title: Party Development 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 党的生活 
English Title: Party Life 
1979 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 党的文献 
English Title: Literature of Chinese Communist 
Party 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 党风与廉政 
English Title: Honest Party 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 党建 
English Title: Party Building 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 党建与人才 
English Title: Party Building and Talent 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 东南亚研究 
English Title: Southeast Asian Studies 
1957 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 东南亚纵横 
English Title: Around Southeast Asia 
1980 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 党史博采(纪实) 
English Title: Extensive Collection of the Party 
History 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 党史研究与教学 
English Title: Party History Research & Teaching 
1979 - 2008 
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Chinese Title: 党史纵横 
English Title: Over the Party History 
1988 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 党史纵览 
English Title: Party History Overview 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 党政干部论坛 
English Title: Cadres Tribune 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 党政干部学刊 
English Title: Journal for Party and Administrative 
Cadres 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 党政论坛 
English Title: Party & Government Forum 
1985 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 党史博采(理论) 
English Title: Extensive Collection of The Party 
History 
1994 – 2005 
 
Chinese Title: 德国研究 
English Title: Deutschland-studien 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 地方政府管理 
English Title: Local Government Management 
1992 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 东北亚论坛 
English Title: Northeast Asia Forum 
1992 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 俄罗斯研究 
English Title: Russian Studies 
1983 - 2008 
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Chinese Title: 法律适用 
English Title: Journal of Law Application 
1986 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 法国研究 
English Title: Etudes Francaises 
1983 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 法律科学(西北政法大学学报) 
English Title: Science of Law (Journal of Northwest 
University of Political Science and Law) 
1983 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 法律与生活 
English Title: Law & Life 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 犯罪研究 
English Title: Criminal Research 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 法商研究 
English Title: Studies in Law and Business 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 法学 
English Title: Legal Science 
1982 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 法学论坛 
English Title: Legal Forum 
1986 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 法学评论 
English Title: Law Review 
1980 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 法学天地 
English Title: Jurisprudence Universe 
1994 - 2008 
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Chinese Title: 法学研究 
English Title: Chinese Journal of Law 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 法学杂志 
English Title: Law Science Magazine 
1980 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 法学家 
English Title: Jurists Review 
1986 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 发展论坛 
English Title: Development Tribune 
1994 - 2003 
 
Chinese Title: 法治论丛 
English Title: The Rule of Law Forum (Journal of 
Shanghai University of Political Science & Law) 
1989 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 法制现代化研究 
English Title: The Study on Legal System 
Modernization 
1995 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 法制与经济 
English Title: Legal & Economy 
1995 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 法制与社会发展 
English Title: Law and Social Development 
1995 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 福州党校学报 
English Title: Journal of the Party School of Fuzhou 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 福建党史月刊 
English Title: Fujian History Monthly 
1985 – 2008 
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Chinese Title: 福建理论学习 
English Title: Fujian Theoretical Study 
1997 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 福建省社会主义学院学报 
English Title: Journal of Fujian Institute of 
Socialism 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 妇女研究论丛 
English Title: Collection of Women's Studies 
1992 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 甘肃政报 
English Title: Gansu Administrative Reporter 
1950 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 甘肃政法学院学报 
English Title: Journal of Gansu Political Science and 
Law Institute 
1986 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 公安教育 
English Title: Police Education and Training 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 公安月刊 
English Title: Police Magazine 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 共产党人 
English Title: Communists 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 工会理论研究 
(上海工会管理职业学院学报) 
English Title: Labour Union Studies 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 广东公安科技 
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English Title: Guangdong Science & Technology of 
Security 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 广东青年干部学院学报 
English Title: Journal of Guangdong Youth Leaders 
College 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 广东行政学院学报 
English Title: Journal of Guangdong Institute of 
Public Administration 
1989 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 国防 
English Title: National Defense 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 广西青年干部学院学报 
English Title: Journal of Guangxi Youth Leaders 
College 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 广西社会主义学院学报 
English Title: Journal of Guangxi Institute of 
Socialism 
1996 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 广西政法管理干部学院学报 
English Title: Journal of Guangxi Administrative 
Cadre Institute of Politics and Law 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 广西壮族自治区人民政府公报 
English Title: Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region 
People's Government Gazette 
1985 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 广州政报 
English Title: Guangzhou Reporter 
1985 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 桂海论丛 
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English Title: Guihai Tribune 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 贵州警官职业学院学报 
English Title: Journal of Guizhou Police Officer 
Vocational College 
1988 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 贵州省人民政府公报 
English Title: Gazette of Guizhou Provincial 
People＇s Government 
1996 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 国际观察 
English Title: International Review 
1980 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 国际关系学院学报 
English Title: Journal of University of International 
Relations 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 国际问题研究 
English Title: International Studies 
1959 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title:国际展望 
English Title:World Outlook 
1981 - 2007 
 
Chinese Title: 国际政治研究 
English Title: International Politics Quarterly 
1980 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 国际资料信息 
English Title: International Data Information 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 国家检察官学院学报 
English Title: Journal of National Prosecutors 
College 
1993 – 2008 
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Chinese Title: 国外理论动态 
English Title: Foreign Theoretical Trends 
1993 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: International Understanding 
English Title: 国际交流(英文版) 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 海内与海外 
English Title:At Home & Overseas 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 河北法学 
English Title:  Hebei Law Science 
1983 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 黑龙江政报 
English Title: Heilongjiang Government Reporter 
1950 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 河南公安高等专科学校学报 
English Title: Journal of Henan Public Security 
Academy 
1991 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 河南省人民政府公报 
English Title: Gazette of the People＇s Government 
of Henan Province 
1950 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 河南省政法管理干部学院学报 
English Title: Journal of Henan Administrative 
Institute of Politics and Law 
1995 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 和平与发展 
English Title: Peace and Development 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 红旗文稿 
English Title: Red Flag Manuscript 
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1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 红岩春秋 
English Title: Annals of Red Rock 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 华东政法大学学报 
English Title: Journal of East China University of 
Political Science and Law 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 黄埔 
English Title: Huang Pu 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 环球法律评论 
English Title: Global Law Review 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 华人时刊 
English Title: Chinese Times 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 湖北省社会主义学院学报 
English Title: Journal of Hubei Institute of Socialism 
1997 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 湖南政报 
English Title: Hunan Government Reporter 
1949 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 湖湘论坛 
English Title: Huxiang Forum 
1990 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 检察风云 
English Title: Prosecutorial View 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 江苏警官学院学报 
English Title:Journal of Jiangsu Police Officer 
College 
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1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 江苏政协 
English Title: Political Consultative Conference of 
Jiangsu 
1996 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 吉林公安高等专科学校学报 
English Title: Journal of Jilin Public Security 
Academy 
1986 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 吉林人大 
English Title: Jilin People's Congress 
1997 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 吉林政报 
English Title: Gazette of the People＇s Government 
of Jilin Province 
1950 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 警察技术 
English Title: Police Technology 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 警察天地 
English Title: Police World 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 军事历史研究 
English Title: Military Historical Research 
1986 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 军队政工理论研究 
English Title: Theoretical Studies on PLA Political 
Work 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 军事经济学院学报 
English Title: Journal of Military Economics 
Academy 
1994 - 2008 
  337 
 
Chinese Title: 军事经济研究 
English Title: Military Economic Research 
1987 - 2008 
 
 
 
 
Chinese Title: 军事历史 
English Title: Military History 
1983 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 军事运筹与系统工程 
English Title: Military Operations Research and 
Systems Engineering 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title:刊授党校 
English Title:Party School Magazine 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 科技与法律 
English Title: Science-Technology and Law 
1991 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 科学社会主义 
English Title: Scientific Socialism 
1984 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 拉丁美洲研究 
English Title: Journal of Latin American Studies 
1986 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 两岸关系 
English Title: Cross-Strait Relations 
1997 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 廉政大视野 
English Title: Honest Governance 
1994 - 2003 
 
Chinese Title: 廉政瞭望 
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English Title: Honesty Outlook 
1995 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 瞭望 
English Title: Outlook 
1984 - 2008 
 
 
Chinese Title: 理论导刊 
English Title: Journal of Socialist Theory Guide 
1985 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 理论建设 
English Title: Theory Research 
1981 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 理论界 
English Title: Theory Horizon 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 理论前沿 
English Title: Theory Front 
1987 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title:理论视野 
English Title: Theoretical Horizon 
1993 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 理论探索 
English Title: Theoretical Exploration 
1984 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 理论探讨 
English Title: Theoretical Investigation 
1984 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 理论学刊 
English Title: Theory Journal 
1984 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 理论学习 
English Title: Theoretical Study 
1994 - 2008 
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Chinese Title: 理论学习与探索 
English Title: Theory Studying and Exploration 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 理论研究 
English Title: Theoretical Research 
1984 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 理论与当代 
English Title: Theory and Contemporary 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 理论与改革 
English Title: Theory and Reform 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 领导科学 
English Title: Leadership Science 
1985 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 领导文萃 
English Title: Leadership Culture Collection 
1993 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 领导之友 
English Title: The Friend of Leaders 
1985 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 岭南学刊 
English Title: Lingnan Journal 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title:律师世界 
English Title:Lawyer World 
1994 - 2003 
 
Chinese Title: 马克思主义研究 
English Title: Studies on Marxism 
1983 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 马克思主义与现实 
English Title: Marxism & Reality 
1990 - 2008 
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Chinese Title: 毛泽东邓小平理论研究 
English Title: Studies on Mao Zedong and Deng 
Xiaoping Theories 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 毛泽东思想论坛 
English Title: Mao Zedong Thought Forum 
1994 – 1997 
 
Chinese Title: 毛泽东思想研究 
English Title: Mao Zedong Thought Study 
1983 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 美国研究 
English Title: American Studies Quarterly 
1987 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 民主 
English Title: Democracy Monthly 
1996 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 民主与科学 
English Title: Democracy & Science 
1989 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 南风窗 
English Title: South Wind Window 
1985 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 南京政治学院学报 
English Title: Journal of PLA Nanjing Institute of 
Politics 
1987 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 南亚研究季刊 
English Title: South Asian Studies Quarterly 
1985 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 南洋问题研究 
English Title:Southeast Asian Affairs 
1974 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 南洋资料译丛 
English Title: Southeast Asian Studies 
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1957 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 欧洲研究 
English Title: Chinese Journal of European Studies 
1994 – 2008 
 
 
 
Chinese Title: 攀登 
English Title: Ascent 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 前进 
English Title: Advance 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 前进论坛 
English Title: Forum For Advancement 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 前线 
English Title: Frontline 
1958 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 侨园 
English Title: China Overseas 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 青少年犯罪问题 
English Title: Issues on Juvenile Crimes and 
Delinquency 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 青年探索 
English Title: Youth Studies 
1983 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 青少年研究(山东省团校学报) 
English Title: Youth & Juvenile Research 
1993 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 求实 
English Title: Truth Seeking 
1980 – 2008 
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Chinese Title: 求是 
English Title: Qiushi 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 群众 
English Title: Masses 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title:群言 
English Title:Popular Tribune 
1986 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 人民检察 
English Title: People’s Procuratorial Semimonthly 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 人大建设 
English Title: National People's Congress 
Development 
1996 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 人大研究 
English Title: People's Congress Studying 
1992 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 人民公安 
English Title: People's Police 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 人民论坛 
English Title: People's Tribune 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 人民司法 
English Title: People's Judicature 
1958 – 2007 
 
Chinese Title: 人民调解 
English Title: People's Mediations 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 人民之声 
English Title: People's Voice 
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1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 日本问题研究 
English Title: Japanese Study 
1994 – 2008 
 
 
 
Chinese Title: 日本学刊 
English Title: Japanese Studies 
1985 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 日本研究 
English Title: Japan Studies 
1985 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 山西政报 
English Title: Shanxi Government Reporter 
1950 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 山东警察学院学报 
English Title: Journal of Shandong Police College 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 山东审判 
English Title: Shandong Justice 
1995 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 山东政报 
English Title: Shandong Government Reporter 
1949 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 上海党史与党建 
English Title: Shanghai History and Party Building 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 上海公安高等专科学校学报 
English Title: Journal of Shanghai Police College 
1997 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 
上海市人民代表大会常务委员会公报 
English Title: Shanghai Municipal People's 
Congress Standing Committee Bulletin 
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1987 – 2007 
 
Chinese Title: 山西警官高等专科学校学报 
English Title: Journal of Shanxi Police Academy 
1993 - 2008 
 
 
 
Chinese Title: 陕西社会主义学院学报 
English Title: Journal of Shaanxi Institute of 
Socialism 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 陕西省人民政府公报 
English Title: Shaanxi Provincial People's 
Government Gazette 
1950 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 社会主义研究 
English Title: Socialism Studies 
1979 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 时代潮 
English Title: Chinese Times 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 世纪桥 
English Title: Bridge of Century 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 实践(思想理论版) 
English Title: Practice (Ideological and Theoretical 
Edition) 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 世界知识 
English Title: World Affairs 
1932 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 世纪行 
English Title: Cross Century 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 实事求是 
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English Title: Seek Truth From Facts 
1978 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 疏导 
English Title: Persuasion 
1994 – 2008 
 
 
Chinese Title: 四川党的建设城市版 
English Title: Sichuan CCP Urban Development 
Edition 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 四川党史 
English Title: History of CCP in Sichuan 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 四川省社会主义学院学报 
English Title: Journal of Sichuan Provincial Institute 
of Socialism 
1996 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 四川政报 
English Title: Sichuan Government Reporter 
1985 – 2003 
 
Chinese Title: 思想工作 
English Title: Ideological Work 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 思想战线 
English Title: Thinking 
1975 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 思想政治工作研究 
English Title: Ideological and Political Work 
Research 
1983 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 太平洋学报 
English Title: Pacific Journal 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 台声 
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English Title: Tai Sheng 
1993 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 台湾研究 
English Title: Taiwan Studies 
1983 – 2008 
 
 
Chinese Title: 台湾研究集刊 
English Title: Taiwan Research Quarterly 
1983 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 探求 
English Title: Academic Search for Truth and 
Reality 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 探索 
English Title: Probe 
1985 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 探索与求是 
English Title: Exploration and Seeking Truth 
1994 – 2003 
 
Chinese Title: 特区实践与理论 
English Title: Practice and Theory of Sezs 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 天津市工会管理干部学院学报 
English Title: Journal of Tianjin Trade Union 
Administrators’ College 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 统一论坛 
English Title: Reunification Forum 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 团结 
English Title: Unity 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 外国问题研究 
English Title: Journal of Foreign Studies 
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1978 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 外交评论(外交学院学报) 
English Title: Foreign Affairs Review 
1984 – 2008 
 
 
 
Chinese Title: 唯实 
English Title: Reality Only 
1982 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 文明与宣传 
English Title: Market Economic Journal 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 武大国际法评论 
English Title: International Law Review of Wuhan 
University 
1974 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 武钢政工 
English Title: Wisco Ideology & Politics 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 武警工程学院学报 
English Title: Journal of Engineering College of 
Armed Police Force 
1994 – 2007 
 
Chinese Title: 武警学院学报 
English Title: Journal of Chinese People＇s Armed 
Police Force Academy 
1994 – 208 
 
Chinese Title: 现代国际关系(英文版) 
English Title: Contemporary International Relations 
1992 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 现代法学 
English Title: Modern Law Science 
1988 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 现代妇女 
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English Title: Modern Women 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 现代国际关系 
English Title: Contemporary International Relations 
1981 – 2008 
 
 
Chinese Title: 现代军事 
English Title: Modern Military Affairs 
1994 – 2007 
 
Chinese Title: 先锋队 
English Title: Vanguard 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 湘潮 
English Title: Monthly Magazine 
1984 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 新长征 
English Title: The New Long March 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 新视野 
English Title: Expanding Horizons 
1985 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 西南民兵杂志 
English Title: Journal of the Southwest Militia 
1994 – 2007 
 
Chinese Title: 新法规月刊 
English Title: New Law and Reglations Monthly 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 行政论坛 
English Title: Administrative Tribune 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 刑事技术 
English Title: Forensic Science and Technology 
1993 – 2008 
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Chinese Title: 行政法学研究 
English Title: Administrative Law Review 
1993 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 行政与法 
English Title: Public Administration & Law 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 新疆警官高等专科学校学报 
English Title: Journal of Xinjiang Police Officers＇ 
Academy 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 新疆人大(汉文) 
English Title: Xinjiang People's Congress 
1995 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 新湘评论 
English Title: Xin-Xiang comment 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 西亚非洲 
English Title: West Asia and Africa 
1980 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 学习论坛 
English Title: Tribune of Study 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 学习月刊 
English Title: Study Monthly 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 学校党建与思想教育 
English Title: School Party and Ideological 
Education 
1985 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 友声 (英文版) 
English Title: Voice of Friendship 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 亚非纵横 
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English Title: Asia & Africa Review 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 延边党校学报 
English Title: Journal of Yanbian Party School 
1994 – 2008 
 
 
 
Chinese Title: 云南大学学报(法学版) 
English Title: Journal of Yunnan University(Law 
Edition) 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 云南警官学院学报 
English Title: Journal of Yunnan Police Officer 
Academy 
1997 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 云南政报 
English Title: Yunnan Government Reporter 
1950 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中国妇女(英文版) 
English Title: Women of China 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 浙江工商大学学报 
English Title: Journal of Zhejiang Gongshang 
University 
1992 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 政法论丛 
English Title: Journal of Political Science and Law 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 政法论坛 
English Title: Tribune of Political Science and Law 
1985 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 政法学刊 
English Title: Journal of Political Science and Law 
1984 – 2008 
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Chinese Title: 政府法制 
English Title: Government Legality 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 证据科学 
English Title: Evidence Science 
1994 – 2008 
 
 
Chinese Title: 正气 
English Title: Healthy Atmosphere 
1996 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 政治与法律 
English Title: Political Science and Law 
1982 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 政治学研究 
English Title: Cass Journal of Political Science 
1985 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 郑州市人民政府公报 
English Title: Gazette of Zhengzhou Municipal 
People’s Government 
1985 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 真理的追求 
English Title: Pursuing the Truth 
1994 – 2001 
 
Chinese Title: 知识产权 
English Title: Intellectual Property 
1991 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中共福建省委党校学报 
English Title: Journal of Fujian Provincial 
Committee Party School of CPC 
1989 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中共贵州省委党校学报 
English Title: Journal of Guizhou Provincial 
Committee Party’s School of C.P.C 
1994 – 2008 
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Chinese Title: 中共宁波市委党校学报 
English Title: Journal of the Party School of Cpc 
Ningbo Municipal Committee 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中共山西省委党校学报 
English Title: Academic Journal of Shanxi 
Provincial Committee Party School of C.P.C 
1978 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中共四川省委省级机关党校学报 
English Title: Journal of the Party School of 
Province-level of Sichuan Province Committee of 
CCP 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中共天津市委党校学报 
English Title: Journal of the party School of Tianjin 
Committee of the CPC 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中共乌鲁木齐市委党校学报 
English Title: Journal of the Party School of CPC 
Urumqi Municipal Committee 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中共浙江省委党校学报 
English Title: Journal of Zhejiang Provincial Party 
School 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中共中央党校学报 
English Title: Journal of the Party School of the 
Central Committee of the C.P.C 
1997 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中国保安 
English Title: China Security Service 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中国残疾人 
English Title: Disability in China 
1994 – 2008 
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Chinese Title: 中国党政干部论坛 
English Title: Chinese Cadres Tribune 
1988 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中国法学 
English Title: China Legal Science 
1984 – 2008 
 
 
Chinese Title: 中国法医学杂志 
English Title:Chinese Journal of Forensic Medicine 
1986 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中国妇运 
English Title: Chinese Women's Movement 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中国工会财会 
English Title: Trade Union Financial Affairs of 
China 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中国公务员 
English Title: Chinese Public Servant 
1994 – 2003 
 
Chinese Title: 中国工运 
English Title: Chinese Workers' Movement 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中国国防科技信息 
English Title: China's National Defense Science and 
Technology News 
1994 – 1998 
 
Chinese Title: 中国海商法年刊 
English Title: Annual of China Maritime Law 
1990 – 2007 
 
Chinese Title: 中国监察 
English Title: Supervision in China 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中国机关后勤 
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English Title: Chinese Authorities Logistics 
1996 – 2003 
 
Chinese Title: 中国劳动关系学院学报 
English Title: Journal of China Institute of Industrial 
Relations 
1987 – 2008 
 
 
Chinese Title: 中国律师 
English Title: Chinese Lawyer 
1994 - 2007 
 
Chinese Title: 中国民兵 
English Title: Chinese Militia 
1984 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中国民政 
English Title: China Civil Affairs 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中国女性(中文海外版) 
English Title: Women of China 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中国青年研究 
English Title: China Youth Study 
1989 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中国青年政治学院学报 
English Title: Journal of China Youth University for 
Political Sciences 
1982 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中国人大 
English Title: China's National People's Congress 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中国人民公安大学学报 
(社会科学版) 
English Title: Journal of Chinese People’s Public 
Security University (Social Sciences Edition) 
1985 – 2008 
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Chinese Title: 中国司法 
English Title: Justice of China 
1997 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中国特色社会主义研究 
English Title: Studies on the Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics 
1995 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中国统一战线 
English Title: China's United Front 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中国卫生法制 
English Title: China Health Law 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中国刑事警察 
English Title: China Criminal Police 
1994 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中华人民共和国国务院公报 
English Title: Gazette of the State Council of the 
People＇s Republic of China 
1954 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中华女子学院学报 
English Title: Journal of China Women’s University 
1989 – 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中华人民共和国最高人民法院公报 
English Title: Gazette of the Supreme People＇s 
Court of the People’s Republic of China 
1985 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中外法学 
English Title: Peking University Law Journal 
1994 - 2008 
 
Chinese Title: 中央社会主义学院学报 
English Title: Journal of the Central Institute of 
Socialism 
1988 – 2008 
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Chinese Title: 中央政法管理干部学院学报 
English Title: Journal of Central Leadership Institute 
of Politics and Law 
1994 - 2001 
 
Chinese Title: 中州统战 
English Title: The United Front of Henan 
1994 – 2003 
 
Chinese Title: 组织人事学研究 
English Title: Organization and Personnel 
Management Studies 
1994 - 2003 
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